- About
- Events
- Calendar
- Graduation Information
- Cornell Learning Machines Seminar
- Student Colloquium
- BOOM
- Spring 2025 Colloquium
- Conway-Walker Lecture Series
- Salton 2024 Lecture Series
- Seminars / Lectures
- Big Red Hacks
- Cornell University / Cornell Tech - High School Programming Workshop and Contest 2025
- Game Design Initiative
- CSMore: The Rising Sophomore Summer Program in Computer Science
- Explore CS Research
- ACSU Research Night
- Cornell Junior Theorists' Workshop 2024
- People
- Courses
- Research
- Undergraduate
- M Eng
- MS
- PhD
- Admissions
- Current Students
- Computer Science Graduate Office Hours
- Advising Guide for Research Students
- Business Card Policy
- Cornell Tech
- Curricular Practical Training
- A & B Exam Scheduling Guidelines
- Fellowship Opportunities
- Field of Computer Science Ph.D. Student Handbook
- Graduate TA Handbook
- Field A Exam Summary Form
- Graduate School Forms
- Instructor / TA Application
- Ph.D. Requirements
- Ph.D. Student Financial Support
- Special Committee Selection
- Travel Funding Opportunities
- Travel Reimbursement Guide
- The Outside Minor Requirement
- Robotics Ph. D. prgram
- Diversity and Inclusion
- Graduation Information
- CS Graduate Minor
- Outreach Opportunities
- Parental Accommodation Policy
- Special Masters
- Student Spotlights
- Contact PhD Office
(joint w/ David Delacrétaz & Scott Duke Kominers)
Abstract: Over 100,000 refugees are permanently resettled from refugee camps to hosting countries every year. Nevertheless, refugee resettlement processes in most countries are ad hoc, accounting for neither the priorities of hosting communities nor the preferences of refugees themselves. Building on models from two-sided matching theory, we introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional constraints that models refugee families' needs for multiple units of different services, as well as the service capacities of local areas. We propose several refugee resettlement mechanisms that can be used by hosting countries under various institutional and informational constraints. Our mechanisms can improve match efficiency, incentivize refugees to report where they would like to settle, and respect priorities of local areas thereby encouraging them to accept more refugees overall. Beyond the refugee resettlement context, our model has applications ranging from the allocation of daycare slots to the incorporation of complex diversity constraints in public school assignment.
**Papers, if available, will be in 402 Uris Hall on Thursday, September 13, and also at the Dept. of Economics Website: http://www.economics.cornell.edu/seminars