strong security
strong consistency
open and decentralized
Fabric architecture

Fabric is a high-level programming language for building open distributed applications with strong security. Fabric enables securely computing and storing information, and sharing code and data across trust boundaries. It is being developed by the Applied Programming Languages Group at Cornell University.

Fabric presents a single-system image of all resources that can be named by it, making programming easy. It is a decentralized system with no central security enforcement mechanism, yet it provides security guarantees to mutually distrusting users. The key to strong, compositional information security guarantees is the use of information flow control.

Fabric's programming language, based on Jif, controls the placement of computation and data through type annotations that set policies for information security. Using information flow control, Fabric also makes mobile code secure. Strong consistency is ensured through a hierarchical two-phase commit protocol that respects information security. Fabric also leverages peer-to-peer replication to provide high availability.

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Releases

In addition to the downloads below, the full history of Fabric releases is also available on GitHub:

Current release

Fabric 0.3.0 (June 2016) includes support for object partitioning and has several bug fixes. See the ChangeLog for details.

Previous releases and branches

There is a branch of 0.2.2 that incorporates support for state warranties, as described in our NSDI 2014 paper.

Previous releases
Version Release date
July 2014 Reference manual ChangeLog
July 2014 Reference manual ChangeLog
June 2013 Reference manual ChangeLog
October 2012 Reference manual ChangeLog
September 2010

Related group publications

  1. A language-based approach to secure quorum replication

    Quorum replication with information flow control can simultaneously enforce all three core security properties: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

    9th ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS), August 2014. Lantian Zheng and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{zm14-plas, title="A language-based approach to secure quorum replication", author="Lantian Zheng and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="9th ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS)", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/plas14", month="August", year="2014"}  ]
  2. Warranties for faster strong consistency

    Distributed transactions can be sped up by giving clients time-limited invariants on state and computation.

    11th USENIX Symp. on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), pp. 513–517, April 2014. Jed Liu, Tom Magrino, Owen Arden, Michael D. George, and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{warranties, title="Warranties for faster strong consistency", author="Jed Liu and Tom Magrino and Owen Arden and Michael D. George and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="11th USENIX Symp. on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI)", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/warranties", pages="513–517", month="April", year="2014"}  ]
  3. Defining and enforcing referential security

    New security properties related to referential integrity and persistence can be soundly enforced by a type system.

    3rd Conf. on Principles of Security and Trust, pp. 199–219, April 2014. Jed Liu and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{persist, title="Defining and enforcing referential security", author="Liu, Jed and Myers, Andrew C.", booktitle="3rd Conf. on Principles of Security and Trust", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/persist", pages="199–219", month="April", year="2014"}TR ]
  4. Towards a secure federated information system
    Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University Department of Computer Science, August 2012. Jed Liu. [ ×@phdthesis{liu-thesis, title="Towards a secure federated information system", author="Jed Liu", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/jed-liu-dissertation.pdf", month="August", year="2012"}  ]
  5. Language-based control and mitigation of timing channels

    A type system bounds timing leakage when programs are run on hardware obeying the right contract.

    ACM SIGPLAN Conf. on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI), pp. 99–110, June 2012. Danfeng Zhang, Aslan Askarov, and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{pldi12, title="Language-based control and mitigation of timing channels", author="Danfeng Zhang and Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="ACM SIGPLAN Conf. on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI)", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/pltiming.html", pages="99–110", month="June", year="2012"}  ]
  6. Sharing mobile code securely with information flow control
    IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, pp. 191–205, May 2012. Owen Arden, Michael D. George, Jed Liu, K. Vikram, Aslan Askarov, and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{oakland12, title="Sharing mobile code securely with information flow control", author="Owen Arden and Michael D. George and Jed Liu and K. Vikram and Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/mobile.html", pages="191–205", month="May", year="2012"}  ]
  7. Predictive mitigation of timing channels in interactive systems
    18th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pp. 563-–574, October 2011. Danfeng Zhang, Aslan Askarov, and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{zam11, title="Predictive mitigation of timing channels in interactive systems", author="Danfeng Zhang and Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="18th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/gentiming.html", pages="563-–574", month="October", year="2011"}  ]
  8. Attacker control and impact for confidentiality and integrity
    Logical Methods in Computer Science, 7(3), September 2011. Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@article{am11, title="Attacker control and impact for confidentiality and integrity", author="Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers", volume="7", number="3", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/robknowledge-lmcs.pdf", month="September", year="2011"}  ]
  9. Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels
    17th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pp. 297–307, October 2010. Aslan Askarov, Danfeng Zhang, and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{azm10, title="Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels", author="Aslan Askarov and Danfeng Zhang and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="17th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/timing.html", pages="297–307", month="October", year="2010"}  ]
  10. A semantic framework for declassification and endorsement
    19th European Symposium on Programming, March 2010. Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{am10, title="A semantic framework for declassification and endorsement", author="Aslan Askarov and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="19th European Symposium on Programming", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/robknowledge.pdf", month="March", year="2010"}  ]
  11. Fabric: a platform for secure distributed computation and storage
    22nd ACM Symp. on Operating System Principles (SOSP), pp. 321–334, October 2009. Jed Liu, Michael D. George, K. Vikram, Xin Qi, Lucas Waye, and Andrew C. Myers. [ ×@inproceedings{fabric09, title="Fabric: a platform for secure distributed computation and storage", author="Jed Liu and Michael D. George and K. Vikram and Xin Qi and Lucas Waye and Andrew C. Myers", booktitle="22nd ACM Symp. on Operating System Principles (SOSP)", url="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/fabric-sosp09.html", pages="321–334", month="October", year="2009"}  ]
The development of Fabric has been supported by a number of funding sources, including NSF awards 0627649 and CCF-0964409; TRUST (Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology), which receives support from the NSF (CCF-0424422); ONR awards N00014-09-1-0652 and N00014-13-1-0089; and Air Force Research Laboratory award FA8750-08-2-0079. Fabric is also supported by a free open-source JProfiler license. This work does not necessarily represent the opinions, expressed or implied, of any of these sponsors.