KEY EXCHANGE USING "KEYLESS CRYPTOGRAPHY"[*]

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ABSTRACT

Protocols to generate and distribute secret keys in a computer network are described. They are based on *keyless cryptography*, a new cryptographic technique where information is hidden by keeping only the originator of a message, and not its contents, secret.

1. Introduction

In a classical cryptosystem, as opposed to a public-key cryptosystem, communication between users is based on a secret key known to them, but no others. A *key-distribution protocol* is employed to distribute copies of this secret key to the users. One simple way to perform key-distribution makes use of out-of-band communication–a diplomatic courier, for example. More desirable for a computer network, however, is a key-distribution protocol that uses the network itself for all communication. Protocols that do this are described in [Need78] and [Denn81].

In this note, we describe key-distribution protocols that are based on *keyless cryptography*, a new cryptographic technique where information is hidden by keeping the originator of a message, not the contents of the message, secret. Our protocols allow two users to agree on the value of a secret key, while preventing passive wiretappers and other users from determining its value.

2. General Approach

For users A and B to agree on a secret key k_{AB}, each first chooses its own secret key. Let the bit string $k_A[1]\,k_A[2]\,...\,k_A[2n]$ be k_A, the key chosen by A, and the bit string $k_B[1]\,k_B[2]\,...\,k_B[2n]$ be k_B, the key chosen by B. A then constructs 2n messages, one for each bit in k_A, where each message has the form

$$\text{``Concerning } k_{AB}: \text{ bit i is } k_A[i]\text{''}$$

and B constructs 2n messages, one for each bit in k_B, where each message has the form

$$\text{``Concerning } k_{AB}: \text{ bit i is } k_B[i]\text{''}.$$

Finally, each of these messages is made available to other users (and any passive wiretappers) in a way that leaves its contents readable, but makes it impossible to determine its origin.

By reading these messages, user A can determine k_B: A knows the messages it constructed, thus the other value for each bit position can be attributed to B. Similarly, B can determine k_A.

Now, consider some other user or passive wiretapper U. U can read the contents of all messages. This allows U to deduce values only for those positions of k_A and k_B that are the same. On the average, U will learn n bits in this manner. However, A and B can determine which values U will deduce. So, A can delete the bits known to U from k_A to form k_A', and B can form k_B' similarly. Then, by convention:

$$k_{AB} = k_A' = complement(k_B').$$

If necessary, this procedure can be repeated to obtain a larger key.

3. Implementation

We now outline three ways to implement the key distribution scheme described above. In each, passive wiretappers and users are able to read the contents of messages, but are unable to determine their origin.

3.1. Central Key Distribution Facility

Assume the existence of a trusted process S.[1] S maintains a database, called the *blackboard*, which can be read by any user at any time. In addition, each user A is assumed to have a secure channel to S. This channel allows a user A to transmit to S the 2n messages it constructs containing the bits of k_A.

Upon receipt of such a message, S posts it on the blackboard. So no user can determine the origin of a message simply by its position on the blackboard, S should post messages in random positions on the blackboard; further, S should wait until receiving a number of messages from both A and B before posting any of them, so no user can determine the origin of a message by observing communications traffic.

By reading the blackboard, A can determine k_B and B can determine k_A. Now consider another user or passive wiretapper U. By assumption, U will be unable to intercept messages sent to S by A and B. Reading the blackboard allows U to deduce values only for those positions of k_A and k_B that are the same. As before, A and B can determine which values U will deduce, so those bits are deleted when forming k_{AB}.

3.2. Broadcast Network

Assume users are linked by a broadcast network–either a ring or an Ethernet–where messages are labeled with a destination address, but not the sender's address. Users A and B each transmits in the clear to the blackboard process the 2n messages it constructs for its secret key.

Users monitoring the network can read the contents of a message, but will not be able to determine its origin. As required, A will be able to determine k_B; B will be able to determine k_A; other users U will only be able to deduce values for those positions of k_A and k_B that are the same[2].

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[1]An *authentication server* in the terminology of [Need78].

[2]A passive wiretapper might be able to determine the origin of a message by simultaneously monitoring several points on the network. Thus, this implementation may not protect the key from a passive wiretapper; it will protect the key from users monitoring the network.

3.3. Special Communications Channels

Assume users A and B are linked by a communications channel consisting of 2 wires[3] named 0 and 1, each characterized by:

C1: Both users can write a 1 on either wire.
C2: Both users and any wiretapper can sense the state of either wire.
C3: If a wire has value 1 then no passive wiretapper can determine
   which of A and/or B is writing a 1 on that wire.

Such a wire can be approximated by using low-impedance cable and high-impedance receivers–that way, hardly any current will flow when a 1 is written on the wire. The approximation will be even closer if a wiretapper is restricted to a single-point tap only.

Assume A and B have perfectly synchronized clocks.[4] At the ith clock tick, A writes a 1 on the wire whose name is represented by bit $k_A[i]$ and B writes a 1 on the wire whose name is represented by bit $k_B[i]$. Then, each reads both wires and records which ones have a 1 written on them.

As before, each user can determine the sequence of bits sent by the other, but a wiretapper can determine only some of the values sent.

4. Discussion

Although perhaps impractical, keyless cryptography provides a way to hide information. By keeping the origin of a message secret, instead of its content, it is possible for two users to exchange messages and have on the average 1/2 the bits hidden from others.

It would be misleading to view keyless cryptography as a *bona fide* cryptosystem. While it can disguise data during transmission, we have been unable to devise a scheme using keyless cryptography to encrypt data for secure storage.

References
[Denn81]   Denning, D.E., and G.M. Sacco. Timestamps in Key Distribution Protocols. *CACM 24*, 8 (August 1981), 533-536.

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[3]Actually, a single wire will suffice if it is multiplexed.

[4]This assumption is relaxed in the Appendix.

[Need78]   Needham, R.M., and M. Schroeder. Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Computers. *CACM 21*, 12 (Dec. 1978), 993-999.

Appendix–Writing Values Without Synchronized Clocks

Assume users A and B have clocks that drift apart at rate ϵ, where $\epsilon \ll 1$. A and B use their clocks to measure intervals of k seconds (apparent time). Each will write its value for k seconds starting from the beginning of an interval and will sample the wires at the midpoint of the interval. In order for each user to read the value sent by the other, the clocks must be reset every $k/(2\epsilon)$ seconds. Whenever there is a transition on the wire, the users resynchronize their clocks. If no transition occurs for nearly $k/(2\epsilon)$ seconds, a transition is forced–the value corresponding to this transition is ignored by both since they know it is only for purposes of clock synchronization.