Congestion Games with Load-Dependent Failures: Identical
Resources
Maria Polukarov
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Abstract:
We introduce the concept of resource failures in congestion games. We study two
models - {congestion games with load-dependent failures} (CGLFs) and {taxed
congestion games with failures} (TCGFs) -- that differ in the following
aspects: failure probabilities may be constant or congestion-dependent; agents
may have different interests and utilities - in a CGLF, a player wishes to
maximize the difference between his benefit from a successful task completion
and the total cost of the utilized resources, in a TCGF, the aim of a player is
to minimize his expected delay. Although, as we show, CGLFs and TCGFs do not
admit a potential function and therefore are not isomorphic to congestion games,
we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the above classes
of games.
Joint work with Michal Penn and Moshe Tennenholtz.