Elliot Anshelevich

CS 789 THEORY SEMINAR [home]

Speaker:  Elliot Anshelevich
Affiliation: Computer Science, Cornell University
Date: Monday, February 17, 2003
Title: Near-Optimal Network Design with Selfish Agents

Abstract:

We introduce a simple network design game that models how independent selfish

agents can build or maintain a large network. In our game every agent has a specific connectivity requirement, i.e. each agent has a set of terminals and wants to build a network in which his terminals are connected. Possible edges in the network have costs and each agent's goal is to pay as little as possible. Determining whether or not a Nash equilibrium exists in this game is NP-complete. However, when the goal of each player is to connect a terminal to a common source, we prove that there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the optimal network, and give a polynomial time algorithm to find a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more.

For the general connection game we prove that there is a 3-approximate Nash equilibrium that is as cheap as the optimal network, and give an algorithm to find a $(4.65+\varepsilon)$-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more.

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