

Follow the perturbed leader

Julia Robinson '56

time t set

$$s^* = \arg \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u_i(s, s_{-i}^{\tau})$$

our framework:

adversary sets $u^t(s) \quad s \in S$

$$s^t = \arg \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u^{\tau}(s)$$

Robinson '56 : 2-person 0-sum games

follow the leader converges to Nash
in marginal dist

Cheat algorithm: be the leader

$$s^t = \arg \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^t u^{\tau}(s)$$

Claim: sequence has no-regret:

player has strategy set S

adversary sets $u^t: S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

Proof: induction
 $t=1$ by choice

$t > 1$

$$\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^{\tau}(s^{\tau}) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u^{\tau}(s^{\tau}) + u^t(s^t)$$

$$\stackrel{\text{r.h}}{\geq} \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u^{\tau}(s) + u^t(s^t)$$

$$\geq \sum_{\tau=1}^t u^{\tau}(s^t) \geq \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^t u^{\tau}(s)$$

by choice of s^t

Add noise:

$$s^t = \arg \max_s \left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^{\tau}(s) + \tilde{z}_s \right)$$

indep random

Claim: regret of this sequence in exp

$$\leq E \left(\max_s \tilde{z}_s \right)$$

Proof: base $t=0$ ✓ ✓

$$\begin{aligned}
E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^\tau(s^\tau)\right) &= E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u^\tau(s^\tau)\right) + E(u^t(s^t)) \\
&\stackrel{i.h.}{\geq} \max_s E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u^\tau(s)\right) + \cancel{E(\xi_s)} - E(\max_s \xi_s) + E(u^t(s^t)) \\
&\geq E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^\tau(s^t)\right) + \cancel{\xi_{s^t}} - E(\max_s \xi_s) \\
&\geq E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^\tau(s) + \xi_s - \cancel{\xi_{s^t}}\right) - E(\max_s \xi_s)
\end{aligned}$$

stronger i.h

$$E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^\tau(s^\tau)\right) + E(\max_s \xi_s) \geq E\left(\sum_{\tau=1}^t u^\tau(s) + \xi_s\right)$$

for all s

implies desired statement, $\xi_s \geq 0$

Next step:

- ① define ξ_s need $E(\max_s \xi_s)$
- ② Prob $\arg \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^t u^\tau(s) + \xi_s$
 $= \arg \max_s \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} u^\tau(s) + \xi_s$
 $\geq 1 - \epsilon$