COM S 6830 - Cryptography

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Lecture 15: Interactive Proofs

Instructor: Rafael Pass Scribe: Chin Isradisaikul

In this lecture we discuss a new kind of proofs that involves interaction between the prover and the verifier and then extend it to zero-knowledge protocols. We then construct interactive, zero-knowledge proofs for graph nonisomorphism and graph isomorphism, provided that the verifier is honest.

1 Interactive Proofs

1.1 Definitions

Before we define an interactive proof, let us recall the traditional proof. Intuitively, we can obtain interactive proofs by relaxing the requirements posed by traditional proofs:

| Traditional Proof (NP-proofs) | | Interactive Proof |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| - non-interactive | RELAXATION | - interactive |
| - can never "prove" false statement | \longrightarrow | - can "prove" false statement |
| | | with "small" probability |

Having the intuition, we now formally define traditional proofs.

Definition 1 V is an NP-verifier for L if V is polynomial-time in the length of the first input and that the following two properties hold:

- (completeness) If $x \in L$, $\exists \pi : V(x, \pi) = 1$.
- (soundness) If $x \notin L$, $\forall \pi : V(x, \pi) = 0$.

In this definition, π is a certificate for x. Notice that this definition states that if $x \in L$, there is a certificate that the verifier can use to ensure that $x \in L$. Otherwise, if $x \notin L$, then there should be no such certificate.

Remark: Because V is polynomial-time in |x|, it is necessary that $|\pi| \leq p(|x|)$, where p is a polynomial.

Remark: This definition is equivalent to the other definition of NP (which states that there exists a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether $x \in L$) because we can view the nondeterministic tape on an accepting path as a certificate. Conversely, if we have a certificate π , we can construct a nondeterministic algorithm that simply guesses π .

Now, we consider relaxing some of the requirements for an NP-verifier. If we only relax completeness and soundness (e.g., that if $x \in L$, then $\exists \pi : V(x,\pi) > \frac{2}{3}$, and if $x \notin L$, then

 $\forall \pi: V(x,\pi) < \frac{1}{3}$), the resulting V will be a BPP algorithm. Therefore, we also have to relax the non-interactive requirement as well to arrive at a new kind of proof system. It seems that in doing so, we arrive at the following definition:

Definition 2 (INCORRECT) (P, V) is said to be an *interactive proof* for L if V is PPT (in the length of the input) and that the following two properties hold:

• (completeness) $\forall x \in L \exists y \in \{0,1\}^*$:

$$\Pr[\operatorname{out}_V[P(x,y) \leftrightarrow V(x)] = 1 = 1$$

• (soundness) \exists negligible function $\varepsilon \forall x \notin L \forall y \in \{0,1\}^*$:

$$\Pr[\operatorname{out}_V[P(x,y) \leftrightarrow V(x)] = 1 \le \varepsilon(|x|)$$

where $P(x,y) \leftrightarrow V(x)$ denotes a random variable indicating the interaction between P and V (both probabilistic) and out_V denotes a random variable indicating the output of V.

In this definition, the completeness requirement states that there is some string y that P can use to convince V with probability 1, and the soundness requirement states that no string can P use to convince V with nonnegligible probability.

For the interaction, P and V interact for a number of rounds. In the end, V outputs either 1 or 0. Also note that we did not restrict the complexity of P. That is, P can be unbounded in time. Later we will require that P be PPT so that the proof is efficient and can be used in practice.

Remark: Since ε is negligible, it might be the case that for small |x|, the probability that V is convinced when $x \notin L$ might be nonnegligible. To fix this, we can simply pad the instance x to be long enough that the probability of successful "cheating" becomes negligible.

Nonetheless, the definition above allows a dishonest prover to convince V that $x \in L$ even though it is not. For example, in the interactive protocol shown in Figure $\ref{eq:protocol}$, P that never says Hello can convince V with nonnegligible probability when $x \notin L$.

$$\begin{array}{c|c} P(x,w) & V(x) \\ \hline & \stackrel{\text{Hello}}{\longrightarrow} \\ & \stackrel{\text{Hello}}{\longrightarrow} \\ & \stackrel{w}{\longrightarrow} \\ & \text{If P said Hello, accept if } (x,w) \in R_L; \text{ otherwise, always accept.} \end{array}$$

Figure 1: An interactive protocol in which the prover can convince the verifier with nonnegligible probability, even though $x \notin L$

Therefore, we should redefine soundness to prevent this kind of anomaly.

Definition 3 (P, V) is said to be an *interactive proof* for L if V is PPT (in the length of the input) and that the following two properties hold:

• (completeness) $\forall x \in L \exists y \in \{0,1\}^*$:

$$\Pr[\operatorname{Out}_V[P(x,y)\leftrightarrow V(x)]=1=1$$

• (soundness) \exists negligible function $\varepsilon \forall P^* \forall x \notin L \forall y \in \{0,1\}^*$:

$$\Pr[\operatorname{Out}_V[P^*(x,y) \leftrightarrow V(x)] = 1 \le \varepsilon(|x|)$$

where P^* is any algorithm, $P(x,y) \leftrightarrow V(x)$ denotes a random variable indicating the interaction between P and V (both probabilistic), and out_V denotes a random variable indicating the output of V.

Remark: We can restrict P^* in the above definition to be only nuPPT algorithms. In this case, the resulting definition

 \forall nuPPT $P^*\exists$ negligible function $\varepsilon \forall x \notin L \forall y \in \{0,1\}^*$:

$$\Pr[]\operatorname{out}_V[P^*(x,y) \leftrightarrow V(x)] = 1 \le \varepsilon(|x|)$$

is called *computational soundness*. An *interactive argument* is an interactive system such that completeness (as defined in the definition) and computational soundness hold.

For cryptography, we only require that P be PPT, which will suffice to provide proofs for problems in NP.

Before we move on to the next section, we present some results where P might be unbounded for the completeness of the topic.

1.2 Example: Graph Nonisomorphism

Recall that two graphs are isomorphic if there is a way to relabel the nodes of one so that they are identical to the other's. The Graph Isomorphism problem is in NP as we can consider a permutation of nodes as a witness. Given two graphs, how can Alice (prover) convince Bob (verifier) that the two graphs are isomorphic or nonisomorphic?

First, we consider the nonisomorphism. Consider the interactive protocol shown in Figure ??. We claim that this protocol is an interactive proof. That is, completeness and soundness holds for this protocol.

• Completeness: If G_1G_2 , then there is only one b' such that $H \approx G_{b'}$. In this case, P always answers b' correctly. Hence, b = b' always, and $\Pr[|\text{out}_V[P \leftrightarrow V] = 1 = 1]$.

Input: $x = G_1, G_2$, where G_1G_2

$$P \qquad \qquad V$$

$$Pick \ b \in \{1,2\} \ \text{randomly.}$$

$$Pick \ a \ random \ permutation \ \pi \in S_n,$$

$$where \ n = |V_b|.$$

$$Compute \ a \ new \ graph \ H = \pi(G_b).$$

$$\stackrel{H}{\longleftarrow}$$

$$Compute \ b' \ \text{such that } H \approx G_{b'}$$

$$\stackrel{b'}{\longrightarrow}$$

$$Accept \ \text{if } b = b'.$$

Repeat this interaction |x| times.

Figure 2: An interactive proof for graph nonisomorphism

• Soundness: If $G_1 \approx G_2$, then $\{\pi(G_1)\} \equiv \{\pi(G_2)\}$ for random π because $G_2 = \rho(G_1)$ for some permutation ρ , so $\{\pi(G_2)\} \equiv \{\pi(\rho(G_1))\} \equiv \{\pi'(G_1)\}$ for some permutation π' . But then P cannot determine exactly whether b' is 1 or 2, so P needs to guess b' with probability 1/2 of being correct in each round. Hence, the probability that P guesses b' correctly for all the |x| rounds is $1/2^{|x|}$, which is negligible.

Note that the prover in this protocol needs not run in polynomial time. This protocol is zero-knowledge for an honest verifier because a simulator that picks random b and π , generates H, and answers b'=b runs in polynomial time. It turns out that this protocol is not zero-knowledge for a dishonest verifier.

1.3 Interactive Proofs with Efficient Provers

Definition 4 An interactive proof (P, V) for $L \in NP$ has an *efficient* prover if P is PPT and completeness holds whenever P receives (x, y), where y is a "witness" for x, for some witness relation on L.

Now we consider an interactive proof for Graph Isomorphism in Figure ?? We claim that this protocol is an interactive proof with efficient prover.

- Completeness: Suppose $G_1 \approx G_2$. Then there exists a permutation ρ such that $G_2 = \rho(G_1)$. Let $H = \pi(G_1)$, where π is a permutation. Then there is a correspondence among G_1, G_2, H as shown in Figure ??. Therefore, if c = 1, $G_1 = \pi^{-1}(H)$, and if c = 2, $G_2 = \rho \circ \pi^{-1}(H)$. Hence, $G_c = \sigma(H)$ always, so V always accepts.
- Soundness: If G_1G_2 , then H is isomorphic to only G_1 . Picking c at random, V will discover that G_cH with probability 1/2. That is, with probability 1/2, P can convince

Input: $x = G_1, G_2$, where $G_2 = \rho(G_1)$

Variable: n is the number of vertices in each graph (which is the same).

$$P(G_1,G_2,\rho) \qquad \qquad V(G_1,G_2)$$

$$Pick \ \pi \leftarrow S_n.$$

$$Compute \ H = \pi(G_1).$$

$$\xrightarrow{H} \qquad \qquad Pick \ b \leftarrow \{1,2\} \ randomly. \qquad \qquad (Ask \ P: \ How \ to \ go \ from \ H \ to \ G_c?)$$

$$\xleftarrow{c} \qquad \qquad \qquad Compute \ \sigma = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \pi^{-1} & \text{if } c = 1 \\ \rho \circ \pi^{-1} & \text{if } c = 2 \end{array} \right.$$

$$Accept \ \text{if } G_c = \sigma(H).$$

Repeat this interaction n times.

Figure 3: An interactive proof for graph isomorphism




Figure 4: Correspondences among G_1, G_2 , and H

V even though the two graphs are not isomorphic. Therefore, the probability that P convinces V for all the n rounds is $1/2^n$, which is negligible.

Note: This protocol will not be zero-knowledge if H is repeated (i.e., the same π is chosen twice) and both c=1,2 are chosen for this H.

Proposition 5 This interactive protocol is zero-knowledge for honest verifier. **Proof Idea**: If the protocol is zero-knowledge, V needs to generate (H, c, σ) so that

- $\sigma(H) = G_c$,
- c is uniform in $\{1, 2\}$, and
- H is a uniform graph isomorphic to G_1 , i.e., $\pi \leftarrow S_n$.

This can be done by generating c first, then H, so that $G_c \approx \sigma(H)$ always. \square

Note that for dishonest $V,\,V$ can fix c and the above proof would not follow (because c is not uniformly chosen).