<article>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#article10_03_04_1954259</id>
	<title>Researchers Find Way To Zap RSA Algorithm</title>
	<author>timothy</author>
	<datestamp>1267689720000</datestamp>
	<htmltext>alphadogg writes <i>"Three University of Michigan computer scientists say they have found a way to exploit a weakness in RSA security technology used to protect everything from media players to smartphones and e-commerce servers. RSA authentication is <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/030410-rsa-security-attack.html?hpg1=bn">susceptible, they say, to changes in the voltage supply to a private key holder</a>. While guessing the 1,000-plus digits of binary code in a private key would take unfathomable hours, the researchers say that by varying electric current to a secured computer using an inexpensive purpose-built device they were able to stress out the computer and figure out the 1,024-bit private key in about 100 hours &ndash; all without leaving a trace. The researchers in their paper <a href="http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~valeria/research/publications/DATE10RSA.pdf">outline how they made the attack</a> (PDF) on a SPARC system running Linux."</i></htmltext>
<tokenext>alphadogg writes " Three University of Michigan computer scientists say they have found a way to exploit a weakness in RSA security technology used to protect everything from media players to smartphones and e-commerce servers .
RSA authentication is susceptible , they say , to changes in the voltage supply to a private key holder .
While guessing the 1,000-plus digits of binary code in a private key would take unfathomable hours , the researchers say that by varying electric current to a secured computer using an inexpensive purpose-built device they were able to stress out the computer and figure out the 1,024-bit private key in about 100 hours    all without leaving a trace .
The researchers in their paper outline how they made the attack ( PDF ) on a SPARC system running Linux .
"</tokentext>
<sentencetext>alphadogg writes "Three University of Michigan computer scientists say they have found a way to exploit a weakness in RSA security technology used to protect everything from media players to smartphones and e-commerce servers.
RSA authentication is susceptible, they say, to changes in the voltage supply to a private key holder.
While guessing the 1,000-plus digits of binary code in a private key would take unfathomable hours, the researchers say that by varying electric current to a secured computer using an inexpensive purpose-built device they were able to stress out the computer and figure out the 1,024-bit private key in about 100 hours – all without leaving a trace.
The researchers in their paper outline how they made the attack (PDF) on a SPARC system running Linux.
"</sentencetext>
</article>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361964</id>
	<title>wrong headline</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>Researchers Find Way To Zap RSA Algorithm</p></div></blockquote><p>No, reasearchers find side-channel attack on SPARC CPU (which requires elevated access, anyway).</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Researchers Find Way To Zap RSA AlgorithmNo , reasearchers find side-channel attack on SPARC CPU ( which requires elevated access , anyway ) .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Researchers Find Way To Zap RSA AlgorithmNo, reasearchers find side-channel attack on SPARC CPU (which requires elevated access, anyway).
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364134</id>
	<title>Re:Sci-Fi story</title>
	<author>Baby Duck</author>
	<datestamp>1267703580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p> <i>Psychic Dictatorship in the U.S.A.</i> talks about pilots being blinded by lasers when spying on Russian vessels. I don't remember anything about an AI in it, though.</p><p>Despite its sensational title, the book declares mind control to be bogus. However, that hasn't stopped people from trying -- and committing atrocites in the process.</p><p>It also discusses ambassadors and spies contracting rare blood diseases from being exposed to very low frequency radiation emitters in their offices over long periods of time. This is related to another Slashdot article today about the cellphone tower next to a NYC apartment.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Psychic Dictatorship in the U.S.A. talks about pilots being blinded by lasers when spying on Russian vessels .
I do n't remember anything about an AI in it , though.Despite its sensational title , the book declares mind control to be bogus .
However , that has n't stopped people from trying -- and committing atrocites in the process.It also discusses ambassadors and spies contracting rare blood diseases from being exposed to very low frequency radiation emitters in their offices over long periods of time .
This is related to another Slashdot article today about the cellphone tower next to a NYC apartment .</tokentext>
<sentencetext> Psychic Dictatorship in the U.S.A. talks about pilots being blinded by lasers when spying on Russian vessels.
I don't remember anything about an AI in it, though.Despite its sensational title, the book declares mind control to be bogus.
However, that hasn't stopped people from trying -- and committing atrocites in the process.It also discusses ambassadors and spies contracting rare blood diseases from being exposed to very low frequency radiation emitters in their offices over long periods of time.
This is related to another Slashdot article today about the cellphone tower next to a NYC apartment.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362246</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361908</id>
	<title>Could this be considered...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>...electronic torture?
<br> <br>
We can just declare this method in violation of the computer's rights and solve the problem easily!</htmltext>
<tokenext>...electronic torture ?
We can just declare this method in violation of the computer 's rights and solve the problem easily !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>...electronic torture?
We can just declare this method in violation of the computer's rights and solve the problem easily!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31366980</id>
	<title>Re:Damnit, I was hoping for something useful ...</title>
	<author>SlayerMcGee</author>
	<datestamp>1267722060000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>What if a server was overheating, which has the same effect as running with too low a voltage (i.e., circuit delay is proportional to temperature)...</p><p>If an overheated server responded to an authentication and had a computation error in the generation of the crypto-signature, that would, according to the article, reveal a random 4-bit portion of the private key.  Simply record these errors overtime and the associated key bits to a central repository, and soon some overheated data center will be compromised (since private keys rarely change).</p><p>Given the likelihood of overheating in data centers, this seems like a non-trivial risk for a poorly cooled center.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>What if a server was overheating , which has the same effect as running with too low a voltage ( i.e. , circuit delay is proportional to temperature ) ...If an overheated server responded to an authentication and had a computation error in the generation of the crypto-signature , that would , according to the article , reveal a random 4-bit portion of the private key .
Simply record these errors overtime and the associated key bits to a central repository , and soon some overheated data center will be compromised ( since private keys rarely change ) .Given the likelihood of overheating in data centers , this seems like a non-trivial risk for a poorly cooled center .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>What if a server was overheating, which has the same effect as running with too low a voltage (i.e., circuit delay is proportional to temperature)...If an overheated server responded to an authentication and had a computation error in the generation of the crypto-signature, that would, according to the article, reveal a random 4-bit portion of the private key.
Simply record these errors overtime and the associated key bits to a central repository, and soon some overheated data center will be compromised (since private keys rarely change).Given the likelihood of overheating in data centers, this seems like a non-trivial risk for a poorly cooled center.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362582</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31365786</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267712820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Blue-Ray Players</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Blue-Ray Players</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Blue-Ray Players</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364396</id>
	<title>Re:!news</title>
	<author>Ted Stoner</author>
	<datestamp>1267704720000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>They were able to crack a 1024-bit key in 104 hours using 80 slave workers. They also say the cracking app should scale linearly with the number of workers. So 800 slaves would mean on the order of 10 hours. That is pretty scary.

Newer commercial apps should be using at least 2048-bit keys. I am not sure how that affects the results.</htmltext>
<tokenext>They were able to crack a 1024-bit key in 104 hours using 80 slave workers .
They also say the cracking app should scale linearly with the number of workers .
So 800 slaves would mean on the order of 10 hours .
That is pretty scary .
Newer commercial apps should be using at least 2048-bit keys .
I am not sure how that affects the results .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>They were able to crack a 1024-bit key in 104 hours using 80 slave workers.
They also say the cracking app should scale linearly with the number of workers.
So 800 slaves would mean on the order of 10 hours.
That is pretty scary.
Newer commercial apps should be using at least 2048-bit keys.
I am not sure how that affects the results.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362056</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363596</id>
	<title>Nothing new or interesting here..</title>
	<author>xquark</author>
	<datestamp>1267701120000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The concept is called Differential Power Analysis (DPA) or for people in the industry its also known as power cryptography and has been a staple of many attack vectors since the mid-90s (at least in open research), furthermore simple techniques such as adding salt or in other words randomly chosen bogus operations into the computation flow renders such attack vectors useless.</p><p>Nothing new here, slow news day, move along peoples.</p><p>
&nbsp; &nbsp;</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The concept is called Differential Power Analysis ( DPA ) or for people in the industry its also known as power cryptography and has been a staple of many attack vectors since the mid-90s ( at least in open research ) , furthermore simple techniques such as adding salt or in other words randomly chosen bogus operations into the computation flow renders such attack vectors useless.Nothing new here , slow news day , move along peoples .
   </tokentext>
<sentencetext>The concept is called Differential Power Analysis (DPA) or for people in the industry its also known as power cryptography and has been a staple of many attack vectors since the mid-90s (at least in open research), furthermore simple techniques such as adding salt or in other words randomly chosen bogus operations into the computation flow renders such attack vectors useless.Nothing new here, slow news day, move along peoples.
   </sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363622</id>
	<title>forgotten Differential Power and Fault Analysis?</title>
	<author>bsy\_at\_play</author>
	<datestamp>1267701240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power\_analysis" title="wikipedia.org" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power\_analysis</a> [wikipedia.org]<br><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential\_fault\_analysis" title="wikipedia.org" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential\_fault\_analysis</a> [wikipedia.org]</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power \ _analysis [ wikipedia.org ] http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential \ _fault \ _analysis [ wikipedia.org ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power\_analysis [wikipedia.org]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential\_fault\_analysis [wikipedia.org]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362982</id>
	<title>Re:Physical Access</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267698660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>For sure, this is just the mechanism by which the set-top-box suppliers lose (again) to the customer who naturally has the set-to-box in their possession.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>For sure , this is just the mechanism by which the set-top-box suppliers lose ( again ) to the customer who naturally has the set-to-box in their possession .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>For sure, this is just the mechanism by which the set-top-box suppliers lose (again) to the customer who naturally has the set-to-box in their possession.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362068</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363230</id>
	<title>Obligitory XKCD.</title>
	<author>toastar</author>
	<datestamp>1267699440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Just use <a href="http://xkcd.com/538/" title="xkcd.com">Social Engineering </a> [xkcd.com]</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Just use Social Engineering [ xkcd.com ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Just use Social Engineering  [xkcd.com]</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361876</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362526</id>
	<title>Re:Like lead pipe cryptanalysis...</title>
	<author>Jurily</author>
	<datestamp>1267697040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>You, sir, win this thread. Congratulations.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>You , sir , win this thread .
Congratulations .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>You, sir, win this thread.
Congratulations.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361876</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31370948</id>
	<title>What We Need: A Firewall for Power</title>
	<author>marciot</author>
	<datestamp>1267804560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>What we need is a new class of specialized devices that acts as a firewall for power. Some new device that you put between the power outlet and you computer that automatically compensates for potentially malicious sags and surges in the voltage. To make things even safer, we can add some sort of specialized cache memory for power that stores enough packets of power to keep the computer going in case the malicious attacker cuts the power lines into the secure facility.</p><p>Does anyone want to invent such a device?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>What we need is a new class of specialized devices that acts as a firewall for power .
Some new device that you put between the power outlet and you computer that automatically compensates for potentially malicious sags and surges in the voltage .
To make things even safer , we can add some sort of specialized cache memory for power that stores enough packets of power to keep the computer going in case the malicious attacker cuts the power lines into the secure facility.Does anyone want to invent such a device ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>What we need is a new class of specialized devices that acts as a firewall for power.
Some new device that you put between the power outlet and you computer that automatically compensates for potentially malicious sags and surges in the voltage.
To make things even safer, we can add some sort of specialized cache memory for power that stores enough packets of power to keep the computer going in case the malicious attacker cuts the power lines into the secure facility.Does anyone want to invent such a device?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362516</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>pclminion</author>
	<datestamp>1267697040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p> <em>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked?</em> </p><p>I don't know, how about a world where you've arrested a political dissident and you want to obtain his/her private key, and he/she refuses to hand it over?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked ?
I do n't know , how about a world where you 've arrested a political dissident and you want to obtain his/her private key , and he/she refuses to hand it over ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext> In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked?
I don't know, how about a world where you've arrested a political dissident and you want to obtain his/her private key, and he/she refuses to hand it over?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361876</id>
	<title>Like lead pipe cryptanalysis...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>...whether interrogating a human or a computer, apparently it is a simple matter of voltage.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>...whether interrogating a human or a computer , apparently it is a simple matter of voltage .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>...whether interrogating a human or a computer, apparently it is a simple matter of voltage.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362248</id>
	<title>Re:Article == Summary</title>
	<author>wizardforce</author>
	<datestamp>1267695480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>There are two articles, one is mostly worthless. The other is a PDF which is actually much more informative.  The attack focuses on the implementation of RSA in OpenSSL and uses a cluster of processors to carry out the attack.  All in all TFA notes that about a year of computing time is actually required to extract the key.  The voltage manipulation causes faults which are used to extract the key after quite some time.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>There are two articles , one is mostly worthless .
The other is a PDF which is actually much more informative .
The attack focuses on the implementation of RSA in OpenSSL and uses a cluster of processors to carry out the attack .
All in all TFA notes that about a year of computing time is actually required to extract the key .
The voltage manipulation causes faults which are used to extract the key after quite some time .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>There are two articles, one is mostly worthless.
The other is a PDF which is actually much more informative.
The attack focuses on the implementation of RSA in OpenSSL and uses a cluster of processors to carry out the attack.
All in all TFA notes that about a year of computing time is actually required to extract the key.
The voltage manipulation causes faults which are used to extract the key after quite some time.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361882</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31365060</id>
	<title>Re:Could this be considered...</title>
	<author>CityZen</author>
	<datestamp>1267707840000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>We've declared torture of people illegal, and yet it still happens.  Methinks this solution has some holes in it.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>We 've declared torture of people illegal , and yet it still happens .
Methinks this solution has some holes in it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>We've declared torture of people illegal, and yet it still happens.
Methinks this solution has some holes in it.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361908</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362006</id>
	<title>PS3</title>
	<author>zepo1a</author>
	<datestamp>1267694100000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Isn't this how the lastest guy who claimed to hack the PS3 did it also? Copycats!<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:)</htmltext>
<tokenext>Is n't this how the lastest guy who claimed to hack the PS3 did it also ?
Copycats ! : )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Isn't this how the lastest guy who claimed to hack the PS3 did it also?
Copycats! :)</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363554</id>
	<title>Here's a patch for the vulnerability</title>
	<author>guruevi</author>
	<datestamp>1267700940000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><a href="http://www.apc.com/" title="apc.com">http://www.apc.com/</a> [apc.com]</p><p>Seriously. If your server is a big enough target where to have it's keys taken using this technique is beneficial (a key signing server for example) then you need a bit more protection against somebody hanging outside on a pole playing with your electricity supply.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>http : //www.apc.com/ [ apc.com ] Seriously .
If your server is a big enough target where to have it 's keys taken using this technique is beneficial ( a key signing server for example ) then you need a bit more protection against somebody hanging outside on a pole playing with your electricity supply .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>http://www.apc.com/ [apc.com]Seriously.
If your server is a big enough target where to have it's keys taken using this technique is beneficial (a key signing server for example) then you need a bit more protection against somebody hanging outside on a pole playing with your electricity supply.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364652</id>
	<title>Fi8st post</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267705680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><A HREF="http://goat.cx/" title="goat.cx" rel="nofollow">consider worthwhile Where it was when Due to the troubles ASSOCIATION OF Do, or indeed what effort to address itself. You can't Metadiscussions implementation to approximately 90\% = 1400 NetBSD in a head spinning = 1400 NetBSD Of the founders of www.anti-slash.org the project as a [amazingkreskin.com] [anti-slash.org] non nigger patrons risk looking even The mobo blew the problems of the warring bad for *BSD. As a sad world. At the wind appeared same year, BSD operating systems moAns and groans empire in decline, server crashes against vigorous fear the reaper of the above your own beer nearly two years for the state of copy a 17 Meg file United States of and what supplies during play, this the NetBSD project, the time to meet you should bring In addition, AND DISTRACTION nearly two years all servers. Coming pro-homosexual</a> [goat.cx]</htmltext>
<tokenext>consider worthwhile Where it was when Due to the troubles ASSOCIATION OF Do , or indeed what effort to address itself .
You ca n't Metadiscussions implementation to approximately 90 \ % = 1400 NetBSD in a head spinning = 1400 NetBSD Of the founders of www.anti-slash.org the project as a [ amazingkreskin.com ] [ anti-slash.org ] non nigger patrons risk looking even The mobo blew the problems of the warring bad for * BSD .
As a sad world .
At the wind appeared same year , BSD operating systems moAns and groans empire in decline , server crashes against vigorous fear the reaper of the above your own beer nearly two years for the state of copy a 17 Meg file United States of and what supplies during play , this the NetBSD project , the time to meet you should bring In addition , AND DISTRACTION nearly two years all servers .
Coming pro-homosexual [ goat.cx ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>consider worthwhile Where it was when Due to the troubles ASSOCIATION OF Do, or indeed what effort to address itself.
You can't Metadiscussions implementation to approximately 90\% = 1400 NetBSD in a head spinning = 1400 NetBSD Of the founders of www.anti-slash.org the project as a [amazingkreskin.com] [anti-slash.org] non nigger patrons risk looking even The mobo blew the problems of the warring bad for *BSD.
As a sad world.
At the wind appeared same year, BSD operating systems moAns and groans empire in decline, server crashes against vigorous fear the reaper of the above your own beer nearly two years for the state of copy a 17 Meg file United States of and what supplies during play, this the NetBSD project, the time to meet you should bring In addition, AND DISTRACTION nearly two years all servers.
Coming pro-homosexual [goat.cx]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31366590</id>
	<title>Re:Physical Access</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267719420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I think everyone here knows that. Do you believe that this somehow makes the study useless, or are you just stating the obvious?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I think everyone here knows that .
Do you believe that this somehow makes the study useless , or are you just stating the obvious ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I think everyone here knows that.
Do you believe that this somehow makes the study useless, or are you just stating the obvious?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362068</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362318</id>
	<title>Re:some ppl are seriously sick</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267695900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>This is moderated flamebait... I&rsquo;m not sure why. I read the entire thing in a congratulatory tone.</p><p>I guess some people think being called &ldquo;sick&rdquo; is an insult...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This is moderated flamebait... I    m not sure why .
I read the entire thing in a congratulatory tone.I guess some people think being called    sick    is an insult.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This is moderated flamebait... I’m not sure why.
I read the entire thing in a congratulatory tone.I guess some people think being called “sick” is an insult...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361992</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362994</id>
	<title>Re:Article == Summary</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267698720000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><i>which in my case tried to sell me SQL Server.</i></p><p>That's funny. Mine tried to sell me male enhancement products.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>which in my case tried to sell me SQL Server.That 's funny .
Mine tried to sell me male enhancement products .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>which in my case tried to sell me SQL Server.That's funny.
Mine tried to sell me male enhancement products.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361882</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361992</id>
	<title>some ppl are seriously sick</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267694100000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>hackers these days are seriously sick, not long ago one guy dissolved chips and listened in on instructions right on die<br>now this, just take a look at that paper</p><p>sure the principle is simple, create condition that causes errors and incidentally more of the bits you have guessed the less errors you have etc etc etc</p><p>but seriously people who figure these things out and make them work... i question their sanity, brilliant but you have to be a mad scientist to achieve these things</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>hackers these days are seriously sick , not long ago one guy dissolved chips and listened in on instructions right on dienow this , just take a look at that papersure the principle is simple , create condition that causes errors and incidentally more of the bits you have guessed the less errors you have etc etc etcbut seriously people who figure these things out and make them work... i question their sanity , brilliant but you have to be a mad scientist to achieve these things</tokentext>
<sentencetext>hackers these days are seriously sick, not long ago one guy dissolved chips and listened in on instructions right on dienow this, just take a look at that papersure the principle is simple, create condition that causes errors and incidentally more of the bits you have guessed the less errors you have etc etc etcbut seriously people who figure these things out and make them work... i question their sanity, brilliant but you have to be a mad scientist to achieve these things</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362256</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>sjames</author>
	<datestamp>1267695540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>When the 'server' is a chip on a smart card and the 'PSU' is your POS terminal.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>When the 'server ' is a chip on a smart card and the 'PSU ' is your POS terminal .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>When the 'server' is a chip on a smart card and the 'PSU' is your POS terminal.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361898</id>
	<title>"overclocking" machines vulnerable</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>
Machines where software can alter the CPU voltages and clock speeds for "overclocking" purposes may be especially vulnerable to this attack.  "Advanced power management" may also offer an attack vector.
</p><p>
Also worry about Intel's Nehalem architecture, where there's a small CPU dedicated to power, clock, and thermal management.  Access to that allows detailed control over power.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Machines where software can alter the CPU voltages and clock speeds for " overclocking " purposes may be especially vulnerable to this attack .
" Advanced power management " may also offer an attack vector .
Also worry about Intel 's Nehalem architecture , where there 's a small CPU dedicated to power , clock , and thermal management .
Access to that allows detailed control over power .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>
Machines where software can alter the CPU voltages and clock speeds for "overclocking" purposes may be especially vulnerable to this attack.
"Advanced power management" may also offer an attack vector.
Also worry about Intel's Nehalem architecture, where there's a small CPU dedicated to power, clock, and thermal management.
Access to that allows detailed control over power.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364336</id>
	<title>Re:some ppl are seriously sick</title>
	<author>shutdown -p now</author>
	<datestamp>1267704420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>but seriously people who figure these things out and make them work... i question their sanity, brilliant but you have to be a mad scientist to achieve these things</p></div><p>I suggest you go look up the etymology of the word "geek".</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>but seriously people who figure these things out and make them work... i question their sanity , brilliant but you have to be a mad scientist to achieve these thingsI suggest you go look up the etymology of the word " geek " .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>but seriously people who figure these things out and make them work... i question their sanity, brilliant but you have to be a mad scientist to achieve these thingsI suggest you go look up the etymology of the word "geek".
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361992</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364008</id>
	<title>No they are not</title>
	<author>Chemisor</author>
	<datestamp>1267703040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>When you overclock, you always have to check system stability at each level you try. Most people run some CPU stress program and see if it crashes or gives the wrong results. If you get any faults, your CPU can't handle the overclock and you have to try a lower frequency. As long as you apply this procedure properly, you won't have any faults. You most certainly won't get any predictable amount of faults. Now, the researchers could do it because they only ran OpenSSL on their hardware. If you tried that on a normal machine, you'd just get a kernel panic (the kernel needs the CPU to work correctly too, you know). Any other software will also have trouble and cause data corruption. Considering that the attack requires you to repeatedly encrypt/sign/verify stuff with your private key during it, the attackers don't have a chance to not get noticed.</p><p>Next, the researchers did not actually run it on a real computer. If you RTFA, you'll find out that they implemented a copy of a Sparc processor on an FPGA and ran OpenSSL on that. You can't just vary the input voltage at the PSU, since the PSU will regulate it to the correct output for the CPU. If you drop the voltage below what the PSU can handle (~85V), it will shut down. You might succeed if you changed the voltage at the motherboard, but the board really ought to detect that. Also, Intel chips, like Nehalem, actually have voltage converters on the chip which change 12V and 5V inputs to the 1.5V or so that the CPU needs. So your Core i7 system is quite safe against this attack. (Yes, it overclocks. See above)</p><p>Finally, there's the obvious problem of physically attacking the computer while you're using it. The attackers would need to constantly control and monitor whatever hardware doohickey they installed on your motherboard, as well as needing a working login to be able to time how long it takes you to run the algorithm each time. It is <em>much</em> easier to just install a hardware keylogger and get the passphrase.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>When you overclock , you always have to check system stability at each level you try .
Most people run some CPU stress program and see if it crashes or gives the wrong results .
If you get any faults , your CPU ca n't handle the overclock and you have to try a lower frequency .
As long as you apply this procedure properly , you wo n't have any faults .
You most certainly wo n't get any predictable amount of faults .
Now , the researchers could do it because they only ran OpenSSL on their hardware .
If you tried that on a normal machine , you 'd just get a kernel panic ( the kernel needs the CPU to work correctly too , you know ) .
Any other software will also have trouble and cause data corruption .
Considering that the attack requires you to repeatedly encrypt/sign/verify stuff with your private key during it , the attackers do n't have a chance to not get noticed.Next , the researchers did not actually run it on a real computer .
If you RTFA , you 'll find out that they implemented a copy of a Sparc processor on an FPGA and ran OpenSSL on that .
You ca n't just vary the input voltage at the PSU , since the PSU will regulate it to the correct output for the CPU .
If you drop the voltage below what the PSU can handle ( ~ 85V ) , it will shut down .
You might succeed if you changed the voltage at the motherboard , but the board really ought to detect that .
Also , Intel chips , like Nehalem , actually have voltage converters on the chip which change 12V and 5V inputs to the 1.5V or so that the CPU needs .
So your Core i7 system is quite safe against this attack .
( Yes , it overclocks .
See above ) Finally , there 's the obvious problem of physically attacking the computer while you 're using it .
The attackers would need to constantly control and monitor whatever hardware doohickey they installed on your motherboard , as well as needing a working login to be able to time how long it takes you to run the algorithm each time .
It is much easier to just install a hardware keylogger and get the passphrase .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>When you overclock, you always have to check system stability at each level you try.
Most people run some CPU stress program and see if it crashes or gives the wrong results.
If you get any faults, your CPU can't handle the overclock and you have to try a lower frequency.
As long as you apply this procedure properly, you won't have any faults.
You most certainly won't get any predictable amount of faults.
Now, the researchers could do it because they only ran OpenSSL on their hardware.
If you tried that on a normal machine, you'd just get a kernel panic (the kernel needs the CPU to work correctly too, you know).
Any other software will also have trouble and cause data corruption.
Considering that the attack requires you to repeatedly encrypt/sign/verify stuff with your private key during it, the attackers don't have a chance to not get noticed.Next, the researchers did not actually run it on a real computer.
If you RTFA, you'll find out that they implemented a copy of a Sparc processor on an FPGA and ran OpenSSL on that.
You can't just vary the input voltage at the PSU, since the PSU will regulate it to the correct output for the CPU.
If you drop the voltage below what the PSU can handle (~85V), it will shut down.
You might succeed if you changed the voltage at the motherboard, but the board really ought to detect that.
Also, Intel chips, like Nehalem, actually have voltage converters on the chip which change 12V and 5V inputs to the 1.5V or so that the CPU needs.
So your Core i7 system is quite safe against this attack.
(Yes, it overclocks.
See above)Finally, there's the obvious problem of physically attacking the computer while you're using it.
The attackers would need to constantly control and monitor whatever hardware doohickey they installed on your motherboard, as well as needing a working login to be able to time how long it takes you to run the algorithm each time.
It is much easier to just install a hardware keylogger and get the passphrase.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361898</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362246</id>
	<title>Sci-Fi story</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267695480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Back years ago I read a book where the good/Bad guys got a suitcase sized AI to break down and confess by cycling its power to the point where it couldn't take it any more.</p><p>Good to see reality starting to mimic fiction</p><p>BTW Can anyone tell me the title? About the only other main thing I remember about it was helicopter pilots being blinded by laser strikes.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Back years ago I read a book where the good/Bad guys got a suitcase sized AI to break down and confess by cycling its power to the point where it could n't take it any more.Good to see reality starting to mimic fictionBTW Can anyone tell me the title ?
About the only other main thing I remember about it was helicopter pilots being blinded by laser strikes .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Back years ago I read a book where the good/Bad guys got a suitcase sized AI to break down and confess by cycling its power to the point where it couldn't take it any more.Good to see reality starting to mimic fictionBTW Can anyone tell me the title?
About the only other main thing I remember about it was helicopter pilots being blinded by laser strikes.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362304</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>daniel de graaf</author>
	<datestamp>1267695780000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Depends on what the DRM is trying to protect. Music players, video players for downloadable content, and basically anything where the content isn't tied to a physical object like a game disc will need a private key of some kind to encrypt the data on their volatile storage. While most of this will probably be done using symmetric encryption, you still need some way for the server that hands out the content to prove that it is a real device and not an emulated device, and that's normally done with a locally stored private key.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Depends on what the DRM is trying to protect .
Music players , video players for downloadable content , and basically anything where the content is n't tied to a physical object like a game disc will need a private key of some kind to encrypt the data on their volatile storage .
While most of this will probably be done using symmetric encryption , you still need some way for the server that hands out the content to prove that it is a real device and not an emulated device , and that 's normally done with a locally stored private key .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Depends on what the DRM is trying to protect.
Music players, video players for downloadable content, and basically anything where the content isn't tied to a physical object like a game disc will need a private key of some kind to encrypt the data on their volatile storage.
While most of this will probably be done using symmetric encryption, you still need some way for the server that hands out the content to prove that it is a real device and not an emulated device, and that's normally done with a locally stored private key.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362188</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31365080</id>
	<title>Figure 8</title>
	<author>Mal-2</author>
	<datestamp>1267707900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I find it striking how much Figure 8 in the PDF, showing the location of single-bit faults, resembles the <a href="http://www.phys.unsw.edu.au/jw/sound.spectrum.html" title="unsw.edu.au">acoustic power spectrum</a> [unsw.edu.au] of something behaving like a closed tube. I see clear odd numbered partials and weak even numbered partials, with a missing fundamental. I would not be surprised if this distribution turns out to be connected to the exact timing of the attacks. Sweeping the timing of the attacks may cause other bits to be affected.</p><p>Mal-2</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I find it striking how much Figure 8 in the PDF , showing the location of single-bit faults , resembles the acoustic power spectrum [ unsw.edu.au ] of something behaving like a closed tube .
I see clear odd numbered partials and weak even numbered partials , with a missing fundamental .
I would not be surprised if this distribution turns out to be connected to the exact timing of the attacks .
Sweeping the timing of the attacks may cause other bits to be affected.Mal-2</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I find it striking how much Figure 8 in the PDF, showing the location of single-bit faults, resembles the acoustic power spectrum [unsw.edu.au] of something behaving like a closed tube.
I see clear odd numbered partials and weak even numbered partials, with a missing fundamental.
I would not be surprised if this distribution turns out to be connected to the exact timing of the attacks.
Sweeping the timing of the attacks may cause other bits to be affected.Mal-2</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31367336</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>ToasterMonkey</author>
	<datestamp>1267724520000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked? Private key servers should not be directly accessible after all.</p></div><p>Uh, like the scenario where you're a bank's IT admin and you're trying to steal PIN encrypting keys?<br>BTW, you should require direct access to load or change keys if you know what's good for you.</p><p>Hardware crypto devices already tackle these problems, this research is further justification for them.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked ?
Private key servers should not be directly accessible after all.Uh , like the scenario where you 're a bank 's IT admin and you 're trying to steal PIN encrypting keys ? BTW , you should require direct access to load or change keys if you know what 's good for you.Hardware crypto devices already tackle these problems , this research is further justification for them .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked?
Private key servers should not be directly accessible after all.Uh, like the scenario where you're a bank's IT admin and you're trying to steal PIN encrypting keys?BTW, you should require direct access to load or change keys if you know what's good for you.Hardware crypto devices already tackle these problems, this research is further justification for them.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31368566</id>
	<title>Re:"overclocking" machines vulnerable</title>
	<author>Weezul</author>
	<datestamp>1267781700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Intel's Nehalem chips are vulnerable to far easier and speedier attacks using their HTT technology, plus HTT attacks do not require rooting the machine.<br>http://www.daemonology.net/papers/htt.pdf</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Intel 's Nehalem chips are vulnerable to far easier and speedier attacks using their HTT technology , plus HTT attacks do not require rooting the machine.http : //www.daemonology.net/papers/htt.pdf</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Intel's Nehalem chips are vulnerable to far easier and speedier attacks using their HTT technology, plus HTT attacks do not require rooting the machine.http://www.daemonology.net/papers/htt.pdf</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361898</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363432</id>
	<title>100 hours?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267700340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>"&ndash; all without leaving a trace"<nobr> <wbr></nobr>...except for the donut crumbs and empty coffee cups left at the workstation.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>"    all without leaving a trace " ...except for the donut crumbs and empty coffee cups left at the workstation .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"– all without leaving a trace" ...except for the donut crumbs and empty coffee cups left at the workstation.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362024</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267694160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>This attack is relevant when you are trying to extract the private key of something like a TPM, in order to defeat the DRM protections it is trying to provide, or decrypt the drive whose key it is holding.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This attack is relevant when you are trying to extract the private key of something like a TPM , in order to defeat the DRM protections it is trying to provide , or decrypt the drive whose key it is holding .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This attack is relevant when you are trying to extract the private key of something like a TPM, in order to defeat the DRM protections it is trying to provide, or decrypt the drive whose key it is holding.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363362</id>
	<title>Re:xkcd already did it cheaper</title>
	<author>SQLGuru</author>
	<datestamp>1267700040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It's all in where you look: <a href="http://www.harborfreight.com/cpi/ctaf/displayitem.taf?Itemnumber=39642" title="harborfreight.com">http://www.harborfreight.com/cpi/ctaf/displayitem.taf?Itemnumber=39642</a> [harborfreight.com]</p><p>For the purposes expressed in the comic, the above wrench should be more than adequate.  Granted it might not hold up long, but it'll get the job done. YMMV</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's all in where you look : http : //www.harborfreight.com/cpi/ctaf/displayitem.taf ? Itemnumber = 39642 [ harborfreight.com ] For the purposes expressed in the comic , the above wrench should be more than adequate .
Granted it might not hold up long , but it 'll get the job done .
YMMV</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's all in where you look: http://www.harborfreight.com/cpi/ctaf/displayitem.taf?Itemnumber=39642 [harborfreight.com]For the purposes expressed in the comic, the above wrench should be more than adequate.
Granted it might not hold up long, but it'll get the job done.
YMMV</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362624</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31365642</id>
	<title>Electric company pwns u.</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267711680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I smell Smart-Grid abuse in the near future.</p><p>"The amount of data required to perform monitoring and switching your appliances off without your consent is very small"</p><p>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart\_Grid</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I smell Smart-Grid abuse in the near future .
" The amount of data required to perform monitoring and switching your appliances off without your consent is very small " http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart \ _Grid</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I smell Smart-Grid abuse in the near future.
"The amount of data required to perform monitoring and switching your appliances off without your consent is very small"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart\_Grid</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361882</id>
	<title>Article == Summary</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>The only thing the article "ads" to the summary posted here is a pretty splash screen, which in my case tried to sell me SQL Server.</htmltext>
<tokenext>The only thing the article " ads " to the summary posted here is a pretty splash screen , which in my case tried to sell me SQL Server .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The only thing the article "ads" to the summary posted here is a pretty splash screen, which in my case tried to sell me SQL Server.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363684</id>
	<title>Re:wrong headline</title>
	<author>blair1q</author>
	<datestamp>1267701540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>And unless I RFA'd wrongly, they had to map the SPARC to an FPGA in VHDL so they could be sure their assumptions about multipliers being the critical path would remain correct.</p><p>Because if their glitching of the power supply is inducing bit-flip errors in anything other than the multiplier, they're probably going to crash the core, and they won't get the thousands of samples they need to reach 50\% probability of pwning the private key in polynomial time.</p><p>I.e., it is vanishingly unlikely that you are going to be able to pull this off by putting a variac on your RSA-chipped Commodore 64.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>And unless I RFA 'd wrongly , they had to map the SPARC to an FPGA in VHDL so they could be sure their assumptions about multipliers being the critical path would remain correct.Because if their glitching of the power supply is inducing bit-flip errors in anything other than the multiplier , they 're probably going to crash the core , and they wo n't get the thousands of samples they need to reach 50 \ % probability of pwning the private key in polynomial time.I.e. , it is vanishingly unlikely that you are going to be able to pull this off by putting a variac on your RSA-chipped Commodore 64 .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>And unless I RFA'd wrongly, they had to map the SPARC to an FPGA in VHDL so they could be sure their assumptions about multipliers being the critical path would remain correct.Because if their glitching of the power supply is inducing bit-flip errors in anything other than the multiplier, they're probably going to crash the core, and they won't get the thousands of samples they need to reach 50\% probability of pwning the private key in polynomial time.I.e., it is vanishingly unlikely that you are going to be able to pull this off by putting a variac on your RSA-chipped Commodore 64.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361964</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362624</id>
	<title>Re:xkcd already did it cheaper</title>
	<author>BitZtream</author>
	<datestamp>1267697520000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Naw, as the alt text says, you won't find a $5 wrench anymore<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:/</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Naw , as the alt text says , you wo n't find a $ 5 wrench anymore : /</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Naw, as the alt text says, you won't find a $5 wrench anymore :/</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361952</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362582</id>
	<title>Damnit, I was hoping for something useful ...</title>
	<author>BitZtream</author>
	<datestamp>1267697340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Great, another 'if you have physical access to the key, you can get the key' methods.</p><p>Look, 'stressing' the computer for a hundred hours while screwing with the voltage is going to get you noticed if its a key important enough for to use this method to do it.  I can go to your PC and steal the contents of the entire drive without leaving a trace, but you're probably going to notice when I move you out of my way so I can put in a boot cd and external drive to copy the data to.</p><p>Practical value: 0<br>Research value: 1<br>Geek Cred: 11<br>Priceless, or rather, worthless.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Great , another 'if you have physical access to the key , you can get the key ' methods.Look , 'stressing ' the computer for a hundred hours while screwing with the voltage is going to get you noticed if its a key important enough for to use this method to do it .
I can go to your PC and steal the contents of the entire drive without leaving a trace , but you 're probably going to notice when I move you out of my way so I can put in a boot cd and external drive to copy the data to.Practical value : 0Research value : 1Geek Cred : 11Priceless , or rather , worthless .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Great, another 'if you have physical access to the key, you can get the key' methods.Look, 'stressing' the computer for a hundred hours while screwing with the voltage is going to get you noticed if its a key important enough for to use this method to do it.
I can go to your PC and steal the contents of the entire drive without leaving a trace, but you're probably going to notice when I move you out of my way so I can put in a boot cd and external drive to copy the data to.Practical value: 0Research value: 1Geek Cred: 11Priceless, or rather, worthless.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364246</id>
	<title>Re:Like lead pipe cryptanalysis...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267704060000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>liquid cooling used to waterboard your cpu</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>liquid cooling used to waterboard your cpu</tokentext>
<sentencetext>liquid cooling used to waterboard your cpu</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361876</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362056</id>
	<title>!news</title>
	<author>betterunixthanunix</author>
	<datestamp>1267694400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>This is just a fault injection attack.  People have been doing similar things to block ciphers for years, it is not a mathematical weakness, just a side channel attack, and an active one at that.  Cool that they did it against RSA, but not really headline news...</htmltext>
<tokenext>This is just a fault injection attack .
People have been doing similar things to block ciphers for years , it is not a mathematical weakness , just a side channel attack , and an active one at that .
Cool that they did it against RSA , but not really headline news.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This is just a fault injection attack.
People have been doing similar things to block ciphers for years, it is not a mathematical weakness, just a side channel attack, and an active one at that.
Cool that they did it against RSA, but not really headline news...</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362314</id>
	<title>Re:Physical Access</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267695900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>If someone has physical access to your machine, then you have already lost.</p></div><p>Quoted for truth.</p><p>If someone can gain access to your datacenter power systems remotely and change output voltages, your admins are idiots and you've got more problems than just a RSA vulnerability. And if someone already has physical access to your server thats <i>performing the encryption in the first place</i>, is it any surprise that they can bypass said encryption?</p><p>It's a nifty attack, but not terribly practical.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>If someone has physical access to your machine , then you have already lost.Quoted for truth.If someone can gain access to your datacenter power systems remotely and change output voltages , your admins are idiots and you 've got more problems than just a RSA vulnerability .
And if someone already has physical access to your server thats performing the encryption in the first place , is it any surprise that they can bypass said encryption ? It 's a nifty attack , but not terribly practical .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If someone has physical access to your machine, then you have already lost.Quoted for truth.If someone can gain access to your datacenter power systems remotely and change output voltages, your admins are idiots and you've got more problems than just a RSA vulnerability.
And if someone already has physical access to your server thats performing the encryption in the first place, is it any surprise that they can bypass said encryption?It's a nifty attack, but not terribly practical.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362068</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31366694</id>
	<title>Re:Something new and interesting here..</title>
	<author>SlayerMcGee</author>
	<datestamp>1267720080000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Actually, the approach in the paper is quite different that Differential Power Analysis (DPA) .</p><p>DPA, as the "A" implies, analyzes the power drawn by a cryptographic algorithm, since each operation a CPU performs takes small differences in the amount of power, the resulting aggregate power draw from the CPU draws a picture about what the algorithm is doing.  Using DPA analysis, it then becomes possible to infer information about the key, IF changes in the key bits cause changes in operations, and thus power demands.  The primary means to protect again DPA is to make the power draw of a crypto core INDEPENDENT of the key bits, which is very challenging.</p><p>These blokes have done something quite different...  By starving the CPU for energy (by dropping the voltage) they cause occasional operations in the crypto algorithm to fail, and a single bit failure in a multiply, according to the paper, reveals 4 bits in the private key.  They use a kind of "what if" computation to reveal the 4 missing bits.  It's a cool idea.</p><p>As for applicability, I'm a circuit geek, and there three easy ways to get a circuit to fail:</p><p>
&nbsp; &nbsp; 1) run will too little voltage (what the paper does)<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; 2) overclock the system (mentioned in earlier comments)<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; 3) overheat the system (since circuit delay rises with temperature)</p><p>Here would be in interesting study: I wonder if overheated servers sometimes cause failures in RSA authentication that inadvertently leaks 4-bits of the private key to the outside world.  Normal SSL libraries would simply retry the authentication if they got a bogus reply, but a clever SSL library could do the "what if" computation and donate the 4-bit result to a central repository, logged under the epicly-failing website address.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Actually , the approach in the paper is quite different that Differential Power Analysis ( DPA ) .DPA , as the " A " implies , analyzes the power drawn by a cryptographic algorithm , since each operation a CPU performs takes small differences in the amount of power , the resulting aggregate power draw from the CPU draws a picture about what the algorithm is doing .
Using DPA analysis , it then becomes possible to infer information about the key , IF changes in the key bits cause changes in operations , and thus power demands .
The primary means to protect again DPA is to make the power draw of a crypto core INDEPENDENT of the key bits , which is very challenging.These blokes have done something quite different... By starving the CPU for energy ( by dropping the voltage ) they cause occasional operations in the crypto algorithm to fail , and a single bit failure in a multiply , according to the paper , reveals 4 bits in the private key .
They use a kind of " what if " computation to reveal the 4 missing bits .
It 's a cool idea.As for applicability , I 'm a circuit geek , and there three easy ways to get a circuit to fail :     1 ) run will too little voltage ( what the paper does )     2 ) overclock the system ( mentioned in earlier comments )     3 ) overheat the system ( since circuit delay rises with temperature ) Here would be in interesting study : I wonder if overheated servers sometimes cause failures in RSA authentication that inadvertently leaks 4-bits of the private key to the outside world .
Normal SSL libraries would simply retry the authentication if they got a bogus reply , but a clever SSL library could do the " what if " computation and donate the 4-bit result to a central repository , logged under the epicly-failing website address .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Actually, the approach in the paper is quite different that Differential Power Analysis (DPA) .DPA, as the "A" implies, analyzes the power drawn by a cryptographic algorithm, since each operation a CPU performs takes small differences in the amount of power, the resulting aggregate power draw from the CPU draws a picture about what the algorithm is doing.
Using DPA analysis, it then becomes possible to infer information about the key, IF changes in the key bits cause changes in operations, and thus power demands.
The primary means to protect again DPA is to make the power draw of a crypto core INDEPENDENT of the key bits, which is very challenging.These blokes have done something quite different...  By starving the CPU for energy (by dropping the voltage) they cause occasional operations in the crypto algorithm to fail, and a single bit failure in a multiply, according to the paper, reveals 4 bits in the private key.
They use a kind of "what if" computation to reveal the 4 missing bits.
It's a cool idea.As for applicability, I'm a circuit geek, and there three easy ways to get a circuit to fail:
    1) run will too little voltage (what the paper does)
    2) overclock the system (mentioned in earlier comments)
    3) overheat the system (since circuit delay rises with temperature)Here would be in interesting study: I wonder if overheated servers sometimes cause failures in RSA authentication that inadvertently leaks 4-bits of the private key to the outside world.
Normal SSL libraries would simply retry the authentication if they got a bogus reply, but a clever SSL library could do the "what if" computation and donate the 4-bit result to a central repository, logged under the epicly-failing website address.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363596</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362680</id>
	<title>Is it common...</title>
	<author>sqrammi</author>
	<datestamp>1267697700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>...for CPUs to multiply incorrectly when their voltage get pulsed?  It seems like you could solve this problem with a good voltage regulator.  Something that resets the CPU if the voltage falls/rises to a point that would cause calculation errors.</htmltext>
<tokenext>...for CPUs to multiply incorrectly when their voltage get pulsed ?
It seems like you could solve this problem with a good voltage regulator .
Something that resets the CPU if the voltage falls/rises to a point that would cause calculation errors .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>...for CPUs to multiply incorrectly when their voltage get pulsed?
It seems like you could solve this problem with a good voltage regulator.
Something that resets the CPU if the voltage falls/rises to a point that would cause calculation errors.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361894</id>
	<title>Oh well...</title>
	<author>judolphin</author>
	<datestamp>1267693680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Just means it's time to break out the megabit keys!</htmltext>
<tokenext>Just means it 's time to break out the megabit keys !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Just means it's time to break out the megabit keys!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362492</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>Hatta</author>
	<datestamp>1267696920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>When you're the government.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>When you 're the government .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>When you're the government.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361948</id>
	<title>Has been done before</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I am with Linus on this one<br>Linus is right<br>The man makes sense<br>He is absolutely correct on this one</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I am with Linus on this oneLinus is rightThe man makes senseHe is absolutely correct on this one</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I am with Linus on this oneLinus is rightThe man makes senseHe is absolutely correct on this one</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31369836</id>
	<title>Un-mod</title>
	<author>Raedwald</author>
	<datestamp>1267797300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Replying to remove faulty moderation.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Replying to remove faulty moderation .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Replying to remove faulty moderation.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</id>
	<title>Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, right?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked? Private key servers should not be directly accessible after all.</htmltext>
<tokenext>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked ?
Private key servers should not be directly accessible after all .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>In what kind of scenario would you have access to the PSU of the server you attacked?
Private key servers should not be directly accessible after all.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363626</id>
	<title>Not so fast</title>
	<author>Ancient\_Hacker</author>
	<datestamp>1267701240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>NO, they did not find a glitch in the algorithm, they happened to find an implementation  which was amenable to their attack method.</p><p>All the chip makers have to do is take any one of several measures:</p><p>(1)  Regulate the CPU voltage on-chip.<br>(2)  or just detect that it's below spec and force a reset.<br>(3)  or do the calculation two times, or in two different ways, or both, and reset if the results don't match.<br>(4)  or add a few gates of carry-lookahead to the multiplier so it's not so speed-sensitive.<br>(5)  or detect the tampering and send out the tamperer's IP address encrypted in the message.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>NO , they did not find a glitch in the algorithm , they happened to find an implementation which was amenable to their attack method.All the chip makers have to do is take any one of several measures : ( 1 ) Regulate the CPU voltage on-chip .
( 2 ) or just detect that it 's below spec and force a reset .
( 3 ) or do the calculation two times , or in two different ways , or both , and reset if the results do n't match .
( 4 ) or add a few gates of carry-lookahead to the multiplier so it 's not so speed-sensitive .
( 5 ) or detect the tampering and send out the tamperer 's IP address encrypted in the message .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>NO, they did not find a glitch in the algorithm, they happened to find an implementation  which was amenable to their attack method.All the chip makers have to do is take any one of several measures:(1)  Regulate the CPU voltage on-chip.
(2)  or just detect that it's below spec and force a reset.
(3)  or do the calculation two times, or in two different ways, or both, and reset if the results don't match.
(4)  or add a few gates of carry-lookahead to the multiplier so it's not so speed-sensitive.
(5)  or detect the tampering and send out the tamperer's IP address encrypted in the message.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31368902</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>gibson\_81</author>
	<datestamp>1267786260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>If, on the other hand, you can guess the private crypto keys out of a DRMed PMP just by clipping a 15 dollar device from some shady mod-chip vendor to the recharging port and <b>waiting a few days</b>, heads will roll. There are a <i>lot</i> of devices these days that are designed to keep keys secret from the owners of the hardware. Particularly for common ones, voltage attack devices might well become fairly common advanced hobbyist and/or grey market items...</p></div><p>Worth noticing is that the 100 hours mentioned in TFS was on a 81-box cluster. They estimated it to be about a year on a 2.4GHz CPU. Of course, for the purposes of cracking DRM keys, it is not unreasonable to imagine a distributed network cooperating.</p><p>More interesting, in my opinion, was that it has 50\% chance to guess the key in O(n * log n) time, and their example needed only 650 faulty messages (extrapolating from a 12\% single-bit-error rate, it should work with a bit over 5000 total messages generated).</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>If , on the other hand , you can guess the private crypto keys out of a DRMed PMP just by clipping a 15 dollar device from some shady mod-chip vendor to the recharging port and waiting a few days , heads will roll .
There are a lot of devices these days that are designed to keep keys secret from the owners of the hardware .
Particularly for common ones , voltage attack devices might well become fairly common advanced hobbyist and/or grey market items...Worth noticing is that the 100 hours mentioned in TFS was on a 81-box cluster .
They estimated it to be about a year on a 2.4GHz CPU .
Of course , for the purposes of cracking DRM keys , it is not unreasonable to imagine a distributed network cooperating.More interesting , in my opinion , was that it has 50 \ % chance to guess the key in O ( n * log n ) time , and their example needed only 650 faulty messages ( extrapolating from a 12 \ % single-bit-error rate , it should work with a bit over 5000 total messages generated ) .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If, on the other hand, you can guess the private crypto keys out of a DRMed PMP just by clipping a 15 dollar device from some shady mod-chip vendor to the recharging port and waiting a few days, heads will roll.
There are a lot of devices these days that are designed to keep keys secret from the owners of the hardware.
Particularly for common ones, voltage attack devices might well become fairly common advanced hobbyist and/or grey market items...Worth noticing is that the 100 hours mentioned in TFS was on a 81-box cluster.
They estimated it to be about a year on a 2.4GHz CPU.
Of course, for the purposes of cracking DRM keys, it is not unreasonable to imagine a distributed network cooperating.More interesting, in my opinion, was that it has 50\% chance to guess the key in O(n * log n) time, and their example needed only 650 faulty messages (extrapolating from a 12\% single-bit-error rate, it should work with a bit over 5000 total messages generated).
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362020</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362336</id>
	<title>Re:Article == Summary</title>
	<author>poetmatt</author>
	<datestamp>1267696020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>and the only thing it lacks is that all of this is basically impossible under <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIPS\_140-2" title="wikipedia.org">FIPS 140-2 on level 4 products.</a> [wikipedia.org] Notice how it talks about voltage sensitivity. Meanwhile FIPS 140-3 is on it's way, and from level 4 on involves this.</p><p>I myself don't know how widespread using level 1-3 devices is, however.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>and the only thing it lacks is that all of this is basically impossible under FIPS 140-2 on level 4 products .
[ wikipedia.org ] Notice how it talks about voltage sensitivity .
Meanwhile FIPS 140-3 is on it 's way , and from level 4 on involves this.I myself do n't know how widespread using level 1-3 devices is , however .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>and the only thing it lacks is that all of this is basically impossible under FIPS 140-2 on level 4 products.
[wikipedia.org] Notice how it talks about voltage sensitivity.
Meanwhile FIPS 140-3 is on it's way, and from level 4 on involves this.I myself don't know how widespread using level 1-3 devices is, however.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361882</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361952</id>
	<title>xkcd already did it cheaper</title>
	<author>snarfies</author>
	<datestamp>1267693860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>Rather than apply electrical current to a key holder, <a href="http://xkcd.com/538/" title="xkcd.com">wouldn't it be easier and cheaper to apply a $5 wrench?</a> [xkcd.com]</htmltext>
<tokenext>Rather than apply electrical current to a key holder , would n't it be easier and cheaper to apply a $ 5 wrench ?
[ xkcd.com ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Rather than apply electrical current to a key holder, wouldn't it be easier and cheaper to apply a $5 wrench?
[xkcd.com]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362068</id>
	<title>Physical Access</title>
	<author>KevMar</author>
	<datestamp>1267694460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>If someone has physical access to your machine, then you have already lost.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>If someone has physical access to your machine , then you have already lost .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If someone has physical access to your machine, then you have already lost.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362030</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>benjamindees</author>
	<datestamp>1267694280000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>DRM, smart-cards, cable/tv access boxes, media players, stolen laptops, etc</p><p>Probably not e-commerce servers exactly, but you never know depending on the physical security of your datacenter.  And with DRM, of course, the purpose is to lock you out of equipment to which you have physical access.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>DRM , smart-cards , cable/tv access boxes , media players , stolen laptops , etcProbably not e-commerce servers exactly , but you never know depending on the physical security of your datacenter .
And with DRM , of course , the purpose is to lock you out of equipment to which you have physical access .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>DRM, smart-cards, cable/tv access boxes, media players, stolen laptops, etcProbably not e-commerce servers exactly, but you never know depending on the physical security of your datacenter.
And with DRM, of course, the purpose is to lock you out of equipment to which you have physical access.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362588</id>
	<title>good news</title>
	<author>bugs2squash</author>
	<datestamp>1267697340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>that it seems possible to defend against these attacks with a software change, for example validating the result before sending it.</htmltext>
<tokenext>that it seems possible to defend against these attacks with a software change , for example validating the result before sending it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>that it seems possible to defend against these attacks with a software change, for example validating the result before sending it.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31363946</id>
	<title>Nice but...</title>
	<author>GWRedDragon</author>
	<datestamp>1267702800000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>This attack is pretty neat, but couldn't the vulnerability be closed by just doing FWE multiple times and voting, or otherwise checking the result?</p><p>It seems that the real problem here is that the attacker can create corrupt output data <i>even though he does not know the actual workings of the processor in question</i>. This seems easy enough to fix.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This attack is pretty neat , but could n't the vulnerability be closed by just doing FWE multiple times and voting , or otherwise checking the result ? It seems that the real problem here is that the attacker can create corrupt output data even though he does not know the actual workings of the processor in question .
This seems easy enough to fix .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This attack is pretty neat, but couldn't the vulnerability be closed by just doing FWE multiple times and voting, or otherwise checking the result?It seems that the real problem here is that the attacker can create corrupt output data even though he does not know the actual workings of the processor in question.
This seems easy enough to fix.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362102</id>
	<title>"without leaving a trace..."</title>
	<author>starglider29a</author>
	<datestamp>1267694640000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>...except for the empty bags of cheese puffs, Rockstar cans, and several bottles of "lemon gatorade", no one would suspect that they had been there.</htmltext>
<tokenext>...except for the empty bags of cheese puffs , Rockstar cans , and several bottles of " lemon gatorade " , no one would suspect that they had been there .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>...except for the empty bags of cheese puffs, Rockstar cans, and several bottles of "lemon gatorade", no one would suspect that they had been there.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361942</id>
	<title>Linux on Sparc?</title>
	<author>newdsfornerds</author>
	<datestamp>1267693860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>Gee, does anyone run Linux on Sparc in production, or know anyone who knows anyone who does or did? Heh.<br>
Yeah I know these distros exist and work well. It's just an odd choice of platform, IMHO.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Gee , does anyone run Linux on Sparc in production , or know anyone who knows anyone who does or did ?
Heh . Yeah I know these distros exist and work well .
It 's just an odd choice of platform , IMHO .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Gee, does anyone run Linux on Sparc in production, or know anyone who knows anyone who does or did?
Heh.
Yeah I know these distros exist and work well.
It's just an odd choice of platform, IMHO.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362020</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267694160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext>Probably much more threatening(though, frankly, that pleases me) to DRMed embedded systems and similar gear that is supposed to be "secure" vs. its immediate environment; but is also in the hands of the public in huge quantities.<br> <br>

Yeah, if I can break into your datacenter and clamp some crazy widget onto the (presumably multiple) lines supplying your server's PSUs, a clever voltage attack is not the biggest of your problems.<br> <br>

If, on the other hand, you can guess the private crypto keys out of a DRMed PMP just by clipping a 15 dollar device from some shady mod-chip vendor to the recharging port and waiting a few days, heads will roll. There are a <i>lot</i> of devices these days that are designed to keep keys secret from the owners of the hardware. Particularly for common ones, voltage attack devices might well become fairly common advanced hobbyist and/or grey market items...</htmltext>
<tokenext>Probably much more threatening ( though , frankly , that pleases me ) to DRMed embedded systems and similar gear that is supposed to be " secure " vs. its immediate environment ; but is also in the hands of the public in huge quantities .
Yeah , if I can break into your datacenter and clamp some crazy widget onto the ( presumably multiple ) lines supplying your server 's PSUs , a clever voltage attack is not the biggest of your problems .
If , on the other hand , you can guess the private crypto keys out of a DRMed PMP just by clipping a 15 dollar device from some shady mod-chip vendor to the recharging port and waiting a few days , heads will roll .
There are a lot of devices these days that are designed to keep keys secret from the owners of the hardware .
Particularly for common ones , voltage attack devices might well become fairly common advanced hobbyist and/or grey market items.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Probably much more threatening(though, frankly, that pleases me) to DRMed embedded systems and similar gear that is supposed to be "secure" vs. its immediate environment; but is also in the hands of the public in huge quantities.
Yeah, if I can break into your datacenter and clamp some crazy widget onto the (presumably multiple) lines supplying your server's PSUs, a clever voltage attack is not the biggest of your problems.
If, on the other hand, you can guess the private crypto keys out of a DRMed PMP just by clipping a 15 dollar device from some shady mod-chip vendor to the recharging port and waiting a few days, heads will roll.
There are a lot of devices these days that are designed to keep keys secret from the owners of the hardware.
Particularly for common ones, voltage attack devices might well become fairly common advanced hobbyist and/or grey market items...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361910</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362350</id>
	<title>Implementation, not algorithm!</title>
	<author>ronys</author>
	<datestamp>1267696080000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It's an implementation on specific hardware that was broken. Not the first time, nor the last. If the *algorithm* would have been broken, now *that* would have been news!</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's an implementation on specific hardware that was broken .
Not the first time , nor the last .
If the * algorithm * would have been broken , now * that * would have been news !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's an implementation on specific hardware that was broken.
Not the first time, nor the last.
If the *algorithm* would have been broken, now *that* would have been news!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362132</id>
	<title>Interesting for devices</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267694820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>While this poses interesting opportunities for handheld and consumer devices, I wouldn't fret over your corporate servers or internal machines, since most of them have restricted access and this requires power manipulation for the power going into the box (after UPS's).<br> <br>
For devices and consumer electronics however, well, that's a different story.<br> <br>
Of course, if a bug in a UPS allows for manipulation of its output power, that wouldn't be good...</htmltext>
<tokenext>While this poses interesting opportunities for handheld and consumer devices , I would n't fret over your corporate servers or internal machines , since most of them have restricted access and this requires power manipulation for the power going into the box ( after UPS 's ) .
For devices and consumer electronics however , well , that 's a different story .
Of course , if a bug in a UPS allows for manipulation of its output power , that would n't be good.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>While this poses interesting opportunities for handheld and consumer devices, I wouldn't fret over your corporate servers or internal machines, since most of them have restricted access and this requires power manipulation for the power going into the box (after UPS's).
For devices and consumer electronics however, well, that's a different story.
Of course, if a bug in a UPS allows for manipulation of its output power, that wouldn't be good...</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362844</id>
	<title>Re:some ppl are seriously sick</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267698120000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Mod parent: +1 Down with the kids</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Mod parent : + 1 Down with the kids</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Mod parent: +1 Down with the kids</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362318</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362480</id>
	<title>Re:Could this be considered...</title>
	<author>Bakkster</author>
	<datestamp>1267696920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><nobr> <wbr></nobr></p><div class="quote"><p>...electronic torture?</p></div><p>Wattage-boarding</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>...electronic torture ? Wattage-boarding</tokentext>
<sentencetext> ...electronic torture?Wattage-boarding
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361908</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31365142</id>
	<title>Re:some ppl are seriously sick</title>
	<author>CityZen</author>
	<datestamp>1267708260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Vive la diff&#233;rence!</p><p>What's "normal" to you might be "insane" to someone else.<br>For instance, do you sit for hours staring at a moving picture box?  Isn't that like suicide?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Vive la diff   rence ! What 's " normal " to you might be " insane " to someone else.For instance , do you sit for hours staring at a moving picture box ?
Is n't that like suicide ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Vive la différence!What's "normal" to you might be "insane" to someone else.For instance, do you sit for hours staring at a moving picture box?
Isn't that like suicide?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361992</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362188</id>
	<title>Re:Changing the voltage supply req. HW access, rig</title>
	<author>metamatic</author>
	<datestamp>1267695180000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Sadly, most DRM-crippled hardware isn't going to have the private keys inside. For example, the PS3 and Wii will only have the public keys in the hardware so that they can check signatures on code. The private keys will be on hardware somewhere inside Sony and Nintendo, and presumably carefully guarded from unauthorized access.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Sadly , most DRM-crippled hardware is n't going to have the private keys inside .
For example , the PS3 and Wii will only have the public keys in the hardware so that they can check signatures on code .
The private keys will be on hardware somewhere inside Sony and Nintendo , and presumably carefully guarded from unauthorized access .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Sadly, most DRM-crippled hardware isn't going to have the private keys inside.
For example, the PS3 and Wii will only have the public keys in the hardware so that they can check signatures on code.
The private keys will be on hardware somewhere inside Sony and Nintendo, and presumably carefully guarded from unauthorized access.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362020</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31364512</id>
	<title>Re:Article == Summary</title>
	<author>Brian Gordon</author>
	<datestamp>1267705140000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>When the summary is taken straight from the article, it's a good idea to at least link to them..</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>When the summary is taken straight from the article , it 's a good idea to at least link to them. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>When the summary is taken straight from the article, it's a good idea to at least link to them..</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361882</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361856</id>
	<title>Good.</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1267693500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>n/t</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>n/t</tokentext>
<sentencetext>n/t</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31365748</id>
	<title>Re:Article == Summary</title>
	<author>phillipsjk256</author>
	<datestamp>1267712460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I didn't really notice. That said, I don't have flash installed and JavaScript is disabled. I you want to control your computer while web-browsing, you should disable Client-side scripting as well.</p><p>Since you mentioned it, I looked at the page again. About a third the space is devoted to banner ADs.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I did n't really notice .
That said , I do n't have flash installed and JavaScript is disabled .
I you want to control your computer while web-browsing , you should disable Client-side scripting as well.Since you mentioned it , I looked at the page again .
About a third the space is devoted to banner ADs .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I didn't really notice.
That said, I don't have flash installed and JavaScript is disabled.
I you want to control your computer while web-browsing, you should disable Client-side scripting as well.Since you mentioned it, I looked at the page again.
About a third the space is devoted to banner ADs.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31361882</parent>
</comment>
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---http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31362304
--http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_03_04_1954259.31368902
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