<article>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#article10_01_12_134225</id>
	<title>Second 3G GSM Cipher Cracked</title>
	<author>Soulskill</author>
	<datestamp>1263304080000</datestamp>
	<htmltext>Trailrunner7 writes <i>"A group of cryptographers has developed <a href="http://threatpost.com/en\_us/blogs/second-gsm-cipher-falls-011110"> a new attack that has broken Kasumi</a>, the encryption algorithm used to secure traffic on 3G GSM wireless networks. The technique enables them to recover a full key by using a tactic known as a related-key attack, but experts say it is not the end of the world for Kasumi. Kasumi, also known as A5/3, is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks, and it's a modified version of an older algorithm called Misty. In the abstract of their paper, the cryptographers say the attack can be implemented easily on one standard PC. 'In this paper we describe a new type of attack called a sandwich attack, and use it to construct a simple distinguisher for 7 of the 8 rounds of KASUMI with an amazingly high probability of 214. By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round, we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4 related keys, 226 data, 230 bytes of memory, and 232 time. These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC, and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity.'"</i></htmltext>
<tokenext>Trailrunner7 writes " A group of cryptographers has developed a new attack that has broken Kasumi , the encryption algorithm used to secure traffic on 3G GSM wireless networks .
The technique enables them to recover a full key by using a tactic known as a related-key attack , but experts say it is not the end of the world for Kasumi .
Kasumi , also known as A5/3 , is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks , and it 's a modified version of an older algorithm called Misty .
In the abstract of their paper , the cryptographers say the attack can be implemented easily on one standard PC .
'In this paper we describe a new type of attack called a sandwich attack , and use it to construct a simple distinguisher for 7 of the 8 rounds of KASUMI with an amazingly high probability of 214 .
By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round , we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4 related keys , 226 data , 230 bytes of memory , and 232 time .
These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC , and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity .
' "</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Trailrunner7 writes "A group of cryptographers has developed  a new attack that has broken Kasumi, the encryption algorithm used to secure traffic on 3G GSM wireless networks.
The technique enables them to recover a full key by using a tactic known as a related-key attack, but experts say it is not the end of the world for Kasumi.
Kasumi, also known as A5/3, is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks, and it's a modified version of an older algorithm called Misty.
In the abstract of their paper, the cryptographers say the attack can be implemented easily on one standard PC.
'In this paper we describe a new type of attack called a sandwich attack, and use it to construct a simple distinguisher for 7 of the 8 rounds of KASUMI with an amazingly high probability of 214.
By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round, we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4 related keys, 226 data, 230 bytes of memory, and 232 time.
These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC, and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity.
'"</sentencetext>
</article>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737828</id>
	<title>Re:Shamir and his techniques</title>
	<author>radtea</author>
	<datestamp>1263314700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><i>This is the danger with cutting and pasting mathematics.</i></p><p>Actually it's a danger with getting your tech news from a site with no editorial oversight, or at best editors who have so little clue about the subject that they let nonsense like this get through (I know zip about cryptography, but knew enough that the values in the summary made no sense, although not enough to infer the correct values.  That's how low the bar is that the<nobr> <wbr></nobr>/. editors fail to reach.)</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This is the danger with cutting and pasting mathematics.Actually it 's a danger with getting your tech news from a site with no editorial oversight , or at best editors who have so little clue about the subject that they let nonsense like this get through ( I know zip about cryptography , but knew enough that the values in the summary made no sense , although not enough to infer the correct values .
That 's how low the bar is that the / .
editors fail to reach .
)</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This is the danger with cutting and pasting mathematics.Actually it's a danger with getting your tech news from a site with no editorial oversight, or at best editors who have so little clue about the subject that they let nonsense like this get through (I know zip about cryptography, but knew enough that the values in the summary made no sense, although not enough to infer the correct values.
That's how low the bar is that the /.
editors fail to reach.
)</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737096</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737054</id>
	<title>Re:3G GSM ?</title>
	<author>Verdatum</author>
	<datestamp>1263311580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>3G GSM is frequently used interchangeably to refer to 3GPP implementation of 3G, which is UMTS.</htmltext>
<tokenext>3G GSM is frequently used interchangeably to refer to 3GPP implementation of 3G , which is UMTS .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>3G GSM is frequently used interchangeably to refer to 3GPP implementation of 3G, which is UMTS.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736312</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736502</id>
	<title>Re:Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263309180000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Flamebait</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Even worse than the fact that they typoed a 3 letter word is that they didn't fatfinger it, they instead somehow confused their index finger with their middle finger.<br>Oh Slashdot contributors, how do your brains operate on anything higher than a limbic level, I'll never know.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Even worse than the fact that they typoed a 3 letter word is that they did n't fatfinger it , they instead somehow confused their index finger with their middle finger.Oh Slashdot contributors , how do your brains operate on anything higher than a limbic level , I 'll never know .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Even worse than the fact that they typoed a 3 letter word is that they didn't fatfinger it, they instead somehow confused their index finger with their middle finger.Oh Slashdot contributors, how do your brains operate on anything higher than a limbic level, I'll never know.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736638</id>
	<title>Actually</title>
	<author>Rikiji7</author>
	<datestamp>1263309900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Redundant</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>Source says:<p><nobr> <wbr></nobr></p><div class="quote"><p>...by using only 4 related keys, 2^26 data, 2^30 bytes of memory, and 2^32 time.</p></div><p>Copy-paste lost some exponentials...</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Source says : ...by using only 4 related keys , 2 ^ 26 data , 2 ^ 30 bytes of memory , and 2 ^ 32 time.Copy-paste lost some exponentials.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Source says: ...by using only 4 related keys, 2^26 data, 2^30 bytes of memory, and 2^32 time.Copy-paste lost some exponentials...
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737846</id>
	<title>Freaking ninja cryptographers!</title>
	<author>Max(10)</author>
	<datestamp>1263314820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>For a nanosecond I was worried that Mugen Tenshin ninja cryptographers had attacked <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kasumi\_(Dead\_or\_Alive\_character)" title="wikipedia.org" rel="nofollow">Kasumi</a> [wikipedia.org]!</htmltext>
<tokenext>For a nanosecond I was worried that Mugen Tenshin ninja cryptographers had attacked Kasumi [ wikipedia.org ] !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>For a nanosecond I was worried that Mugen Tenshin ninja cryptographers had attacked Kasumi [wikipedia.org]!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736758</id>
	<title>Re:Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>Jurily</author>
	<datestamp>1263310440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Mr. eldavojohn, you're under arrest for violating the Slashdot Anti-Proofreading Act.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Mr. eldavojohn , you 're under arrest for violating the Slashdot Anti-Proofreading Act .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Mr. eldavojohn, you're under arrest for violating the Slashdot Anti-Proofreading Act.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737742</id>
	<title>Re:Shamir and his techniques</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263314400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Both Orr and Nathan are post-docs. That said, I am sure they spent lots of time working hard on this one.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Both Orr and Nathan are post-docs .
That said , I am sure they spent lots of time working hard on this one .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Both Orr and Nathan are post-docs.
That said, I am sure they spent lots of time working hard on this one.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737096</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736524</id>
	<title>Re: Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>error\_frey</author>
	<datestamp>1263309360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>It should be 2^(-14)</htmltext>
<tokenext>It should be 2 ^ ( -14 )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It should be 2^(-14)</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736448</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737132</id>
	<title>Re:3G GSM ?</title>
	<author>genik76</author>
	<datestamp>1263311820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>3G GSM is shorthand for "3G and GSM".</htmltext>
<tokenext>3G GSM is shorthand for " 3G and GSM " .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>3G GSM is shorthand for "3G and GSM".</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736312</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30740140</id>
	<title>Re:EN\_UK and EN\_US</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263322740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>I would like to agree with lnf0phreak, and point out the reason for the difference:<br>
<br>
British English, "A group" is considered plural, because it is made of numerous individuals.<br>
<br>
American English, "A group" is singular, because there is only one group.<br>
<br>
Both can be considered correct, just different conventions, really.</htmltext>
<tokenext>I would like to agree with lnf0phreak , and point out the reason for the difference : British English , " A group " is considered plural , because it is made of numerous individuals .
American English , " A group " is singular , because there is only one group .
Both can be considered correct , just different conventions , really .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I would like to agree with lnf0phreak, and point out the reason for the difference:

British English, "A group" is considered plural, because it is made of numerous individuals.
American English, "A group" is singular, because there is only one group.
Both can be considered correct, just different conventions, really.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737056</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737592</id>
	<title>Re:3G GSM ?</title>
	<author>LucidBeast</author>
	<datestamp>1263313740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>UMTS allows operator to choose chiphers as long as it confirms to the 3GPP specification
see: <a href="http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33105.htm" title="3gpp.org">http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33105.htm</a> [3gpp.org] .
<p>
All 3G cards I've seen have used rijndael (AES).</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>UMTS allows operator to choose chiphers as long as it confirms to the 3GPP specification see : http : //www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33105.htm [ 3gpp.org ] .
All 3G cards I 've seen have used rijndael ( AES ) .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>UMTS allows operator to choose chiphers as long as it confirms to the 3GPP specification
see: http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33105.htm [3gpp.org] .
All 3G cards I've seen have used rijndael (AES).</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736312</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737324</id>
	<title>Gotta crack 'em all!</title>
	<author>Pluvius</author>
	<datestamp>1263312600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><i>Kasumi, also known as A5/3, is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks, and it's a modified version of an older algorithm called Misty.</i></p><p>OK, who's the dork who named these?</p><p>Rob</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Kasumi , also known as A5/3 , is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks , and it 's a modified version of an older algorithm called Misty.OK , who 's the dork who named these ? Rob</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Kasumi, also known as A5/3, is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks, and it's a modified version of an older algorithm called Misty.OK, who's the dork who named these?Rob</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736312</id>
	<title>3G GSM ?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263307980000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>Kasumi, also known as A5/3, is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networks</p></div></blockquote><p>What is 3G GSM ? As far as I know GSM is a 2G standard.</p><p>This encryption is also used in UMTS, which is the successor of GSM and a 3G standard.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Kasumi , also known as A5/3 , is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networksWhat is 3G GSM ?
As far as I know GSM is a 2G standard.This encryption is also used in UMTS , which is the successor of GSM and a 3G standard .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Kasumi, also known as A5/3, is the standard cipher used to encrypt communications on 3G GSM networksWhat is 3G GSM ?
As far as I know GSM is a 2G standard.This encryption is also used in UMTS, which is the successor of GSM and a 3G standard.
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736448</id>
	<title>Re: Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>gidds</author>
	<datestamp>1263308940000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>That makes a lot more sense.
<br> <br>
Doesn't explain how you can have a probability of 214, though.  And a probability of 2^14 would just be worse.</htmltext>
<tokenext>That makes a lot more sense .
Does n't explain how you can have a probability of 214 , though .
And a probability of 2 ^ 14 would just be worse .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>That makes a lot more sense.
Doesn't explain how you can have a probability of 214, though.
And a probability of 2^14 would just be worse.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736990</id>
	<title>Re:Language lesson first...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263311400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The phrase "a group" is singular. So it's "a group of cryptographers has developed". Without the phrase "a group" making it singular, it would be "cryptographers have developed".</p><p>(Really, niggling about the grammar when there are so many other errors in the summary...)</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The phrase " a group " is singular .
So it 's " a group of cryptographers has developed " .
Without the phrase " a group " making it singular , it would be " cryptographers have developed " .
( Really , niggling about the grammar when there are so many other errors in the summary... )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The phrase "a group" is singular.
So it's "a group of cryptographers has developed".
Without the phrase "a group" making it singular, it would be "cryptographers have developed".
(Really, niggling about the grammar when there are so many other errors in the summary...)</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736844</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737096</id>
	<title>Shamir and his techniques</title>
	<author>dachshund</author>
	<datestamp>1263311700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>First of all, the amazingly high probability should be 2^14 (or 1/2^14 = 1 / 16,384), not "214".  This is the danger with cutting and pasting mathematics.  In a slightly simplified explanation, distinguishing attacks work by looking at encrypted data and trying to distinguish it from random bits.  This means that the distinguisher succeeds with the probability above, which may not seem very high, but believe me --- it's much higher than what it should be for a cipher like this.  And as they show, efficient distinguishing attacks can lead to nastier things like key recovery.</p><p>I saw Adi Shamir stand up in front of a crowd at Crypto 2008 and introduce a new set of techniques he and his colleagues had developed for simplifying complex algebraic equations.  People jokingly asked him if he thought it might work against AES (yes, it <a href="http://blog.pgp.com/index.php/tag/adi-shamir/" title="pgp.com">did</a> [pgp.com]).  I haven't seen this paper, but my guess is that they're running around applying their techniques to everything they can find.  And so Kasumi bites the dust.  (Meaning that I must update my course slides, agh.)</p><p>More to the point, this is unlikely to be a practical issue right now because it's a related key attack.  You have to encrypt something with multiple keys that are closely related (similar in many respects) before the attack applies.  This usually doesn't happen unless the implementers are idiots.  But the point is that it's bad news --- related key attacks are the camel's nose under the tent for much worse things to come.  I'd say they should upgrade to AES, but I'm not even sure if that's a great idea<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:)</p><p>Oh, and I'm doing the thing I hate the most: giving the senior person all the credit.  No doubt an equal or greater share of the credit goes to Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller, his hungry PhD student and post-doc who probably spent the last zillion hours of their lives working this out in their lab only to see people like me attribute all of their work to Shamir.  Good job, guys.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>First of all , the amazingly high probability should be 2 ^ 14 ( or 1/2 ^ 14 = 1 / 16,384 ) , not " 214 " .
This is the danger with cutting and pasting mathematics .
In a slightly simplified explanation , distinguishing attacks work by looking at encrypted data and trying to distinguish it from random bits .
This means that the distinguisher succeeds with the probability above , which may not seem very high , but believe me --- it 's much higher than what it should be for a cipher like this .
And as they show , efficient distinguishing attacks can lead to nastier things like key recovery.I saw Adi Shamir stand up in front of a crowd at Crypto 2008 and introduce a new set of techniques he and his colleagues had developed for simplifying complex algebraic equations .
People jokingly asked him if he thought it might work against AES ( yes , it did [ pgp.com ] ) .
I have n't seen this paper , but my guess is that they 're running around applying their techniques to everything they can find .
And so Kasumi bites the dust .
( Meaning that I must update my course slides , agh .
) More to the point , this is unlikely to be a practical issue right now because it 's a related key attack .
You have to encrypt something with multiple keys that are closely related ( similar in many respects ) before the attack applies .
This usually does n't happen unless the implementers are idiots .
But the point is that it 's bad news --- related key attacks are the camel 's nose under the tent for much worse things to come .
I 'd say they should upgrade to AES , but I 'm not even sure if that 's a great idea : ) Oh , and I 'm doing the thing I hate the most : giving the senior person all the credit .
No doubt an equal or greater share of the credit goes to Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller , his hungry PhD student and post-doc who probably spent the last zillion hours of their lives working this out in their lab only to see people like me attribute all of their work to Shamir .
Good job , guys .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>First of all, the amazingly high probability should be 2^14 (or 1/2^14 = 1 / 16,384), not "214".
This is the danger with cutting and pasting mathematics.
In a slightly simplified explanation, distinguishing attacks work by looking at encrypted data and trying to distinguish it from random bits.
This means that the distinguisher succeeds with the probability above, which may not seem very high, but believe me --- it's much higher than what it should be for a cipher like this.
And as they show, efficient distinguishing attacks can lead to nastier things like key recovery.I saw Adi Shamir stand up in front of a crowd at Crypto 2008 and introduce a new set of techniques he and his colleagues had developed for simplifying complex algebraic equations.
People jokingly asked him if he thought it might work against AES (yes, it did [pgp.com]).
I haven't seen this paper, but my guess is that they're running around applying their techniques to everything they can find.
And so Kasumi bites the dust.
(Meaning that I must update my course slides, agh.
)More to the point, this is unlikely to be a practical issue right now because it's a related key attack.
You have to encrypt something with multiple keys that are closely related (similar in many respects) before the attack applies.
This usually doesn't happen unless the implementers are idiots.
But the point is that it's bad news --- related key attacks are the camel's nose under the tent for much worse things to come.
I'd say they should upgrade to AES, but I'm not even sure if that's a great idea :)Oh, and I'm doing the thing I hate the most: giving the senior person all the credit.
No doubt an equal or greater share of the credit goes to Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller, his hungry PhD student and post-doc who probably spent the last zillion hours of their lives working this out in their lab only to see people like me attribute all of their work to Shamir.
Good job, guys.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736844</id>
	<title>Language lesson first...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263310800000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>"A group of cryptographers <b>has</b> developed...."</p></div>
</blockquote><p>
Shouldn't this be "have"?. I admit English is not my first language, but I think I remember those 3rd grade chapters.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>" A group of cryptographers has developed.... " Should n't this be " have " ? .
I admit English is not my first language , but I think I remember those 3rd grade chapters .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"A group of cryptographers has developed...."

Shouldn't this be "have"?.
I admit English is not my first language, but I think I remember those 3rd grade chapters.
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736266</id>
	<title>Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>eldavojohn</author>
	<datestamp>1263307680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>The technique enables them to recover a full key by using a tactic known as a <b>related-hey</b> attack<nobr> <wbr></nobr>...</p> </div><p>Certainly you meant <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Related-key\_attack" title="wikipedia.org">related-key attack</a> [wikipedia.org] since <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/013.pdf" title="iacr.org">the paper</a> [iacr.org] by and large discusses related key attacks before explaining their sandwich attack.</p><p><div class="quote"><p>These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC, and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity.</p></div><p>To give you more specific numbers from the conclusion of the paper:</p><p><div class="quote"><p>By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round, we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4 related keys, 226 data, 230 bytes of memory, and 232 time.</p></div><p>Er, I believe you meant to say 4 related keys, 2^26 data, 2^30 bytes of memory and 2^32 time.  As you will see in the conclusion of the paper:</p><p><div class="quote"><p>In this paper we develop a new sandwich attack on iterated block ciphers, and use
it to reduce the time complexity of the best known attack on the full KASUMI
from an impractical 2^76 to the very practical 2^32.</p></div><p>After all a time complexity of 232 should take any computer at most a few seconds while 2^32 approaches the two hour-ish mark.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>The technique enables them to recover a full key by using a tactic known as a related-hey attack ... Certainly you meant related-key attack [ wikipedia.org ] since the paper [ iacr.org ] by and large discusses related key attacks before explaining their sandwich attack.These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC , and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity.To give you more specific numbers from the conclusion of the paper : By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round , we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4 related keys , 226 data , 230 bytes of memory , and 232 time.Er , I believe you meant to say 4 related keys , 2 ^ 26 data , 2 ^ 30 bytes of memory and 2 ^ 32 time .
As you will see in the conclusion of the paper : In this paper we develop a new sandwich attack on iterated block ciphers , and use it to reduce the time complexity of the best known attack on the full KASUMI from an impractical 2 ^ 76 to the very practical 2 ^ 32.After all a time complexity of 232 should take any computer at most a few seconds while 2 ^ 32 approaches the two hour-ish mark .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The technique enables them to recover a full key by using a tactic known as a related-hey attack ... Certainly you meant related-key attack [wikipedia.org] since the paper [iacr.org] by and large discusses related key attacks before explaining their sandwich attack.These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC, and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity.To give you more specific numbers from the conclusion of the paper:By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round, we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4 related keys, 226 data, 230 bytes of memory, and 232 time.Er, I believe you meant to say 4 related keys, 2^26 data, 2^30 bytes of memory and 2^32 time.
As you will see in the conclusion of the paper:In this paper we develop a new sandwich attack on iterated block ciphers, and use
it to reduce the time complexity of the best known attack on the full KASUMI
from an impractical 2^76 to the very practical 2^32.After all a time complexity of 232 should take any computer at most a few seconds while 2^32 approaches the two hour-ish mark.
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30739600</id>
	<title>Re:3G GSM ?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263320760000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>UMTS is still a specification from the GSMA.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>UMTS is still a specification from the GSMA .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>UMTS is still a specification from the GSMA.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736312</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736950</id>
	<title>Related hey attack?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263311220000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Would that be a 'needle in a hey-stack' attack?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Would that be a 'needle in a hey-stack ' attack ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Would that be a 'needle in a hey-stack' attack?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30738620</id>
	<title>Ahem.</title>
	<author>QuoteMstr</author>
	<datestamp>1263317460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Just as <a href="http://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=1491648&amp;cid=30578558" title="slashdot.org">I was saying</a> [slashdot.org], <i>just use AES</i>, and <b>never</b> roll your own cryptography.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Just as I was saying [ slashdot.org ] , just use AES , and never roll your own cryptography .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Just as I was saying [slashdot.org], just use AES, and never roll your own cryptography.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736716</id>
	<title>And the first decryption yielded this....</title>
	<author>SpurtyBurger</author>
	<datestamp>1263310260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>"I'm on the train..."</htmltext>
<tokenext>" I 'm on the train... "</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"I'm on the train..."</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30744314</id>
	<title>Re:Shamir and his techniques</title>
	<author>HonestButCurious</author>
	<datestamp>1263298440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>More to the point, this is unlikely to be a practical issue right now because it's a related key attack.  You have to encrypt something with multiple keys that are closely related (similar in many respects) before the attack applies.  This usually doesn't happen unless the implementers are idiots.  </p></div><p>Related key attacks are very feasible if a block cipher is used as a building block for a hash function.  FYI <a href="http://www.xbox-linux.org/wiki/17\_Mistakes\_Microsoft\_Made\_in\_the\_Xbox\_Security\_System#Startup\_Security.2C\_Take\_Two" title="xbox-linux.org" rel="nofollow">XBOX was broken</a> [xbox-linux.org] with a related key attack.</p><p>(credit goes to Orr Dunkelman for finding this out)</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>More to the point , this is unlikely to be a practical issue right now because it 's a related key attack .
You have to encrypt something with multiple keys that are closely related ( similar in many respects ) before the attack applies .
This usually does n't happen unless the implementers are idiots .
Related key attacks are very feasible if a block cipher is used as a building block for a hash function .
FYI XBOX was broken [ xbox-linux.org ] with a related key attack .
( credit goes to Orr Dunkelman for finding this out )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>More to the point, this is unlikely to be a practical issue right now because it's a related key attack.
You have to encrypt something with multiple keys that are closely related (similar in many respects) before the attack applies.
This usually doesn't happen unless the implementers are idiots.
Related key attacks are very feasible if a block cipher is used as a building block for a hash function.
FYI XBOX was broken [xbox-linux.org] with a related key attack.
(credit goes to Orr Dunkelman for finding this out)
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737096</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737048</id>
	<title>Re:Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263311580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>poop</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>poop</tokentext>
<sentencetext>poop</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736598</id>
	<title>Coping, pasting and typesetting</title>
	<author>sakonofie</author>
	<datestamp>1263309660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p> with an amazingly high probability of 214.</p></div><p>Yep that is amazing. Not the same thing as 2^(-14). Not at all.
<br>
<br>

(And just to preempt some wise ass C programmer, I do not mean -16.)</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>with an amazingly high probability of 214.Yep that is amazing .
Not the same thing as 2 ^ ( -14 ) .
Not at all .
( And just to preempt some wise ass C programmer , I do not mean -16 .
)</tokentext>
<sentencetext> with an amazingly high probability of 214.Yep that is amazing.
Not the same thing as 2^(-14).
Not at all.
(And just to preempt some wise ass C programmer, I do not mean -16.
)
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736996</id>
	<title>The probability is not 214</title>
	<author>RandCraw</author>
	<datestamp>1263311400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The probability should be p=2^-14.  A p value of 214 would be an amazingly <i>low</i> probability.</p><p>This is why we computer scientists need to study more math.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The probability should be p = 2 ^ -14 .
A p value of 214 would be an amazingly low probability.This is why we computer scientists need to study more math .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The probability should be p=2^-14.
A p value of 214 would be an amazingly low probability.This is why we computer scientists need to study more math.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736442</id>
	<title>Re:Related-Key and Original Paper</title>
	<author>blee37</author>
	<datestamp>1263308880000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>Note that Adi Shamir is the "S" in RSA.  The other two authors are from the Weizmann Institute and Hebrew University.

Though the paper is not public yet, these guys seem like genuine crypto all stars.

<a href="http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2010/01/another\_week\_another\_gsm.html" title="emergentchaos.com" rel="nofollow">http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2010/01/another\_week\_another\_gsm.html</a> [emergentchaos.com]</htmltext>
<tokenext>Note that Adi Shamir is the " S " in RSA .
The other two authors are from the Weizmann Institute and Hebrew University .
Though the paper is not public yet , these guys seem like genuine crypto all stars .
http : //www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2010/01/another \ _week \ _another \ _gsm.html [ emergentchaos.com ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Note that Adi Shamir is the "S" in RSA.
The other two authors are from the Weizmann Institute and Hebrew University.
Though the paper is not public yet, these guys seem like genuine crypto all stars.
http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2010/01/another\_week\_another\_gsm.html [emergentchaos.com]</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30738142</id>
	<title>Like it was private to begin with</title>
	<author>papasui</author>
	<datestamp>1263315840000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>If you think your phone calls were secure to begin with (at least in the US), man I have a couple bridges for sale.   Everything you say on a phone, anything you do online can be intercepted by the Feds.  Here's just one example of methods implemented in carrier-level equipment that specifically allows ease-dropping.  <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful\_interception" title="wikipedia.org">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful\_interception</a> [wikipedia.org]</htmltext>
<tokenext>If you think your phone calls were secure to begin with ( at least in the US ) , man I have a couple bridges for sale .
Everything you say on a phone , anything you do online can be intercepted by the Feds .
Here 's just one example of methods implemented in carrier-level equipment that specifically allows ease-dropping .
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful \ _interception [ wikipedia.org ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If you think your phone calls were secure to begin with (at least in the US), man I have a couple bridges for sale.
Everything you say on a phone, anything you do online can be intercepted by the Feds.
Here's just one example of methods implemented in carrier-level equipment that specifically allows ease-dropping.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful\_interception [wikipedia.org]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736530</id>
	<title>Again, Failing ...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1263309360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><i>with an amazingly high probability of 214</i>
<br> <br>
O.K., the abstract from TFA says 1/2^14, but I still fail to see how this is 'amazingly high'.
<br> <br>
CC.</htmltext>
<tokenext>with an amazingly high probability of 214 O.K. , the abstract from TFA says 1/2 ^ 14 , but I still fail to see how this is 'amazingly high' .
CC .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>with an amazingly high probability of 214
 
O.K., the abstract from TFA says 1/2^14, but I still fail to see how this is 'amazingly high'.
CC.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30740538</id>
	<title>Re:Language lesson first...</title>
	<author>Paul Jakma</author>
	<datestamp>1263324180000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Yes you're right.</p><p>Collective nouns generally are plural. Some nouns are treated as singular, even when you could consider them as groupings. Where the line lies is somewhat subjective. Wrt group, it's very emphatically a collective noun and there should be very little reason to want to  consider it a singular, distinct entity from its constituents.</p><p>Another example are companies. It is acceptable to consider these too as plural collectives, e.g. "My company have developed", or "ACMEs' products" (note the placing of the possessive '), indeed it was the normal usage once upon a time. However, the tendency to treat companies as singular, distinct things is becoming (has become) the norm in British english too. It seems nicer to use the plural to me, as it reinforces the idea that companies are not single-minded entities.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Yes you 're right.Collective nouns generally are plural .
Some nouns are treated as singular , even when you could consider them as groupings .
Where the line lies is somewhat subjective .
Wrt group , it 's very emphatically a collective noun and there should be very little reason to want to consider it a singular , distinct entity from its constituents.Another example are companies .
It is acceptable to consider these too as plural collectives , e.g .
" My company have developed " , or " ACMEs ' products " ( note the placing of the possessive ' ) , indeed it was the normal usage once upon a time .
However , the tendency to treat companies as singular , distinct things is becoming ( has become ) the norm in British english too .
It seems nicer to use the plural to me , as it reinforces the idea that companies are not single-minded entities .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Yes you're right.Collective nouns generally are plural.
Some nouns are treated as singular, even when you could consider them as groupings.
Where the line lies is somewhat subjective.
Wrt group, it's very emphatically a collective noun and there should be very little reason to want to  consider it a singular, distinct entity from its constituents.Another example are companies.
It is acceptable to consider these too as plural collectives, e.g.
"My company have developed", or "ACMEs' products" (note the placing of the possessive '), indeed it was the normal usage once upon a time.
However, the tendency to treat companies as singular, distinct things is becoming (has become) the norm in British english too.
It seems nicer to use the plural to me, as it reinforces the idea that companies are not single-minded entities.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736844</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737056</id>
	<title>EN\_UK and EN\_US</title>
	<author>Inf0phreak</author>
	<datestamp>1263311580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>
In British English, 'have' is indeed correct. US English is a bit different in this regard IIRC.
</p><p>
"Arsenal have defeated<nobr> <wbr></nobr>..." vs. "Arsenal has defeated<nobr> <wbr></nobr>..."
</p><p>
At least that's how I remember it from over a decade ago.
</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>In British English , 'have ' is indeed correct .
US English is a bit different in this regard IIRC .
" Arsenal have defeated ... " vs. " Arsenal has defeated ... " At least that 's how I remember it from over a decade ago .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>
In British English, 'have' is indeed correct.
US English is a bit different in this regard IIRC.
"Arsenal have defeated ..." vs. "Arsenal has defeated ..."

At least that's how I remember it from over a decade ago.
</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736844</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30737502</id>
	<title>Re:Again, Failing ...</title>
	<author>marcansoft</author>
	<datestamp>1263313380000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Hint: it takes on the order of milliseconds for a computer to do something 2^14 = 16384 times.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Hint : it takes on the order of milliseconds for a computer to do something 2 ^ 14 = 16384 times .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Hint: it takes on the order of milliseconds for a computer to do something 2^14 = 16384 times.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment10_01_12_134225.30736530</parent>
</comment>
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