<article>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#article09_12_27_1526256</id>
	<title>Security In the Ether</title>
	<author>Soulskill</author>
	<datestamp>1261934100000</datestamp>
	<htmltext>theodp writes <i>"Technology Review's David Talbot says <a href="http://www.technologyreview.com/web/24166/">IT's next grand challenge will be to secure the cloud &mdash; and prove we can trust it</a>. 'The focus of IT innovation has shifted from hardware to software applications,' says Harvard economist Dale Jorgenson. 'Many of these applications are going on at a blistering pace, and cloud computing is going to be a great facilitative technology for a lot of these people.' But there's one little catch. 'None of this can happen unless cloud services are kept secure,' notes Talbot. 'And they are not.' Fully ensuring the security of cloud computing, says Talbot, will inevitably fall to <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9134823/IBM\_touts\_encryption\_innovation">emerging encryption technologies</a>."</i></htmltext>
<tokenext>theodp writes " Technology Review 's David Talbot says IT 's next grand challenge will be to secure the cloud    and prove we can trust it .
'The focus of IT innovation has shifted from hardware to software applications, ' says Harvard economist Dale Jorgenson .
'Many of these applications are going on at a blistering pace , and cloud computing is going to be a great facilitative technology for a lot of these people .
' But there 's one little catch .
'None of this can happen unless cloud services are kept secure, ' notes Talbot .
'And they are not .
' Fully ensuring the security of cloud computing , says Talbot , will inevitably fall to emerging encryption technologies .
"</tokentext>
<sentencetext>theodp writes "Technology Review's David Talbot says IT's next grand challenge will be to secure the cloud — and prove we can trust it.
'The focus of IT innovation has shifted from hardware to software applications,' says Harvard economist Dale Jorgenson.
'Many of these applications are going on at a blistering pace, and cloud computing is going to be a great facilitative technology for a lot of these people.
' But there's one little catch.
'None of this can happen unless cloud services are kept secure,' notes Talbot.
'And they are not.
' Fully ensuring the security of cloud computing, says Talbot, will inevitably fall to emerging encryption technologies.
"</sentencetext>
</article>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30574310</id>
	<title>Re:Whom are we securing it from?</title>
	<author>lsatenstein</author>
	<datestamp>1262030940000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>Why do you think that data stored on a Chinese server is less secure then one stored on a USA server. All one needs is the URL. The same software, given the URL, will circumvent the security system in place.  (A bribe could be paid to get the encryption keys for either site).

Ho Ho Ho,  Merry Christmas and Happy New Year</htmltext>
<tokenext>Why do you think that data stored on a Chinese server is less secure then one stored on a USA server .
All one needs is the URL .
The same software , given the URL , will circumvent the security system in place .
( A bribe could be paid to get the encryption keys for either site ) .
Ho Ho Ho , Merry Christmas and Happy New Year</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Why do you think that data stored on a Chinese server is less secure then one stored on a USA server.
All one needs is the URL.
The same software, given the URL, will circumvent the security system in place.
(A bribe could be paid to get the encryption keys for either site).
Ho Ho Ho,  Merry Christmas and Happy New Year</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564006</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564016</id>
	<title>Security aside...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261938420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Would you trust other companies to manage your electronic secrets?</p><p>I would never, no matter what promise.</p><p>Besides, we all know the track-records of the companies offering this and they are real bad at least in my opinion.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Would you trust other companies to manage your electronic secrets ? I would never , no matter what promise.Besides , we all know the track-records of the companies offering this and they are real bad at least in my opinion .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Would you trust other companies to manage your electronic secrets?I would never, no matter what promise.Besides, we all know the track-records of the companies offering this and they are real bad at least in my opinion.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564006</id>
	<title>Whom are we securing it from?</title>
	<author>bschorr</author>
	<datestamp>1261938360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext>Part of the problem is that with Cloud Computing you have a much broader set of "enemies" to secure your data from.  It's naturally in the interests of cloud/SaaS providers, who are selling an increasingly commodity product, to look for ways to cut their costs.  They have price pressure from consumers and competitors so like any business you can bet they're looking for the cheapest providers they can for the services they require.  Unfortunately that cost-cutting and corner-cutting will lead to new and different security challenges.<br><br>For example: all but the largest will be outsourcing their data centers. And when they outsource that storage will they find the same sort of pricing structures, perhaps on a different scale, that everybody else does - it is attractive, from a price perspective, to off-shore that data to places where it's just cheaper to run.  One of the strengths of the Internet is how it shrinks the planet in that regard.  But there has recently been a big debate about whether or not the 4th Amendment in the U.S. protects hosted e-mail from search and seizure by the U.S. government.  What does the 4th Amendment in Malaysia protect against?<br><br>What if your biggest competitor in your particular industry is a Chinese company and your Cloud provider decides to store your data on a server located in China.  Do you suppose the Chinese gov't might be able to access (or monitor) your data and provide any of it to their company?<br><br>Even if your data stays on a domestic server and your business is entirely legitimate - most Cloud providers are multi-tenant (that's the economy of scale that helps them keep prices down).  What if one of the other tenants on that server is doing something naughty and the government decides to seize the server to go after them.  Will your data be safe and protected?  They're the government, right?  OF COURSE your data will be handled properly.<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:-)  Uh huh.<br><br>Another big topic is document retention.  You want to keep documents as long as you need to and then expire those documents.  Will your SaaS/Cloud provider respect your document retention policies?  Or are you going to discover, hopefully not after being served with a discovery request, that they actually have copies of your expired documents in cache or on backups somewhere that they never destroyed?<br><br>There are a LOT of new security issues that come up when you essentially put your data at arm's length with no real idea of where it's physically stored or who has access to those servers.  I'll close with a quote:<br><br>"If (CIO) Randy Mott told me 'Put the general ledger up in the Cloud' I'd say 'Go back to work, we're not doing that."<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; -Mark Hurd, CEO of Hewlett Packard-</div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Part of the problem is that with Cloud Computing you have a much broader set of " enemies " to secure your data from .
It 's naturally in the interests of cloud/SaaS providers , who are selling an increasingly commodity product , to look for ways to cut their costs .
They have price pressure from consumers and competitors so like any business you can bet they 're looking for the cheapest providers they can for the services they require .
Unfortunately that cost-cutting and corner-cutting will lead to new and different security challenges.For example : all but the largest will be outsourcing their data centers .
And when they outsource that storage will they find the same sort of pricing structures , perhaps on a different scale , that everybody else does - it is attractive , from a price perspective , to off-shore that data to places where it 's just cheaper to run .
One of the strengths of the Internet is how it shrinks the planet in that regard .
But there has recently been a big debate about whether or not the 4th Amendment in the U.S. protects hosted e-mail from search and seizure by the U.S. government. What does the 4th Amendment in Malaysia protect against ? What if your biggest competitor in your particular industry is a Chinese company and your Cloud provider decides to store your data on a server located in China .
Do you suppose the Chinese gov't might be able to access ( or monitor ) your data and provide any of it to their company ? Even if your data stays on a domestic server and your business is entirely legitimate - most Cloud providers are multi-tenant ( that 's the economy of scale that helps them keep prices down ) .
What if one of the other tenants on that server is doing something naughty and the government decides to seize the server to go after them .
Will your data be safe and protected ?
They 're the government , right ?
OF COURSE your data will be handled properly .
: - ) Uh huh.Another big topic is document retention .
You want to keep documents as long as you need to and then expire those documents .
Will your SaaS/Cloud provider respect your document retention policies ?
Or are you going to discover , hopefully not after being served with a discovery request , that they actually have copies of your expired documents in cache or on backups somewhere that they never destroyed ? There are a LOT of new security issues that come up when you essentially put your data at arm 's length with no real idea of where it 's physically stored or who has access to those servers .
I 'll close with a quote : " If ( CIO ) Randy Mott told me 'Put the general ledger up in the Cloud ' I 'd say 'Go back to work , we 're not doing that .
"             -Mark Hurd , CEO of Hewlett Packard-</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Part of the problem is that with Cloud Computing you have a much broader set of "enemies" to secure your data from.
It's naturally in the interests of cloud/SaaS providers, who are selling an increasingly commodity product, to look for ways to cut their costs.
They have price pressure from consumers and competitors so like any business you can bet they're looking for the cheapest providers they can for the services they require.
Unfortunately that cost-cutting and corner-cutting will lead to new and different security challenges.For example: all but the largest will be outsourcing their data centers.
And when they outsource that storage will they find the same sort of pricing structures, perhaps on a different scale, that everybody else does - it is attractive, from a price perspective, to off-shore that data to places where it's just cheaper to run.
One of the strengths of the Internet is how it shrinks the planet in that regard.
But there has recently been a big debate about whether or not the 4th Amendment in the U.S. protects hosted e-mail from search and seizure by the U.S. government.  What does the 4th Amendment in Malaysia protect against?What if your biggest competitor in your particular industry is a Chinese company and your Cloud provider decides to store your data on a server located in China.
Do you suppose the Chinese gov't might be able to access (or monitor) your data and provide any of it to their company?Even if your data stays on a domestic server and your business is entirely legitimate - most Cloud providers are multi-tenant (that's the economy of scale that helps them keep prices down).
What if one of the other tenants on that server is doing something naughty and the government decides to seize the server to go after them.
Will your data be safe and protected?
They're the government, right?
OF COURSE your data will be handled properly.
:-)  Uh huh.Another big topic is document retention.
You want to keep documents as long as you need to and then expire those documents.
Will your SaaS/Cloud provider respect your document retention policies?
Or are you going to discover, hopefully not after being served with a discovery request, that they actually have copies of your expired documents in cache or on backups somewhere that they never destroyed?There are a LOT of new security issues that come up when you essentially put your data at arm's length with no real idea of where it's physically stored or who has access to those servers.
I'll close with a quote:"If (CIO) Randy Mott told me 'Put the general ledger up in the Cloud' I'd say 'Go back to work, we're not doing that.
"
            -Mark Hurd, CEO of Hewlett Packard-
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30571016</id>
	<title>Re:Never safe.</title>
	<author>sowth</author>
	<datestamp>1262015460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I don't get why it isn't obvious, but if you can't trust your hosting provider, you can't trust the server you run at their site. Period. If you can't trust them with the root password, then you shouldn't be hosting with them. They have physical access. Any 20 minute downtime (which you may never notice) could be them pulling the hard drive and cloning it, then putting it back.

</p><p>Even if you encrypt the hard drive, most likely they could stage a MITM attack one way or another to get the key. They can go to the point of emulating the machine on a hypervisor and access the RAM directly. <b>They have total physical and network control of the machine, so nothing can stop them</b>. It is like saying you don't trust your bank, but your safety deposit box is secure because they gave you a key.

</p><p>If you don't use a host you can trust, don't be surprised if they root your server or copy your private data. Just as if you can't trust your bank, don't be surprised if they funnel all your money into their personal accounts (such as charging absurdly high interest / fees and upper management giving themselves absurd multi-million dollar salaries and bonuses). Do research and try to find a company you can trust. If what you have is too valuable to be trusted with someone else, don't let them handle it.

</p><p>BTW, from the posts in that story, from what I understood, they wanted his root password because they <a href="http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=1490392&amp;cid=30557506" title="slashdot.org">moved his image to another computer</a> [slashdot.org] because the old one was flaky and they needed to install drivers on the new one to get it to boot, and the asshole was <a href="http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=1490392&amp;cid=30557564" title="slashdot.org">too cheap to pay their $35/day fee for virtual kvm access so he could do it himself</a> [slashdot.org].</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I do n't get why it is n't obvious , but if you ca n't trust your hosting provider , you ca n't trust the server you run at their site .
Period. If you ca n't trust them with the root password , then you should n't be hosting with them .
They have physical access .
Any 20 minute downtime ( which you may never notice ) could be them pulling the hard drive and cloning it , then putting it back .
Even if you encrypt the hard drive , most likely they could stage a MITM attack one way or another to get the key .
They can go to the point of emulating the machine on a hypervisor and access the RAM directly .
They have total physical and network control of the machine , so nothing can stop them .
It is like saying you do n't trust your bank , but your safety deposit box is secure because they gave you a key .
If you do n't use a host you can trust , do n't be surprised if they root your server or copy your private data .
Just as if you ca n't trust your bank , do n't be surprised if they funnel all your money into their personal accounts ( such as charging absurdly high interest / fees and upper management giving themselves absurd multi-million dollar salaries and bonuses ) .
Do research and try to find a company you can trust .
If what you have is too valuable to be trusted with someone else , do n't let them handle it .
BTW , from the posts in that story , from what I understood , they wanted his root password because they moved his image to another computer [ slashdot.org ] because the old one was flaky and they needed to install drivers on the new one to get it to boot , and the asshole was too cheap to pay their $ 35/day fee for virtual kvm access so he could do it himself [ slashdot.org ] .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I don't get why it isn't obvious, but if you can't trust your hosting provider, you can't trust the server you run at their site.
Period. If you can't trust them with the root password, then you shouldn't be hosting with them.
They have physical access.
Any 20 minute downtime (which you may never notice) could be them pulling the hard drive and cloning it, then putting it back.
Even if you encrypt the hard drive, most likely they could stage a MITM attack one way or another to get the key.
They can go to the point of emulating the machine on a hypervisor and access the RAM directly.
They have total physical and network control of the machine, so nothing can stop them.
It is like saying you don't trust your bank, but your safety deposit box is secure because they gave you a key.
If you don't use a host you can trust, don't be surprised if they root your server or copy your private data.
Just as if you can't trust your bank, don't be surprised if they funnel all your money into their personal accounts (such as charging absurdly high interest / fees and upper management giving themselves absurd multi-million dollar salaries and bonuses).
Do research and try to find a company you can trust.
If what you have is too valuable to be trusted with someone else, don't let them handle it.
BTW, from the posts in that story, from what I understood, they wanted his root password because they moved his image to another computer [slashdot.org] because the old one was flaky and they needed to install drivers on the new one to get it to boot, and the asshole was too cheap to pay their $35/day fee for virtual kvm access so he could do it himself [slashdot.org].</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564112</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30568198</id>
	<title>Re:TCP/IP is a cloud we trust</title>
	<author>noidentity</author>
	<datestamp>1261933560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>The problem here is that the remote machine is <i>decrypting</i> the data. If you don't trust that machine, how can you avoid interception of the data? I don't see a way to fully trust a cloud machine. The only thing you can use untrusted machines/connections for is transporting/storing encrypted+signed data. The encryption prevents them from reading the data, and the signing prevents them from forging it.</htmltext>
<tokenext>The problem here is that the remote machine is decrypting the data .
If you do n't trust that machine , how can you avoid interception of the data ?
I do n't see a way to fully trust a cloud machine .
The only thing you can use untrusted machines/connections for is transporting/storing encrypted + signed data .
The encryption prevents them from reading the data , and the signing prevents them from forging it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The problem here is that the remote machine is decrypting the data.
If you don't trust that machine, how can you avoid interception of the data?
I don't see a way to fully trust a cloud machine.
The only thing you can use untrusted machines/connections for is transporting/storing encrypted+signed data.
The encryption prevents them from reading the data, and the signing prevents them from forging it.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564058</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564280</id>
	<title>You Cannot Trust Anyone with your Data.</title>
	<author>lunchlady55</author>
	<datestamp>1261941060000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The problem is you can't trust anyone with your data. For the systems to do something (other than store) your data it must be unencrypted.  If it's unencrypted, it's not safe from prying eyes.  (Internal sysadmins and external eavesdroppers who have compromised systems in the cloud.) End of story.</p><p>Remember there's two kinds of trust, "I'm giving you they keys to the kingdom and I believe you won't do anything bad while I'm not looking," and "I've locked everything and I trust the locks will hold against malicious attackers."  You will never get trust #1 from anyone, especially not a corporation.  And I don't trust locks will hold ; )</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The problem is you ca n't trust anyone with your data .
For the systems to do something ( other than store ) your data it must be unencrypted .
If it 's unencrypted , it 's not safe from prying eyes .
( Internal sysadmins and external eavesdroppers who have compromised systems in the cloud .
) End of story.Remember there 's two kinds of trust , " I 'm giving you they keys to the kingdom and I believe you wo n't do anything bad while I 'm not looking , " and " I 've locked everything and I trust the locks will hold against malicious attackers .
" You will never get trust # 1 from anyone , especially not a corporation .
And I do n't trust locks will hold ; )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The problem is you can't trust anyone with your data.
For the systems to do something (other than store) your data it must be unencrypted.
If it's unencrypted, it's not safe from prying eyes.
(Internal sysadmins and external eavesdroppers who have compromised systems in the cloud.
) End of story.Remember there's two kinds of trust, "I'm giving you they keys to the kingdom and I believe you won't do anything bad while I'm not looking," and "I've locked everything and I trust the locks will hold against malicious attackers.
"  You will never get trust #1 from anyone, especially not a corporation.
And I don't trust locks will hold ; )</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30569704</id>
	<title>It's not the technology, stupid!</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1262003820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It's not the technology you can't trust, it's the people running it. If it's a cloud, you can't trust it.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's not the technology you ca n't trust , it 's the people running it .
If it 's a cloud , you ca n't trust it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's not the technology you can't trust, it's the people running it.
If it's a cloud, you can't trust it.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564038</id>
	<title>Off-topic, but...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261938660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Revenge is a whole meal now? When I was your age, revenge was only one dish.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Revenge is a whole meal now ?
When I was your age , revenge was only one dish .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Revenge is a whole meal now?
When I was your age, revenge was only one dish.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564112</id>
	<title>Never safe.</title>
	<author>fearlezz</author>
	<datestamp>1261939500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>The cloud is not safe. Period.

You might secure parts of your data. You can keep other internet users from illegally accessing your data. But as we <a href="http://ask.slashdot.org/story/09/12/26/1520255/Preventing-My-Hosting-Provider-From-Rooting-My-Server" title="slashdot.org">just discussed</a> [slashdot.org], anyone with (virtual) fysical access to a server can break his way in. You may make it harder by installing full disk encryption software, but you can't even be sure that the bootloader of your virtual server isn't messed with.

If you build a bookstore that costs amazon millions of turnover a year, hosting it at ec2 might not be the smartest idea...</htmltext>
<tokenext>The cloud is not safe .
Period . You might secure parts of your data .
You can keep other internet users from illegally accessing your data .
But as we just discussed [ slashdot.org ] , anyone with ( virtual ) fysical access to a server can break his way in .
You may make it harder by installing full disk encryption software , but you ca n't even be sure that the bootloader of your virtual server is n't messed with .
If you build a bookstore that costs amazon millions of turnover a year , hosting it at ec2 might not be the smartest idea.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The cloud is not safe.
Period.

You might secure parts of your data.
You can keep other internet users from illegally accessing your data.
But as we just discussed [slashdot.org], anyone with (virtual) fysical access to a server can break his way in.
You may make it harder by installing full disk encryption software, but you can't even be sure that the bootloader of your virtual server isn't messed with.
If you build a bookstore that costs amazon millions of turnover a year, hosting it at ec2 might not be the smartest idea...</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30567130</id>
	<title>Re:Security is the NEXT great challenge?</title>
	<author>mrsmiggs</author>
	<datestamp>1261922040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>No the first challenge was to post as many pictures of cats and biscuit recipes as possible to the cloud as possible. This challenge is still underway, by the time it has been completed everyone will have forgotten what the fuss over 'cloud computing' was all about and moved on to the next big IT craze and not actually implement any sound long term businesses in the 'cloud'. <p>

Such is the power of IT marketing, ooooooooo look a pretty flower...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>No the first challenge was to post as many pictures of cats and biscuit recipes as possible to the cloud as possible .
This challenge is still underway , by the time it has been completed everyone will have forgotten what the fuss over 'cloud computing ' was all about and moved on to the next big IT craze and not actually implement any sound long term businesses in the 'cloud' .
Such is the power of IT marketing , ooooooooo look a pretty flower.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>No the first challenge was to post as many pictures of cats and biscuit recipes as possible to the cloud as possible.
This challenge is still underway, by the time it has been completed everyone will have forgotten what the fuss over 'cloud computing' was all about and moved on to the next big IT craze and not actually implement any sound long term businesses in the 'cloud'.
Such is the power of IT marketing, ooooooooo look a pretty flower...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564324</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30565554</id>
	<title>Re:Security aside...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261908600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>Would you trust other companies to manage your electronic secrets?<br>I would never, no matter what promise.</p></div><p>You give your money (and an image of every cheque ever written or cashed) to your bank.<br>Your investments to you broker.<br>Your purchase history to your credit card company (and loyalty programs).<br>Your travel history to government security contractors.<br>Your will (and the details of your dirty deeds) to your lawyer.<br>Your employment history to wherever you apply for a job.<br>Your phone company has records of everyone that you've called (and soon, thanks to GPS, they will know where you are and where you've been at all times).<br>Your ISP has 6 months of your emails stored.<br>Your health secrets to your doctor, and to your HMO, for that matter.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Would you trust other companies to manage your electronic secrets ? I would never , no matter what promise.You give your money ( and an image of every cheque ever written or cashed ) to your bank.Your investments to you broker.Your purchase history to your credit card company ( and loyalty programs ) .Your travel history to government security contractors.Your will ( and the details of your dirty deeds ) to your lawyer.Your employment history to wherever you apply for a job.Your phone company has records of everyone that you 've called ( and soon , thanks to GPS , they will know where you are and where you 've been at all times ) .Your ISP has 6 months of your emails stored.Your health secrets to your doctor , and to your HMO , for that matter .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Would you trust other companies to manage your electronic secrets?I would never, no matter what promise.You give your money (and an image of every cheque ever written or cashed) to your bank.Your investments to you broker.Your purchase history to your credit card company (and loyalty programs).Your travel history to government security contractors.Your will (and the details of your dirty deeds) to your lawyer.Your employment history to wherever you apply for a job.Your phone company has records of everyone that you've called (and soon, thanks to GPS, they will know where you are and where you've been at all times).Your ISP has 6 months of your emails stored.Your health secrets to your doctor, and to your HMO, for that matter.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564016</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564686</id>
	<title>Re:Whom are we securing it from?</title>
	<author>mlts</author>
	<datestamp>1261945320000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Cloud computing violates the first rule of security:  Don't let the data be accessible in any shape or form to those not authorized.  It goes with one of the fundamental rules of the Internet which is often ignore:, don't put anything on a Net accessible computer that you would be afraid of it ending up linked off of 4chan.</p><p>Cloud computing has some seductive properties for PHBs:  It is just a network jump away through an API, requires no dedicated equipment on the client site, and the big named company salespeople who play in the same foursome at the golf course sell the stuff.</p><p>However, if one drops the smoke and mirrors, there isn't much difference between cloud storage and FTP-ing files onto a remote site.</p><p>So, what does one do?  Before someone states "encrypt it!" one has to know that there are two parts to encrypting:</p><p>First is choosing the algorithms (AES-256, and if worried about an AES crack, chain AES and Serpent or Twofish [1]) and how they are implemented (ECB bad, XTS good).  You also add to this how one can tell if the key is valid, and one of the most secure ways is to have the key use a salt, decrypt part of the cyphertext, and check it against a known value.  TrueCrypt does this when validating if a filesystem is OK to mount.</p><p>The second part is not as obvious, but it means as much to secured data as the cypher:  Key management is where you feel the burn.  The simplest key management is having some random passphrase the maximum length allowed stored in a file on a USB flash drive and printed out for safekeeping.  However, this runs you into the same issues as using WPA2-PSK, if the key is divulged on one area, the whole security of the system is now compromised.</p><p>Which means that you have to have a system of subkeys where the keys will decrypt the master key, similar to how PGP stores multiple passphrases and public key information to open a PGPDisk.  You can give everyone a different passphrace to remember, or you can give them some type of smart card that unlocks the information.  If a passphrase is divulged, it will suck, but given time, it can be removed from the authorized list.</p><p>Don't forget not just using one volume key for the data, one needs to use a different one every so often, so a compromised subkey which allows someone to slurp up the main decryption key won't compromise everything.</p><p>In reality, after a company goes through their iterations of a key management system, going from passphrases to RSA keys (because passphrases are hard to remember), then going from a list of keys to a full blown PKI with multiple recovery mechanisms, companies usually end up going to a smart card system.  Of course, this is expensive and requires an elaborate support structure, but it is the best way of dealing with key management we have.  And of course smart cards have driver hell in most cases.</p><p>So, with all the complexity that one needs to have in place for an encryption layer before stuff ends up stored offsite, it gets to a point where why should one even bother?  Instead, for a number of SMBs with a non trivial amount of employees, they should just buy tape libraries and a backup program that has encryption.  Some drives (like some of HP's) have encryption functionality in hardware.  Then after the tapes are backed up, they are either stored in the data center (with restricted access), a tape safe, or an Iron Mountain tub.</p><p>What is the advantage of going back to tape even though cloud computing is seductive and seems like all problems of storage are just an Internet connection away?  You know who has physical possession of the data at all times.  It is a lot easier to deny someone access to physical media by rekeying locks, yanking their HID card access, or striking their name from the authorized user rolls at the offsite system than it is to deny access to stuff where you don't know even where it is stored.</p><p>With physical media, you have two pieces of security.  The physical media itself, and the encryption on it.  With cloud storage, ALL your se</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Cloud computing violates the first rule of security : Do n't let the data be accessible in any shape or form to those not authorized .
It goes with one of the fundamental rules of the Internet which is often ignore : , do n't put anything on a Net accessible computer that you would be afraid of it ending up linked off of 4chan.Cloud computing has some seductive properties for PHBs : It is just a network jump away through an API , requires no dedicated equipment on the client site , and the big named company salespeople who play in the same foursome at the golf course sell the stuff.However , if one drops the smoke and mirrors , there is n't much difference between cloud storage and FTP-ing files onto a remote site.So , what does one do ?
Before someone states " encrypt it !
" one has to know that there are two parts to encrypting : First is choosing the algorithms ( AES-256 , and if worried about an AES crack , chain AES and Serpent or Twofish [ 1 ] ) and how they are implemented ( ECB bad , XTS good ) .
You also add to this how one can tell if the key is valid , and one of the most secure ways is to have the key use a salt , decrypt part of the cyphertext , and check it against a known value .
TrueCrypt does this when validating if a filesystem is OK to mount.The second part is not as obvious , but it means as much to secured data as the cypher : Key management is where you feel the burn .
The simplest key management is having some random passphrase the maximum length allowed stored in a file on a USB flash drive and printed out for safekeeping .
However , this runs you into the same issues as using WPA2-PSK , if the key is divulged on one area , the whole security of the system is now compromised.Which means that you have to have a system of subkeys where the keys will decrypt the master key , similar to how PGP stores multiple passphrases and public key information to open a PGPDisk .
You can give everyone a different passphrace to remember , or you can give them some type of smart card that unlocks the information .
If a passphrase is divulged , it will suck , but given time , it can be removed from the authorized list.Do n't forget not just using one volume key for the data , one needs to use a different one every so often , so a compromised subkey which allows someone to slurp up the main decryption key wo n't compromise everything.In reality , after a company goes through their iterations of a key management system , going from passphrases to RSA keys ( because passphrases are hard to remember ) , then going from a list of keys to a full blown PKI with multiple recovery mechanisms , companies usually end up going to a smart card system .
Of course , this is expensive and requires an elaborate support structure , but it is the best way of dealing with key management we have .
And of course smart cards have driver hell in most cases.So , with all the complexity that one needs to have in place for an encryption layer before stuff ends up stored offsite , it gets to a point where why should one even bother ?
Instead , for a number of SMBs with a non trivial amount of employees , they should just buy tape libraries and a backup program that has encryption .
Some drives ( like some of HP 's ) have encryption functionality in hardware .
Then after the tapes are backed up , they are either stored in the data center ( with restricted access ) , a tape safe , or an Iron Mountain tub.What is the advantage of going back to tape even though cloud computing is seductive and seems like all problems of storage are just an Internet connection away ?
You know who has physical possession of the data at all times .
It is a lot easier to deny someone access to physical media by rekeying locks , yanking their HID card access , or striking their name from the authorized user rolls at the offsite system than it is to deny access to stuff where you do n't know even where it is stored.With physical media , you have two pieces of security .
The physical media itself , and the encryption on it .
With cloud storage , ALL your se</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Cloud computing violates the first rule of security:  Don't let the data be accessible in any shape or form to those not authorized.
It goes with one of the fundamental rules of the Internet which is often ignore:, don't put anything on a Net accessible computer that you would be afraid of it ending up linked off of 4chan.Cloud computing has some seductive properties for PHBs:  It is just a network jump away through an API, requires no dedicated equipment on the client site, and the big named company salespeople who play in the same foursome at the golf course sell the stuff.However, if one drops the smoke and mirrors, there isn't much difference between cloud storage and FTP-ing files onto a remote site.So, what does one do?
Before someone states "encrypt it!
" one has to know that there are two parts to encrypting:First is choosing the algorithms (AES-256, and if worried about an AES crack, chain AES and Serpent or Twofish [1]) and how they are implemented (ECB bad, XTS good).
You also add to this how one can tell if the key is valid, and one of the most secure ways is to have the key use a salt, decrypt part of the cyphertext, and check it against a known value.
TrueCrypt does this when validating if a filesystem is OK to mount.The second part is not as obvious, but it means as much to secured data as the cypher:  Key management is where you feel the burn.
The simplest key management is having some random passphrase the maximum length allowed stored in a file on a USB flash drive and printed out for safekeeping.
However, this runs you into the same issues as using WPA2-PSK, if the key is divulged on one area, the whole security of the system is now compromised.Which means that you have to have a system of subkeys where the keys will decrypt the master key, similar to how PGP stores multiple passphrases and public key information to open a PGPDisk.
You can give everyone a different passphrace to remember, or you can give them some type of smart card that unlocks the information.
If a passphrase is divulged, it will suck, but given time, it can be removed from the authorized list.Don't forget not just using one volume key for the data, one needs to use a different one every so often, so a compromised subkey which allows someone to slurp up the main decryption key won't compromise everything.In reality, after a company goes through their iterations of a key management system, going from passphrases to RSA keys (because passphrases are hard to remember), then going from a list of keys to a full blown PKI with multiple recovery mechanisms, companies usually end up going to a smart card system.
Of course, this is expensive and requires an elaborate support structure, but it is the best way of dealing with key management we have.
And of course smart cards have driver hell in most cases.So, with all the complexity that one needs to have in place for an encryption layer before stuff ends up stored offsite, it gets to a point where why should one even bother?
Instead, for a number of SMBs with a non trivial amount of employees, they should just buy tape libraries and a backup program that has encryption.
Some drives (like some of HP's) have encryption functionality in hardware.
Then after the tapes are backed up, they are either stored in the data center (with restricted access), a tape safe, or an Iron Mountain tub.What is the advantage of going back to tape even though cloud computing is seductive and seems like all problems of storage are just an Internet connection away?
You know who has physical possession of the data at all times.
It is a lot easier to deny someone access to physical media by rekeying locks, yanking their HID card access, or striking their name from the authorized user rolls at the offsite system than it is to deny access to stuff where you don't know even where it is stored.With physical media, you have two pieces of security.
The physical media itself, and the encryption on it.
With cloud storage, ALL your se</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564006</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564826</id>
	<title>Why Bother?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261946700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>I just bought a terabyte drive for $79. Why would I want to store data in the cloud, when I can put it on a drive and have access to it immediately, and at a vastly higher bandwidth than any "cloud"? Why would I want some company to hold my files when I can hold them locally and at incredibly cheap rates and super high bandwidth? Why would I use software in the cloud, when it is dependent on an internet connection, when my internet connection is completely dependent on whether or not my next door neighbour pays his phone bills? And when will my mom let me out of the basement?</htmltext>
<tokenext>I just bought a terabyte drive for $ 79 .
Why would I want to store data in the cloud , when I can put it on a drive and have access to it immediately , and at a vastly higher bandwidth than any " cloud " ?
Why would I want some company to hold my files when I can hold them locally and at incredibly cheap rates and super high bandwidth ?
Why would I use software in the cloud , when it is dependent on an internet connection , when my internet connection is completely dependent on whether or not my next door neighbour pays his phone bills ?
And when will my mom let me out of the basement ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I just bought a terabyte drive for $79.
Why would I want to store data in the cloud, when I can put it on a drive and have access to it immediately, and at a vastly higher bandwidth than any "cloud"?
Why would I want some company to hold my files when I can hold them locally and at incredibly cheap rates and super high bandwidth?
Why would I use software in the cloud, when it is dependent on an internet connection, when my internet connection is completely dependent on whether or not my next door neighbour pays his phone bills?
And when will my mom let me out of the basement?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30566588</id>
	<title>Cloud computing ?</title>
	<author>Salsaman</author>
	<datestamp>1261917420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Cloud computing is all vapour anyway.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Cloud computing is all vapour anyway .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Cloud computing is all vapour anyway.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30565744</id>
	<title>Re:Why Bother?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261910040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>You may keep a local copy on that drive but when your $79 terabyte drive dies (and you can depend on the fact that it will), where is your data?  If you say you back it up to another drive, they what happens when the building burns down, disgruntled employee deletes the data on the way out the door, or thieves break in and steal everything?  Now you have to have an offsite copy of your data and that means something in the cloud or something really cumbersome.  Taking home a copy each night almost NEVER works because people get lazy.  If you keep a copy in the cloud, you can get to it even if the building burns down.  The more data we have the more important it becomes that you have a copy that is geographically remote to you.  We don't have paper to fall back to any more when there is a catastrophic failure.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>You may keep a local copy on that drive but when your $ 79 terabyte drive dies ( and you can depend on the fact that it will ) , where is your data ?
If you say you back it up to another drive , they what happens when the building burns down , disgruntled employee deletes the data on the way out the door , or thieves break in and steal everything ?
Now you have to have an offsite copy of your data and that means something in the cloud or something really cumbersome .
Taking home a copy each night almost NEVER works because people get lazy .
If you keep a copy in the cloud , you can get to it even if the building burns down .
The more data we have the more important it becomes that you have a copy that is geographically remote to you .
We do n't have paper to fall back to any more when there is a catastrophic failure .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>You may keep a local copy on that drive but when your $79 terabyte drive dies (and you can depend on the fact that it will), where is your data?
If you say you back it up to another drive, they what happens when the building burns down, disgruntled employee deletes the data on the way out the door, or thieves break in and steal everything?
Now you have to have an offsite copy of your data and that means something in the cloud or something really cumbersome.
Taking home a copy each night almost NEVER works because people get lazy.
If you keep a copy in the cloud, you can get to it even if the building burns down.
The more data we have the more important it becomes that you have a copy that is geographically remote to you.
We don't have paper to fall back to any more when there is a catastrophic failure.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564826</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30565482</id>
	<title>Re:Whom are we securing it from?</title>
	<author>Suki I</author>
	<datestamp>1261907880000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Don't we get a larger circle of trusted insiders with outsourcing?  Weakest link in the security chain, IIRC.

Open to correction and education.  Please don't flame too bad?</htmltext>
<tokenext>Do n't we get a larger circle of trusted insiders with outsourcing ?
Weakest link in the security chain , IIRC .
Open to correction and education .
Please do n't flame too bad ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Don't we get a larger circle of trusted insiders with outsourcing?
Weakest link in the security chain, IIRC.
Open to correction and education.
Please don't flame too bad?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564006</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30566368</id>
	<title>Re:Remember kids</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261915500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Cloud is a bit like "Smurf". It means whatever the speaker or listener wants it to mean.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Cloud is a bit like " Smurf " .
It means whatever the speaker or listener wants it to mean .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Cloud is a bit like "Smurf".
It means whatever the speaker or listener wants it to mean.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30563964</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564310</id>
	<title>Put up your own servers!</title>
	<author>Hurricane78</author>
	<datestamp>1261941420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>In the name of probably pretty much all of us:</p><p>1. Unless yo smoke weed: Shut the fuck up about your &ldquo;cloud&ldquo; shit!<br>2. iPhones, iPods, iAssplugs, iBubbles, iFails: See point 1.<br>3. It is OK to call hooters 'knockers' and sometimes snack trays<br>4. It is wrong to be French (Yeah, that was the point 4 you always forgot. ^^)<br>5. PROFIT</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>In the name of probably pretty much all of us : 1 .
Unless yo smoke weed : Shut the fuck up about your    cloud    shit ! 2 .
iPhones , iPods , iAssplugs , iBubbles , iFails : See point 1.3 .
It is OK to call hooters 'knockers ' and sometimes snack trays4 .
It is wrong to be French ( Yeah , that was the point 4 you always forgot .
^ ^ ) 5. PROFIT</tokentext>
<sentencetext>In the name of probably pretty much all of us:1.
Unless yo smoke weed: Shut the fuck up about your “cloud“ shit!2.
iPhones, iPods, iAssplugs, iBubbles, iFails: See point 1.3.
It is OK to call hooters 'knockers' and sometimes snack trays4.
It is wrong to be French (Yeah, that was the point 4 you always forgot.
^^)5. PROFIT</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30569068</id>
	<title>Re:Emerging encryption tec</title>
	<author>0ptix</author>
	<datestamp>1261990980000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Improvments to Craig's original work are already starting to come out. <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/571" title="iacr.org" rel="nofollow">Smart and Vercauteren</a> [iacr.org] use integer arithmetic to obtain a more efficient scheme (though still not widly practical yet). <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/616" title="iacr.org" rel="nofollow">Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan</a> [iacr.org] show an even simpler (though not more efficient) scheme using integer arithmetics. In fact it's probably a good first paper to read for cryptographers interested in the area.
<br> <br>
In light of these developments hardly a year since craig first released his results i see reason to hope for more improvments also towards efficiency (and basing the security on different and more common assumptions).
<br> <br>
never the less for cloud computing applications where resource usage is carefully counted out and billed its hard to imagen such encryption technology being for a long time to come. neiche markets and applications could be another matter. for example something like a freenets/cloud where you can securely (privatly and correctly) farm out computation to be accessed from any client device with your key (for a comparable hit to performance). still, like freenet today the extent of the performance hit will most likely force it to remain generally unused for quite a while still.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Improvments to Craig 's original work are already starting to come out .
Smart and Vercauteren [ iacr.org ] use integer arithmetic to obtain a more efficient scheme ( though still not widly practical yet ) .
Dijk , Gentry , Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [ iacr.org ] show an even simpler ( though not more efficient ) scheme using integer arithmetics .
In fact it 's probably a good first paper to read for cryptographers interested in the area .
In light of these developments hardly a year since craig first released his results i see reason to hope for more improvments also towards efficiency ( and basing the security on different and more common assumptions ) .
never the less for cloud computing applications where resource usage is carefully counted out and billed its hard to imagen such encryption technology being for a long time to come .
neiche markets and applications could be another matter .
for example something like a freenets/cloud where you can securely ( privatly and correctly ) farm out computation to be accessed from any client device with your key ( for a comparable hit to performance ) .
still , like freenet today the extent of the performance hit will most likely force it to remain generally unused for quite a while still .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Improvments to Craig's original work are already starting to come out.
Smart and Vercauteren [iacr.org] use integer arithmetic to obtain a more efficient scheme (though still not widly practical yet).
Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [iacr.org] show an even simpler (though not more efficient) scheme using integer arithmetics.
In fact it's probably a good first paper to read for cryptographers interested in the area.
In light of these developments hardly a year since craig first released his results i see reason to hope for more improvments also towards efficiency (and basing the security on different and more common assumptions).
never the less for cloud computing applications where resource usage is carefully counted out and billed its hard to imagen such encryption technology being for a long time to come.
neiche markets and applications could be another matter.
for example something like a freenets/cloud where you can securely (privatly and correctly) farm out computation to be accessed from any client device with your key (for a comparable hit to performance).
still, like freenet today the extent of the performance hit will most likely force it to remain generally unused for quite a while still.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564002</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564058</id>
	<title>TCP/IP is a cloud we trust</title>
	<author>hey</author>
	<datestamp>1261938900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>We already trust the cloud a bit.  We use the internet to move stuff around.  Do we trust intermediate nodes not to eavesdrop or<br>steal our data?  No... we use SSL.  Do we trust the intermediate nodes to deliver our packets on time?  No... we wait for ACKs and use timeouts.<br>Seems to be this is just like cloud storage.  Use it but don't just it all.  Encrypt everything.  Periodically pull the data back to make sure its OK, etc.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>We already trust the cloud a bit .
We use the internet to move stuff around .
Do we trust intermediate nodes not to eavesdrop orsteal our data ?
No... we use SSL .
Do we trust the intermediate nodes to deliver our packets on time ?
No... we wait for ACKs and use timeouts.Seems to be this is just like cloud storage .
Use it but do n't just it all .
Encrypt everything .
Periodically pull the data back to make sure its OK , etc .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>We already trust the cloud a bit.
We use the internet to move stuff around.
Do we trust intermediate nodes not to eavesdrop orsteal our data?
No... we use SSL.
Do we trust the intermediate nodes to deliver our packets on time?
No... we wait for ACKs and use timeouts.Seems to be this is just like cloud storage.
Use it but don't just it all.
Encrypt everything.
Periodically pull the data back to make sure its OK, etc.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564742</id>
	<title>For most users, cloud storage is more secure</title>
	<author>marvis</author>
	<datestamp>1261945860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>I understand that many people here are critical towards cloud computing. But the majority of people who use computers are not like the people on<nobr> <wbr></nobr>/. .
<br> <br>
Most people do not know how to make their machines secure. Most people do not know how to encrypt their hard drives. Most people do not know how to protect against viruses or trojans. Most people even do not have backups.
<br> <br>
I agree that for us geeks, the kind of security measures that we apply to our machines make our data safer than they would be in the cloud.
However, I doubt that this is true for the majority of people who use computers.
<br> <br>
I believe that  cloud computing is more secure for most people. Of course it is right to improve the technology, make it better and even more secure. But it is wrong to assume that data is secure just because it is stored locally.</htmltext>
<tokenext>I understand that many people here are critical towards cloud computing .
But the majority of people who use computers are not like the people on / .
. Most people do not know how to make their machines secure .
Most people do not know how to encrypt their hard drives .
Most people do not know how to protect against viruses or trojans .
Most people even do not have backups .
I agree that for us geeks , the kind of security measures that we apply to our machines make our data safer than they would be in the cloud .
However , I doubt that this is true for the majority of people who use computers .
I believe that cloud computing is more secure for most people .
Of course it is right to improve the technology , make it better and even more secure .
But it is wrong to assume that data is secure just because it is stored locally .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I understand that many people here are critical towards cloud computing.
But the majority of people who use computers are not like the people on /.
.
 
Most people do not know how to make their machines secure.
Most people do not know how to encrypt their hard drives.
Most people do not know how to protect against viruses or trojans.
Most people even do not have backups.
I agree that for us geeks, the kind of security measures that we apply to our machines make our data safer than they would be in the cloud.
However, I doubt that this is true for the majority of people who use computers.
I believe that  cloud computing is more secure for most people.
Of course it is right to improve the technology, make it better and even more secure.
But it is wrong to assume that data is secure just because it is stored locally.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564002</id>
	<title>Emerging encryption tec</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261938300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Full homeomorphic encryption is, contrary to IBMs press team, still far from useable. In fact, there is no method in sight that could do the job.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Full homeomorphic encryption is , contrary to IBMs press team , still far from useable .
In fact , there is no method in sight that could do the job .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Full homeomorphic encryption is, contrary to IBMs press team, still far from useable.
In fact, there is no method in sight that could do the job.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564756</id>
	<title>Marketing the Prototype</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261946040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It's how we ended up with this unsecurable protocol stack.</p><p>Why would we expect anything else?</p><p>We bought it the first time, and the second, and the...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's how we ended up with this unsecurable protocol stack.Why would we expect anything else ? We bought it the first time , and the second , and the.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's how we ended up with this unsecurable protocol stack.Why would we expect anything else?We bought it the first time, and the second, and the...</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564352</id>
	<title>Re:Security aside...</title>
	<author>selven</author>
	<datestamp>1261941660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I wouldn't put my private data up even onto a cloud of a company I trust completely. It could still get PATRIOT Acted into the hands of pretty much everyone who I don't want to see it.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I would n't put my private data up even onto a cloud of a company I trust completely .
It could still get PATRIOT Acted into the hands of pretty much everyone who I do n't want to see it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I wouldn't put my private data up even onto a cloud of a company I trust completely.
It could still get PATRIOT Acted into the hands of pretty much everyone who I don't want to see it.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564016</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564106</id>
	<title>What could possibly go wrong?</title>
	<author>David Gerard</author>
	<datestamp>1261939440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Microsoft today implemented its 100\% Data Confidentiality package for T-Mobile Sidekick, comprehensively protecting users&rsquo; contacts, email and messages <a href="http://newstechnica.com/2009/10/11/microsoft-renders-sidekick-data-completely-secure/" title="newstechnica.com">from any possible attacker</a> [newstechnica.com].</p><p>&ldquo;Our data security is impenetrable,&rdquo; said Steve Ballmer, &ldquo;and will reassure everyone of the data integrity of our Windows Azure Screen Of Death cloud computing and Windows Mobile initiatives.&rdquo;</p><p>Microsoft plans to leverage the new confidentiality mechanism to finally purge the horror of Vista from the face of the earth, in the same manner as firing all the contractors who knew how to build Windows 2000 and having to reconstruct Windows XP from bits of NT 4.</p><p>Microsoft Sharepoint users looked forward to a similar denouement as the only safe way to scour their hopelessly incompetent organisations from the world in a manner that would not infect successor organisations.</p><p>Microsoft is putting together an outsourcing proposal to the UK government for data protection.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Microsoft today implemented its 100 \ % Data Confidentiality package for T-Mobile Sidekick , comprehensively protecting users    contacts , email and messages from any possible attacker [ newstechnica.com ] .    Our data security is impenetrable ,    said Steve Ballmer ,    and will reassure everyone of the data integrity of our Windows Azure Screen Of Death cloud computing and Windows Mobile initiatives.    Microsoft plans to leverage the new confidentiality mechanism to finally purge the horror of Vista from the face of the earth , in the same manner as firing all the contractors who knew how to build Windows 2000 and having to reconstruct Windows XP from bits of NT 4.Microsoft Sharepoint users looked forward to a similar denouement as the only safe way to scour their hopelessly incompetent organisations from the world in a manner that would not infect successor organisations.Microsoft is putting together an outsourcing proposal to the UK government for data protection .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Microsoft today implemented its 100\% Data Confidentiality package for T-Mobile Sidekick, comprehensively protecting users’ contacts, email and messages from any possible attacker [newstechnica.com].“Our data security is impenetrable,” said Steve Ballmer, “and will reassure everyone of the data integrity of our Windows Azure Screen Of Death cloud computing and Windows Mobile initiatives.”Microsoft plans to leverage the new confidentiality mechanism to finally purge the horror of Vista from the face of the earth, in the same manner as firing all the contractors who knew how to build Windows 2000 and having to reconstruct Windows XP from bits of NT 4.Microsoft Sharepoint users looked forward to a similar denouement as the only safe way to scour their hopelessly incompetent organisations from the world in a manner that would not infect successor organisations.Microsoft is putting together an outsourcing proposal to the UK government for data protection.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564488</id>
	<title>Emerging encryption technologies</title>
	<author>wirelessbuzzers</author>
	<datestamp>1261943100000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>"Emerging encryption technologies" such as Gentry's doubly-homomorphic encryption (which is what the link points to) tend to have a major disadvantage: they tend to be horribly inefficient.  We're talking 6 orders of magnitude minimum, probably more like 12 orders.  Unless there's a major breakthrough, this is not going to help.</p><p>Cryptographic engineering solutions, like DRM, might help.  But then again, they might not: they require lots of engineering effort from the cloud providers, which they have little incentive to perform; and even then, DRM technologies don't have the greatest security record.</p><p>Operating system security measures will probably be very useful to protect against attacks, not from the hosting provider, but from other clients.  These measures are tricky and unlikely to provide "perfect" security, but can definitely make attacks much more difficult.</p><p>I predict that after conventional defenses are applied, the solution will be either be less paranoid, or don't move to the cloud.</p><p>And yes, I am a cryptographer.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>" Emerging encryption technologies " such as Gentry 's doubly-homomorphic encryption ( which is what the link points to ) tend to have a major disadvantage : they tend to be horribly inefficient .
We 're talking 6 orders of magnitude minimum , probably more like 12 orders .
Unless there 's a major breakthrough , this is not going to help.Cryptographic engineering solutions , like DRM , might help .
But then again , they might not : they require lots of engineering effort from the cloud providers , which they have little incentive to perform ; and even then , DRM technologies do n't have the greatest security record.Operating system security measures will probably be very useful to protect against attacks , not from the hosting provider , but from other clients .
These measures are tricky and unlikely to provide " perfect " security , but can definitely make attacks much more difficult.I predict that after conventional defenses are applied , the solution will be either be less paranoid , or do n't move to the cloud.And yes , I am a cryptographer .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"Emerging encryption technologies" such as Gentry's doubly-homomorphic encryption (which is what the link points to) tend to have a major disadvantage: they tend to be horribly inefficient.
We're talking 6 orders of magnitude minimum, probably more like 12 orders.
Unless there's a major breakthrough, this is not going to help.Cryptographic engineering solutions, like DRM, might help.
But then again, they might not: they require lots of engineering effort from the cloud providers, which they have little incentive to perform; and even then, DRM technologies don't have the greatest security record.Operating system security measures will probably be very useful to protect against attacks, not from the hosting provider, but from other clients.
These measures are tricky and unlikely to provide "perfect" security, but can definitely make attacks much more difficult.I predict that after conventional defenses are applied, the solution will be either be less paranoid, or don't move to the cloud.And yes, I am a cryptographer.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30565396</id>
	<title>Re:TCP/IP is a cloud we trust</title>
	<author>mlts</author>
	<datestamp>1261907280000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>SSL is different.  The encryption key that is used is used just for the communication, then is tossed.  In general, one will not have a SSL negotiated key for last week's bank transaction on their computer.</p><p>Because the SSL key management is about keys that are tossed, there isn't much of an issue with the nodes in between.</p><p>Cloud computing is about long term, persistant storage.  The session key that gets chucked in SSL has to be kept permanently somewhere when it comes to storage, and key management is a major headache.  Have too little redundancy, you can lose access forever to data.  Have too much redundancy, and keys can wind up in the hands of blackhats and people who you really don't want to have access.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>SSL is different .
The encryption key that is used is used just for the communication , then is tossed .
In general , one will not have a SSL negotiated key for last week 's bank transaction on their computer.Because the SSL key management is about keys that are tossed , there is n't much of an issue with the nodes in between.Cloud computing is about long term , persistant storage .
The session key that gets chucked in SSL has to be kept permanently somewhere when it comes to storage , and key management is a major headache .
Have too little redundancy , you can lose access forever to data .
Have too much redundancy , and keys can wind up in the hands of blackhats and people who you really do n't want to have access .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>SSL is different.
The encryption key that is used is used just for the communication, then is tossed.
In general, one will not have a SSL negotiated key for last week's bank transaction on their computer.Because the SSL key management is about keys that are tossed, there isn't much of an issue with the nodes in between.Cloud computing is about long term, persistant storage.
The session key that gets chucked in SSL has to be kept permanently somewhere when it comes to storage, and key management is a major headache.
Have too little redundancy, you can lose access forever to data.
Have too much redundancy, and keys can wind up in the hands of blackhats and people who you really don't want to have access.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564058</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564174</id>
	<title>cloud computing</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261940160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>cloud computing is a fad in my opinion. Its not safe, will not be. Encryption is nice but for every algorithm to encrypt something there is an algorithm to decrypt it. Unless you use lots of bits and passes with different algorithms to make it harder, which does add security but also make things slower. I always see lots of technologies come and go and one thing people don't seem to ask before hand is why we need this. I have seen technologies used for no real purpose other than to use something new when what already was around did the job just fine. There is so much overkill in the technology industry it really is a waste of money and energy in these 'going green' times</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>cloud computing is a fad in my opinion .
Its not safe , will not be .
Encryption is nice but for every algorithm to encrypt something there is an algorithm to decrypt it .
Unless you use lots of bits and passes with different algorithms to make it harder , which does add security but also make things slower .
I always see lots of technologies come and go and one thing people do n't seem to ask before hand is why we need this .
I have seen technologies used for no real purpose other than to use something new when what already was around did the job just fine .
There is so much overkill in the technology industry it really is a waste of money and energy in these 'going green ' times</tokentext>
<sentencetext>cloud computing is a fad in my opinion.
Its not safe, will not be.
Encryption is nice but for every algorithm to encrypt something there is an algorithm to decrypt it.
Unless you use lots of bits and passes with different algorithms to make it harder, which does add security but also make things slower.
I always see lots of technologies come and go and one thing people don't seem to ask before hand is why we need this.
I have seen technologies used for no real purpose other than to use something new when what already was around did the job just fine.
There is so much overkill in the technology industry it really is a waste of money and energy in these 'going green' times</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564374</id>
	<title>In other words...</title>
	<author>geegel</author>
	<datestamp>1261941840000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The future of technology depends greatly on the future of technology. Hooray for buzzwords</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The future of technology depends greatly on the future of technology .
Hooray for buzzwords</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The future of technology depends greatly on the future of technology.
Hooray for buzzwords</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30565876</id>
	<title>Re:Why Bother?</title>
	<author>Creepy Crawler</author>
	<datestamp>1261911240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>And all I can say to you Ralph is.....</p><p>"Music these days suck."</p><p>Betcha you cant find me<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:P</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>And all I can say to you Ralph is..... " Music these days suck .
" Betcha you cant find me : P</tokentext>
<sentencetext>And all I can say to you Ralph is....."Music these days suck.
"Betcha you cant find me :P</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564826</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30566688</id>
	<title>Re:Security aside...</title>
	<author>dkf</author>
	<datestamp>1261918320000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>I wouldn't put my private data up even onto a cloud of a company I trust completely.</p></div><p>And you're going to pay to maintain your own hardware and software installations as an upshot of that choice. As long as you're willing to deal with the consequences, your decision is fine. The only time there's a problem with the cloud is when you're forced into using it for your private data because there's no choice. (But then again, that's generally when there's a monopoly about instead of a free market...)</p><p>BTW, successful cloud providers are probably more likely to take good care of your data than some random corporate datacenter. For one thing, the cloud providers have to have competent and security-aware technical staff. All you need to have to own and run a datacenter is a building with enough power, AC and networking, and someone who can plug a rack in.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>I would n't put my private data up even onto a cloud of a company I trust completely.And you 're going to pay to maintain your own hardware and software installations as an upshot of that choice .
As long as you 're willing to deal with the consequences , your decision is fine .
The only time there 's a problem with the cloud is when you 're forced into using it for your private data because there 's no choice .
( But then again , that 's generally when there 's a monopoly about instead of a free market... ) BTW , successful cloud providers are probably more likely to take good care of your data than some random corporate datacenter .
For one thing , the cloud providers have to have competent and security-aware technical staff .
All you need to have to own and run a datacenter is a building with enough power , AC and networking , and someone who can plug a rack in .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I wouldn't put my private data up even onto a cloud of a company I trust completely.And you're going to pay to maintain your own hardware and software installations as an upshot of that choice.
As long as you're willing to deal with the consequences, your decision is fine.
The only time there's a problem with the cloud is when you're forced into using it for your private data because there's no choice.
(But then again, that's generally when there's a monopoly about instead of a free market...)BTW, successful cloud providers are probably more likely to take good care of your data than some random corporate datacenter.
For one thing, the cloud providers have to have competent and security-aware technical staff.
All you need to have to own and run a datacenter is a building with enough power, AC and networking, and someone who can plug a rack in.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564352</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30572110</id>
	<title>Re:For most users, cloud storage is more secure</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1262021160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Well, that's a good point. But is "Better than nothing" really what we're aspiring to?<br><br>Wouldn't it be better to find ways to increase the security of the average folks WITHOUT introducing all of the other risks?</htmltext>
<tokenext>Well , that 's a good point .
But is " Better than nothing " really what we 're aspiring to ? Would n't it be better to find ways to increase the security of the average folks WITHOUT introducing all of the other risks ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Well, that's a good point.
But is "Better than nothing" really what we're aspiring to?Wouldn't it be better to find ways to increase the security of the average folks WITHOUT introducing all of the other risks?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564742</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564074</id>
	<title>Cloud Computing Security Is Another Name for DRM</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261939020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>While they may sound different, the Cloud Computing security problem seems to be almost identical to any other Digital Rights Management problem.  Both are concerned with only exposing what the information owner wants exposed to the underlying hardware/provider/user/etc.</p><p>It's just a question of whose "Cloud" you are trying to secure information on, and who the "user" of said information is supposed to be.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>While they may sound different , the Cloud Computing security problem seems to be almost identical to any other Digital Rights Management problem .
Both are concerned with only exposing what the information owner wants exposed to the underlying hardware/provider/user/etc.It 's just a question of whose " Cloud " you are trying to secure information on , and who the " user " of said information is supposed to be .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>While they may sound different, the Cloud Computing security problem seems to be almost identical to any other Digital Rights Management problem.
Both are concerned with only exposing what the information owner wants exposed to the underlying hardware/provider/user/etc.It's just a question of whose "Cloud" you are trying to secure information on, and who the "user" of said information is supposed to be.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564646</id>
	<title>Sure it can be.</title>
	<author>crovira</author>
	<datestamp>1261944780000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>All that you need to do is encrypt the data portion with a key that's generated from two one-time pads of 256-bit random keys, and then wipe out all traces of the pads.</p><p>They the data will be secure, even from you.<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:-)</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>All that you need to do is encrypt the data portion with a key that 's generated from two one-time pads of 256-bit random keys , and then wipe out all traces of the pads.They the data will be secure , even from you .
: - )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>All that you need to do is encrypt the data portion with a key that's generated from two one-time pads of 256-bit random keys, and then wipe out all traces of the pads.They the data will be secure, even from you.
:-)</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564218</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30565290</id>
	<title>Re:Why Bother?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261906560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Well, I wouldn't either, but increasingly many people's model is that the internet *is* the computer.  They're used to logging into their MyFace account from any computer anywhere and seeing the exact same environment.  Data being stuck on a drive in your basement is going the way of the do-do.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Well , I would n't either , but increasingly many people 's model is that the internet * is * the computer .
They 're used to logging into their MyFace account from any computer anywhere and seeing the exact same environment .
Data being stuck on a drive in your basement is going the way of the do-do .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Well, I wouldn't either, but increasingly many people's model is that the internet *is* the computer.
They're used to logging into their MyFace account from any computer anywhere and seeing the exact same environment.
Data being stuck on a drive in your basement is going the way of the do-do.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564826</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30566010</id>
	<title>Re:Security aside...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261912260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Then you really don't want to know how your medical records (doctor's transcriptions specifically) are shopped across the internet to the lowest cost sub-contractor...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Then you really do n't want to know how your medical records ( doctor 's transcriptions specifically ) are shopped across the internet to the lowest cost sub-contractor.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Then you really don't want to know how your medical records (doctor's transcriptions specifically) are shopped across the internet to the lowest cost sub-contractor...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564016</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30563964</id>
	<title>Remember kids</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261937940000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>"Cloud" computing is a buzzword, nothing more.  It has no real meaning, therefor all talk about it is worthless drivel.</p><p>Proceed with the drivel.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>" Cloud " computing is a buzzword , nothing more .
It has no real meaning , therefor all talk about it is worthless drivel.Proceed with the drivel .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"Cloud" computing is a buzzword, nothing more.
It has no real meaning, therefor all talk about it is worthless drivel.Proceed with the drivel.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564218</id>
	<title>Security is not an absolute!</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261940520000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>For crissakes, people who say something needs to be secure before it can be trusted really get on my nerves. Anyone who's waded out of the shallow end of the pool on security (of any kind) knows one of the fundamentals of security is that it isn't perfect. No matter how good you make your mouse-trap, there will someday be a better mouse. The more realistic analysis is to ask yourself what the acceptable risk is. Or, put another way, you should strive to ensure that the security is more difficult to break than the value of whatever it is that is being protected.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>For crissakes , people who say something needs to be secure before it can be trusted really get on my nerves .
Anyone who 's waded out of the shallow end of the pool on security ( of any kind ) knows one of the fundamentals of security is that it is n't perfect .
No matter how good you make your mouse-trap , there will someday be a better mouse .
The more realistic analysis is to ask yourself what the acceptable risk is .
Or , put another way , you should strive to ensure that the security is more difficult to break than the value of whatever it is that is being protected .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>For crissakes, people who say something needs to be secure before it can be trusted really get on my nerves.
Anyone who's waded out of the shallow end of the pool on security (of any kind) knows one of the fundamentals of security is that it isn't perfect.
No matter how good you make your mouse-trap, there will someday be a better mouse.
The more realistic analysis is to ask yourself what the acceptable risk is.
Or, put another way, you should strive to ensure that the security is more difficult to break than the value of whatever it is that is being protected.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30568872</id>
	<title>Gee, I wonder where this concept could go wrong?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1262030760000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Wasn't Google one of the big proponants of Cloud Computing (along with that other Stalwort of "privacy" IBM/Hollerith of "Nazi Germany fame")?</p><p>I wouldn't trust ANYTHING that was not stored physically in my home/office. Even then, Lots of measures have to be taken, so why the hell do people want to store all their stuff on a Google server (or any server for that matter), ESPECIALLY with the atrocious privacy record Google has with every single product that they bring to market?</p><p>Maybe they haven't been reading the press reporting it on a weekly basis? So far Google is batting Zero on the privacy front.</p><p>You might as well say, here, Google, US Military, Law Enforcement, Data Mining Contractors, Domestic Government, Foriegn Governments, Private Surveillance Contractors, Homeland Security, Identity Theives, Let me just give you ALL MY DATA to look at! Here's all my company's trade secrets that you can sell without my knowledge to the highest bidder!</p><p>Is anyone actually buying this crap? If so: Are they INSANE? They spend all of this money on IT people to secure their networks, and now they want to give all of their data over to some remote entity?</p><p>Cloud Computing sounds like a Surveillence State's wet dream, to me. I'm not buying it.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Was n't Google one of the big proponants of Cloud Computing ( along with that other Stalwort of " privacy " IBM/Hollerith of " Nazi Germany fame " ) ? I would n't trust ANYTHING that was not stored physically in my home/office .
Even then , Lots of measures have to be taken , so why the hell do people want to store all their stuff on a Google server ( or any server for that matter ) , ESPECIALLY with the atrocious privacy record Google has with every single product that they bring to market ? Maybe they have n't been reading the press reporting it on a weekly basis ?
So far Google is batting Zero on the privacy front.You might as well say , here , Google , US Military , Law Enforcement , Data Mining Contractors , Domestic Government , Foriegn Governments , Private Surveillance Contractors , Homeland Security , Identity Theives , Let me just give you ALL MY DATA to look at !
Here 's all my company 's trade secrets that you can sell without my knowledge to the highest bidder ! Is anyone actually buying this crap ?
If so : Are they INSANE ?
They spend all of this money on IT people to secure their networks , and now they want to give all of their data over to some remote entity ? Cloud Computing sounds like a Surveillence State 's wet dream , to me .
I 'm not buying it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Wasn't Google one of the big proponants of Cloud Computing (along with that other Stalwort of "privacy" IBM/Hollerith of "Nazi Germany fame")?I wouldn't trust ANYTHING that was not stored physically in my home/office.
Even then, Lots of measures have to be taken, so why the hell do people want to store all their stuff on a Google server (or any server for that matter), ESPECIALLY with the atrocious privacy record Google has with every single product that they bring to market?Maybe they haven't been reading the press reporting it on a weekly basis?
So far Google is batting Zero on the privacy front.You might as well say, here, Google, US Military, Law Enforcement, Data Mining Contractors, Domestic Government, Foriegn Governments, Private Surveillance Contractors, Homeland Security, Identity Theives, Let me just give you ALL MY DATA to look at!
Here's all my company's trade secrets that you can sell without my knowledge to the highest bidder!Is anyone actually buying this crap?
If so: Are they INSANE?
They spend all of this money on IT people to secure their networks, and now they want to give all of their data over to some remote entity?Cloud Computing sounds like a Surveillence State's wet dream, to me.
I'm not buying it.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564020</id>
	<title>I'm a nigger</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261938480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>and my HP webcam can't see me!</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>and my HP webcam ca n't see me !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>and my HP webcam can't see me!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30567664</id>
	<title>Re:TCP/IP is a cloud we trust</title>
	<author>hughperkins</author>
	<datestamp>1261927200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Many banks use multiple layers of security for data traversing WAN links:<br>- the WAN link itself is supposedly secure and encrypted intrinsically by the provider<br>- vpns run over the wan links.  All traffic runs over these vpns<br>- data is forbidden from being sent in clear, even though it's running over a vpn.  ssh et al are used to secure data that traverses</p><p>The advantage of layering is:<br>- if one layer of security fails by accident, the data is not necessarily compromised<br>- if one layer of security fails by design or intrusion, the data is not necessarily compromised<br>- no one person or group has the power to access the data from everyone, ie segregation of responsibility, ie the network team can, yes, get access to all network data, but it's all mandatorily encrypted by the application teams anyway....</p><p>Application teams can obviously see all their own data unencrypted, but they cannot see the data from other teams, since each team has encrypted their own data.</p><p>Now... moving onto the cloud.  There is as far as I can see it very little room for layering:<br>- all data is available in ram in an unencrypted form<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; - an attacker with access to the physical vm host can read arbitrary data from the ram of executing guests<br>- the network adapter of the virtual host is bridged directly in many cases to the public internet, but even when it is connected to a cloud-provided vpn, or uses its own vpn set up by the guest's company, the number of layers is significantly smaller than a server safely tucked away in a secure data center somewhere behind multiple layers of firewalls, dmzs, enterprise intrusion detection devices and so on...<br>- the block storage itself (EBS for example) is just a few steps away from a potential attacker: yes, EBS is in theory wiped to zero by Amazon, and yes one can run encryption over the top of the EBS, but still, that is only two layers.  What if the wipe gets turned off one day without the guest company knowing?  What if the guest's SA forgets to encrypt the volume for some reason?</p><p>I imagine that none of these problems are insurmountable, but one can see why large corporations would be reticent to move their sensitive servers, or even not so sensitive servers, onto publically available cloud servers?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Many banks use multiple layers of security for data traversing WAN links : - the WAN link itself is supposedly secure and encrypted intrinsically by the provider- vpns run over the wan links .
All traffic runs over these vpns- data is forbidden from being sent in clear , even though it 's running over a vpn .
ssh et al are used to secure data that traversesThe advantage of layering is : - if one layer of security fails by accident , the data is not necessarily compromised- if one layer of security fails by design or intrusion , the data is not necessarily compromised- no one person or group has the power to access the data from everyone , ie segregation of responsibility , ie the network team can , yes , get access to all network data , but it 's all mandatorily encrypted by the application teams anyway....Application teams can obviously see all their own data unencrypted , but they can not see the data from other teams , since each team has encrypted their own data.Now... moving onto the cloud .
There is as far as I can see it very little room for layering : - all data is available in ram in an unencrypted form       - an attacker with access to the physical vm host can read arbitrary data from the ram of executing guests- the network adapter of the virtual host is bridged directly in many cases to the public internet , but even when it is connected to a cloud-provided vpn , or uses its own vpn set up by the guest 's company , the number of layers is significantly smaller than a server safely tucked away in a secure data center somewhere behind multiple layers of firewalls , dmzs , enterprise intrusion detection devices and so on...- the block storage itself ( EBS for example ) is just a few steps away from a potential attacker : yes , EBS is in theory wiped to zero by Amazon , and yes one can run encryption over the top of the EBS , but still , that is only two layers .
What if the wipe gets turned off one day without the guest company knowing ?
What if the guest 's SA forgets to encrypt the volume for some reason ? I imagine that none of these problems are insurmountable , but one can see why large corporations would be reticent to move their sensitive servers , or even not so sensitive servers , onto publically available cloud servers ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Many banks use multiple layers of security for data traversing WAN links:- the WAN link itself is supposedly secure and encrypted intrinsically by the provider- vpns run over the wan links.
All traffic runs over these vpns- data is forbidden from being sent in clear, even though it's running over a vpn.
ssh et al are used to secure data that traversesThe advantage of layering is:- if one layer of security fails by accident, the data is not necessarily compromised- if one layer of security fails by design or intrusion, the data is not necessarily compromised- no one person or group has the power to access the data from everyone, ie segregation of responsibility, ie the network team can, yes, get access to all network data, but it's all mandatorily encrypted by the application teams anyway....Application teams can obviously see all their own data unencrypted, but they cannot see the data from other teams, since each team has encrypted their own data.Now... moving onto the cloud.
There is as far as I can see it very little room for layering:- all data is available in ram in an unencrypted form
      - an attacker with access to the physical vm host can read arbitrary data from the ram of executing guests- the network adapter of the virtual host is bridged directly in many cases to the public internet, but even when it is connected to a cloud-provided vpn, or uses its own vpn set up by the guest's company, the number of layers is significantly smaller than a server safely tucked away in a secure data center somewhere behind multiple layers of firewalls, dmzs, enterprise intrusion detection devices and so on...- the block storage itself (EBS for example) is just a few steps away from a potential attacker: yes, EBS is in theory wiped to zero by Amazon, and yes one can run encryption over the top of the EBS, but still, that is only two layers.
What if the wipe gets turned off one day without the guest company knowing?
What if the guest's SA forgets to encrypt the volume for some reason?I imagine that none of these problems are insurmountable, but one can see why large corporations would be reticent to move their sensitive servers, or even not so sensitive servers, onto publically available cloud servers?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564058</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564324</id>
	<title>Security is the NEXT great challenge?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261941480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Shouldn't it have been the FIRST great challenge once things were up and running?</htmltext>
<tokenext>Should n't it have been the FIRST great challenge once things were up and running ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Shouldn't it have been the FIRST great challenge once things were up and running?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30569422</id>
	<title>Re:For most users, cloud storage is more secure</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261998360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>So... how much do they pay you to post online about this stuff? Do you get really good benefits? I bet the pension is to die for.</p><p>Come on. Are you trying to pull our legs? Yea... storing files on remote serves is SOOOOO secure. You're not dealing with little old ladies who don't know how to operate a digital camera.</p><p>If you're storing your data remotely, it by default introduces a number of major security issues, regardless of how much the company tries to claim it is safe (like the company is going to admit security holes and ruin it's profit margin.. yeah<nobr> <wbr></nobr>... okay). Also keep in mind these companies who are pushing this technology have a very publicized and long history of circumventing privacy, even when not required by law. Even when privacy laws contradicted their corporate policies, they made every effort to thwart them, and sell information to third parties without the authorization or knowledge of the party involved. . . Come on, now. You're not dealing with idiots, here.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>So... how much do they pay you to post online about this stuff ?
Do you get really good benefits ?
I bet the pension is to die for.Come on .
Are you trying to pull our legs ?
Yea... storing files on remote serves is SOOOOO secure .
You 're not dealing with little old ladies who do n't know how to operate a digital camera.If you 're storing your data remotely , it by default introduces a number of major security issues , regardless of how much the company tries to claim it is safe ( like the company is going to admit security holes and ruin it 's profit margin.. yeah ... okay ) . Also keep in mind these companies who are pushing this technology have a very publicized and long history of circumventing privacy , even when not required by law .
Even when privacy laws contradicted their corporate policies , they made every effort to thwart them , and sell information to third parties without the authorization or knowledge of the party involved .
. .
Come on , now .
You 're not dealing with idiots , here .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>So... how much do they pay you to post online about this stuff?
Do you get really good benefits?
I bet the pension is to die for.Come on.
Are you trying to pull our legs?
Yea... storing files on remote serves is SOOOOO secure.
You're not dealing with little old ladies who don't know how to operate a digital camera.If you're storing your data remotely, it by default introduces a number of major security issues, regardless of how much the company tries to claim it is safe (like the company is going to admit security holes and ruin it's profit margin.. yeah ... okay). Also keep in mind these companies who are pushing this technology have a very publicized and long history of circumventing privacy, even when not required by law.
Even when privacy laws contradicted their corporate policies, they made every effort to thwart them, and sell information to third parties without the authorization or knowledge of the party involved.
. .
Come on, now.
You're not dealing with idiots, here.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564742</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30564282</id>
	<title>Re:Remember kids</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1261941060000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>It's not a buzzword, it's a filterword.  A buzzword is a word that describes a broad range of technologies and is useful for setting the scene, although a real technical discussion requires more focussed terminology.  A filterword is a word used let you know that the person talking is an idiot and that you can safely disregard everything else that they say.  Other examples include 'beowulf cluster,' and 'first post.'</htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's not a buzzword , it 's a filterword .
A buzzword is a word that describes a broad range of technologies and is useful for setting the scene , although a real technical discussion requires more focussed terminology .
A filterword is a word used let you know that the person talking is an idiot and that you can safely disregard everything else that they say .
Other examples include 'beowulf cluster, ' and 'first post .
'</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's not a buzzword, it's a filterword.
A buzzword is a word that describes a broad range of technologies and is useful for setting the scene, although a real technical discussion requires more focussed terminology.
A filterword is a word used let you know that the person talking is an idiot and that you can safely disregard everything else that they say.
Other examples include 'beowulf cluster,' and 'first post.
'</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_12_27_1526256.30563964</parent>
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