<article>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#article09_11_21_0354209</id>
	<title>RFID Fingerprints To Fight Tag Cloning</title>
	<author>Soulskill</author>
	<datestamp>1258822800000</datestamp>
	<htmltext>Bourdain writes with news out of the University of Arkansas, where researchers are <a href="http://dailyheadlines.uark.edu/16260.htm">looking for ways to combat counterfeit RFID tags</a>. Passive tags typically wait for a reader to transmit a signal of the appropriate strength and frequency before sending their own transmission. The scientists found that the amount of power required to trigger this varies quite a bit from one tag to the next, especially when many different frequencies are sampled. This and other physical characteristics give the tag its own "fingerprint" that is independent of the signal information stored in its memory, which the researchers say will facilitate the detection of cloned tags.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Bourdain writes with news out of the University of Arkansas , where researchers are looking for ways to combat counterfeit RFID tags .
Passive tags typically wait for a reader to transmit a signal of the appropriate strength and frequency before sending their own transmission .
The scientists found that the amount of power required to trigger this varies quite a bit from one tag to the next , especially when many different frequencies are sampled .
This and other physical characteristics give the tag its own " fingerprint " that is independent of the signal information stored in its memory , which the researchers say will facilitate the detection of cloned tags .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Bourdain writes with news out of the University of Arkansas, where researchers are looking for ways to combat counterfeit RFID tags.
Passive tags typically wait for a reader to transmit a signal of the appropriate strength and frequency before sending their own transmission.
The scientists found that the amount of power required to trigger this varies quite a bit from one tag to the next, especially when many different frequencies are sampled.
This and other physical characteristics give the tag its own "fingerprint" that is independent of the signal information stored in its memory, which the researchers say will facilitate the detection of cloned tags.</sentencetext>
</article>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182388</id>
	<title>Are we actually fixing anything here?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258744980000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>So... we're now looking into methods of physical authentication for digital authentication data that was intended to replace physical authentication?</p><p>Wouldn't it be easier (and cheaper) to go back a step?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>So... we 're now looking into methods of physical authentication for digital authentication data that was intended to replace physical authentication ? Would n't it be easier ( and cheaper ) to go back a step ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>So... we're now looking into methods of physical authentication for digital authentication data that was intended to replace physical authentication?Wouldn't it be easier (and cheaper) to go back a step?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182276</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258743540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Those fingetprints are physical charactistics due to manufacturing process. You can't duplicate them in software.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Those fingetprints are physical charactistics due to manufacturing process .
You ca n't duplicate them in software .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Those fingetprints are physical charactistics due to manufacturing process.
You can't duplicate them in software.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182088</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182088</id>
	<title>Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258740300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>If you can read the fingerprint, so can anyone...
<br> <br>
So what's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents, and then devising a method to duplicate all the data?
<br> <br>
An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics.</htmltext>
<tokenext>If you can read the fingerprint , so can anyone.. . So what 's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents , and then devising a method to duplicate all the data ?
An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If you can read the fingerprint, so can anyone...
 
So what's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents, and then devising a method to duplicate all the data?
An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30184364</id>
	<title>Re:Solving the wrong problem</title>
	<author>mtremsal</author>
	<datestamp>1258820160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Can anyone give me an example of a situation where someone would want to clone RFID tags ?<br>Who would be using them for authentication ?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Can anyone give me an example of a situation where someone would want to clone RFID tags ? Who would be using them for authentication ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Can anyone give me an example of a situation where someone would want to clone RFID tags ?Who would be using them for authentication ?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182724</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182320</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>cortesoft</author>
	<datestamp>1258744020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Crypto wouldn't work... the cloner doesn't have to break the encryption to copy the chip.</p><p>Imagine in this way.... you have an encrypted hard drive, and someone wants to pass off their hard drive as yours.  They don't have to break the encryption... they can copy the drive byte for byte, and hand it to the person who if verifying that is the original.  The person checking the data is the one who does the decrypting.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Crypto would n't work... the cloner does n't have to break the encryption to copy the chip.Imagine in this way.... you have an encrypted hard drive , and someone wants to pass off their hard drive as yours .
They do n't have to break the encryption... they can copy the drive byte for byte , and hand it to the person who if verifying that is the original .
The person checking the data is the one who does the decrypting .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Crypto wouldn't work... the cloner doesn't have to break the encryption to copy the chip.Imagine in this way.... you have an encrypted hard drive, and someone wants to pass off their hard drive as yours.
They don't have to break the encryption... they can copy the drive byte for byte, and hand it to the person who if verifying that is the original.
The person checking the data is the one who does the decrypting.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182210</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30183858</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>MobyDisk</author>
	<datestamp>1258815300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I think RFID crypto involves things like challenge-response.  They can still do that on passive tags.</p><p>Also, what do the US passport RFID tags use that prevents copying?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I think RFID crypto involves things like challenge-response .
They can still do that on passive tags.Also , what do the US passport RFID tags use that prevents copying ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I think RFID crypto involves things like challenge-response.
They can still do that on passive tags.Also, what do the US passport RFID tags use that prevents copying?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182320</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182710</id>
	<title>Solution looking for a problem</title>
	<author>mac1235</author>
	<datestamp>1258794000000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>Who is cloning RFIDs yet? Seriously, who?</htmltext>
<tokenext>Who is cloning RFIDs yet ?
Seriously , who ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Who is cloning RFIDs yet?
Seriously, who?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182684</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258836900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>They only have to meet the measurement device's standards for EXACTLY not some ideal perfect copy.  So that means you need to be able to copy the measurable characteristics, which doesn't mean a perfect clone.  Just a perfect mimic.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>They only have to meet the measurement device 's standards for EXACTLY not some ideal perfect copy .
So that means you need to be able to copy the measurable characteristics , which does n't mean a perfect clone .
Just a perfect mimic .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>They only have to meet the measurement device's standards for EXACTLY not some ideal perfect copy.
So that means you need to be able to copy the measurable characteristics, which doesn't mean a perfect clone.
Just a perfect mimic.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182290</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182724</id>
	<title>Solving the wrong problem</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258794240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>RFID tags are not security devices, they are hyped barcodes.  They do not provide any authentication.</p><p>If you're worrying about your RFID tags being cloned for a malicious purpose, you are using them for the wrong thing.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>RFID tags are not security devices , they are hyped barcodes .
They do not provide any authentication.If you 're worrying about your RFID tags being cloned for a malicious purpose , you are using them for the wrong thing .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>RFID tags are not security devices, they are hyped barcodes.
They do not provide any authentication.If you're worrying about your RFID tags being cloned for a malicious purpose, you are using them for the wrong thing.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182454</id>
	<title>Passive tags will never be secure...</title>
	<author>oljanx</author>
	<datestamp>1258746060000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>Because it's not practical to produce a reader capable of transmitting enormous amounts of power, the complexity of passive tags is inherently limited.  They are essentially glorified bar codes.  This type of "fingerprinting" might add another level of complexity to the identification of tags, but it's not going to prevent counterfeit tags.  At best it will slow down the production of counterfeit tags by an insignificant amount of time.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Because it 's not practical to produce a reader capable of transmitting enormous amounts of power , the complexity of passive tags is inherently limited .
They are essentially glorified bar codes .
This type of " fingerprinting " might add another level of complexity to the identification of tags , but it 's not going to prevent counterfeit tags .
At best it will slow down the production of counterfeit tags by an insignificant amount of time .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Because it's not practical to produce a reader capable of transmitting enormous amounts of power, the complexity of passive tags is inherently limited.
They are essentially glorified bar codes.
This type of "fingerprinting" might add another level of complexity to the identification of tags, but it's not going to prevent counterfeit tags.
At best it will slow down the production of counterfeit tags by an insignificant amount of time.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182210</id>
	<title>What's the point?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258742160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Just use a sensible crypographic authentication mechanism and be done with it. I guess that it is interesting from a "pure science" point of view but I'm not quite sure that this should be used to detect fake passports.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Just use a sensible crypographic authentication mechanism and be done with it .
I guess that it is interesting from a " pure science " point of view but I 'm not quite sure that this should be used to detect fake passports .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Just use a sensible crypographic authentication mechanism and be done with it.
I guess that it is interesting from a "pure science" point of view but I'm not quite sure that this should be used to detect fake passports.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30191372</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>lsatenstein</author>
	<datestamp>1258830420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>I guess we are in need of smart rfid tags, as are used on our Montreal Public Transportation system.  A smart-card solution.  If RFID was used, it could read a code sent from the host, use it with another to generate a hash number, which the host could validate.  Counterfeit RFID units would not generate the correct hash result.  (Shades of public key encryption).</htmltext>
<tokenext>I guess we are in need of smart rfid tags , as are used on our Montreal Public Transportation system .
A smart-card solution .
If RFID was used , it could read a code sent from the host , use it with another to generate a hash number , which the host could validate .
Counterfeit RFID units would not generate the correct hash result .
( Shades of public key encryption ) .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I guess we are in need of smart rfid tags, as are used on our Montreal Public Transportation system.
A smart-card solution.
If RFID was used, it could read a code sent from the host, use it with another to generate a hash number, which the host could validate.
Counterfeit RFID units would not generate the correct hash result.
(Shades of public key encryption).</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182290</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30185496</id>
	<title>Re:Solving the wrong problem</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258826640000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I agree they should be using cryptographically secure tags and I thought that they were doing so for some things. This needs public key cryptography and a central key repository.</p><p>It sounds as if they're going to try security through obscurity when all it will take is someone scanning features till they get one to pass.</p><p>I *want* electronic parts such as IC's, capacitors, resistors, etc to have such high grade RFID microtags it's getting to the point we have to test every part. Right now we're testing the high dollar parts.  We have to do this because if we get a run of fake crap we're screwed on the cost to create the assembly and the cost to rework it and in some cases reworking it is not an option.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I agree they should be using cryptographically secure tags and I thought that they were doing so for some things .
This needs public key cryptography and a central key repository.It sounds as if they 're going to try security through obscurity when all it will take is someone scanning features till they get one to pass.I * want * electronic parts such as IC 's , capacitors , resistors , etc to have such high grade RFID microtags it 's getting to the point we have to test every part .
Right now we 're testing the high dollar parts .
We have to do this because if we get a run of fake crap we 're screwed on the cost to create the assembly and the cost to rework it and in some cases reworking it is not an option .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I agree they should be using cryptographically secure tags and I thought that they were doing so for some things.
This needs public key cryptography and a central key repository.It sounds as if they're going to try security through obscurity when all it will take is someone scanning features till they get one to pass.I *want* electronic parts such as IC's, capacitors, resistors, etc to have such high grade RFID microtags it's getting to the point we have to test every part.
Right now we're testing the high dollar parts.
We have to do this because if we get a run of fake crap we're screwed on the cost to create the assembly and the cost to rework it and in some cases reworking it is not an option.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182724</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30183040</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>AdamInParadise</author>
	<datestamp>1258800660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Encrypting a hard drive protects the confidentiality of its data. It does not prevent you from cloning the hard drive i.e. it does not protect the authenticity of the hard drive.</p><p>In many applications that use RFID tags, authenticity is much more important than confidentiality. Those researchers seem to propose a way to authenticate the RFID tag using its "fingerprint". What I'm saying is that a dynamic challenge-response scheme is much more practical and more reliable.</p><p>Crypto is not only about encrypting data.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Encrypting a hard drive protects the confidentiality of its data .
It does not prevent you from cloning the hard drive i.e .
it does not protect the authenticity of the hard drive.In many applications that use RFID tags , authenticity is much more important than confidentiality .
Those researchers seem to propose a way to authenticate the RFID tag using its " fingerprint " .
What I 'm saying is that a dynamic challenge-response scheme is much more practical and more reliable.Crypto is not only about encrypting data .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Encrypting a hard drive protects the confidentiality of its data.
It does not prevent you from cloning the hard drive i.e.
it does not protect the authenticity of the hard drive.In many applications that use RFID tags, authenticity is much more important than confidentiality.
Those researchers seem to propose a way to authenticate the RFID tag using its "fingerprint".
What I'm saying is that a dynamic challenge-response scheme is much more practical and more reliable.Crypto is not only about encrypting data.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182320</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30186320</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258831860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>RFID tags are made by 'glueing' a small chip onto an antenna.  The quality of the chip, antenna, connect etc all affect the characteristics of the RFID tag.<br>What UofA is referring to is infering those characteristics by looking at the frequency response of the tag.</p><p>The problem is, to make this precise characterization of a RFID tag you need a controlled environment (RF chamber).  It would be much easier to associate a particular RFID tag with some physical property (Iike biometrics for items - I've heard about randomly placing fibers in a label - the placement of the fibers is remember along with an RFID tag's serial number.  When that serial number shows up, you check the label for the fibers - if they are in the right place, then all is good.  To hack that, you would have to be able to replicate fiber placement on a microscopic level.</p><p>Of course, tagged humans you just match it up to biometrics....  Unless they clone the human as well....</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>RFID tags are made by 'glueing ' a small chip onto an antenna .
The quality of the chip , antenna , connect etc all affect the characteristics of the RFID tag.What UofA is referring to is infering those characteristics by looking at the frequency response of the tag.The problem is , to make this precise characterization of a RFID tag you need a controlled environment ( RF chamber ) .
It would be much easier to associate a particular RFID tag with some physical property ( Iike biometrics for items - I 've heard about randomly placing fibers in a label - the placement of the fibers is remember along with an RFID tag 's serial number .
When that serial number shows up , you check the label for the fibers - if they are in the right place , then all is good .
To hack that , you would have to be able to replicate fiber placement on a microscopic level.Of course , tagged humans you just match it up to biometrics.... Unless they clone the human as well... .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>RFID tags are made by 'glueing' a small chip onto an antenna.
The quality of the chip, antenna, connect etc all affect the characteristics of the RFID tag.What UofA is referring to is infering those characteristics by looking at the frequency response of the tag.The problem is, to make this precise characterization of a RFID tag you need a controlled environment (RF chamber).
It would be much easier to associate a particular RFID tag with some physical property (Iike biometrics for items - I've heard about randomly placing fibers in a label - the placement of the fibers is remember along with an RFID tag's serial number.
When that serial number shows up, you check the label for the fibers - if they are in the right place, then all is good.
To hack that, you would have to be able to replicate fiber placement on a microscopic level.Of course, tagged humans you just match it up to biometrics....  Unless they clone the human as well....</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182088</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30183102</id>
	<title>Fingerprinting capability very limited.....</title>
	<author>jcochran</author>
	<datestamp>1258801980000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>given what the article says.</p><p>What they're measuring is the minimum power level that a given RFID will respond to. This opens up two major issues.</p><p>1. A database of the response curves is needed in order to uniquely identify the RFID chip in question.<br>2. Since the power received follows the inverse square law, one of the major advantages of an RFID chip is negated. Namely the ability to scan for it's presence without having to have exact location. They need to precisely control the distance from the RFID chip and the reader in order for that technology to work. And if they need that level of control, why not use a contact based technology?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>given what the article says.What they 're measuring is the minimum power level that a given RFID will respond to .
This opens up two major issues.1 .
A database of the response curves is needed in order to uniquely identify the RFID chip in question.2 .
Since the power received follows the inverse square law , one of the major advantages of an RFID chip is negated .
Namely the ability to scan for it 's presence without having to have exact location .
They need to precisely control the distance from the RFID chip and the reader in order for that technology to work .
And if they need that level of control , why not use a contact based technology ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>given what the article says.What they're measuring is the minimum power level that a given RFID will respond to.
This opens up two major issues.1.
A database of the response curves is needed in order to uniquely identify the RFID chip in question.2.
Since the power received follows the inverse square law, one of the major advantages of an RFID chip is negated.
Namely the ability to scan for it's presence without having to have exact location.
They need to precisely control the distance from the RFID chip and the reader in order for that technology to work.
And if they need that level of control, why not use a contact based technology?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30183660</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258812420000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Yes it would, because when you want security, you don't store encrypted data onto a readable memory chip (be it proximity or contact smart card).</p><p>What you do is put a chip on a card with which you talk using keys in other to authenticate. The card authenticate the reader, and the reader authenticate the card. When both are satisfied that the other is legit, then the content part of the chip is opened and handed over to the reader. ie "I'm employee 1234"</p><p>The solution for security has been around for decades using encrypted and challenge based smartcard devices, but people keep on using glorified RFID tags to open their doors.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Yes it would , because when you want security , you do n't store encrypted data onto a readable memory chip ( be it proximity or contact smart card ) .What you do is put a chip on a card with which you talk using keys in other to authenticate .
The card authenticate the reader , and the reader authenticate the card .
When both are satisfied that the other is legit , then the content part of the chip is opened and handed over to the reader .
ie " I 'm employee 1234 " The solution for security has been around for decades using encrypted and challenge based smartcard devices , but people keep on using glorified RFID tags to open their doors .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Yes it would, because when you want security, you don't store encrypted data onto a readable memory chip (be it proximity or contact smart card).What you do is put a chip on a card with which you talk using keys in other to authenticate.
The card authenticate the reader, and the reader authenticate the card.
When both are satisfied that the other is legit, then the content part of the chip is opened and handed over to the reader.
ie "I'm employee 1234"The solution for security has been around for decades using encrypted and challenge based smartcard devices, but people keep on using glorified RFID tags to open their doors.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182320</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30184930</id>
	<title>How reliable is this?</title>
	<author>Trevin</author>
	<datestamp>1258823460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Given that the fingerprint is due to "radio-frequency and manufacturing differences" and "significantly different for same-model tags," isn't it also possible that a tag's fingerprint may vary over time?</p><p>And if the idea is "to detect counterfeit tags," how can they do that if tags of the same model have different fingerprints?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Given that the fingerprint is due to " radio-frequency and manufacturing differences " and " significantly different for same-model tags , " is n't it also possible that a tag 's fingerprint may vary over time ? And if the idea is " to detect counterfeit tags , " how can they do that if tags of the same model have different fingerprints ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Given that the fingerprint is due to "radio-frequency and manufacturing differences" and "significantly different for same-model tags," isn't it also possible that a tag's fingerprint may vary over time?And if the idea is "to detect counterfeit tags," how can they do that if tags of the same model have different fingerprints?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182988</id>
	<title>This is nothing new</title>
	<author>ian\_mackereth</author>
	<datestamp>1258799640000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>This sort of physical characteristic fingerprinting has been done for years on magnetic stripe cards and EEPROM smartcards, so this is nothing new in theory, just in what physical characteristics are being measured.<p>

In mag stripes, the magnetic remanence of the strip is different from card to card, in EEPROM, differences in the voltage levels and speed of reading of the cells are used.</p><p>

The general principle is that it's no point having unbreakable crypto if the data can simply be copied to a new medium.  Consider a card (of whatever type) that stores monetary value for public transport or photocopying or whatever:  Put $100 on it and copy the data, not knowing which bits are what.  Copy that data onto a heap of cards bought with $5 of credit on them and sell them in the grey market for $50 each and pocket the profit.</p><p>
With this sort of technique, though, part of that encrypted data is a fingerprint based on the physical characteristics of the original card. The new cards will generate a fingerprint in the reader that doesn't match the original, making the copies invalid.</p><p>
Sure, if you can crack the encryption, this method is useless, but that's not the point.  Crypto can be pretty good and costs more than a cheap reader/writer to break to duplicate cards/RFIDs.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This sort of physical characteristic fingerprinting has been done for years on magnetic stripe cards and EEPROM smartcards , so this is nothing new in theory , just in what physical characteristics are being measured .
In mag stripes , the magnetic remanence of the strip is different from card to card , in EEPROM , differences in the voltage levels and speed of reading of the cells are used .
The general principle is that it 's no point having unbreakable crypto if the data can simply be copied to a new medium .
Consider a card ( of whatever type ) that stores monetary value for public transport or photocopying or whatever : Put $ 100 on it and copy the data , not knowing which bits are what .
Copy that data onto a heap of cards bought with $ 5 of credit on them and sell them in the grey market for $ 50 each and pocket the profit .
With this sort of technique , though , part of that encrypted data is a fingerprint based on the physical characteristics of the original card .
The new cards will generate a fingerprint in the reader that does n't match the original , making the copies invalid .
Sure , if you can crack the encryption , this method is useless , but that 's not the point .
Crypto can be pretty good and costs more than a cheap reader/writer to break to duplicate cards/RFIDs .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This sort of physical characteristic fingerprinting has been done for years on magnetic stripe cards and EEPROM smartcards, so this is nothing new in theory, just in what physical characteristics are being measured.
In mag stripes, the magnetic remanence of the strip is different from card to card, in EEPROM, differences in the voltage levels and speed of reading of the cells are used.
The general principle is that it's no point having unbreakable crypto if the data can simply be copied to a new medium.
Consider a card (of whatever type) that stores monetary value for public transport or photocopying or whatever:  Put $100 on it and copy the data, not knowing which bits are what.
Copy that data onto a heap of cards bought with $5 of credit on them and sell them in the grey market for $50 each and pocket the profit.
With this sort of technique, though, part of that encrypted data is a fingerprint based on the physical characteristics of the original card.
The new cards will generate a fingerprint in the reader that doesn't match the original, making the copies invalid.
Sure, if you can crack the encryption, this method is useless, but that's not the point.
Crypto can be pretty good and costs more than a cheap reader/writer to break to duplicate cards/RFIDs.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182490</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>oljanx</author>
	<datestamp>1258746840000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>It's not practical for a passive RFID tag to provide cryptographically secure authentication.  Only a very small amount of power can be transmitted from the reader to the tag, just enough to transmit back a fairly simple ID.  If you want a secure challenge/response mechanism it would require much more power, an active tag would be required.</htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's not practical for a passive RFID tag to provide cryptographically secure authentication .
Only a very small amount of power can be transmitted from the reader to the tag , just enough to transmit back a fairly simple ID .
If you want a secure challenge/response mechanism it would require much more power , an active tag would be required .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's not practical for a passive RFID tag to provide cryptographically secure authentication.
Only a very small amount of power can be transmitted from the reader to the tag, just enough to transmit back a fairly simple ID.
If you want a secure challenge/response mechanism it would require much more power, an active tag would be required.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182210</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182636</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>vojtech</author>
	<datestamp>1258835820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It just means the clone will have to be a bit more expensive.</p><p>Cloned tags aren't using the same cheap chips that the common passive tags do. An attacker  can afford to carry batteries with him and make the tag completely locally powered. Then he has much more powerful electronics at his disposal and can simulate whatever frequency response the original tag had due to its cheap (few cents per tag) design.</p><p>This fingerprinting will do no more than to force the attacker to pay a few bucks more to create a clone.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It just means the clone will have to be a bit more expensive.Cloned tags are n't using the same cheap chips that the common passive tags do .
An attacker can afford to carry batteries with him and make the tag completely locally powered .
Then he has much more powerful electronics at his disposal and can simulate whatever frequency response the original tag had due to its cheap ( few cents per tag ) design.This fingerprinting will do no more than to force the attacker to pay a few bucks more to create a clone .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It just means the clone will have to be a bit more expensive.Cloned tags aren't using the same cheap chips that the common passive tags do.
An attacker  can afford to carry batteries with him and make the tag completely locally powered.
Then he has much more powerful electronics at his disposal and can simulate whatever frequency response the original tag had due to its cheap (few cents per tag) design.This fingerprinting will do no more than to force the attacker to pay a few bucks more to create a clone.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182290</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182962</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>owlstead</author>
	<datestamp>1258799280000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Depends on the chip. If you include ISO 14443 processor cards then you can have crypto, combined with secure on chip storage of the key of course. You are giving away this chip, so you must make sure that the chip storage and on board crypto is sufficiently protected against attacks. E.g for passports you can have active authentication or chip authentication to verify that the chip is not cloned.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Depends on the chip .
If you include ISO 14443 processor cards then you can have crypto , combined with secure on chip storage of the key of course .
You are giving away this chip , so you must make sure that the chip storage and on board crypto is sufficiently protected against attacks .
E.g for passports you can have active authentication or chip authentication to verify that the chip is not cloned .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Depends on the chip.
If you include ISO 14443 processor cards then you can have crypto, combined with secure on chip storage of the key of course.
You are giving away this chip, so you must make sure that the chip storage and on board crypto is sufficiently protected against attacks.
E.g for passports you can have active authentication or chip authentication to verify that the chip is not cloned.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182320</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182902</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>Bourdain</author>
	<datestamp>1258798020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>If you can
read the
fingerprint, so can anyone...
So what's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint
when they read the tag contents, and then devising a method to
duplicate all the data?
An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint
characteristics.</p></div><p><div class="quote"><p>If
you can read the
fingerprint, so can anyone</p></div><p>
-true, that's not the point, no one can WRITE
the fingerprint (or at least it would be prohibitively difficult to do so currently)<br>
<br>
An application of this could include:<br>
-Secure building entry; the building could maintain a database of both
the RFID fingerprint and the RFID data and only grant admission to
those with that combination (the RFID data would, in theory, also
contain information about its fingerprint as well)<br>
<br>
-RFID isn't meant to be an encryption system, it's meant to be more
like a more efficient bar code</p><p><div class="quote"></div></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>If you can read the fingerprint , so can anyone.. . So what 's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents , and then devising a method to duplicate all the data ?
An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics.If you can read the fingerprint , so can anyone -true , that 's not the point , no one can WRITE the fingerprint ( or at least it would be prohibitively difficult to do so currently ) An application of this could include : -Secure building entry ; the building could maintain a database of both the RFID fingerprint and the RFID data and only grant admission to those with that combination ( the RFID data would , in theory , also contain information about its fingerprint as well ) -RFID is n't meant to be an encryption system , it 's meant to be more like a more efficient bar code</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If you can
read the
fingerprint, so can anyone...
So what's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint
when they read the tag contents, and then devising a method to
duplicate all the data?
An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint
characteristics.If
you can read the
fingerprint, so can anyone
-true, that's not the point, no one can WRITE
the fingerprint (or at least it would be prohibitively difficult to do so currently)

An application of this could include:
-Secure building entry; the building could maintain a database of both
the RFID fingerprint and the RFID data and only grant admission to
those with that combination (the RFID data would, in theory, also
contain information about its fingerprint as well)

-RFID isn't meant to be an encryption system, it's meant to be more
like a more efficient bar code
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182088</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182270</id>
	<title>Re:What's the point?</title>
	<author>sdiz</author>
	<datestamp>1258743480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>These are passive tags, i.e. ultra-low power consumption. You can't put any decent crypto on it.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>These are passive tags , i.e .
ultra-low power consumption .
You ca n't put any decent crypto on it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>These are passive tags, i.e.
ultra-low power consumption.
You can't put any decent crypto on it.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182210</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30190532</id>
	<title>Quantum tags?</title>
	<author>thePowerOfGrayskull</author>
	<datestamp>1258819020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>But the act of embedding the correct fingerprint signature into the RFID tag might change the signature! How's that cat doing, anyway.</htmltext>
<tokenext>But the act of embedding the correct fingerprint signature into the RFID tag might change the signature !
How 's that cat doing , anyway .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>But the act of embedding the correct fingerprint signature into the RFID tag might change the signature!
How's that cat doing, anyway.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30184066</id>
	<title>Observation looking for relavence</title>
	<author>dzoey</author>
	<datestamp>1258817520000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>I wonder if their data will scale?  Is it effected by temperature changes?  Humidity changes (especially Gen2 tags)?    It's one thing to notice the uniqueness  of a few hundred chips, but it a passport database could have billions of entries, or say a database of tagged cash with trillions of entries, would entries still be unique under varying temperature and humidty?   Or just mostly unique, like social security numbers?

Another way of reducing counterfeiting is to track where the item is supposed to be in a secure database (or secure databases linked by secure communications) and if the tag shows up in an unexpected place, investigate further.   In the passport example from the article, if passport X is known to be in the US and its counterfeit tries to be used in France, that should trigger further examination.   Of course, this requires all the passport computers to communicate world wide which could be administratively difficult, but probably not a lot more difficult than figuring out which database of response curves to query.</htmltext>
<tokenext>I wonder if their data will scale ?
Is it effected by temperature changes ?
Humidity changes ( especially Gen2 tags ) ?
It 's one thing to notice the uniqueness of a few hundred chips , but it a passport database could have billions of entries , or say a database of tagged cash with trillions of entries , would entries still be unique under varying temperature and humidty ?
Or just mostly unique , like social security numbers ?
Another way of reducing counterfeiting is to track where the item is supposed to be in a secure database ( or secure databases linked by secure communications ) and if the tag shows up in an unexpected place , investigate further .
In the passport example from the article , if passport X is known to be in the US and its counterfeit tries to be used in France , that should trigger further examination .
Of course , this requires all the passport computers to communicate world wide which could be administratively difficult , but probably not a lot more difficult than figuring out which database of response curves to query .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I wonder if their data will scale?
Is it effected by temperature changes?
Humidity changes (especially Gen2 tags)?
It's one thing to notice the uniqueness  of a few hundred chips, but it a passport database could have billions of entries, or say a database of tagged cash with trillions of entries, would entries still be unique under varying temperature and humidty?
Or just mostly unique, like social security numbers?
Another way of reducing counterfeiting is to track where the item is supposed to be in a secure database (or secure databases linked by secure communications) and if the tag shows up in an unexpected place, investigate further.
In the passport example from the article, if passport X is known to be in the US and its counterfeit tries to be used in France, that should trigger further examination.
Of course, this requires all the passport computers to communicate world wide which could be administratively difficult, but probably not a lot more difficult than figuring out which database of response curves to query.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182158</id>
	<title>Does this say the same at 55-70+ mph or just at</title>
	<author>Joe The Dragon</author>
	<datestamp>1258741140000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Does this say the same at 55-70+ mph or just at much lower walking speeds?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Does this say the same at 55-70 + mph or just at much lower walking speeds ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Does this say the same at 55-70+ mph or just at much lower walking speeds?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182144</id>
	<title>i just got off the toilet</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258741020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext>i shit out an obama.<br> <br>plop!</htmltext>
<tokenext>i shit out an obama .
plop !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>i shit out an obama.
plop!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182134</id>
	<title>Potentiometer</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258740900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>So if I have a pot wired across the power receiver, I can twiddle it until it matches.  If people know the factors being sampled, they can adjust them.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>So if I have a pot wired across the power receiver , I can twiddle it until it matches .
If people know the factors being sampled , they can adjust them .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>So if I have a pot wired across the power receiver, I can twiddle it until it matches.
If people know the factors being sampled, they can adjust them.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30183028</id>
	<title>full clone</title>
	<author>Spaham</author>
	<datestamp>1258800540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>well, they'll just have to clone that parameter too.<br>Unless of course the industrial process used to create the tags makes each one of them a bit different,<br>hence defeating the identification in the first place.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>well , they 'll just have to clone that parameter too.Unless of course the industrial process used to create the tags makes each one of them a bit different,hence defeating the identification in the first place .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>well, they'll just have to clone that parameter too.Unless of course the industrial process used to create the tags makes each one of them a bit different,hence defeating the identification in the first place.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182070</id>
	<title>Why /. fired Michael</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258740120000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>January 31st, 2005, was the last day that Michael Sims, <a href="http://trollaxor.blogspot.com/2001/07/michael-sims-gay-nazi-conspirator.html" title="blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">Nazi editor of Slashdot</a> [blogspot.com] [blogspot.com], ever posted a story or indeed was ever heard from again. But what happened that day to Michael Sims? Did his embroilment in the Censorware.org conspiracy finally catch up with him? Or was he involved in a violent, and ultimately fatal, lovers' spat with his partner Jamie McCarthy? The truth, as we'll see, is much more perverse than fiction.</p><p>On New Year's Eve of 2004, the entire Slashdot staff was throwing a party to celebrate another year of Linux propaganda, homosexual recruitment, and the profits that their Microsoft ad banners had raked in for them. Eric Raymond, Emad, Roblimo, Hemos, Taco, Jamie, and Alan Cox all planned to rape Richard Stallman later in the night. Michael had shown up late, however, and was let in on the plans after they were made.</p><p>As it turned out, Jamie was to be leading the charge against the Free Software Foundation's founder and would be the first to penetrate Stallman's hairy unwashed ass. Michael, however, was jealous of this and made secret plans to thwart their nefarious venture of homosexual rape. The event was planned for zero hours, right as the ball dropped. But Michael had other ideas.</p><p>Michael suggested they all toast their plan with J&#195;germeister, Eric Raymond's drink of choice that was in heavy supply that night, and the rest of the partygoers followed. While everyone downed their first shot, Michael slipped into the VA Software office's break-room, grabbing the syringe Raymond used to inject Rob Malda's semen with on the way. Michael leered at the case of J&#195;germeister, needle in hand.</p><p>Minutes later, Michael reappeared in the conference room with more J&#195;ger, ready for more shots. Over the next couple of hours they indulged in several drinking and party games, spurred on by Michael, as they drank bottle after bottle of the dark brown herbal liquor. If one were to pay special attention to Michael, however, they would note that Michael drank much less than anyone else and only from his own bottle.</p><p>Emad and Roblimo were involved in a powerful sixty-nine cheered on by  Hemos and Alan whose bent geek penises throbbed near Emad's head and Roblimo's bloated ass, waiting for an opportunity. Moaning, Emad diverted his wet mouth from Roblimo's butthole and took down Hemos and Alan's cocks in quick succession. Hearing the wet, sloppy commotion behind him, Roblimo lost control and glunked all over Emad's chest.</p><p>Across the room near the podium, Eric Raymond was man-handling Rob, jamming a handgun down the back of his pants and asking him if he remembered their <a href="http://trollaxor.blogspot.com/2004/03/what-happened-in-holland.htmll" title="blogspot.com" rel="nofollow">special night in Holland</a> [blogspot.com] [blogspot.com]. Rob was giggling like a school girl and squirmed with all his might against the cold steel. Eric rained a shower of J&#195;ger over Rob's head which Rob greedily tongued up even as Eric's skinny red penis entered his ass cheeks, probing for the brown prize.</p><p>The conference room was awash in gay cum and chaos, Michael noted happily as he surveyed the carnage around him. Emad had now teamed up with Alan and Hemos to rape Roblimo's ass as Rob was being pistol-whipped to orgasm by Eric, all oblivious to the massive amounts of Rohypnol they were ingesting as they drank the J&#195;germeister Michael had given them. It wouldn't be much longer before the drug took effect.</p><p>Another half-hour into the night, Eric paused from raping Taco's mouth and sodomizing his anus with his Glock, short of breath. His head swam and he looked at his bottle of J&#195;germeister. <i>I can usually down six of these babies,</i> thought Eric, wondering why he was now farting uncontrollably. Rob's nose wrinkled as Eric's rectum expelled another gallon of aerosolized feces into the air. Stooping, Eric held on to the podium for support.</p><p>Across the way, Emad pulled his tiny Iranian dick out from betwee</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>January 31st , 2005 , was the last day that Michael Sims , Nazi editor of Slashdot [ blogspot.com ] [ blogspot.com ] , ever posted a story or indeed was ever heard from again .
But what happened that day to Michael Sims ?
Did his embroilment in the Censorware.org conspiracy finally catch up with him ?
Or was he involved in a violent , and ultimately fatal , lovers ' spat with his partner Jamie McCarthy ?
The truth , as we 'll see , is much more perverse than fiction.On New Year 's Eve of 2004 , the entire Slashdot staff was throwing a party to celebrate another year of Linux propaganda , homosexual recruitment , and the profits that their Microsoft ad banners had raked in for them .
Eric Raymond , Emad , Roblimo , Hemos , Taco , Jamie , and Alan Cox all planned to rape Richard Stallman later in the night .
Michael had shown up late , however , and was let in on the plans after they were made.As it turned out , Jamie was to be leading the charge against the Free Software Foundation 's founder and would be the first to penetrate Stallman 's hairy unwashed ass .
Michael , however , was jealous of this and made secret plans to thwart their nefarious venture of homosexual rape .
The event was planned for zero hours , right as the ball dropped .
But Michael had other ideas.Michael suggested they all toast their plan with J   germeister , Eric Raymond 's drink of choice that was in heavy supply that night , and the rest of the partygoers followed .
While everyone downed their first shot , Michael slipped into the VA Software office 's break-room , grabbing the syringe Raymond used to inject Rob Malda 's semen with on the way .
Michael leered at the case of J   germeister , needle in hand.Minutes later , Michael reappeared in the conference room with more J   ger , ready for more shots .
Over the next couple of hours they indulged in several drinking and party games , spurred on by Michael , as they drank bottle after bottle of the dark brown herbal liquor .
If one were to pay special attention to Michael , however , they would note that Michael drank much less than anyone else and only from his own bottle.Emad and Roblimo were involved in a powerful sixty-nine cheered on by Hemos and Alan whose bent geek penises throbbed near Emad 's head and Roblimo 's bloated ass , waiting for an opportunity .
Moaning , Emad diverted his wet mouth from Roblimo 's butthole and took down Hemos and Alan 's cocks in quick succession .
Hearing the wet , sloppy commotion behind him , Roblimo lost control and glunked all over Emad 's chest.Across the room near the podium , Eric Raymond was man-handling Rob , jamming a handgun down the back of his pants and asking him if he remembered their special night in Holland [ blogspot.com ] [ blogspot.com ] .
Rob was giggling like a school girl and squirmed with all his might against the cold steel .
Eric rained a shower of J   ger over Rob 's head which Rob greedily tongued up even as Eric 's skinny red penis entered his ass cheeks , probing for the brown prize.The conference room was awash in gay cum and chaos , Michael noted happily as he surveyed the carnage around him .
Emad had now teamed up with Alan and Hemos to rape Roblimo 's ass as Rob was being pistol-whipped to orgasm by Eric , all oblivious to the massive amounts of Rohypnol they were ingesting as they drank the J   germeister Michael had given them .
It would n't be much longer before the drug took effect.Another half-hour into the night , Eric paused from raping Taco 's mouth and sodomizing his anus with his Glock , short of breath .
His head swam and he looked at his bottle of J   germeister .
I can usually down six of these babies , thought Eric , wondering why he was now farting uncontrollably .
Rob 's nose wrinkled as Eric 's rectum expelled another gallon of aerosolized feces into the air .
Stooping , Eric held on to the podium for support.Across the way , Emad pulled his tiny Iranian dick out from betwee</tokentext>
<sentencetext>January 31st, 2005, was the last day that Michael Sims, Nazi editor of Slashdot [blogspot.com] [blogspot.com], ever posted a story or indeed was ever heard from again.
But what happened that day to Michael Sims?
Did his embroilment in the Censorware.org conspiracy finally catch up with him?
Or was he involved in a violent, and ultimately fatal, lovers' spat with his partner Jamie McCarthy?
The truth, as we'll see, is much more perverse than fiction.On New Year's Eve of 2004, the entire Slashdot staff was throwing a party to celebrate another year of Linux propaganda, homosexual recruitment, and the profits that their Microsoft ad banners had raked in for them.
Eric Raymond, Emad, Roblimo, Hemos, Taco, Jamie, and Alan Cox all planned to rape Richard Stallman later in the night.
Michael had shown up late, however, and was let in on the plans after they were made.As it turned out, Jamie was to be leading the charge against the Free Software Foundation's founder and would be the first to penetrate Stallman's hairy unwashed ass.
Michael, however, was jealous of this and made secret plans to thwart their nefarious venture of homosexual rape.
The event was planned for zero hours, right as the ball dropped.
But Michael had other ideas.Michael suggested they all toast their plan with JÃgermeister, Eric Raymond's drink of choice that was in heavy supply that night, and the rest of the partygoers followed.
While everyone downed their first shot, Michael slipped into the VA Software office's break-room, grabbing the syringe Raymond used to inject Rob Malda's semen with on the way.
Michael leered at the case of JÃgermeister, needle in hand.Minutes later, Michael reappeared in the conference room with more JÃger, ready for more shots.
Over the next couple of hours they indulged in several drinking and party games, spurred on by Michael, as they drank bottle after bottle of the dark brown herbal liquor.
If one were to pay special attention to Michael, however, they would note that Michael drank much less than anyone else and only from his own bottle.Emad and Roblimo were involved in a powerful sixty-nine cheered on by  Hemos and Alan whose bent geek penises throbbed near Emad's head and Roblimo's bloated ass, waiting for an opportunity.
Moaning, Emad diverted his wet mouth from Roblimo's butthole and took down Hemos and Alan's cocks in quick succession.
Hearing the wet, sloppy commotion behind him, Roblimo lost control and glunked all over Emad's chest.Across the room near the podium, Eric Raymond was man-handling Rob, jamming a handgun down the back of his pants and asking him if he remembered their special night in Holland [blogspot.com] [blogspot.com].
Rob was giggling like a school girl and squirmed with all his might against the cold steel.
Eric rained a shower of JÃger over Rob's head which Rob greedily tongued up even as Eric's skinny red penis entered his ass cheeks, probing for the brown prize.The conference room was awash in gay cum and chaos, Michael noted happily as he surveyed the carnage around him.
Emad had now teamed up with Alan and Hemos to rape Roblimo's ass as Rob was being pistol-whipped to orgasm by Eric, all oblivious to the massive amounts of Rohypnol they were ingesting as they drank the JÃgermeister Michael had given them.
It wouldn't be much longer before the drug took effect.Another half-hour into the night, Eric paused from raping Taco's mouth and sodomizing his anus with his Glock, short of breath.
His head swam and he looked at his bottle of JÃgermeister.
I can usually down six of these babies, thought Eric, wondering why he was now farting uncontrollably.
Rob's nose wrinkled as Eric's rectum expelled another gallon of aerosolized feces into the air.
Stooping, Eric held on to the podium for support.Across the way, Emad pulled his tiny Iranian dick out from betwee</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182788</id>
	<title>I think I get it...</title>
	<author>Anachragnome</author>
	<datestamp>1258795680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Ok, at first, this made no sense to me. The trouble I had was understanding how the flaws(uncontrolled manufacturing artifacts) would be of any use. I think I finally figured out what that poorly written article was trying to get across.</p><p>Say, for example,you have 200 million different passports. They should have 200 million different PROGRAMMED sets of information. At the time the passport is issued, the RFID is scanned to detect the FLAWS in it. This is recorded and filed away somewhere. The FLAWS are recorded as a specific signature that is in turn referenced to the PROGRAMMED data.</p><p>In order to detect a counterfeit passport all they have to do is make sure the flaw fingerprint matches the programmed data.</p><p>But seeing as how the article just told the entire world how they tell what the fingerprint is, I don't think it would be long before the cloners simply modify readers to start at a low frequency then ramp up until they get a signal and make sure the counterfeit responds the same way, at the same frequency. It could be as simple as smacking the RFID against a table until the RFID "flaws" react the way you want them to. In short, keep changing it until it reacts the same way as the original.</p><p>Ok, someone tell me I'm wrong because I'm not sure I'm right.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Ok , at first , this made no sense to me .
The trouble I had was understanding how the flaws ( uncontrolled manufacturing artifacts ) would be of any use .
I think I finally figured out what that poorly written article was trying to get across.Say , for example,you have 200 million different passports .
They should have 200 million different PROGRAMMED sets of information .
At the time the passport is issued , the RFID is scanned to detect the FLAWS in it .
This is recorded and filed away somewhere .
The FLAWS are recorded as a specific signature that is in turn referenced to the PROGRAMMED data.In order to detect a counterfeit passport all they have to do is make sure the flaw fingerprint matches the programmed data.But seeing as how the article just told the entire world how they tell what the fingerprint is , I do n't think it would be long before the cloners simply modify readers to start at a low frequency then ramp up until they get a signal and make sure the counterfeit responds the same way , at the same frequency .
It could be as simple as smacking the RFID against a table until the RFID " flaws " react the way you want them to .
In short , keep changing it until it reacts the same way as the original.Ok , someone tell me I 'm wrong because I 'm not sure I 'm right .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Ok, at first, this made no sense to me.
The trouble I had was understanding how the flaws(uncontrolled manufacturing artifacts) would be of any use.
I think I finally figured out what that poorly written article was trying to get across.Say, for example,you have 200 million different passports.
They should have 200 million different PROGRAMMED sets of information.
At the time the passport is issued, the RFID is scanned to detect the FLAWS in it.
This is recorded and filed away somewhere.
The FLAWS are recorded as a specific signature that is in turn referenced to the PROGRAMMED data.In order to detect a counterfeit passport all they have to do is make sure the flaw fingerprint matches the programmed data.But seeing as how the article just told the entire world how they tell what the fingerprint is, I don't think it would be long before the cloners simply modify readers to start at a low frequency then ramp up until they get a signal and make sure the counterfeit responds the same way, at the same frequency.
It could be as simple as smacking the RFID against a table until the RFID "flaws" react the way you want them to.
In short, keep changing it until it reacts the same way as the original.Ok, someone tell me I'm wrong because I'm not sure I'm right.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30187066</id>
	<title>Re:Solving the wrong problem</title>
	<author>Ozlanthos</author>
	<datestamp>1258836360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>It smells to me like they are getting ready to chip us all. Can't have you masquerading as Obama. It'll probably be MANDATORY in Obamacare.
<p>
-Oz</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It smells to me like they are getting ready to chip us all .
Ca n't have you masquerading as Obama .
It 'll probably be MANDATORY in Obamacare .
-Oz</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It smells to me like they are getting ready to chip us all.
Can't have you masquerading as Obama.
It'll probably be MANDATORY in Obamacare.
-Oz</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182724</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182290</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>cortesoft</author>
	<datestamp>1258743780000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I don't know if it will be that easy.  These fingerprints seem to be based on the fact that all RFID chips have flaws, and they are all flawed in different ways.... including the device that is trying to act as the clone of the RFID.  What this means is that this clone RFID has to be able to mimic EXACTLY the flaws of the real thing without giving itself away by its OWN flaws.  Without knowing more details about the flaws they are trying to measure, it is hard to say whether that would be possible.  If the flaws are easily mimicked in the sense that you can create a clone whose own defects are not detected because they are all superseded by the original's flaws, it may work.  If they vary so much that every clone will have some flaw that is severe enough to shine through, it would be impossible.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I do n't know if it will be that easy .
These fingerprints seem to be based on the fact that all RFID chips have flaws , and they are all flawed in different ways.... including the device that is trying to act as the clone of the RFID .
What this means is that this clone RFID has to be able to mimic EXACTLY the flaws of the real thing without giving itself away by its OWN flaws .
Without knowing more details about the flaws they are trying to measure , it is hard to say whether that would be possible .
If the flaws are easily mimicked in the sense that you can create a clone whose own defects are not detected because they are all superseded by the original 's flaws , it may work .
If they vary so much that every clone will have some flaw that is severe enough to shine through , it would be impossible .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I don't know if it will be that easy.
These fingerprints seem to be based on the fact that all RFID chips have flaws, and they are all flawed in different ways.... including the device that is trying to act as the clone of the RFID.
What this means is that this clone RFID has to be able to mimic EXACTLY the flaws of the real thing without giving itself away by its OWN flaws.
Without knowing more details about the flaws they are trying to measure, it is hard to say whether that would be possible.
If the flaws are easily mimicked in the sense that you can create a clone whose own defects are not detected because they are all superseded by the original's flaws, it may work.
If they vary so much that every clone will have some flaw that is severe enough to shine through, it would be impossible.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182088</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182370</id>
	<title>Re:Security enhancement at best</title>
	<author>TubeSteak</author>
	<datestamp>1258744680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>So what's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents, and then devising a method to duplicate all the data?</p><p>An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics.</p></div><p>I RTFA and I feel like I'm missing something.<br>They have a fingerprint of the RFID... and?<br>Are they proposing to embed the fingerprint in the RFID's data as a CRC/encrypted check?<br>Are you going to create a database of fingerprints and query it when the tag gets scanned?</p><p>I can't be the only one wondering what's the practical application of the discovery.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>So what 's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents , and then devising a method to duplicate all the data ? An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics.I RTFA and I feel like I 'm missing something.They have a fingerprint of the RFID... and ? Are they proposing to embed the fingerprint in the RFID 's data as a CRC/encrypted check ? Are you going to create a database of fingerprints and query it when the tag gets scanned ? I ca n't be the only one wondering what 's the practical application of the discovery .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>So what's to stop a dedicated attacker from reading the fingerprint when they read the tag contents, and then devising a method to duplicate all the data?An active tag might even be programmed to emulate the fingerprint characteristics.I RTFA and I feel like I'm missing something.They have a fingerprint of the RFID... and?Are they proposing to embed the fingerprint in the RFID's data as a CRC/encrypted check?Are you going to create a database of fingerprints and query it when the tag gets scanned?I can't be the only one wondering what's the practical application of the discovery.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_21_0354209.30182088</parent>
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