<article>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#article09_11_12_190206</id>
	<title>How To DDoS a Federal Wiretap</title>
	<author>timothy</author>
	<datestamp>1258053300000</datestamp>
	<htmltext>alphadogg writes <i>"Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania say they've discovered a way to<a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/111209-how-to-ddos-a-federal.html"> circumvent the networking technology used by law enforcement to tap phone lines</a> in the US. The flaws they've found 'represent a serious threat to the accuracy and completeness of wiretap records used for both criminal investigation and as evidence in trial,' the researchers say in their <a href="http://micah.cis.upenn.edu/papers/calea.pdf">paper,  set to be presented Thursday</a> at a computer security conference in Chicago. Following up on earlier work on evading analog wiretap devices called loop extenders, the Penn researchers took a deep look at the newer technical standards used to enable wiretapping on telecommunication switches. They found that while these newer devices probably don't suffer from many of the bugs they'd found in the loop extender world, they do introduce new flaws. In fact, wiretaps could probably be rendered useless if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data, something known as a denial of service (DOS) attack."</i></htmltext>
<tokenext>alphadogg writes " Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania say they 've discovered a way to circumvent the networking technology used by law enforcement to tap phone lines in the US .
The flaws they 've found 'represent a serious threat to the accuracy and completeness of wiretap records used for both criminal investigation and as evidence in trial, ' the researchers say in their paper , set to be presented Thursday at a computer security conference in Chicago .
Following up on earlier work on evading analog wiretap devices called loop extenders , the Penn researchers took a deep look at the newer technical standards used to enable wiretapping on telecommunication switches .
They found that while these newer devices probably do n't suffer from many of the bugs they 'd found in the loop extender world , they do introduce new flaws .
In fact , wiretaps could probably be rendered useless if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data , something known as a denial of service ( DOS ) attack .
"</tokentext>
<sentencetext>alphadogg writes "Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania say they've discovered a way to circumvent the networking technology used by law enforcement to tap phone lines in the US.
The flaws they've found 'represent a serious threat to the accuracy and completeness of wiretap records used for both criminal investigation and as evidence in trial,' the researchers say in their paper,  set to be presented Thursday at a computer security conference in Chicago.
Following up on earlier work on evading analog wiretap devices called loop extenders, the Penn researchers took a deep look at the newer technical standards used to enable wiretapping on telecommunication switches.
They found that while these newer devices probably don't suffer from many of the bugs they'd found in the loop extender world, they do introduce new flaws.
In fact, wiretaps could probably be rendered useless if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data, something known as a denial of service (DOS) attack.
"</sentencetext>
</article>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077874</id>
	<title>Why Bother Wire-tapping</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258016400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>. . . if once you have the evidence you don't do anything with it, ala Nidal Hasan?</p><p> I know the foundations of our legal system lie stem from the formerly great British Empire, but there's no reason why we have to follow them into becoming a pussified police state that spends more time acting like a nanny than a great power.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>.
. .
if once you have the evidence you do n't do anything with it , ala Nidal Hasan ?
I know the foundations of our legal system lie stem from the formerly great British Empire , but there 's no reason why we have to follow them into becoming a pussified police state that spends more time acting like a nanny than a great power .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>.
. .
if once you have the evidence you don't do anything with it, ala Nidal Hasan?
I know the foundations of our legal system lie stem from the formerly great British Empire, but there's no reason why we have to follow them into becoming a pussified police state that spends more time acting like a nanny than a great power.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078042</id>
	<title>Re:Buffering...</title>
	<author>starfishsystems</author>
	<datestamp>1258017000000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>I developed a similar system.  This particular product is not restricted to voice, but supports any network device which can mirror its packet traffic.
<br> <br>
Under its present interpretation, CALEA applies to any sort of subscriber data.  If law enforcement can clearly identify the subscriber and the intercept period, the network provider is obliged to supply all data carried for that subscriber during that period.  That could be your voice traffic or web browsing or email or whatever.  The plant has to be engineered accordingly, but that's essentially a capacity issue.
<br> <br>
On the other hand, it's important to note that there is no obligation upon the provider to interpret the supplied data.  Such an obligation would be unreasonable and unenforceable.  Instead, law enforcement is basically getting a raw PCAP file.
<br> <br>
I'll tell you what I found to be the most interesting aspect of this project.  There is very strict language in CALEA against intercepting data except for the specified subscriber during the specified period.  Of course we were careful to implement controls over that.  But until I insisted on the point, nobody even considered that we might want to have controls to verify that the intercept request came from a bona fide court and that the intercept data would be sent to a bona fide law enforcement agency.</htmltext>
<tokenext>I developed a similar system .
This particular product is not restricted to voice , but supports any network device which can mirror its packet traffic .
Under its present interpretation , CALEA applies to any sort of subscriber data .
If law enforcement can clearly identify the subscriber and the intercept period , the network provider is obliged to supply all data carried for that subscriber during that period .
That could be your voice traffic or web browsing or email or whatever .
The plant has to be engineered accordingly , but that 's essentially a capacity issue .
On the other hand , it 's important to note that there is no obligation upon the provider to interpret the supplied data .
Such an obligation would be unreasonable and unenforceable .
Instead , law enforcement is basically getting a raw PCAP file .
I 'll tell you what I found to be the most interesting aspect of this project .
There is very strict language in CALEA against intercepting data except for the specified subscriber during the specified period .
Of course we were careful to implement controls over that .
But until I insisted on the point , nobody even considered that we might want to have controls to verify that the intercept request came from a bona fide court and that the intercept data would be sent to a bona fide law enforcement agency .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I developed a similar system.
This particular product is not restricted to voice, but supports any network device which can mirror its packet traffic.
Under its present interpretation, CALEA applies to any sort of subscriber data.
If law enforcement can clearly identify the subscriber and the intercept period, the network provider is obliged to supply all data carried for that subscriber during that period.
That could be your voice traffic or web browsing or email or whatever.
The plant has to be engineered accordingly, but that's essentially a capacity issue.
On the other hand, it's important to note that there is no obligation upon the provider to interpret the supplied data.
Such an obligation would be unreasonable and unenforceable.
Instead, law enforcement is basically getting a raw PCAP file.
I'll tell you what I found to be the most interesting aspect of this project.
There is very strict language in CALEA against intercepting data except for the specified subscriber during the specified period.
Of course we were careful to implement controls over that.
But until I insisted on the point, nobody even considered that we might want to have controls to verify that the intercept request came from a bona fide court and that the intercept data would be sent to a bona fide law enforcement agency.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077332</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30080194</id>
	<title>Re:Stupid</title>
	<author>pwfffff</author>
	<datestamp>1258024620000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I've seen supposed wiretap transcripts on news sites and such that I guess were released during the trial. Most of the time the criminals ARE using code words, it's just, you know, not real hard to figure out that your terror suspects aren't really opening a hair salon, and therefore probably aren't ordering 300 'bottles' of 'conditioner' that are 'guaranteed to go off'.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I 've seen supposed wiretap transcripts on news sites and such that I guess were released during the trial .
Most of the time the criminals ARE using code words , it 's just , you know , not real hard to figure out that your terror suspects are n't really opening a hair salon , and therefore probably are n't ordering 300 'bottles ' of 'conditioner ' that are 'guaranteed to go off' .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I've seen supposed wiretap transcripts on news sites and such that I guess were released during the trial.
Most of the time the criminals ARE using code words, it's just, you know, not real hard to figure out that your terror suspects aren't really opening a hair salon, and therefore probably aren't ordering 300 'bottles' of 'conditioner' that are 'guaranteed to go off'.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077790</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078366</id>
	<title>Re:And here again is a door open to geeks unemploy</title>
	<author>Tenebrious1</author>
	<datestamp>1258018320000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>"At $150 a pop to "consult" with a man in a nice suit, you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop aren't secure, even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better."
<br> <br>
You better be giving him some damn good advice, or you might end up with some broken kneecaps if you're lucky, getting fished out of the river with cement shoes if not.</htmltext>
<tokenext>" At $ 150 a pop to " consult " with a man in a nice suit , you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop are n't secure , even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better .
" You better be giving him some damn good advice , or you might end up with some broken kneecaps if you 're lucky , getting fished out of the river with cement shoes if not .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"At $150 a pop to "consult" with a man in a nice suit, you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop aren't secure, even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.
"
 
You better be giving him some damn good advice, or you might end up with some broken kneecaps if you're lucky, getting fished out of the river with cement shoes if not.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077502</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30086158</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>Civil\_Disobedient</author>
	<datestamp>1258124940000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The entire A,B,C,D column is @ 1633hz.  Ergo, the 'C' key is 1633 Hz (column) + 852 Hz (row) -- two tones because of the <b>D</b> (dual) in DTMF.  <a href="http://www.tech-faq.com/dtmf-tone-frequencies.shtml" title="tech-faq.com">The full list is available here.</a> [tech-faq.com]</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The entire A,B,C,D column is @ 1633hz .
Ergo , the 'C ' key is 1633 Hz ( column ) + 852 Hz ( row ) -- two tones because of the D ( dual ) in DTMF .
The full list is available here .
[ tech-faq.com ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The entire A,B,C,D column is @ 1633hz.
Ergo, the 'C' key is 1633 Hz (column) + 852 Hz (row) -- two tones because of the D (dual) in DTMF.
The full list is available here.
[tech-faq.com]</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078194</id>
	<title>Re:In Soviet russia...</title>
	<author>interkin3tic</author>
	<datestamp>1258017660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>It seems like discussing anything over an unencrypted medium is asking for trouble.</p></div><p>Er... isn't<nobr> <wbr></nobr>/. an unencrypted medium?  Isn't this thread discussing something that would fall under the category of "anything?"</p><p>(yes, I know what you meant, I just couldn't resist, I'm sorry.)</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>It seems like discussing anything over an unencrypted medium is asking for trouble.Er... is n't / .
an unencrypted medium ?
Is n't this thread discussing something that would fall under the category of " anything ?
" ( yes , I know what you meant , I just could n't resist , I 'm sorry .
)</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It seems like discussing anything over an unencrypted medium is asking for trouble.Er... isn't /.
an unencrypted medium?
Isn't this thread discussing something that would fall under the category of "anything?
"(yes, I know what you meant, I just couldn't resist, I'm sorry.
)
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30085864</id>
	<title>Easier method</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258122900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Since your not going to get a green light that says your DOS attack is working why not just take your chances and play dark side of the moon really loud over your conversation.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Since your not going to get a green light that says your DOS attack is working why not just take your chances and play dark side of the moon really loud over your conversation .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Since your not going to get a green light that says your DOS attack is working why not just take your chances and play dark side of the moon really loud over your conversation.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078696</id>
	<title>Re:Buffering...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258019580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Yes the data is buffered in several places but the voice is sent out to PSTN via a 3way calling feature of the DMS. Interrupting the voice portion of the call is possible just like war dialing to overload a phone number is possible. But that assumes they know the LEA's number to call, that they have enough skype bots to do it, and that the intercept target is only going to 1 phone number.</p><p>A typical intercept involves several agencies and sometimes voice is sent to an agents cellphone as well. You can't be sure how many places the voice portion of the intercept is going but the SS7 telephony side of the house is much more hardened and difficult to gain access to than the IP side of it. Good luck getting your own STP to hide your criminal activity.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Yes the data is buffered in several places but the voice is sent out to PSTN via a 3way calling feature of the DMS .
Interrupting the voice portion of the call is possible just like war dialing to overload a phone number is possible .
But that assumes they know the LEA 's number to call , that they have enough skype bots to do it , and that the intercept target is only going to 1 phone number.A typical intercept involves several agencies and sometimes voice is sent to an agents cellphone as well .
You ca n't be sure how many places the voice portion of the intercept is going but the SS7 telephony side of the house is much more hardened and difficult to gain access to than the IP side of it .
Good luck getting your own STP to hide your criminal activity .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Yes the data is buffered in several places but the voice is sent out to PSTN via a 3way calling feature of the DMS.
Interrupting the voice portion of the call is possible just like war dialing to overload a phone number is possible.
But that assumes they know the LEA's number to call, that they have enough skype bots to do it, and that the intercept target is only going to 1 phone number.A typical intercept involves several agencies and sometimes voice is sent to an agents cellphone as well.
You can't be sure how many places the voice portion of the intercept is going but the SS7 telephony side of the house is much more hardened and difficult to gain access to than the IP side of it.
Good luck getting your own STP to hide your criminal activity.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077332</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077352</id>
	<title>New best ...</title>
	<author>dijjnn</author>
	<datestamp>1258057740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>New best way to get your funding cut: publish a paper that outlines a way to use DDOS to hinder a federal investigation. Old best: come out of the closet &amp; join the communist party.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>New best way to get your funding cut : publish a paper that outlines a way to use DDOS to hinder a federal investigation .
Old best : come out of the closet &amp; join the communist party .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>New best way to get your funding cut: publish a paper that outlines a way to use DDOS to hinder a federal investigation.
Old best: come out of the closet &amp; join the communist party.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077246</id>
	<title>Pithy Comment</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258057440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Great news! Thank you very much!</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Great news !
Thank you very much !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Great news!
Thank you very much!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079460</id>
	<title>I'm not sure</title>
	<author>Virtucon</author>
	<datestamp>1258022280000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I'm not sure that our average dumba$$ criminal out there would be thinking of this or as they article says, opt for encrypted Skype.</p><p>For every mechanism the government tries to put into place to interdict in calls, there's always a way around it.  In this case<br>I'm not completely sure what the attack is, other than attack the control channel for signaling the surveillance system.  Why not<br>just capture all of the traffic and filter later, ala Echelon?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I 'm not sure that our average dumba $ $ criminal out there would be thinking of this or as they article says , opt for encrypted Skype.For every mechanism the government tries to put into place to interdict in calls , there 's always a way around it .
In this caseI 'm not completely sure what the attack is , other than attack the control channel for signaling the surveillance system .
Why notjust capture all of the traffic and filter later , ala Echelon ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I'm not sure that our average dumba$$ criminal out there would be thinking of this or as they article says, opt for encrypted Skype.For every mechanism the government tries to put into place to interdict in calls, there's always a way around it.
In this caseI'm not completely sure what the attack is, other than attack the control channel for signaling the surveillance system.
Why notjust capture all of the traffic and filter later, ala Echelon?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079240</id>
	<title>Re:Already happens</title>
	<author>citab</author>
	<datestamp>1258021500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><blockquote><div><p>"...if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data, something known as a denial of service (DOS) attack...</p></div></blockquote><p>This just in, arrest warrants issued for 92\% of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.</p></div><p>hmf!
Try 12 and 97!!</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>" ...if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data , something known as a denial of service ( DOS ) attack...This just in , arrest warrants issued for 92 \ % of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.hmf !
Try 12 and 97 !
!</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"...if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data, something known as a denial of service (DOS) attack...This just in, arrest warrants issued for 92\% of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.hmf!
Try 12 and 97!
!
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077408</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079522</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>X86Daddy</author>
	<datestamp>1258022460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Count your columns again.<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:-)</p><p>The term 4x4 used here indicates the number of rows and columns on phone technician devices or specialty home-made phreaking tools...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Count your columns again .
: - ) The term 4x4 used here indicates the number of rows and columns on phone technician devices or specialty home-made phreaking tools.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Count your columns again.
:-)The term 4x4 used here indicates the number of rows and columns on phone technician devices or specialty home-made phreaking tools...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078338</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30081834</id>
	<title>Re:</title>
	<author>clint999</author>
	<datestamp>1258032600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>I've seen supposed wiretap transcripts on news sites and such that I guess were released during the trial. Most of the time the criminals ARE using code words, it's just, you know, not real hard to figure out that your terror suspects aren't really opening a hair salon, and therefore probably aren't ordering 300 'bottles' of 'conditioner' that are 'guaranteed to go off'.</p></div></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>I 've seen supposed wiretap transcripts on news sites and such that I guess were released during the trial .
Most of the time the criminals ARE using code words , it 's just , you know , not real hard to figure out that your terror suspects are n't really opening a hair salon , and therefore probably are n't ordering 300 'bottles ' of 'conditioner ' that are 'guaranteed to go off' .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I've seen supposed wiretap transcripts on news sites and such that I guess were released during the trial.
Most of the time the criminals ARE using code words, it's just, you know, not real hard to figure out that your terror suspects aren't really opening a hair salon, and therefore probably aren't ordering 300 'bottles' of 'conditioner' that are 'guaranteed to go off'.
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078958</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258020540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>If your phone has a 4x4 (not 3x4; count carefully.  sixteen != twelve), then it has four buttons, from top right to bottom right, A, B, C, and D.  On some military 4x4's these are labeled FO, F, I, P to correspond to the call priorities "Flash Override," "Flash," "Immediate," and "Priority."</p><p>If your phone does not have a 4x4, then the problem is that you miscounted; this error accounts for your confusion.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>If your phone has a 4x4 ( not 3x4 ; count carefully .
sixteen ! = twelve ) , then it has four buttons , from top right to bottom right , A , B , C , and D. On some military 4x4 's these are labeled FO , F , I , P to correspond to the call priorities " Flash Override , " " Flash , " " Immediate , " and " Priority .
" If your phone does not have a 4x4 , then the problem is that you miscounted ; this error accounts for your confusion .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If your phone has a 4x4 (not 3x4; count carefully.
sixteen != twelve), then it has four buttons, from top right to bottom right, A, B, C, and D.  On some military 4x4's these are labeled FO, F, I, P to correspond to the call priorities "Flash Override," "Flash," "Immediate," and "Priority.
"If your phone does not have a 4x4, then the problem is that you miscounted; this error accounts for your confusion.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078338</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077502</id>
	<title>And here again is a door open to geeks unemployed</title>
	<author>dada21</author>
	<datestamp>1258058400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>...sort of off-topic, but something I mention to my geek friends out of work: the black market of crime has endless jobs available for you.</p><p>Go into any barbershop in a shadier part of town and while you're getting a fantastic $12 haircut, mention to the oldest barber that you are working on security consulting to help people avoid getting into trouble with the law, especially in regards to keeping phone calls and information private.</p><p>At $150 a pop to "consult" with a man in a nice suit, you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop aren't secure, even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.</p><p>In reality, though, wiretaps aren't as important as having a good crew under you.  A large percentage of black market consultants find themselves in jail because of the stool pigeon, not because of the wiretap information.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>...sort of off-topic , but something I mention to my geek friends out of work : the black market of crime has endless jobs available for you.Go into any barbershop in a shadier part of town and while you 're getting a fantastic $ 12 haircut , mention to the oldest barber that you are working on security consulting to help people avoid getting into trouble with the law , especially in regards to keeping phone calls and information private.At $ 150 a pop to " consult " with a man in a nice suit , you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop are n't secure , even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.In reality , though , wiretaps are n't as important as having a good crew under you .
A large percentage of black market consultants find themselves in jail because of the stool pigeon , not because of the wiretap information .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>...sort of off-topic, but something I mention to my geek friends out of work: the black market of crime has endless jobs available for you.Go into any barbershop in a shadier part of town and while you're getting a fantastic $12 haircut, mention to the oldest barber that you are working on security consulting to help people avoid getting into trouble with the law, especially in regards to keeping phone calls and information private.At $150 a pop to "consult" with a man in a nice suit, you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop aren't secure, even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.In reality, though, wiretaps aren't as important as having a good crew under you.
A large percentage of black market consultants find themselves in jail because of the stool pigeon, not because of the wiretap information.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30080824</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258027200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It's a trap! That button actually STARTS the wiretap already placed on your phone. It's intended specifically to catch people who are trying to avoid law enforcement noticing their activities.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's a trap !
That button actually STARTS the wiretap already placed on your phone .
It 's intended specifically to catch people who are trying to avoid law enforcement noticing their activities .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's a trap!
That button actually STARTS the wiretap already placed on your phone.
It's intended specifically to catch people who are trying to avoid law enforcement noticing their activities.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077408</id>
	<title>Already happens</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258057920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>"...if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data, something known as a denial of service (DOS) attack...</p></div></blockquote><p>This just in, arrest warrants issued for 92\% of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>" ...if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data , something known as a denial of service ( DOS ) attack...This just in , arrest warrants issued for 92 \ % of American females between the ages of 12 and 17 .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"...if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data, something known as a denial of service (DOS) attack...This just in, arrest warrants issued for 92\% of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079006</id>
	<title>Re:Buffering...</title>
	<author>phantomcircuit</author>
	<datestamp>1258020720000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>Good luck DDoSing a major telco switching office.</p></div></blockquote><p>That would take what? 10 Gbps?</p><p>Believe me that is relatively easily doable.  If you're highly motivated it would be much easier.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Good luck DDoSing a major telco switching office.That would take what ?
10 Gbps ? Believe me that is relatively easily doable .
If you 're highly motivated it would be much easier .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Good luck DDoSing a major telco switching office.That would take what?
10 Gbps?Believe me that is relatively easily doable.
If you're highly motivated it would be much easier.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077332</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30081706</id>
	<title>This article, circa 1930: Bury the spies in paper.</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258031880000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>To quote <a href="http://project-apollo.net/mos/" title="project-apollo.net" rel="nofollow">A Miracle of Science</a> [project-apollo.net], "<a href="http://project-apollo.net/mos/mos253.html" title="project-apollo.net" rel="nofollow">If you can't disguise the needle, make the haystack bigger</a> [project-apollo.net]."</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>To quote A Miracle of Science [ project-apollo.net ] , " If you ca n't disguise the needle , make the haystack bigger [ project-apollo.net ] .
"</tokentext>
<sentencetext>To quote A Miracle of Science [project-apollo.net], "If you can't disguise the needle, make the haystack bigger [project-apollo.net].
"
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078582</id>
	<title>This is not a DDoS, use buzzwords correctly.</title>
	<author>DdJ</author>
	<datestamp>1258019160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>What is it lately with people using precise terms with only vague ideas about what they actually <em>mean</em>?  Is this a side-effect of H1N1 or something?</p><p>I mean, here we have someone talking about something an individual does all by themselves with one device, calling it a "distributed denial of service attack", when there's nothing "distributed" about it and it's just a denial of service attack.</p><p>In other contexts, we have people talking about Blizzard's new selling of in-game WoW pets for <em>$10 a pop</em>, calling that a <em>micro</em>transaction, when there's nothing "micro" about this, thes are just <em>transactions</em>.  (A microtransaction is worth talking about as such only because strange things happen when the value of a transaction gets too close to the overhead of collecting that value, which does <em>not</em> happen up around the $10 range.  I can talk about this at length, but it doesn't matter, people are still idiots and will say "microtransaction" to sound like they're more clever than they are.)</p><p>WTF?  Gah!  Makes me wish I could just reach through the internet to grab people and shake them.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>What is it lately with people using precise terms with only vague ideas about what they actually mean ?
Is this a side-effect of H1N1 or something ? I mean , here we have someone talking about something an individual does all by themselves with one device , calling it a " distributed denial of service attack " , when there 's nothing " distributed " about it and it 's just a denial of service attack.In other contexts , we have people talking about Blizzard 's new selling of in-game WoW pets for $ 10 a pop , calling that a microtransaction , when there 's nothing " micro " about this , thes are just transactions .
( A microtransaction is worth talking about as such only because strange things happen when the value of a transaction gets too close to the overhead of collecting that value , which does not happen up around the $ 10 range .
I can talk about this at length , but it does n't matter , people are still idiots and will say " microtransaction " to sound like they 're more clever than they are. ) WTF ?
Gah ! Makes me wish I could just reach through the internet to grab people and shake them .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>What is it lately with people using precise terms with only vague ideas about what they actually mean?
Is this a side-effect of H1N1 or something?I mean, here we have someone talking about something an individual does all by themselves with one device, calling it a "distributed denial of service attack", when there's nothing "distributed" about it and it's just a denial of service attack.In other contexts, we have people talking about Blizzard's new selling of in-game WoW pets for $10 a pop, calling that a microtransaction, when there's nothing "micro" about this, thes are just transactions.
(A microtransaction is worth talking about as such only because strange things happen when the value of a transaction gets too close to the overhead of collecting that value, which does not happen up around the $10 range.
I can talk about this at length, but it doesn't matter, people are still idiots and will say "microtransaction" to sound like they're more clever than they are.)WTF?
Gah!  Makes me wish I could just reach through the internet to grab people and shake them.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077524</id>
	<title>Re:In Soviet russia...</title>
	<author>maxwell demon</author>
	<datestamp>1258058460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>Better yet, why would anyone who seriously wants to avoid a wiretap *use a phone*?</p></div><p>To connect his acoustic coupler<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:-)</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Better yet , why would anyone who seriously wants to avoid a wiretap * use a phone * ? To connect his acoustic coupler : - )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Better yet, why would anyone who seriously wants to avoid a wiretap *use a phone*?To connect his acoustic coupler :-)
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077266</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079136</id>
	<title>3G 64kbps channel?</title>
	<author>Kodack</author>
	<datestamp>1258021200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>That's an analog landline convention. They are talking about 3G which isn't getting to the world the same way a voice call would so there are no channels like there would be for say an analog call at 64kbps trunking and SS7 sent via a signaling link.</p><p>I think if you sent so much information you saturated your available bandwidth that any messages not picked up by CALEA also would fail to be delivered. I don't know what 'device' they picked up to do this testing since CALEA is a standard not a box. But I'm guessing that they found a flaw with it, not with the CALEA standard.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>That 's an analog landline convention .
They are talking about 3G which is n't getting to the world the same way a voice call would so there are no channels like there would be for say an analog call at 64kbps trunking and SS7 sent via a signaling link.I think if you sent so much information you saturated your available bandwidth that any messages not picked up by CALEA also would fail to be delivered .
I do n't know what 'device ' they picked up to do this testing since CALEA is a standard not a box .
But I 'm guessing that they found a flaw with it , not with the CALEA standard .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>That's an analog landline convention.
They are talking about 3G which isn't getting to the world the same way a voice call would so there are no channels like there would be for say an analog call at 64kbps trunking and SS7 sent via a signaling link.I think if you sent so much information you saturated your available bandwidth that any messages not picked up by CALEA also would fail to be delivered.
I don't know what 'device' they picked up to do this testing since CALEA is a standard not a box.
But I'm guessing that they found a flaw with it, not with the CALEA standard.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077858</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077790</id>
	<title>Stupid</title>
	<author>Chicken\_Kickers</author>
	<datestamp>1258059300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>If spies/criminals/terrorists/politicians are stupid enough to use plain language over the phone to plan their dastardly deeds, then they deserve to be put into prison.</htmltext>
<tokenext>If spies/criminals/terrorists/politicians are stupid enough to use plain language over the phone to plan their dastardly deeds , then they deserve to be put into prison .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If spies/criminals/terrorists/politicians are stupid enough to use plain language over the phone to plan their dastardly deeds, then they deserve to be put into prison.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077266</id>
	<title>In Soviet russia...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258057500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>Wiretaps DDOS you!

<br> <br>
Ok, seriously? Overwhelm the signal to noise ratio and picking out the useful information becomes harder. It's just a question of how much and how long, not to mention how long after the fact is said information useful. <br>Better yet, why would anyone who seriously wants to avoid a wiretap *use a phone*? It seems like discussing anything over an unencrypted medium is asking for trouble.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Wiretaps DDOS you !
Ok , seriously ?
Overwhelm the signal to noise ratio and picking out the useful information becomes harder .
It 's just a question of how much and how long , not to mention how long after the fact is said information useful .
Better yet , why would anyone who seriously wants to avoid a wiretap * use a phone * ?
It seems like discussing anything over an unencrypted medium is asking for trouble .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Wiretaps DDOS you!
Ok, seriously?
Overwhelm the signal to noise ratio and picking out the useful information becomes harder.
It's just a question of how much and how long, not to mention how long after the fact is said information useful.
Better yet, why would anyone who seriously wants to avoid a wiretap *use a phone*?
It seems like discussing anything over an unencrypted medium is asking for trouble.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30084136</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258055340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>My old 4x4 keypad phone doesn't have a C key.  Or do you mean the 2 key?  Or * or #?</p><p>And a minor nit -- each key doesn't emit one tone.  It emits two tones -- one based on the horizontal location of the button and the other based on the vertical location of the button.  If I recall correctly.  (I imagine you know that already, however.)</p><p>I guess I could go find his paper<nobr> <wbr></nobr>...</p></div><p>It might sound silly at first, but no, it's just one tone. One waveform plus One waveform equals... ONE resulting waveform, not two. So while it's true that it adds two waveforms together based on row/column position, it's still just one waveform being output.<br>And if you look at your keypad, it's 3x4 not 4x4 unless you have some screwball keypad, but in such a case the extra buttons aren't actually signaling on the phone line. The "C" key is on the 4th column which only exists on lineman's handsets (unless you hack one out yourself of course).</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>My old 4x4 keypad phone does n't have a C key .
Or do you mean the 2 key ?
Or * or # ? And a minor nit -- each key does n't emit one tone .
It emits two tones -- one based on the horizontal location of the button and the other based on the vertical location of the button .
If I recall correctly .
( I imagine you know that already , however .
) I guess I could go find his paper ...It might sound silly at first , but no , it 's just one tone .
One waveform plus One waveform equals... ONE resulting waveform , not two .
So while it 's true that it adds two waveforms together based on row/column position , it 's still just one waveform being output.And if you look at your keypad , it 's 3x4 not 4x4 unless you have some screwball keypad , but in such a case the extra buttons are n't actually signaling on the phone line .
The " C " key is on the 4th column which only exists on lineman 's handsets ( unless you hack one out yourself of course ) .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>My old 4x4 keypad phone doesn't have a C key.
Or do you mean the 2 key?
Or * or #?And a minor nit -- each key doesn't emit one tone.
It emits two tones -- one based on the horizontal location of the button and the other based on the vertical location of the button.
If I recall correctly.
(I imagine you know that already, however.
)I guess I could go find his paper ...It might sound silly at first, but no, it's just one tone.
One waveform plus One waveform equals... ONE resulting waveform, not two.
So while it's true that it adds two waveforms together based on row/column position, it's still just one waveform being output.And if you look at your keypad, it's 3x4 not 4x4 unless you have some screwball keypad, but in such a case the extra buttons aren't actually signaling on the phone line.
The "C" key is on the 4th column which only exists on lineman's handsets (unless you hack one out yourself of course).
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078338</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078106</id>
	<title>Re:Stupid</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258017240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>This is essentially a pre-shared key using voice communication.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This is essentially a pre-shared key using voice communication .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This is essentially a pre-shared key using voice communication.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077790</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077976</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>coolsnowmen</author>
	<datestamp>1258016820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>What would that signal even exist? So that law enforcement could break the law by phone and not get caught?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>What would that signal even exist ?
So that law enforcement could break the law by phone and not get caught ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>What would that signal even exist?
So that law enforcement could break the law by phone and not get caught?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078384</id>
	<title>I work on CALEA and DDOS is not possible</title>
	<author>Kodack</author>
	<datestamp>1258018380000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The fact that these researchers worked off of the standard for delivery compliance aka CALEA, has given them the false impression that all they need to do prevent a wiretap is to overload the connection between the agency and the DMS (the switch your call goes through).</p><p>What the J standard does not go into is the fact that at every step of the way there are checks to determine if data can be sent. If it cannot then it is stored until it is able to be sent. It is not uncommon for connections in the IP realm to come up and down so the system can buffer them both at the DMS, as well as at several points inbetween through the various offboard devices in the chain. Typically the data makes 2 stops between the DMS and the LEA.</p><p>This is strictly for the data portion of the call, IE dialed digits, in the wirless world it would include MMS/SMS, GPRS, etc.</p><p>The voice portion of the call is trunked from the DMS to the PSTN via a 3 way calling feature with 1 way audio. It basically dials the LEA's recording equipment every time the target makes a call, their equipment will record automatically when it answers the phone, like an answering machine. However the voice portion doesn't always have to go to a LEA. It can be configured to go to several phone numbers such as an agents mobile phone, a recording device, or other 3rd party.</p><p>Now you could overload the agencies recording equipment if you knew what number to dial using a war dialer type of attack, but that would lead authorities to your door and it would not prevent other agencies and other monitoring centers from receiving that same data. Most bench warrants will have several involved agencies each receiving intercepts from a single target.</p><p>Suffice to say that if you have a tap on your phone, it's going to get to the LEA and there isn't much you can do about it.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The fact that these researchers worked off of the standard for delivery compliance aka CALEA , has given them the false impression that all they need to do prevent a wiretap is to overload the connection between the agency and the DMS ( the switch your call goes through ) .What the J standard does not go into is the fact that at every step of the way there are checks to determine if data can be sent .
If it can not then it is stored until it is able to be sent .
It is not uncommon for connections in the IP realm to come up and down so the system can buffer them both at the DMS , as well as at several points inbetween through the various offboard devices in the chain .
Typically the data makes 2 stops between the DMS and the LEA.This is strictly for the data portion of the call , IE dialed digits , in the wirless world it would include MMS/SMS , GPRS , etc.The voice portion of the call is trunked from the DMS to the PSTN via a 3 way calling feature with 1 way audio .
It basically dials the LEA 's recording equipment every time the target makes a call , their equipment will record automatically when it answers the phone , like an answering machine .
However the voice portion does n't always have to go to a LEA .
It can be configured to go to several phone numbers such as an agents mobile phone , a recording device , or other 3rd party.Now you could overload the agencies recording equipment if you knew what number to dial using a war dialer type of attack , but that would lead authorities to your door and it would not prevent other agencies and other monitoring centers from receiving that same data .
Most bench warrants will have several involved agencies each receiving intercepts from a single target.Suffice to say that if you have a tap on your phone , it 's going to get to the LEA and there is n't much you can do about it .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The fact that these researchers worked off of the standard for delivery compliance aka CALEA, has given them the false impression that all they need to do prevent a wiretap is to overload the connection between the agency and the DMS (the switch your call goes through).What the J standard does not go into is the fact that at every step of the way there are checks to determine if data can be sent.
If it cannot then it is stored until it is able to be sent.
It is not uncommon for connections in the IP realm to come up and down so the system can buffer them both at the DMS, as well as at several points inbetween through the various offboard devices in the chain.
Typically the data makes 2 stops between the DMS and the LEA.This is strictly for the data portion of the call, IE dialed digits, in the wirless world it would include MMS/SMS, GPRS, etc.The voice portion of the call is trunked from the DMS to the PSTN via a 3 way calling feature with 1 way audio.
It basically dials the LEA's recording equipment every time the target makes a call, their equipment will record automatically when it answers the phone, like an answering machine.
However the voice portion doesn't always have to go to a LEA.
It can be configured to go to several phone numbers such as an agents mobile phone, a recording device, or other 3rd party.Now you could overload the agencies recording equipment if you knew what number to dial using a war dialer type of attack, but that would lead authorities to your door and it would not prevent other agencies and other monitoring centers from receiving that same data.
Most bench warrants will have several involved agencies each receiving intercepts from a single target.Suffice to say that if you have a tap on your phone, it's going to get to the LEA and there isn't much you can do about it.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078338</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258018200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>My old 4x4 keypad phone doesn't have a C key.  Or do you mean the 2 key?  Or * or #?

<p>

And a minor nit -- each key doesn't emit one tone.  It emits two tones -- one based on the horizontal location of the button and the other based on the vertical location of the button.  If I recall correctly.  (I imagine you know that already, however.)

</p><p>

I guess I could go find his paper<nobr> <wbr></nobr>...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>My old 4x4 keypad phone does n't have a C key .
Or do you mean the 2 key ?
Or * or # ?
And a minor nit -- each key does n't emit one tone .
It emits two tones -- one based on the horizontal location of the button and the other based on the vertical location of the button .
If I recall correctly .
( I imagine you know that already , however .
) I guess I could go find his paper .. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>My old 4x4 keypad phone doesn't have a C key.
Or do you mean the 2 key?
Or * or #?
And a minor nit -- each key doesn't emit one tone.
It emits two tones -- one based on the horizontal location of the button and the other based on the vertical location of the button.
If I recall correctly.
(I imagine you know that already, however.
)



I guess I could go find his paper ...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078292</id>
	<title>Re:And here again is a door open to geeks unemploy</title>
	<author>dougmc</author>
	<datestamp>1258018020000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>At $150 a pop to "consult" with a man in a nice suit, you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop aren't secure, even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.</p></div><p>I like the idea, but what happens when he gets nabbed anyways, because he fell for something that seemed so trivial you didn't even mention it.  (Or any other a number of scenarios that may or may not be your fault.)
</p><p>
Then he (or Guido) comes looking for you, once he's out of jail?  Or the police come looking for you, his accomplice<nobr> <wbr></nobr>...
</p><p>
I imagine it's lucrative, but sounds risky.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>At $ 150 a pop to " consult " with a man in a nice suit , you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop are n't secure , even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.I like the idea , but what happens when he gets nabbed anyways , because he fell for something that seemed so trivial you did n't even mention it .
( Or any other a number of scenarios that may or may not be your fault .
) Then he ( or Guido ) comes looking for you , once he 's out of jail ?
Or the police come looking for you , his accomplice .. . I imagine it 's lucrative , but sounds risky .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>At $150 a pop to "consult" with a man in a nice suit, you can easily remind him that his phone and laptop aren't secure, even offer him advice on what he can do and what he can buy to keep his tracks concealed better.I like the idea, but what happens when he gets nabbed anyways, because he fell for something that seemed so trivial you didn't even mention it.
(Or any other a number of scenarios that may or may not be your fault.
)

Then he (or Guido) comes looking for you, once he's out of jail?
Or the police come looking for you, his accomplice ...

I imagine it's lucrative, but sounds risky.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077502</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077254</id>
	<title>That's a complex answer for a simple problem</title>
	<author>NotBornYesterday</author>
	<datestamp>1258057440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>Of course, criminals have plenty of easier ways to dodge police surveillance. They can use cash to buy prepaid mobile phones anonymously, or reach out to their accomplices with encrypted Skype calls, said Robert Graham, CEO with Errata Security.</p></div><p>Duh.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Of course , criminals have plenty of easier ways to dodge police surveillance .
They can use cash to buy prepaid mobile phones anonymously , or reach out to their accomplices with encrypted Skype calls , said Robert Graham , CEO with Errata Security.Duh .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Of course, criminals have plenty of easier ways to dodge police surveillance.
They can use cash to buy prepaid mobile phones anonymously, or reach out to their accomplices with encrypted Skype calls, said Robert Graham, CEO with Errata Security.Duh.
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30086296</id>
	<title>Re:Encryption</title>
	<author>Civil\_Disobedient</author>
	<datestamp>1258125600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><i>nobody will care about this because all communications will be encrypted end-to-end and wiretaps will be useless</i></p><p>Useless?  I think not.  Just because the message is encrypted doesn't mean the <i>calling and receiving party information</i> isn't useful.</p><p>I work for the FBI and see that <i>Special Agent Trusted Dude</i> makes an encrypted phone call to <i>Known Terrorist</i>...</p><p>I work for the CIA and see that <i>Dr. Intelligence Specialist</i> made an encrypted call to <i>Comrade Foreign Agent</i>...</p><p>I work for the DEA and see that <i>Mr. Fine Upstanding Citizen</i> made a 20-second encrypted phone call to <i>Known Drug Dealer</i>...</p><p>Etc.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>nobody will care about this because all communications will be encrypted end-to-end and wiretaps will be uselessUseless ?
I think not .
Just because the message is encrypted does n't mean the calling and receiving party information is n't useful.I work for the FBI and see that Special Agent Trusted Dude makes an encrypted phone call to Known Terrorist...I work for the CIA and see that Dr. Intelligence Specialist made an encrypted call to Comrade Foreign Agent...I work for the DEA and see that Mr. Fine Upstanding Citizen made a 20-second encrypted phone call to Known Drug Dealer...Etc .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>nobody will care about this because all communications will be encrypted end-to-end and wiretaps will be uselessUseless?
I think not.
Just because the message is encrypted doesn't mean the calling and receiving party information isn't useful.I work for the FBI and see that Special Agent Trusted Dude makes an encrypted phone call to Known Terrorist...I work for the CIA and see that Dr. Intelligence Specialist made an encrypted call to Comrade Foreign Agent...I work for the DEA and see that Mr. Fine Upstanding Citizen made a 20-second encrypted phone call to Known Drug Dealer...Etc.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077940</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077858</id>
	<title>A couple things...</title>
	<author>mea37</author>
	<datestamp>1258059540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>...for those who didn't RTFA:</p><p>First, this apparently applies to VoIP systems and cell phones, not analog land lines.</p><p>Second, it is not a <b>D</b>DoS attack, as the headline claims.  It is a DoS attack, though.  That extra D means "distributed" and refers to situations where you bring many computers (say, a botnet for example) to the party so that your cumulative traffic-generation ability exceeds your target's capacity.  Those techniques are not in play here.  I guess Internet-based distributed attacks have become so common that people don't bother knowing what the acronyms really mean anymore.</p><p>The channel you're trying to flood is a 64kbps data link between the phone company's switch and the law enforcement equipment.  That is to say, the spec calls for 64kbps - so you don't really know if they have more than that in implementation.  The idea is that if you program your system to rapidly make useless connections (such as text messages to random numbers) then you can flood this link and the equipment will lose track of the metadata describing an important message you send along during the flood.  "Rapid" is on the order of 40 text messages per second; maybe you can program your equipment to do that.</p><p>They have not been able to test this attack in practice, and they're making assumptions - some of which I doubt - about what the result would be.  Seems like a lot of trouble to go to for the chance that maybe there'll be a random probability that the call you care about doesn't get logged - and even then you won't know after the fact whether it worked.  Anyone who takes communications security seriously enough to apply that much effort, will apply it to doing something more certain to work.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>...for those who did n't RTFA : First , this apparently applies to VoIP systems and cell phones , not analog land lines.Second , it is not a DDoS attack , as the headline claims .
It is a DoS attack , though .
That extra D means " distributed " and refers to situations where you bring many computers ( say , a botnet for example ) to the party so that your cumulative traffic-generation ability exceeds your target 's capacity .
Those techniques are not in play here .
I guess Internet-based distributed attacks have become so common that people do n't bother knowing what the acronyms really mean anymore.The channel you 're trying to flood is a 64kbps data link between the phone company 's switch and the law enforcement equipment .
That is to say , the spec calls for 64kbps - so you do n't really know if they have more than that in implementation .
The idea is that if you program your system to rapidly make useless connections ( such as text messages to random numbers ) then you can flood this link and the equipment will lose track of the metadata describing an important message you send along during the flood .
" Rapid " is on the order of 40 text messages per second ; maybe you can program your equipment to do that.They have not been able to test this attack in practice , and they 're making assumptions - some of which I doubt - about what the result would be .
Seems like a lot of trouble to go to for the chance that maybe there 'll be a random probability that the call you care about does n't get logged - and even then you wo n't know after the fact whether it worked .
Anyone who takes communications security seriously enough to apply that much effort , will apply it to doing something more certain to work .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>...for those who didn't RTFA:First, this apparently applies to VoIP systems and cell phones, not analog land lines.Second, it is not a DDoS attack, as the headline claims.
It is a DoS attack, though.
That extra D means "distributed" and refers to situations where you bring many computers (say, a botnet for example) to the party so that your cumulative traffic-generation ability exceeds your target's capacity.
Those techniques are not in play here.
I guess Internet-based distributed attacks have become so common that people don't bother knowing what the acronyms really mean anymore.The channel you're trying to flood is a 64kbps data link between the phone company's switch and the law enforcement equipment.
That is to say, the spec calls for 64kbps - so you don't really know if they have more than that in implementation.
The idea is that if you program your system to rapidly make useless connections (such as text messages to random numbers) then you can flood this link and the equipment will lose track of the metadata describing an important message you send along during the flood.
"Rapid" is on the order of 40 text messages per second; maybe you can program your equipment to do that.They have not been able to test this attack in practice, and they're making assumptions - some of which I doubt - about what the result would be.
Seems like a lot of trouble to go to for the chance that maybe there'll be a random probability that the call you care about doesn't get logged - and even then you won't know after the fact whether it worked.
Anyone who takes communications security seriously enough to apply that much effort, will apply it to doing something more certain to work.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30082502</id>
	<title>Re:This is not a DDoS, use buzzwords correctly.</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258037820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><i>Makes me wish I could just reach through the internet to grab people and shake them.</i> </p><p>Have at!</p><p>I access the internet with my dick.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Makes me wish I could just reach through the internet to grab people and shake them .
Have at ! I access the internet with my dick .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Makes me wish I could just reach through the internet to grab people and shake them.
Have at!I access the internet with my dick.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078582</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079502</id>
	<title>Y)OU FAIl IT</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258022460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Redundant</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext>(7000+1400+700)*4 Most people into a itself backwards,</htmltext>
<tokenext>( 7000 + 1400 + 700 ) * 4 Most people into a itself backwards,</tokentext>
<sentencetext>(7000+1400+700)*4 Most people into a itself backwards,</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077988</id>
	<title>Re:Stupid</title>
	<author>otterpopjunkie</author>
	<datestamp>1258016820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>And if they are clever enough to do otherwise, they don't deserve to be put in prison!</htmltext>
<tokenext>And if they are clever enough to do otherwise , they do n't deserve to be put in prison !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>And if they are clever enough to do otherwise, they don't deserve to be put in prison!</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077790</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30084316</id>
	<title>Re:Already happens</title>
	<author>MateuszM</author>
	<datestamp>1258144380000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>This just in, arrest warrants issued for 92\% of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.</p></div><p>Well, such a warrant would be a great DDoS on law enforcement as a whole, wouldn't it? So one could argue that the teenagers won the battle...</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>This just in , arrest warrants issued for 92 \ % of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.Well , such a warrant would be a great DDoS on law enforcement as a whole , would n't it ?
So one could argue that the teenagers won the battle.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This just in, arrest warrants issued for 92\% of American females between the ages of 12 and 17.Well, such a warrant would be a great DDoS on law enforcement as a whole, wouldn't it?
So one could argue that the teenagers won the battle...
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077408</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078518</id>
	<title>uh, the premise of the article is wrong</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258018920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>64K bits was a limit with x25. most stuff is done over ip now, and doesn't have that limitation. The entire premise for this article is incorrect. It talks about VoIP having the same 64K limitation when that isn't based on anything in reality at all.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>64K bits was a limit with x25 .
most stuff is done over ip now , and does n't have that limitation .
The entire premise for this article is incorrect .
It talks about VoIP having the same 64K limitation when that is n't based on anything in reality at all .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>64K bits was a limit with x25.
most stuff is done over ip now, and doesn't have that limitation.
The entire premise for this article is incorrect.
It talks about VoIP having the same 64K limitation when that isn't based on anything in reality at all.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077332</id>
	<title>Buffering...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258057680000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>As someone who worked on a CALEA system for 18 months, implementing, testing and helping design, I can tell you one thing.</p><p>The specs of all the systems are such that they DO NOT BUFFER the actual voice, only the data.  I mean the numbers punched, busy signals, etc.  Buffered voice would rapidly overwhelm the system, so it is just dropped if the link from the CO (central office) to the LE (law enforcement) goes down.</p><p>Call data can be buffered for days, so that isn't dropped.</p><p>This isn't a flaw, it was a design decision.  Good luck DDoSing a major telco switching office.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>As someone who worked on a CALEA system for 18 months , implementing , testing and helping design , I can tell you one thing.The specs of all the systems are such that they DO NOT BUFFER the actual voice , only the data .
I mean the numbers punched , busy signals , etc .
Buffered voice would rapidly overwhelm the system , so it is just dropped if the link from the CO ( central office ) to the LE ( law enforcement ) goes down.Call data can be buffered for days , so that is n't dropped.This is n't a flaw , it was a design decision .
Good luck DDoSing a major telco switching office .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>As someone who worked on a CALEA system for 18 months, implementing, testing and helping design, I can tell you one thing.The specs of all the systems are such that they DO NOT BUFFER the actual voice, only the data.
I mean the numbers punched, busy signals, etc.
Buffered voice would rapidly overwhelm the system, so it is just dropped if the link from the CO (central office) to the LE (law enforcement) goes down.Call data can be buffered for days, so that isn't dropped.This isn't a flaw, it was a design decision.
Good luck DDoSing a major telco switching office.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077940</id>
	<title>Encryption</title>
	<author>iamacat</author>
	<datestamp>1258016640000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Eventually, nobody will care about this because all communications will be encrypted end-to-end and wiretaps will be useless. Attempts to outlaw that would result in only criminals having encryption and honest people falling victim to wiretaps by criminals and foreign governments. Besides there are many ways to make encryption not look like encryption.</p><p>This is quite all right for law enforcement, as many new ways to breach people's privacy are emerging at the same time - RFIDs, GPS phones, new hackable devices, street cameras, voice-tracking lasers shinned on one's window and so on. On the whole, it will be easier than ever to do lawful or unlawful. curvallaince. They just need to stop cribbing about having to abandon some old technologies and adopting new ones.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Eventually , nobody will care about this because all communications will be encrypted end-to-end and wiretaps will be useless .
Attempts to outlaw that would result in only criminals having encryption and honest people falling victim to wiretaps by criminals and foreign governments .
Besides there are many ways to make encryption not look like encryption.This is quite all right for law enforcement , as many new ways to breach people 's privacy are emerging at the same time - RFIDs , GPS phones , new hackable devices , street cameras , voice-tracking lasers shinned on one 's window and so on .
On the whole , it will be easier than ever to do lawful or unlawful .
curvallaince. They just need to stop cribbing about having to abandon some old technologies and adopting new ones .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Eventually, nobody will care about this because all communications will be encrypted end-to-end and wiretaps will be useless.
Attempts to outlaw that would result in only criminals having encryption and honest people falling victim to wiretaps by criminals and foreign governments.
Besides there are many ways to make encryption not look like encryption.This is quite all right for law enforcement, as many new ways to breach people's privacy are emerging at the same time - RFIDs, GPS phones, new hackable devices, street cameras, voice-tracking lasers shinned on one's window and so on.
On the whole, it will be easier than ever to do lawful or unlawful.
curvallaince. They just need to stop cribbing about having to abandon some old technologies and adopting new ones.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077468</id>
	<title>DOS attack?</title>
	<author>maxwell demon</author>
	<datestamp>1258058220000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>MS DOS or DR DOS?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>MS DOS or DR DOS ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>MS DOS or DR DOS?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078886</id>
	<title>Re:Encryption</title>
	<author>Idbar</author>
	<datestamp>1258020300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Also that implies that all the voice communications pass through some sort of entity. Couldn't just happen that you use your own asterisk server at home, and use some private extensions for calls you don't want to be listened?<br> <br>
Enough proxies and encryption makes me think that system may be useless or just oriented to plain people and not the ones the government should really be worried about.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Also that implies that all the voice communications pass through some sort of entity .
Could n't just happen that you use your own asterisk server at home , and use some private extensions for calls you do n't want to be listened ?
Enough proxies and encryption makes me think that system may be useless or just oriented to plain people and not the ones the government should really be worried about .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Also that implies that all the voice communications pass through some sort of entity.
Couldn't just happen that you use your own asterisk server at home, and use some private extensions for calls you don't want to be listened?
Enough proxies and encryption makes me think that system may be useless or just oriented to plain people and not the ones the government should really be worried about.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077940</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30084142</id>
	<title>Yes, DTMF indeed</title>
	<author>jonaskoelker</author>
	<datestamp>1258055400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>each key doesn't emit one tone. It emits two tones -- one based on [each of row and column]</p></div><p>That is indeed correct; it's also known as DTMF---dual tone multiple frequency.  I think I meant to say something about that.  Now I wonder why I didn't.</p><p>Thanks for pointing this out, though!<nobr> <wbr></nobr>:)</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>each key does n't emit one tone .
It emits two tones -- one based on [ each of row and column ] That is indeed correct ; it 's also known as DTMF---dual tone multiple frequency .
I think I meant to say something about that .
Now I wonder why I did n't.Thanks for pointing this out , though !
: )</tokentext>
<sentencetext>each key doesn't emit one tone.
It emits two tones -- one based on [each of row and column]That is indeed correct; it's also known as DTMF---dual tone multiple frequency.
I think I meant to say something about that.
Now I wonder why I didn't.Thanks for pointing this out, though!
:)
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078338</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078484</id>
	<title>RTFM for more DoS suggestions</title>
	<author>TSHTF</author>
	<datestamp>1258018800000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Great paper.

Cisco is also nice enough to write up about their "Lawful" Intercept products. For example, in <a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/routers/7600/ios/12.2SR/configuration/lawful\_intercept/76LIdoc.pdf" title="cisco.com" rel="nofollow">Configuring Lawful Intercept Support</a> [cisco.com], they kindly warn the end-user that "To maintain VXSM performance, lawful intercept is limited to no more than 60 active calls."  Thanks for the suggestion!</htmltext>
<tokenext>Great paper .
Cisco is also nice enough to write up about their " Lawful " Intercept products .
For example , in Configuring Lawful Intercept Support [ cisco.com ] , they kindly warn the end-user that " To maintain VXSM performance , lawful intercept is limited to no more than 60 active calls .
" Thanks for the suggestion !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Great paper.
Cisco is also nice enough to write up about their "Lawful" Intercept products.
For example, in Configuring Lawful Intercept Support [cisco.com], they kindly warn the end-user that "To maintain VXSM performance, lawful intercept is limited to no more than 60 active calls.
"  Thanks for the suggestion!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078948</id>
	<title>the premise the article and paper on is wrong</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258020540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>it's only assuming a maximum channle of 64 bits. While this may have been true when the j-std was first written, it's not true now. It's definitely not the case when you're delivering voip calls using t1.678 or packetcable. There is no "channel" only packets.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>it 's only assuming a maximum channle of 64 bits .
While this may have been true when the j-std was first written , it 's not true now .
It 's definitely not the case when you 're delivering voip calls using t1.678 or packetcable .
There is no " channel " only packets .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>it's only assuming a maximum channle of 64 bits.
While this may have been true when the j-std was first written, it's not true now.
It's definitely not the case when you're delivering voip calls using t1.678 or packetcable.
There is no "channel" only packets.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30080060</id>
	<title>Major problems</title>
	<author>rabtech</author>
	<datestamp>1258024200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>1. Criminals smart enough to even understand what this issue is about are probably smart enough to do something useful with their lives</p><p>2. Otherwise if they are that smart and still engaged in crime, they're probably involved in major organized crime, in which case they already know (or should know) that wiretaps are a possibility so this brings nothing new to the table.</p><p>3. Law enforcement is probably going to notice (at some point) that their systems are getting jacked with and the reaction will not be a mellow one.</p><p>Most criminals get caught because they're stupid or lazy. Most smart criminals get caught because they got careless and made mistakes. Neither of these two things are likely to change anytime soon so I suspect that law enforcement will continue to be able to easily catch most criminals without employing fancy CSI zoom-enhance techniques.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>1 .
Criminals smart enough to even understand what this issue is about are probably smart enough to do something useful with their lives2 .
Otherwise if they are that smart and still engaged in crime , they 're probably involved in major organized crime , in which case they already know ( or should know ) that wiretaps are a possibility so this brings nothing new to the table.3 .
Law enforcement is probably going to notice ( at some point ) that their systems are getting jacked with and the reaction will not be a mellow one.Most criminals get caught because they 're stupid or lazy .
Most smart criminals get caught because they got careless and made mistakes .
Neither of these two things are likely to change anytime soon so I suspect that law enforcement will continue to be able to easily catch most criminals without employing fancy CSI zoom-enhance techniques .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>1.
Criminals smart enough to even understand what this issue is about are probably smart enough to do something useful with their lives2.
Otherwise if they are that smart and still engaged in crime, they're probably involved in major organized crime, in which case they already know (or should know) that wiretaps are a possibility so this brings nothing new to the table.3.
Law enforcement is probably going to notice (at some point) that their systems are getting jacked with and the reaction will not be a mellow one.Most criminals get caught because they're stupid or lazy.
Most smart criminals get caught because they got careless and made mistakes.
Neither of these two things are likely to change anytime soon so I suspect that law enforcement will continue to be able to easily catch most criminals without employing fancy CSI zoom-enhance techniques.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078116</id>
	<title>Re:Stupid</title>
	<author>Hurricane78</author>
	<datestamp>1258017300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Only a total retard would still think, that the point if this wiretapping is to catch criminals.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Only a total retard would still think , that the point if this wiretapping is to catch criminals .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Only a total retard would still think, that the point if this wiretapping is to catch criminals.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077790</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077470</id>
	<title>Oh really?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258058220000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><i>....In fact, wiretaps could probably be rendered useless if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data....</i> <br> <br>

Is it me or does this kinda read as: "If there is nothing useful going through the line, there is nothing to tap".  Well no shit. If the caller can't complete the call or communicate with the person on the other end because of system overload, guess what, you won't be able to gather anything because the conversation never happened.</htmltext>
<tokenext>....In fact , wiretaps could probably be rendered useless if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data... . Is it me or does this kinda read as : " If there is nothing useful going through the line , there is nothing to tap " .
Well no shit .
If the caller ca n't complete the call or communicate with the person on the other end because of system overload , guess what , you wo n't be able to gather anything because the conversation never happened .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>....In fact, wiretaps could probably be rendered useless if the connection between the switches and law enforcement are overwhelmed with useless data....  

Is it me or does this kinda read as: "If there is nothing useful going through the line, there is nothing to tap".
Well no shit.
If the caller can't complete the call or communicate with the person on the other end because of system overload, guess what, you won't be able to gather anything because the conversation never happened.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079338</id>
	<title>Re:Pithy Comment</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258021920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><i>Great news! Thank you very much!</i> </p><p>Why is this good news?</p><p>From the summary, "... the researchers say in their paper, set to be presented Thursday at a computer security conference in Chicago."</p><p>What do you think will be the effect of pre-announcing the presentation will be?</p><p> Hint: Ed Felten.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Great news !
Thank you very much !
Why is this good news ? From the summary , " ... the researchers say in their paper , set to be presented Thursday at a computer security conference in Chicago .
" What do you think will be the effect of pre-announcing the presentation will be ?
Hint : Ed Felten .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Great news!
Thank you very much!
Why is this good news?From the summary, "... the researchers say in their paper, set to be presented Thursday at a computer security conference in Chicago.
"What do you think will be the effect of pre-announcing the presentation will be?
Hint: Ed Felten.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077246</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30084826</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>L4t3r4lu5</author>
	<datestamp>1258109700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>What, no whistle included in a box of cereal?</htmltext>
<tokenext>What , no whistle included in a box of cereal ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>What, no whistle included in a box of cereal?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078260</id>
	<title>Re:Stupid</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258017900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>if spies/criminals/terrorists/politicians are stupid enough to use plain language over the phone to plan their dastardly deeds, then they deserve to be put into prison.</p></div></blockquote><p>I'd like to point out, that of the four groups you listed, the criminals and the terrorists deserve to be put into prison (or worse) <em>regardless</em> of whether they use plain language. Same applies to spies, unless they work for our side.

</p><p>Politicians planning <em>dastardly</em> deeds get little sympathy too...</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>if spies/criminals/terrorists/politicians are stupid enough to use plain language over the phone to plan their dastardly deeds , then they deserve to be put into prison.I 'd like to point out , that of the four groups you listed , the criminals and the terrorists deserve to be put into prison ( or worse ) regardless of whether they use plain language .
Same applies to spies , unless they work for our side .
Politicians planning dastardly deeds get little sympathy too.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>if spies/criminals/terrorists/politicians are stupid enough to use plain language over the phone to plan their dastardly deeds, then they deserve to be put into prison.I'd like to point out, that of the four groups you listed, the criminals and the terrorists deserve to be put into prison (or worse) regardless of whether they use plain language.
Same applies to spies, unless they work for our side.
Politicians planning dastardly deeds get little sympathy too...
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077790</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078714</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>taniwha</author>
	<datestamp>1258019640000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>the standard has 4 possible tones for each of the 2 dual-tones - one of those 8 tones is not used on a 4x3 keypad but is used for signaling (you phone sends it when it receives caller ID for example) those missing tones from the real 4x4 matrix are named A B C and D</htmltext>
<tokenext>the standard has 4 possible tones for each of the 2 dual-tones - one of those 8 tones is not used on a 4x3 keypad but is used for signaling ( you phone sends it when it receives caller ID for example ) those missing tones from the real 4x4 matrix are named A B C and D</tokentext>
<sentencetext>the standard has 4 possible tones for each of the 2 dual-tones - one of those 8 tones is not used on a 4x3 keypad but is used for signaling (you phone sends it when it receives caller ID for example) those missing tones from the real 4x4 matrix are named A B C and D</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078338</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30079636</id>
	<title>Re:Buffering...</title>
	<author>chill</author>
	<datestamp>1258022820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Not in this case.  I was working on a cell network and it was 100\% VoIP inside, outside and upside down.  All the handsets had IPs as well as phone numbers.  The link to the LEA was an IPsec tunnel from a Juniper VPN Concentrator to an IPSec-enabled endpoint at the LEA's office.  PSTN has nothing to do with it.  No, you CAN'T wardial it because it isn't a phone switch.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Not in this case .
I was working on a cell network and it was 100 \ % VoIP inside , outside and upside down .
All the handsets had IPs as well as phone numbers .
The link to the LEA was an IPsec tunnel from a Juniper VPN Concentrator to an IPSec-enabled endpoint at the LEA 's office .
PSTN has nothing to do with it .
No , you CA N'T wardial it because it is n't a phone switch .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Not in this case.
I was working on a cell network and it was 100\% VoIP inside, outside and upside down.
All the handsets had IPs as well as phone numbers.
The link to the LEA was an IPsec tunnel from a Juniper VPN Concentrator to an IPSec-enabled endpoint at the LEA's office.
PSTN has nothing to do with it.
No, you CAN'T wardial it because it isn't a phone switch.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30078696</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30081568</id>
	<title>Re:Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>bughunter</author>
	<datestamp>1258031040000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>All this talk of 3x3's and 4x4's is <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/raystudio/2086350468/" title="flickr.com">making me hungry</a> [flickr.com]!</htmltext>
<tokenext>All this talk of 3x3 's and 4x4 's is making me hungry [ flickr.com ] !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>All this talk of 3x3's and 4x4's is making me hungry [flickr.com]!</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_11_12_190206.30077608</id>
	<title>Some background about Matt Blaze</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1258058820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Here's a bit of background the<nobr> <wbr></nobr>/. editors didn't give you.</p><p>If you take a 2-second look at the paper (the pdf link in the summary), you see Matt Blaze's name.</p><p>He's been doing other work on making law enforcement wiretapping not work.  For instance, go to <a href="http://www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/" title="usenix.org">http://www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/</a> [usenix.org] and search the page for "Blaze"; you should find his talk (http://www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3) and the Q&amp;A session.</p><p>He also gave essentially the same talk as the first (under a different title) at <a href="http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/" title="usenix.org">http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/</a> [usenix.org] (again, search the page for "Blaze" or go straight to <a href="http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3" title="usenix.org">http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3</a> [usenix.org]).</p><p>He also spoke at hotsec06, <a href="http://www.usenix.org/events/hotsec06/tech/" title="usenix.org">http://www.usenix.org/events/hotsec06/tech/</a> [usenix.org], with no recorded mp3, and at an e-voting panel, <a href="http://www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/" title="usenix.org">http://www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/</a> [usenix.org].</p><p>As you might infer, this isn't the first time Mr. (Dr.?) Blaze has been studying wiretapping (or other security issues).  He's also quite a good, entertaining speaker.  I recommend giving him a listen.</p><p>The short story (from the usenix talks): press the "C" key on your old 4x4-keypad phone.  That's the in-band signal (doh!) used by law enforcement to mean "don't record now".  Or, look up the tone frequency, then play it back at a much lower volume with a tone generator (your laptop might do) so it's more comfortable to talk over.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Here 's a bit of background the / .
editors did n't give you.If you take a 2-second look at the paper ( the pdf link in the summary ) , you see Matt Blaze 's name.He 's been doing other work on making law enforcement wiretapping not work .
For instance , go to http : //www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/ [ usenix.org ] and search the page for " Blaze " ; you should find his talk ( http : //www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3 ) and the Q&amp;A session.He also gave essentially the same talk as the first ( under a different title ) at http : //www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/ [ usenix.org ] ( again , search the page for " Blaze " or go straight to http : //www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3 [ usenix.org ] ) .He also spoke at hotsec06 , http : //www.usenix.org/events/hotsec06/tech/ [ usenix.org ] , with no recorded mp3 , and at an e-voting panel , http : //www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/ [ usenix.org ] .As you might infer , this is n't the first time Mr .
( Dr. ? ) Blaze has been studying wiretapping ( or other security issues ) .
He 's also quite a good , entertaining speaker .
I recommend giving him a listen.The short story ( from the usenix talks ) : press the " C " key on your old 4x4-keypad phone .
That 's the in-band signal ( doh !
) used by law enforcement to mean " do n't record now " .
Or , look up the tone frequency , then play it back at a much lower volume with a tone generator ( your laptop might do ) so it 's more comfortable to talk over .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Here's a bit of background the /.
editors didn't give you.If you take a 2-second look at the paper (the pdf link in the summary), you see Matt Blaze's name.He's been doing other work on making law enforcement wiretapping not work.
For instance, go to http://www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/ [usenix.org] and search the page for "Blaze"; you should find his talk (http://www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3) and the Q&amp;A session.He also gave essentially the same talk as the first (under a different title) at http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/ [usenix.org] (again, search the page for "Blaze" or go straight to http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa05/tech/mp3/blaze.mp3 [usenix.org]).He also spoke at hotsec06, http://www.usenix.org/events/hotsec06/tech/ [usenix.org], with no recorded mp3, and at an e-voting panel, http://www.usenix.org/events/sec07/tech/ [usenix.org].As you might infer, this isn't the first time Mr.
(Dr.?) Blaze has been studying wiretapping (or other security issues).
He's also quite a good, entertaining speaker.
I recommend giving him a listen.The short story (from the usenix talks): press the "C" key on your old 4x4-keypad phone.
That's the in-band signal (doh!
) used by law enforcement to mean "don't record now".
Or, look up the tone frequency, then play it back at a much lower volume with a tone generator (your laptop might do) so it's more comfortable to talk over.</sentencetext>
</comment>
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