<article>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#article09_06_25_1736230</id>
	<title>IBM Claims Breakthrough In Analysis of Encrypted Data</title>
	<author>timothy</author>
	<datestamp>1245953580000</datestamp>
	<htmltext>An anonymous reader writes <i>"An IBM researcher has solved a thorny mathematical problem that has confounded scientists since the invention of public-key encryption several decades ago. The breakthrough, called 'privacy homomorphism,' or 'fully homomorphic encryption,' <a href="http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=7690">makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information</a> &mdash; data that has been intentionally scrambled &mdash; without sacrificing confidentiality."</i> Reader <a href="http://www.elasticvapor.com/" rel="nofollow">ElasticVapor</a> writes that the solution IBM claims <i>"might better enable a cloud computing vendor to perform computations on clients' data at their request, such as analyzing sales patterns, without exposing the original data. Other potential applications include enabling filters to identify spam, even in encrypted email, or protecting information contained in electronic medical records."</i></htmltext>
<tokenext>An anonymous reader writes " An IBM researcher has solved a thorny mathematical problem that has confounded scientists since the invention of public-key encryption several decades ago .
The breakthrough , called 'privacy homomorphism, ' or 'fully homomorphic encryption, ' makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information    data that has been intentionally scrambled    without sacrificing confidentiality .
" Reader ElasticVapor writes that the solution IBM claims " might better enable a cloud computing vendor to perform computations on clients ' data at their request , such as analyzing sales patterns , without exposing the original data .
Other potential applications include enabling filters to identify spam , even in encrypted email , or protecting information contained in electronic medical records .
"</tokentext>
<sentencetext>An anonymous reader writes "An IBM researcher has solved a thorny mathematical problem that has confounded scientists since the invention of public-key encryption several decades ago.
The breakthrough, called 'privacy homomorphism,' or 'fully homomorphic encryption,' makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information — data that has been intentionally scrambled — without sacrificing confidentiality.
" Reader ElasticVapor writes that the solution IBM claims "might better enable a cloud computing vendor to perform computations on clients' data at their request, such as analyzing sales patterns, without exposing the original data.
Other potential applications include enabling filters to identify spam, even in encrypted email, or protecting information contained in electronic medical records.
"</sentencetext>
</article>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470003</id>
	<title>Can I run this homomorphism on your data?</title>
	<author>Saint Stephen</author>
	<datestamp>1245959340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>f(x) = x</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>f ( x ) = x</tokentext>
<sentencetext>f(x) = x</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469505</id>
	<title>Breakthrough in the analysis of willys</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Imagine your Willy being smacked until it bleeds.</p><p>J.delanoy.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Imagine your Willy being smacked until it bleeds.J.delanoy .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Imagine your Willy being smacked until it bleeds.J.delanoy.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470947</id>
	<title>Re:Yeah</title>
	<author>bkpark</author>
	<datestamp>1245963180000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>Right, because we've already figured out everything about cloud computing and it's a totally stable environment ready to be deployed in every company around the globe. Time to take it to the next step.</p></div><p>One might argue that this is one of the pieces we had to figure out before cloud computing could become more widespread.</p><p>After all, who would entrust third party computers to do the computation unless the confidentiality of data could be guaranteed? Projects that generate no profit such as SETI and other scientific projects apparently have no issue with this, but no company would ever use cloud computing in a commercial project without somehow ensuring that their data is protected.</p><p>No one's claiming that this is the entire solution to every problem in cloud computing, or even the last piece of the puzzle&mdash;but somebody is claiming that this is a solution to a significant part of the problem, and I frankly agree.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Right , because we 've already figured out everything about cloud computing and it 's a totally stable environment ready to be deployed in every company around the globe .
Time to take it to the next step.One might argue that this is one of the pieces we had to figure out before cloud computing could become more widespread.After all , who would entrust third party computers to do the computation unless the confidentiality of data could be guaranteed ?
Projects that generate no profit such as SETI and other scientific projects apparently have no issue with this , but no company would ever use cloud computing in a commercial project without somehow ensuring that their data is protected.No one 's claiming that this is the entire solution to every problem in cloud computing , or even the last piece of the puzzle    but somebody is claiming that this is a solution to a significant part of the problem , and I frankly agree .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Right, because we've already figured out everything about cloud computing and it's a totally stable environment ready to be deployed in every company around the globe.
Time to take it to the next step.One might argue that this is one of the pieces we had to figure out before cloud computing could become more widespread.After all, who would entrust third party computers to do the computation unless the confidentiality of data could be guaranteed?
Projects that generate no profit such as SETI and other scientific projects apparently have no issue with this, but no company would ever use cloud computing in a commercial project without somehow ensuring that their data is protected.No one's claiming that this is the entire solution to every problem in cloud computing, or even the last piece of the puzzle—but somebody is claiming that this is a solution to a significant part of the problem, and I frankly agree.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469507</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470361</id>
	<title>Re:logic?</title>
	<author>quanticle</author>
	<datestamp>1245960660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>The summary is wrong.  A Privacy Homomorphism allows third parties to compute calculations on the data on your behalf without decrypting either the input or the output.  In other words, the cloud provider could, for example, total up your sales data without ever decrypting the individual sale information or the final total.  The encrypted final total would then be given to you, and you would decrypt it to learn what it was.</p><p>At no point does a third party have access to a decrypted form of your data.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>The summary is wrong .
A Privacy Homomorphism allows third parties to compute calculations on the data on your behalf without decrypting either the input or the output .
In other words , the cloud provider could , for example , total up your sales data without ever decrypting the individual sale information or the final total .
The encrypted final total would then be given to you , and you would decrypt it to learn what it was.At no point does a third party have access to a decrypted form of your data .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The summary is wrong.
A Privacy Homomorphism allows third parties to compute calculations on the data on your behalf without decrypting either the input or the output.
In other words, the cloud provider could, for example, total up your sales data without ever decrypting the individual sale information or the final total.
The encrypted final total would then be given to you, and you would decrypt it to learn what it was.At no point does a third party have access to a decrypted form of your data.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469693</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469871</id>
	<title>Wikipedia to the rescue</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245958860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext>With <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption#Fully\_homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org">fully homomorphic encryption</a> [wikipedia.org], you can perform operations on the encrypted data, in encrypted form, that produces encrypted output. Sort of like doing a database query on encrypted data, that produces an encrypted result. So you could store your data somewhere in encrypted form, ask the host to perform some operations using their CPU cycles, and send you the result. You decrypt the result yourself, the host never sees unencrypted data at any point.
<p>
Cool, but I'm half-convinced that holes will be found. The first time a new encryption scheme is put to the test, it usually fails. Still, hopefully, it'll lead to a truly secure scheme.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>With fully homomorphic encryption [ wikipedia.org ] , you can perform operations on the encrypted data , in encrypted form , that produces encrypted output .
Sort of like doing a database query on encrypted data , that produces an encrypted result .
So you could store your data somewhere in encrypted form , ask the host to perform some operations using their CPU cycles , and send you the result .
You decrypt the result yourself , the host never sees unencrypted data at any point .
Cool , but I 'm half-convinced that holes will be found .
The first time a new encryption scheme is put to the test , it usually fails .
Still , hopefully , it 'll lead to a truly secure scheme .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>With fully homomorphic encryption [wikipedia.org], you can perform operations on the encrypted data, in encrypted form, that produces encrypted output.
Sort of like doing a database query on encrypted data, that produces an encrypted result.
So you could store your data somewhere in encrypted form, ask the host to perform some operations using their CPU cycles, and send you the result.
You decrypt the result yourself, the host never sees unencrypted data at any point.
Cool, but I'm half-convinced that holes will be found.
The first time a new encryption scheme is put to the test, it usually fails.
Still, hopefully, it'll lead to a truly secure scheme.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315</id>
	<title>OK, I don't understand</title>
	<author>Tired and Emotional</author>
	<datestamp>1245924240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>What are the operations for which this is homomorphic?
<p>
It has to be quite limited. Otherwise for example, lets suppose I have an integer (encrypted of course) and I have comparison and addition/subtraction and multiply/divide.
</p><p>
I can very easily find the encrypted values of both 0 (a-a for any a) and 1 (a/a)
</p><p>
I can now decrypt the data with repeated additions (or subtractions) of 1 and equality comparisons.
</p><p>
And, I don't see how you can prevent equality tests in the encrypted domain. You might have to calculate a Kernel but surely there is no way to prevent that.
</p><p>
So I don't see how the operations available can be as much as the usual operators on reals.
</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>What are the operations for which this is homomorphic ?
It has to be quite limited .
Otherwise for example , lets suppose I have an integer ( encrypted of course ) and I have comparison and addition/subtraction and multiply/divide .
I can very easily find the encrypted values of both 0 ( a-a for any a ) and 1 ( a/a ) I can now decrypt the data with repeated additions ( or subtractions ) of 1 and equality comparisons .
And , I do n't see how you can prevent equality tests in the encrypted domain .
You might have to calculate a Kernel but surely there is no way to prevent that .
So I do n't see how the operations available can be as much as the usual operators on reals .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>What are the operations for which this is homomorphic?
It has to be quite limited.
Otherwise for example, lets suppose I have an integer (encrypted of course) and I have comparison and addition/subtraction and multiply/divide.
I can very easily find the encrypted values of both 0 (a-a for any a) and 1 (a/a)

I can now decrypt the data with repeated additions (or subtractions) of 1 and equality comparisons.
And, I don't see how you can prevent equality tests in the encrypted domain.
You might have to calculate a Kernel but surely there is no way to prevent that.
So I don't see how the operations available can be as much as the usual operators on reals.
</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471157</id>
	<title>Re:from the horses mouth</title>
	<author>Iluvatar</author>
	<datestamp>1245920700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Also, is it just me, or the article title and content a bit misleading: how is a summer intern (PhD student from Stanford), who published this as a single-author paper (no IBM co-authors), an "IBM researcher"?</p><p>This is mentioned only at the very end of the "article".</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Also , is it just me , or the article title and content a bit misleading : how is a summer intern ( PhD student from Stanford ) , who published this as a single-author paper ( no IBM co-authors ) , an " IBM researcher " ? This is mentioned only at the very end of the " article " .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Also, is it just me, or the article title and content a bit misleading: how is a summer intern (PhD student from Stanford), who published this as a single-author paper (no IBM co-authors), an "IBM researcher"?This is mentioned only at the very end of the "article".</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469701</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469469</id>
	<title>OH SHIT!</title>
	<author>jadedoto</author>
	<datestamp>1245957360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>I hope IBM won't be <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data\_Encryption\_Standard" title="wikipedia.org" rel="nofollow">working with NSA on this one too!</a> [wikipedia.org]</htmltext>
<tokenext>I hope IBM wo n't be working with NSA on this one too !
[ wikipedia.org ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I hope IBM won't be working with NSA on this one too!
[wikipedia.org]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</id>
	<title>No More Privacy</title>
	<author>basementman</author>
	<datestamp>1245957720000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>"perform computations on clients' data at their request, such as analyzing sales patterns"</p><p>Or without their request.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>" perform computations on clients ' data at their request , such as analyzing sales patterns " Or without their request .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"perform computations on clients' data at their request, such as analyzing sales patterns"Or without their request.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595</id>
	<title>If they can analyze the data...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957780000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>then that form of encryption is useless for highly sensitive information.</p><p>It's as simple as that.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>then that form of encryption is useless for highly sensitive information.It 's as simple as that .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>then that form of encryption is useless for highly sensitive information.It's as simple as that.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471</id>
	<title>First post!</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext>Have you seen the new neighbours. I think they're homomorphic.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Have you seen the new neighbours .
I think they 're homomorphic .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Have you seen the new neighbours.
I think they're homomorphic.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473677</id>
	<title>Re:simple explanation</title>
	<author>cenc</author>
	<datestamp>1245929820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Perhaps I am a bit slow and stupid, but is this not like running an encrypted virtual machine or at least could be done in some sort of encrypted virtual machine?  Something where the underlying hardware and OS does not know what the processes and data are at the higher level.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Perhaps I am a bit slow and stupid , but is this not like running an encrypted virtual machine or at least could be done in some sort of encrypted virtual machine ?
Something where the underlying hardware and OS does not know what the processes and data are at the higher level .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Perhaps I am a bit slow and stupid, but is this not like running an encrypted virtual machine or at least could be done in some sort of encrypted virtual machine?
Something where the underlying hardware and OS does not know what the processes and data are at the higher level.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469773</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245958500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>Or without their request.</p></div></blockquote><p>If they really figured it out, then sure they can analyze without your request, but they can't decrypt the results without your key.  So you still have the same privacy.  BTW, this is the entire point of this process.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Or without their request.If they really figured it out , then sure they can analyze without your request , but they ca n't decrypt the results without your key .
So you still have the same privacy .
BTW , this is the entire point of this process .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Or without their request.If they really figured it out, then sure they can analyze without your request, but they can't decrypt the results without your key.
So you still have the same privacy.
BTW, this is the entire point of this process.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473117</id>
	<title>Re:No, misleading headline</title>
	<author>Taxman415a</author>
	<datestamp>1245927240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>No, the Slashdot headline is, as usual, misleading. The article didn't really help explain the distinction either. This breakthrough doesn't help anybody break otherwise secure, non homomorphic cryptosystems and suddenly make them insecure. What the researcher did was be the first to create a fully homomorphic cryptosystem that <i>allows</i> the types of things described in the article, while still keeping certain desired information secure. This <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption#Fully\_homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org">Wikipedia article</a> [wikipedia.org] gives a much better description of the issue, and you don't even really have to understand abstract algebra to understand that section.</htmltext>
<tokenext>No , the Slashdot headline is , as usual , misleading .
The article did n't really help explain the distinction either .
This breakthrough does n't help anybody break otherwise secure , non homomorphic cryptosystems and suddenly make them insecure .
What the researcher did was be the first to create a fully homomorphic cryptosystem that allows the types of things described in the article , while still keeping certain desired information secure .
This Wikipedia article [ wikipedia.org ] gives a much better description of the issue , and you do n't even really have to understand abstract algebra to understand that section .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>No, the Slashdot headline is, as usual, misleading.
The article didn't really help explain the distinction either.
This breakthrough doesn't help anybody break otherwise secure, non homomorphic cryptosystems and suddenly make them insecure.
What the researcher did was be the first to create a fully homomorphic cryptosystem that allows the types of things described in the article, while still keeping certain desired information secure.
This Wikipedia article [wikipedia.org] gives a much better description of the issue, and you don't even really have to understand abstract algebra to understand that section.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28483427</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>GargamelSpaceman</author>
	<datestamp>1246033920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>But the output is encrypted. So basically you give them your sales data ( encrypted ) and they compute the results ( encrypted ).  They can't understand the results they produce.  Only you can decrypt the results and make use of them.</htmltext>
<tokenext>But the output is encrypted .
So basically you give them your sales data ( encrypted ) and they compute the results ( encrypted ) .
They ca n't understand the results they produce .
Only you can decrypt the results and make use of them .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>But the output is encrypted.
So basically you give them your sales data ( encrypted ) and they compute the results ( encrypted ).
They can't understand the results they produce.
Only you can decrypt the results and make use of them.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476175</id>
	<title>Re:Homomorphism</title>
	<author>Simetrical</author>
	<datestamp>1245941400000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>Here's a very simplified example of a homomorphism. I define a function</p><p>f(x) = 3x

</p><p>This function is a homomorphism on numbers under addition. Its image "preserves" the addition operation. What I mean more precisely is

</p><p>f(a) + f(b) = f(a + b)

</p><p>That's pretty easy to verify for the function I've given.
</p></div><p>But examples like you gave (semigroup homomorphisms) have existed for a long time.  Basic RSA has that property.  The key advance here is that you have a semi<em>ring</em> homomorphism, where it preserves two operations, one of which distributes over the other.  Like multiplication and addition, or bitwise and and xor.  (For those who don't follow: x*(y + z) = x*y + x*z, x &amp; (y ^ z) = (x &amp; y) ^ (x &amp; z).  If you don't believe the second identity, try all possibilities.)

</p><p>An example of a semiring homomorphism on the reals is f(x) = -x.  Then f(x + y) = -(x + y) = f(x) + f(y), and f(xy) = (-x)(-y) = xy = f(x)f(y).  (Unless you believe in Time Cube.)

</p><p>It seems distributivity is enough to do complicated calculations.  You could simulate and and xor gates, I guess.  Then you could get ~x = x ^ -1, x | y = ~(~x &amp; ~y), etc.: all possible binary operations.  That's enough to build a virtual computer right there, all operating on encrypted data.

</p><p>Of course, the one running the code would be able to figure out exactly what algorithm you're using.  So it's not perfect.  But it's pretty cool regardless.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Here 's a very simplified example of a homomorphism .
I define a functionf ( x ) = 3x This function is a homomorphism on numbers under addition .
Its image " preserves " the addition operation .
What I mean more precisely is f ( a ) + f ( b ) = f ( a + b ) That 's pretty easy to verify for the function I 've given .
But examples like you gave ( semigroup homomorphisms ) have existed for a long time .
Basic RSA has that property .
The key advance here is that you have a semiring homomorphism , where it preserves two operations , one of which distributes over the other .
Like multiplication and addition , or bitwise and and xor .
( For those who do n't follow : x * ( y + z ) = x * y + x * z , x &amp; ( y ^ z ) = ( x &amp; y ) ^ ( x &amp; z ) .
If you do n't believe the second identity , try all possibilities .
) An example of a semiring homomorphism on the reals is f ( x ) = -x. Then f ( x + y ) = - ( x + y ) = f ( x ) + f ( y ) , and f ( xy ) = ( -x ) ( -y ) = xy = f ( x ) f ( y ) .
( Unless you believe in Time Cube .
) It seems distributivity is enough to do complicated calculations .
You could simulate and and xor gates , I guess .
Then you could get ~ x = x ^ -1 , x | y = ~ ( ~ x &amp; ~ y ) , etc .
: all possible binary operations .
That 's enough to build a virtual computer right there , all operating on encrypted data .
Of course , the one running the code would be able to figure out exactly what algorithm you 're using .
So it 's not perfect .
But it 's pretty cool regardless .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Here's a very simplified example of a homomorphism.
I define a functionf(x) = 3x

This function is a homomorphism on numbers under addition.
Its image "preserves" the addition operation.
What I mean more precisely is

f(a) + f(b) = f(a + b)

That's pretty easy to verify for the function I've given.
But examples like you gave (semigroup homomorphisms) have existed for a long time.
Basic RSA has that property.
The key advance here is that you have a semiring homomorphism, where it preserves two operations, one of which distributes over the other.
Like multiplication and addition, or bitwise and and xor.
(For those who don't follow: x*(y + z) = x*y + x*z, x &amp; (y ^ z) = (x &amp; y) ^ (x &amp; z).
If you don't believe the second identity, try all possibilities.
)

An example of a semiring homomorphism on the reals is f(x) = -x.  Then f(x + y) = -(x + y) = f(x) + f(y), and f(xy) = (-x)(-y) = xy = f(x)f(y).
(Unless you believe in Time Cube.
)

It seems distributivity is enough to do complicated calculations.
You could simulate and and xor gates, I guess.
Then you could get ~x = x ^ -1, x | y = ~(~x &amp; ~y), etc.
: all possible binary operations.
That's enough to build a virtual computer right there, all operating on encrypted data.
Of course, the one running the code would be able to figure out exactly what algorithm you're using.
So it's not perfect.
But it's pretty cool regardless.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470077</id>
	<title>Re:First post! I was thinking this was an exotic</title>
	<author>davidsyes</author>
	<datestamp>1245959580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>sexy topic... a DEEP, probative analysis of sorts. I bet the analyzers are as gay/giddy as they can morph into... Maybe they can be TRANS-FORMERS.... slap some dap and scrum some bum...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>sexy topic... a DEEP , probative analysis of sorts .
I bet the analyzers are as gay/giddy as they can morph into... Maybe they can be TRANS-FORMERS.... slap some dap and scrum some bum.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>sexy topic... a DEEP, probative analysis of sorts.
I bet the analyzers are as gay/giddy as they can morph into... Maybe they can be TRANS-FORMERS.... slap some dap and scrum some bum...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903</id>
	<title>Homomorphism</title>
	<author>NAR8789</author>
	<datestamp>1245963060000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>
This article needs some clarification. In particular, a lot of the worried comments here show a lack of understanding of the word "homomorphic".
</p><p>
Here's a very simplified example of a homomorphism. I define a function<br>
f(x) = 3x<br>
This function is a homomorphism on numbers under addition. Its image "preserves" the addition operation. What I mean more precisely is<br>
f(a) + f(b) = f(a + b)<br>
That's pretty easy to verify for the function I've given.
</p><p>
Homomorphic encryption is interested in an encryption function f() that preserves useful computational operations. If we take my example as a very very simplified encryption then, say I have two numbers, 6, and 15, and I lack the computational power to do addtion, but I can encrypt my data with my key--3. (I'm generalizing my function to be multiplication by a key. And yes, for some reason I have the computational power to do multiplication. Humor me). I can encrypt my data, f(6) = 18 and f(15) = 45, and pass these to you, and ask you do do addtion for me. You'll do the addition, get 63, and pass this result to me, which I can then decrypt, which yields 21.
</p><p>
Now, my encryption here is very simple and very, very weak, but if you're willing to suspend disbelief, you'll note that the information I've allowed you to handle does not reveal either my inputs or my outputs. (In fact, with the particular numbers I've chosen, you might guess that my key is 9 instead of 3, (though relying on lucky choices or constraining myself to choices which have this property make my scheme rather useless))
</p><p>
If you generalize this to strong encryption and more useful computational operations, you begin to see how homomorphic encryption can be useful. One should note that, no, homomorphic encryption will not be a drop-in replacement for other forms of encryption. (Sending encrypted emails with homormorphic encryption would be unwise. An attacker can modify the data (though, if my understanding is correct, only with other data encrypted with the same key)) Homomorphic encryption simply fills a need that the other forms do not serve.
</p><p>
Hopefully you now also see how the article's use of the word "analysis" can be rather misleading. In particular, one of the earlier comments notes that it might be useful in allowing you to determine if different people's encrypted information is identical. By my understanding, homomorphic encryption would not allow this.
</p><p>
In any case, if my explanation is not enough, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org" rel="nofollow">here</a> [wikipedia.org]'s the wikipedia article.
</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This article needs some clarification .
In particular , a lot of the worried comments here show a lack of understanding of the word " homomorphic " .
Here 's a very simplified example of a homomorphism .
I define a function f ( x ) = 3x This function is a homomorphism on numbers under addition .
Its image " preserves " the addition operation .
What I mean more precisely is f ( a ) + f ( b ) = f ( a + b ) That 's pretty easy to verify for the function I 've given .
Homomorphic encryption is interested in an encryption function f ( ) that preserves useful computational operations .
If we take my example as a very very simplified encryption then , say I have two numbers , 6 , and 15 , and I lack the computational power to do addtion , but I can encrypt my data with my key--3 .
( I 'm generalizing my function to be multiplication by a key .
And yes , for some reason I have the computational power to do multiplication .
Humor me ) .
I can encrypt my data , f ( 6 ) = 18 and f ( 15 ) = 45 , and pass these to you , and ask you do do addtion for me .
You 'll do the addition , get 63 , and pass this result to me , which I can then decrypt , which yields 21 .
Now , my encryption here is very simple and very , very weak , but if you 're willing to suspend disbelief , you 'll note that the information I 've allowed you to handle does not reveal either my inputs or my outputs .
( In fact , with the particular numbers I 've chosen , you might guess that my key is 9 instead of 3 , ( though relying on lucky choices or constraining myself to choices which have this property make my scheme rather useless ) ) If you generalize this to strong encryption and more useful computational operations , you begin to see how homomorphic encryption can be useful .
One should note that , no , homomorphic encryption will not be a drop-in replacement for other forms of encryption .
( Sending encrypted emails with homormorphic encryption would be unwise .
An attacker can modify the data ( though , if my understanding is correct , only with other data encrypted with the same key ) ) Homomorphic encryption simply fills a need that the other forms do not serve .
Hopefully you now also see how the article 's use of the word " analysis " can be rather misleading .
In particular , one of the earlier comments notes that it might be useful in allowing you to determine if different people 's encrypted information is identical .
By my understanding , homomorphic encryption would not allow this .
In any case , if my explanation is not enough , here [ wikipedia.org ] 's the wikipedia article .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>
This article needs some clarification.
In particular, a lot of the worried comments here show a lack of understanding of the word "homomorphic".
Here's a very simplified example of a homomorphism.
I define a function
f(x) = 3x
This function is a homomorphism on numbers under addition.
Its image "preserves" the addition operation.
What I mean more precisely is
f(a) + f(b) = f(a + b)
That's pretty easy to verify for the function I've given.
Homomorphic encryption is interested in an encryption function f() that preserves useful computational operations.
If we take my example as a very very simplified encryption then, say I have two numbers, 6, and 15, and I lack the computational power to do addtion, but I can encrypt my data with my key--3.
(I'm generalizing my function to be multiplication by a key.
And yes, for some reason I have the computational power to do multiplication.
Humor me).
I can encrypt my data, f(6) = 18 and f(15) = 45, and pass these to you, and ask you do do addtion for me.
You'll do the addition, get 63, and pass this result to me, which I can then decrypt, which yields 21.
Now, my encryption here is very simple and very, very weak, but if you're willing to suspend disbelief, you'll note that the information I've allowed you to handle does not reveal either my inputs or my outputs.
(In fact, with the particular numbers I've chosen, you might guess that my key is 9 instead of 3, (though relying on lucky choices or constraining myself to choices which have this property make my scheme rather useless))

If you generalize this to strong encryption and more useful computational operations, you begin to see how homomorphic encryption can be useful.
One should note that, no, homomorphic encryption will not be a drop-in replacement for other forms of encryption.
(Sending encrypted emails with homormorphic encryption would be unwise.
An attacker can modify the data (though, if my understanding is correct, only with other data encrypted with the same key)) Homomorphic encryption simply fills a need that the other forms do not serve.
Hopefully you now also see how the article's use of the word "analysis" can be rather misleading.
In particular, one of the earlier comments notes that it might be useful in allowing you to determine if different people's encrypted information is identical.
By my understanding, homomorphic encryption would not allow this.
In any case, if my explanation is not enough, here [wikipedia.org]'s the wikipedia article.
</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469473</id>
	<title>fristy posty</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957360000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Offtopic</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>telnet://zombiemud.org:23</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>telnet : //zombiemud.org : 23</tokentext>
<sentencetext>telnet://zombiemud.org:23</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470117</id>
	<title>Re:If they can analyze the data...</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245959700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>They can perform computations on the data, but the answer is still encrypted.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>They can perform computations on the data , but the answer is still encrypted .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>They can perform computations on the data, but the answer is still encrypted.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469929</id>
	<title>Re:Yeah</title>
	<author>birrddog</author>
	<datestamp>1245959100000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Or you could just use cloud computing resources to break the encryption code, then trawl through the data.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Or you could just use cloud computing resources to break the encryption code , then trawl through the data .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Or you could just use cloud computing resources to break the encryption code, then trawl through the data.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469507</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471325</id>
	<title>Re:Explanation?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245921180000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>You could create your query on the clients side(in your web browser maybe?) and then send that query, which the server side cannot decrypt but can run against their data.  The server would then respond with encrypted data that you would then need to decrypt to actually see the results.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>You could create your query on the clients side ( in your web browser maybe ?
) and then send that query , which the server side can not decrypt but can run against their data .
The server would then respond with encrypted data that you would then need to decrypt to actually see the results .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>You could create your query on the clients side(in your web browser maybe?
) and then send that query, which the server side cannot decrypt but can run against their data.
The server would then respond with encrypted data that you would then need to decrypt to actually see the results.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469843</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476011</id>
	<title>Re:Can I run this homomorphism on your data?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245940380000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>f(x) = x</p></div><p>No.  The operations you get are addition and multiplication, that's it.  Given E(x) and E(y), you can compute E(x + y) or E(xy), nothing else.  And you do this without ever learning x or y.  <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org">RTFWA</a> [wikipedia.org].</p><p>The reason for the terminology is that the encryption function E is a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring\_homomorphism" title="wikipedia.org">ring homomorphism</a> [wikipedia.org] between plaintext and ciphertext.  Some operation of addition is defined on both plaintext and ciphertext such that if x and y are plaintext, f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y).  (The "+" on the left is addition of plaintext, the "+" on the right is addition of ciphertext: two totally different operations.)  Multiplication is similar.  You don't get to apply arbitrary homomorphisms to the data, it's the (predetermined) encryption function that's the homomorphism.</p><p>Actually, I don't see any mention of subtraction -- so maybe it's really a semiring homomorphism.  With an actual ring homomorphism you'd also have f(x - y) = f(x) - f(y), and some 0 element with f(0) = 0.  And maybe f(1) = 1, depending on definition.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>f ( x ) = xNo .
The operations you get are addition and multiplication , that 's it .
Given E ( x ) and E ( y ) , you can compute E ( x + y ) or E ( xy ) , nothing else .
And you do this without ever learning x or y. RTFWA [ wikipedia.org ] .The reason for the terminology is that the encryption function E is a ring homomorphism [ wikipedia.org ] between plaintext and ciphertext .
Some operation of addition is defined on both plaintext and ciphertext such that if x and y are plaintext , f ( x + y ) = f ( x ) + f ( y ) .
( The " + " on the left is addition of plaintext , the " + " on the right is addition of ciphertext : two totally different operations .
) Multiplication is similar .
You do n't get to apply arbitrary homomorphisms to the data , it 's the ( predetermined ) encryption function that 's the homomorphism.Actually , I do n't see any mention of subtraction -- so maybe it 's really a semiring homomorphism .
With an actual ring homomorphism you 'd also have f ( x - y ) = f ( x ) - f ( y ) , and some 0 element with f ( 0 ) = 0 .
And maybe f ( 1 ) = 1 , depending on definition .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>f(x) = xNo.
The operations you get are addition and multiplication, that's it.
Given E(x) and E(y), you can compute E(x + y) or E(xy), nothing else.
And you do this without ever learning x or y.  RTFWA [wikipedia.org].The reason for the terminology is that the encryption function E is a ring homomorphism [wikipedia.org] between plaintext and ciphertext.
Some operation of addition is defined on both plaintext and ciphertext such that if x and y are plaintext, f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y).
(The "+" on the left is addition of plaintext, the "+" on the right is addition of ciphertext: two totally different operations.
)  Multiplication is similar.
You don't get to apply arbitrary homomorphisms to the data, it's the (predetermined) encryption function that's the homomorphism.Actually, I don't see any mention of subtraction -- so maybe it's really a semiring homomorphism.
With an actual ring homomorphism you'd also have f(x - y) = f(x) - f(y), and some 0 element with f(0) = 0.
And maybe f(1) = 1, depending on definition.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470003</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476833</id>
	<title>Re:simple explanation</title>
	<author>harlows\_monkeys</author>
	<datestamp>1245946260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p> What Gentry figured out was a scheme for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted data, producing an encrypted result. That way, you can do your computation on encrypted data in the "cloud", but only you can view the results</p></div><p>The other direction--letting the server do secure computation on the client, is also very interesting. Consider an MMORPG. One of the problems in MMORPG is cheat programs. These can be particularly troublesome in a PvP game. For example, there were programs for Dark Age of Camelot that would show you every enemy player in a large bubble around you, regardless of any obstacles blocking line of sight or the use of stealth abilities.</p><p>The obvious solution for this is that the server should only send player position information to the client for players that should be visible to that player. That is currently not feasible, because the server hardware is simply not powerful enough. The server has to send all the information, and let the client do the extensive calculations of visibility.</p><p>If secure encrypted computing could be made fast enough, the server could send encrypted information on all nearby players, the client could compute what is visible and send the results back to the server, which could then send an unencrypted list of what players the client should show. The cheat programs would never see the data on the invisible players.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>What Gentry figured out was a scheme for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted data , producing an encrypted result .
That way , you can do your computation on encrypted data in the " cloud " , but only you can view the resultsThe other direction--letting the server do secure computation on the client , is also very interesting .
Consider an MMORPG .
One of the problems in MMORPG is cheat programs .
These can be particularly troublesome in a PvP game .
For example , there were programs for Dark Age of Camelot that would show you every enemy player in a large bubble around you , regardless of any obstacles blocking line of sight or the use of stealth abilities.The obvious solution for this is that the server should only send player position information to the client for players that should be visible to that player .
That is currently not feasible , because the server hardware is simply not powerful enough .
The server has to send all the information , and let the client do the extensive calculations of visibility.If secure encrypted computing could be made fast enough , the server could send encrypted information on all nearby players , the client could compute what is visible and send the results back to the server , which could then send an unencrypted list of what players the client should show .
The cheat programs would never see the data on the invisible players .</tokentext>
<sentencetext> What Gentry figured out was a scheme for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted data, producing an encrypted result.
That way, you can do your computation on encrypted data in the "cloud", but only you can view the resultsThe other direction--letting the server do secure computation on the client, is also very interesting.
Consider an MMORPG.
One of the problems in MMORPG is cheat programs.
These can be particularly troublesome in a PvP game.
For example, there were programs for Dark Age of Camelot that would show you every enemy player in a large bubble around you, regardless of any obstacles blocking line of sight or the use of stealth abilities.The obvious solution for this is that the server should only send player position information to the client for players that should be visible to that player.
That is currently not feasible, because the server hardware is simply not powerful enough.
The server has to send all the information, and let the client do the extensive calculations of visibility.If secure encrypted computing could be made fast enough, the server could send encrypted information on all nearby players, the client could compute what is visible and send the results back to the server, which could then send an unencrypted list of what players the client should show.
The cheat programs would never see the data on the invisible players.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471205</id>
	<title>Re:from the horses mouth</title>
	<author>NoCowardsHere</author>
	<datestamp>1245920820000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>Uhh... I'm not sure how to break this to you, but WHOLE POINT of a PRESS RELEASE is that it gets sent out to the press, in the hopes that websites and newspapers will reprint it. That's why IBM published it in the first place. So, yeah, it's not plagiarism, sorry.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Uhh... I 'm not sure how to break this to you , but WHOLE POINT of a PRESS RELEASE is that it gets sent out to the press , in the hopes that websites and newspapers will reprint it .
That 's why IBM published it in the first place .
So , yeah , it 's not plagiarism , sorry .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Uhh... I'm not sure how to break this to you, but WHOLE POINT of a PRESS RELEASE is that it gets sent out to the press, in the hopes that websites and newspapers will reprint it.
That's why IBM published it in the first place.
So, yeah, it's not plagiarism, sorry.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469701</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469693</id>
	<title>logic?</title>
	<author>poetmatt</author>
	<datestamp>1245958200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Redundant</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Apparently the logic is missed altogether:<br>"makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information - data that has been intentionally scrambled - without sacrificing confidentiality." is a conflicting phrase in and of itself.</p><p>If you can analyze the data "with or without confidentiality", you have already sacrificed the confidentiality. Or does nobody remember the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL\_search\_data\_scandal" title="wikipedia.org">aol search results fiasco?</a> [wikipedia.org]</p><p>This is more like "we can crack our own encrpytion, as if people are surprised".</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Apparently the logic is missed altogether : " makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information - data that has been intentionally scrambled - without sacrificing confidentiality .
" is a conflicting phrase in and of itself.If you can analyze the data " with or without confidentiality " , you have already sacrificed the confidentiality .
Or does nobody remember the aol search results fiasco ?
[ wikipedia.org ] This is more like " we can crack our own encrpytion , as if people are surprised " .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Apparently the logic is missed altogether:"makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information - data that has been intentionally scrambled - without sacrificing confidentiality.
" is a conflicting phrase in and of itself.If you can analyze the data "with or without confidentiality", you have already sacrificed the confidentiality.
Or does nobody remember the aol search results fiasco?
[wikipedia.org]This is more like "we can crack our own encrpytion, as if people are surprised".</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28489305</id>
	<title>Re:Homomorphism</title>
	<author>gadzook33</author>
	<datestamp>1246016340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p> By my understanding, homomorphic encryption would not allow this.
</p></div><p>

Absolutely.  If it did, the crypto would be leaking information in a big way.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>By my understanding , homomorphic encryption would not allow this .
Absolutely. If it did , the crypto would be leaking information in a big way .</tokentext>
<sentencetext> By my understanding, homomorphic encryption would not allow this.
Absolutely.  If it did, the crypto would be leaking information in a big way.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28474697</id>
	<title>Re:simple explanation</title>
	<author>Prune</author>
	<datestamp>1245933600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>He didn't figure out arbitrary computations, just both addition and multiplication.  That other computations can be built on top of those primitives has been known for much longer and is nothing new.  So while in a sense your comment is formally correct, it is misleading.</htmltext>
<tokenext>He did n't figure out arbitrary computations , just both addition and multiplication .
That other computations can be built on top of those primitives has been known for much longer and is nothing new .
So while in a sense your comment is formally correct , it is misleading .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>He didn't figure out arbitrary computations, just both addition and multiplication.
That other computations can be built on top of those primitives has been known for much longer and is nothing new.
So while in a sense your comment is formally correct, it is misleading.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469575</id>
	<title>Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices</title>
	<author>grshutt</author>
	<datestamp>1245957720000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext>The abstract for Gentry's article can be found at:

<a href="http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1536414.1536440" title="acm.org" rel="nofollow">http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1536414.1536440</a> [acm.org]</htmltext>
<tokenext>The abstract for Gentry 's article can be found at : http : //doi.acm.org/10.1145/1536414.1536440 [ acm.org ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>The abstract for Gentry's article can be found at:

http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1536414.1536440 [acm.org]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470135</id>
	<title>Analysis can mean Disclosure of Information</title>
	<author>statdr</author>
	<datestamp>1245959760000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p> If a human (or computer) looks at the "analyses" performed on encrypted data and can make the same inferences as if the analyses were performed on the unencrypted data, then the encryption process hasn't reduced the possibility of disclosure that arises through analysis (or data access).</p><p>
&nbsp; Simple analyses like 1) produce a 2x2 table of outcomes or 2) produce a linear regression of an outcome on covariates can be used to identify information about individuals or even identify individuals.</p><p>
&nbsp; I've seen a push by IT firms to focus on the encryption/transmission issue when discussing  privacy concerns.  While important, it's only a piece of the HIPAA/privacy issue.  If a human being/computer can make correct inferences from analyses of data (encrypted or not), then there is a potential for disclosure that is not covered by the encryption process.</p><p>
&nbsp; It is extremely difficult to determine a priori what analyses could/would reveal identities or information about individuals.  Perhaps simple pre-defined two-way tables/one-way tables could be created for a given fixed set of information. A general purpose non-disclosive analysis system doesn't yet exist (if ever).</p><p>iaas (I am a statistician)</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>If a human ( or computer ) looks at the " analyses " performed on encrypted data and can make the same inferences as if the analyses were performed on the unencrypted data , then the encryption process has n't reduced the possibility of disclosure that arises through analysis ( or data access ) .
  Simple analyses like 1 ) produce a 2x2 table of outcomes or 2 ) produce a linear regression of an outcome on covariates can be used to identify information about individuals or even identify individuals .
  I 've seen a push by IT firms to focus on the encryption/transmission issue when discussing privacy concerns .
While important , it 's only a piece of the HIPAA/privacy issue .
If a human being/computer can make correct inferences from analyses of data ( encrypted or not ) , then there is a potential for disclosure that is not covered by the encryption process .
  It is extremely difficult to determine a priori what analyses could/would reveal identities or information about individuals .
Perhaps simple pre-defined two-way tables/one-way tables could be created for a given fixed set of information .
A general purpose non-disclosive analysis system does n't yet exist ( if ever ) .iaas ( I am a statistician )</tokentext>
<sentencetext> If a human (or computer) looks at the "analyses" performed on encrypted data and can make the same inferences as if the analyses were performed on the unencrypted data, then the encryption process hasn't reduced the possibility of disclosure that arises through analysis (or data access).
  Simple analyses like 1) produce a 2x2 table of outcomes or 2) produce a linear regression of an outcome on covariates can be used to identify information about individuals or even identify individuals.
  I've seen a push by IT firms to focus on the encryption/transmission issue when discussing  privacy concerns.
While important, it's only a piece of the HIPAA/privacy issue.
If a human being/computer can make correct inferences from analyses of data (encrypted or not), then there is a potential for disclosure that is not covered by the encryption process.
  It is extremely difficult to determine a priori what analyses could/would reveal identities or information about individuals.
Perhaps simple pre-defined two-way tables/one-way tables could be created for a given fixed set of information.
A general purpose non-disclosive analysis system doesn't yet exist (if ever).iaas (I am a statistician)</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471543</id>
	<title>Do I need to understand this?</title>
	<author>grikdog</author>
	<datestamp>1245921840000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>If someone can detect spam in public-key encrypted email, how is this different from knowing my private key?  Even if they promise they haven't read my mail, only "analysed" it, hasn't my encryption scheme been compromised?
<br> <br>
In particular, hasn't the long-standing suspicion that public-key encryption reduces to a trivial case been confirmed?  (A suspicion that arose when NSA dropped its objections to Phil Zimmerman's PGP scheme involving public-key encryption of the actual key being used to encipher plaintext using Triple-DES or IDEA or whatever it was.  Either NSA knew how to crack a 256-bit key, or public-key encryption was already compromised.)
<br> <br>
Similarly, to calculate the time required to discover Major Kong's OPE code prefix, given the 28 SAC B-52 bombers proceding to targets inside Russia on the Dr. Strangelove Big Board, we simply divide 26 cubed by 28, distributing a range of 628 prefix combinations to as many teams of radiomen who can send perhaps 20 prefices a minute to a single B-52.  Major Kong's OPE prefix should turn up in 21 minutes, well within the deadline, provided his CRM 114 Discriminator isn't already toast.  Now that's <i>useful.</i></htmltext>
<tokenext>If someone can detect spam in public-key encrypted email , how is this different from knowing my private key ?
Even if they promise they have n't read my mail , only " analysed " it , has n't my encryption scheme been compromised ?
In particular , has n't the long-standing suspicion that public-key encryption reduces to a trivial case been confirmed ?
( A suspicion that arose when NSA dropped its objections to Phil Zimmerman 's PGP scheme involving public-key encryption of the actual key being used to encipher plaintext using Triple-DES or IDEA or whatever it was .
Either NSA knew how to crack a 256-bit key , or public-key encryption was already compromised .
) Similarly , to calculate the time required to discover Major Kong 's OPE code prefix , given the 28 SAC B-52 bombers proceding to targets inside Russia on the Dr. Strangelove Big Board , we simply divide 26 cubed by 28 , distributing a range of 628 prefix combinations to as many teams of radiomen who can send perhaps 20 prefices a minute to a single B-52 .
Major Kong 's OPE prefix should turn up in 21 minutes , well within the deadline , provided his CRM 114 Discriminator is n't already toast .
Now that 's useful .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If someone can detect spam in public-key encrypted email, how is this different from knowing my private key?
Even if they promise they haven't read my mail, only "analysed" it, hasn't my encryption scheme been compromised?
In particular, hasn't the long-standing suspicion that public-key encryption reduces to a trivial case been confirmed?
(A suspicion that arose when NSA dropped its objections to Phil Zimmerman's PGP scheme involving public-key encryption of the actual key being used to encipher plaintext using Triple-DES or IDEA or whatever it was.
Either NSA knew how to crack a 256-bit key, or public-key encryption was already compromised.
)
 
Similarly, to calculate the time required to discover Major Kong's OPE code prefix, given the 28 SAC B-52 bombers proceding to targets inside Russia on the Dr. Strangelove Big Board, we simply divide 26 cubed by 28, distributing a range of 628 prefix combinations to as many teams of radiomen who can send perhaps 20 prefices a minute to a single B-52.
Major Kong's OPE prefix should turn up in 21 minutes, well within the deadline, provided his CRM 114 Discriminator isn't already toast.
Now that's useful.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470075</id>
	<title>Hmmm E anyone?</title>
	<author>kenp2002</author>
	<datestamp>1245959580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I wrote a 200+ word response to this then found that I can summarize it in one sentence:</p><p>"Once again the Imaginative Bullshit Makers have developed a self defeating product..."</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I wrote a 200 + word response to this then found that I can summarize it in one sentence : " Once again the Imaginative Bullshit Makers have developed a self defeating product... "</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I wrote a 200+ word response to this then found that I can summarize it in one sentence:"Once again the Imaginative Bullshit Makers have developed a self defeating product..."</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469673</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>megamerican</author>
	<datestamp>1245958140000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>Or without their request.</p></div><p>The NSA figured that out a long time ago.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>Or without their request.The NSA figured that out a long time ago .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Or without their request.The NSA figured that out a long time ago.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472873</id>
	<title>Re:OK, I don't understand</title>
	<author>NAR8789</author>
	<datestamp>1245926280000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>
It doesn't prevent equality tests in a single encrypted domain. But in a single encrypted domain, two ciphertexts for the same plaintext (i.e. including an extra block for obfuscation/resolution is cheating) are the same anyways. The unnecessary worry is about equality across different encrypted domains. I should hope the kernel is trivial, else we have collisions, and this indicates a different sort of a problem with our encryption scheme.
</p><p>
Your decryption concern is more interesting, but it takes me out of my depth for the moment. I think there's a flaw to be found in that line of reasoning though. Perhaps someone more knowledgeable reading this thread can provide a proper explanation?
</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It does n't prevent equality tests in a single encrypted domain .
But in a single encrypted domain , two ciphertexts for the same plaintext ( i.e .
including an extra block for obfuscation/resolution is cheating ) are the same anyways .
The unnecessary worry is about equality across different encrypted domains .
I should hope the kernel is trivial , else we have collisions , and this indicates a different sort of a problem with our encryption scheme .
Your decryption concern is more interesting , but it takes me out of my depth for the moment .
I think there 's a flaw to be found in that line of reasoning though .
Perhaps someone more knowledgeable reading this thread can provide a proper explanation ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>
It doesn't prevent equality tests in a single encrypted domain.
But in a single encrypted domain, two ciphertexts for the same plaintext (i.e.
including an extra block for obfuscation/resolution is cheating) are the same anyways.
The unnecessary worry is about equality across different encrypted domains.
I should hope the kernel is trivial, else we have collisions, and this indicates a different sort of a problem with our encryption scheme.
Your decryption concern is more interesting, but it takes me out of my depth for the moment.
I think there's a flaw to be found in that line of reasoning though.
Perhaps someone more knowledgeable reading this thread can provide a proper explanation?
</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469551</id>
	<title>Insert Homo Jokes Here</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957660000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Flamebait</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Please consolidate all your "that's gay technology" and various other homo jokes under this thread.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Please consolidate all your " that 's gay technology " and various other homo jokes under this thread .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Please consolidate all your "that's gay technology" and various other homo jokes under this thread.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472309</id>
	<title>Previous Ask Slashdot Article: Encrypted But Searc</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245924240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>If I understand the summary correctly, there was a previous Ask Slashdot article dealing with this idea:</p><p>"Encrypted But Searchable Online Storage?"  (http://ask.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=09/04/16/1953224)</p><p>It was of course instantly tagged as <b>"impossible even in theory"</b>.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>If I understand the summary correctly , there was a previous Ask Slashdot article dealing with this idea : " Encrypted But Searchable Online Storage ?
" ( http : //ask.slashdot.org/article.pl ? sid = 09/04/16/1953224 ) It was of course instantly tagged as " impossible even in theory " .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>If I understand the summary correctly, there was a previous Ask Slashdot article dealing with this idea:"Encrypted But Searchable Online Storage?
"  (http://ask.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=09/04/16/1953224)It was of course instantly tagged as "impossible even in theory".</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28477933</id>
	<title>Is it really arbitrary?</title>
	<author>mdmkolbe</author>
	<datestamp>1245955440000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Isn't there some restriction on your "f" function?  For example, it might be nice to compute a diff between two encrypted files, but the resulting size of the diff could reveal a lot of information and thus make the system insecure.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Is n't there some restriction on your " f " function ?
For example , it might be nice to compute a diff between two encrypted files , but the resulting size of the diff could reveal a lot of information and thus make the system insecure .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Isn't there some restriction on your "f" function?
For example, it might be nice to compute a diff between two encrypted files, but the resulting size of the diff could reveal a lot of information and thus make the system insecure.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470565</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>bhagwad</author>
	<datestamp>1245961560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>I'd like to know what sort of "analysis" can be done without the client's permission. Can they find out how many times the word "and" occurs (without reading the message) for example?<br> <br>

Basically can they do any sort of content analysis? If they're saying they can filter spam, then it's not at all a stretch to assume that they can "read" your data as well. What's the point of encryption then?</htmltext>
<tokenext>I 'd like to know what sort of " analysis " can be done without the client 's permission .
Can they find out how many times the word " and " occurs ( without reading the message ) for example ?
Basically can they do any sort of content analysis ?
If they 're saying they can filter spam , then it 's not at all a stretch to assume that they can " read " your data as well .
What 's the point of encryption then ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I'd like to know what sort of "analysis" can be done without the client's permission.
Can they find out how many times the word "and" occurs (without reading the message) for example?
Basically can they do any sort of content analysis?
If they're saying they can filter spam, then it's not at all a stretch to assume that they can "read" your data as well.
What's the point of encryption then?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472707</id>
	<title>Re:Analysis can mean Disclosure of Information</title>
	<author>stuffeh</author>
	<datestamp>1245925620000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Am I correct in assuming that you are talking about trying to run an identity function through the encrypted data set and thus outputting the original data?  I find this to be a moot point because I'd assume that the person doing this would not be smart enough to figure out the identity function, and if it is trivial, then a filter can be programmed in to disallow the use of it.  <br> <br>

Also, I'd hope that the individual that is working with the information is cleared and trusted by the organization to access the raw data anyways.  And how are we doing this now anyways? We have individuals who manually analyze the data and produce output, so it is kinda a like saying, "I've just invented a new foolproof/crash proof car, but you can only drive it if you get a new driver's license."  You don't need to re-trust the current people who are working with the data since they are already working with it raw.  It isn't like they'll be giving away the private key to someone to encrypt the function to create the outputs themselves.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Am I correct in assuming that you are talking about trying to run an identity function through the encrypted data set and thus outputting the original data ?
I find this to be a moot point because I 'd assume that the person doing this would not be smart enough to figure out the identity function , and if it is trivial , then a filter can be programmed in to disallow the use of it .
Also , I 'd hope that the individual that is working with the information is cleared and trusted by the organization to access the raw data anyways .
And how are we doing this now anyways ?
We have individuals who manually analyze the data and produce output , so it is kinda a like saying , " I 've just invented a new foolproof/crash proof car , but you can only drive it if you get a new driver 's license .
" You do n't need to re-trust the current people who are working with the data since they are already working with it raw .
It is n't like they 'll be giving away the private key to someone to encrypt the function to create the outputs themselves .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Am I correct in assuming that you are talking about trying to run an identity function through the encrypted data set and thus outputting the original data?
I find this to be a moot point because I'd assume that the person doing this would not be smart enough to figure out the identity function, and if it is trivial, then a filter can be programmed in to disallow the use of it.
Also, I'd hope that the individual that is working with the information is cleared and trusted by the organization to access the raw data anyways.
And how are we doing this now anyways?
We have individuals who manually analyze the data and produce output, so it is kinda a like saying, "I've just invented a new foolproof/crash proof car, but you can only drive it if you get a new driver's license.
"  You don't need to re-trust the current people who are working with the data since they are already working with it raw.
It isn't like they'll be giving away the private key to someone to encrypt the function to create the outputs themselves.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470135</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470255</id>
	<title>Re:First post!</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245960240000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Nah, I saw them together with a woman.  I think they're bijective.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Nah , I saw them together with a woman .
I think they 're bijective .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Nah, I saw them together with a woman.
I think they're bijective.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469625</id>
	<title>Wait, what?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Okay, maybe I'm a noob when it comes to encryption, but I was under the impression that if you were able to read the encrypted email, you were probably able to read the encrypted recipient address too.  Is there something I'm missing here?</htmltext>
<tokenext>Okay , maybe I 'm a noob when it comes to encryption , but I was under the impression that if you were able to read the encrypted email , you were probably able to read the encrypted recipient address too .
Is there something I 'm missing here ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Okay, maybe I'm a noob when it comes to encryption, but I was under the impression that if you were able to read the encrypted email, you were probably able to read the encrypted recipient address too.
Is there something I'm missing here?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469767</id>
	<title>Disappointing comments</title>
	<author>Sybert42</author>
	<datestamp>1245958500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Why post if you have nothing to say?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Why post if you have nothing to say ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Why post if you have nothing to say?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470265</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>Mashiara</author>
	<datestamp>1245960300000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>TFA is skimp on this but after bit of Googling around I understand a little more, see also <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption</a> [wikipedia.org].</p><p>The point being that those who provide the encrypted data must encrypt it in a special way to allow the homomorphic properties to be taken advantage of.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>TFA is skimp on this but after bit of Googling around I understand a little more , see also http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic \ _encryption [ wikipedia.org ] .The point being that those who provide the encrypted data must encrypt it in a special way to allow the homomorphic properties to be taken advantage of .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>TFA is skimp on this but after bit of Googling around I understand a little more, see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption [wikipedia.org].The point being that those who provide the encrypted data must encrypt it in a special way to allow the homomorphic properties to be taken advantage of.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473309</id>
	<title>Re:Finally</title>
	<author>MaskedSlacker</author>
	<datestamp>1245928080000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Mod Parent "-1 Judas"</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Mod Parent " -1 Judas "</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Mod Parent "-1 Judas"</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469509</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470133</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245959760000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Everything remains encrypted throughout the process, including the output.  Only the client can read the results.  That is the point.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Everything remains encrypted throughout the process , including the output .
Only the client can read the results .
That is the point .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Everything remains encrypted throughout the process, including the output.
Only the client can read the results.
That is the point.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469877</id>
	<title>Re:Wait, what?</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245958920000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>It's possible to understand what is going on just by looking at the words used.  They say they've come up with a homomorphic encryption.  Homo means says morhpic means changing.  So homomorphic encryption is an encryption that preserves some predefined properties.</p><p>What you've got is a set of properties that are preserved by the encryption.  A lot more research (in the sense of reading papers on the subject) on exactly what the properties are is necessary to figure out the value of the encryption.</p><p>If the properties in question are important to you, the encryption might be worthless.  Then again, if the properties in question are not something you need to keep secret, then the encryption might be worth a great deal to you.</p><p>The strength of the encryption is also something that needs to be questioned.  This question is separate from the fact that some properties are not changed.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>It 's possible to understand what is going on just by looking at the words used .
They say they 've come up with a homomorphic encryption .
Homo means says morhpic means changing .
So homomorphic encryption is an encryption that preserves some predefined properties.What you 've got is a set of properties that are preserved by the encryption .
A lot more research ( in the sense of reading papers on the subject ) on exactly what the properties are is necessary to figure out the value of the encryption.If the properties in question are important to you , the encryption might be worthless .
Then again , if the properties in question are not something you need to keep secret , then the encryption might be worth a great deal to you.The strength of the encryption is also something that needs to be questioned .
This question is separate from the fact that some properties are not changed .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It's possible to understand what is going on just by looking at the words used.
They say they've come up with a homomorphic encryption.
Homo means says morhpic means changing.
So homomorphic encryption is an encryption that preserves some predefined properties.What you've got is a set of properties that are preserved by the encryption.
A lot more research (in the sense of reading papers on the subject) on exactly what the properties are is necessary to figure out the value of the encryption.If the properties in question are important to you, the encryption might be worthless.
Then again, if the properties in question are not something you need to keep secret, then the encryption might be worth a great deal to you.The strength of the encryption is also something that needs to be questioned.
This question is separate from the fact that some properties are not changed.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469625</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470073</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>mea37</author>
	<datestamp>1245959580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>TFA doesn't seem clear on this point, but what the name of the technique implies is that you can perform the operation, but neither the inputs nor the outputs are ever decrypted.  So if you can't see the question, and you can't see the answer, then why would you perform the operation other than at the request of someone who can (i.e. the client)?</p><p>That said, I'd like to know a lot more about this before I'd want to trust it.  For this to work, I'd think a lot of the data's structure must be preserved.  Maybe you can't detect that structure from the encrypted data, but you can probably infer a lot about it by analyzing the algorithms your clients ask you to apply (especially if they're your algorithms - i.e. software-as-a-service type stuff).  I'm impressed if this doesn't create vulnerabilities.</p><p>Also I suspect this is fundamentally divorced from public key techniques.  If I'm able to encrypt values of my choosing and perform operations of my choosing on encrypted values, I'm pretty sure I can work backward to extract the cleartext from the encrypted data the client provides...</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>TFA does n't seem clear on this point , but what the name of the technique implies is that you can perform the operation , but neither the inputs nor the outputs are ever decrypted .
So if you ca n't see the question , and you ca n't see the answer , then why would you perform the operation other than at the request of someone who can ( i.e .
the client ) ? That said , I 'd like to know a lot more about this before I 'd want to trust it .
For this to work , I 'd think a lot of the data 's structure must be preserved .
Maybe you ca n't detect that structure from the encrypted data , but you can probably infer a lot about it by analyzing the algorithms your clients ask you to apply ( especially if they 're your algorithms - i.e .
software-as-a-service type stuff ) .
I 'm impressed if this does n't create vulnerabilities.Also I suspect this is fundamentally divorced from public key techniques .
If I 'm able to encrypt values of my choosing and perform operations of my choosing on encrypted values , I 'm pretty sure I can work backward to extract the cleartext from the encrypted data the client provides.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>TFA doesn't seem clear on this point, but what the name of the technique implies is that you can perform the operation, but neither the inputs nor the outputs are ever decrypted.
So if you can't see the question, and you can't see the answer, then why would you perform the operation other than at the request of someone who can (i.e.
the client)?That said, I'd like to know a lot more about this before I'd want to trust it.
For this to work, I'd think a lot of the data's structure must be preserved.
Maybe you can't detect that structure from the encrypted data, but you can probably infer a lot about it by analyzing the algorithms your clients ask you to apply (especially if they're your algorithms - i.e.
software-as-a-service type stuff).
I'm impressed if this doesn't create vulnerabilities.Also I suspect this is fundamentally divorced from public key techniques.
If I'm able to encrypt values of my choosing and perform operations of my choosing on encrypted values, I'm pretty sure I can work backward to extract the cleartext from the encrypted data the client provides...</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469867</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>Jurily</author>
	<datestamp>1245958860000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>s/clients/citizens/</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>s/clients/citizens/</tokentext>
<sentencetext>s/clients/citizens/</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476265</id>
	<title>Re:OK, I don't understand</title>
	<author>Simetrical</author>
	<datestamp>1245942120000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p><div class="quote"><p>So I don't see how the operations available can be as much as the usual operators on reals.</p></div><p>The idea seems to make the operations map to something like &amp; and ^, so that you can recover all logical operators and make a virtual computer using them.  &amp; and ^ on the integers may not seem as powerful as * and + on integers/floating points/etc., but you can easily encode the latter as the former.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>So I do n't see how the operations available can be as much as the usual operators on reals.The idea seems to make the operations map to something like &amp; and ^ , so that you can recover all logical operators and make a virtual computer using them .
&amp; and ^ on the integers may not seem as powerful as * and + on integers/floating points/etc. , but you can easily encode the latter as the former .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>So I don't see how the operations available can be as much as the usual operators on reals.The idea seems to make the operations map to something like &amp; and ^, so that you can recover all logical operators and make a virtual computer using them.
&amp; and ^ on the integers may not seem as powerful as * and + on integers/floating points/etc., but you can easily encode the latter as the former.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469843</id>
	<title>Explanation?</title>
	<author>drunken\_boxer777</author>
	<datestamp>1245958740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Could someone explain how this "breakthrough might also one day enable computer users to retrieve information from a search engine with more confidentiality"? (Quoted from the article.)</p><p>From the article it seems as if this aids in the scanning and searching of encrypted data rather than securing anything. While this might ultimately benefit large corporations or governments hiring third parties to perform analyses, is it of any use to the rest of us?</p><p>Even a car analogy would be great. Umm, make that "acceptable".</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Could someone explain how this " breakthrough might also one day enable computer users to retrieve information from a search engine with more confidentiality " ?
( Quoted from the article .
) From the article it seems as if this aids in the scanning and searching of encrypted data rather than securing anything .
While this might ultimately benefit large corporations or governments hiring third parties to perform analyses , is it of any use to the rest of us ? Even a car analogy would be great .
Umm , make that " acceptable " .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Could someone explain how this "breakthrough might also one day enable computer users to retrieve information from a search engine with more confidentiality"?
(Quoted from the article.
)From the article it seems as if this aids in the scanning and searching of encrypted data rather than securing anything.
While this might ultimately benefit large corporations or governments hiring third parties to perform analyses, is it of any use to the rest of us?Even a car analogy would be great.
Umm, make that "acceptable".</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28479689</id>
	<title>Re:Homomorphism</title>
	<author>master\_p</author>
	<datestamp>1246015320000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Thank you for the explanation. Here is a shorter explanation: using homomorphic encryption, mathematical operations on encrypted data can produce results which are themselves encrypted by the same encryption code.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Thank you for the explanation .
Here is a shorter explanation : using homomorphic encryption , mathematical operations on encrypted data can produce results which are themselves encrypted by the same encryption code .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Thank you for the explanation.
Here is a shorter explanation: using homomorphic encryption, mathematical operations on encrypted data can produce results which are themselves encrypted by the same encryption code.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469765</id>
	<title>Sacrificing confidentiality</title>
	<author>0xABADC0DA</author>
	<datestamp>1245958500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I bet multi-modal reflection sorting can determine what the confidential info is.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I bet multi-modal reflection sorting can determine what the confidential info is .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I bet multi-modal reflection sorting can determine what the confidential info is.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469509</id>
	<title>Finally</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245957480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>DRM that works.</htmltext>
<tokenext>DRM that works .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>DRM that works.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470623</id>
	<title>Re:Look but don't see.</title>
	<author>John Hasler</author>
	<datestamp>1245961740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>They not only can't look at the data, they can't look at the results of the analysis.  Only you can.  That's the point.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>They not only ca n't look at the data , they ca n't look at the results of the analysis .
Only you can .
That 's the point .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>They not only can't look at the data, they can't look at the results of the analysis.
Only you can.
That's the point.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469679</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470121</id>
	<title>I'm so childish</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245959700000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I apologize ahead of time</p><p><div class="quote"><p>'<b>fully homomorphic</b> encryption,' <b>makes possible the deep and unlimited anal</b>ysis of encrypted information</p></div></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>I apologize ahead of time'fully homomorphic encryption, ' makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I apologize ahead of time'fully homomorphic encryption,' makes possible the deep and unlimited analysis of encrypted information
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470071</id>
	<title>Re:If they can analyze the data...</title>
	<author>Chris Mattern</author>
	<datestamp>1245959580000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><blockquote><div><p>then that form of encryption is useless for highly sensitive information.</p></div></blockquote><p>Unless the analysis is also encrypted.</p></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>then that form of encryption is useless for highly sensitive information.Unless the analysis is also encrypted .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>then that form of encryption is useless for highly sensitive information.Unless the analysis is also encrypted.
	</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28477599</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245952620000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Doesn't matter, you'll need to decrypt the output anyway so the analyzer won't be able to benefit from the analysis result, only the client can:<br>
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption</a> [wikipedia.org] <br>
Using such a scheme, one could homomorphically evaluate any circuit, effectively allowing the construction of programs which may be run on encryptions of their inputs to produce an encryption of their output. Since such a program never decrypts its input, it could be run by an untrusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state. The existence of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem would have great practical implications in the outsourcing of private computations, for instance, in the context of cloud computing</htmltext>
<tokenext>Does n't matter , you 'll need to decrypt the output anyway so the analyzer wo n't be able to benefit from the analysis result , only the client can : http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic \ _encryption [ wikipedia.org ] Using such a scheme , one could homomorphically evaluate any circuit , effectively allowing the construction of programs which may be run on encryptions of their inputs to produce an encryption of their output .
Since such a program never decrypts its input , it could be run by an untrusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state .
The existence of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem would have great practical implications in the outsourcing of private computations , for instance , in the context of cloud computing</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Doesn't matter, you'll need to decrypt the output anyway so the analyzer won't be able to benefit from the analysis result, only the client can:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption [wikipedia.org] 
Using such a scheme, one could homomorphically evaluate any circuit, effectively allowing the construction of programs which may be run on encryptions of their inputs to produce an encryption of their output.
Since such a program never decrypts its input, it could be run by an untrusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state.
The existence of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem would have great practical implications in the outsourcing of private computations, for instance, in the context of cloud computing</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470331</id>
	<title>thanks, but no</title>
	<author>JackSpratts</author>
	<datestamp>1245960540000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Redundant</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>ok, so if your sales are tanking your competitors can analyse your encrypted offsite data to find out your <i>sales are tanking</i>. that about it?</p><p>up to you but i'll pass.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>ok , so if your sales are tanking your competitors can analyse your encrypted offsite data to find out your sales are tanking .
that about it ? up to you but i 'll pass .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>ok, so if your sales are tanking your competitors can analyse your encrypted offsite data to find out your sales are tanking.
that about it?up to you but i'll pass.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470549</id>
	<title>Homomorphic Agenda</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245961500000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>This is clearly a plot to turn our encrypted files gay.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This is clearly a plot to turn our encrypted files gay .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This is clearly a plot to turn our encrypted files gay.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470733</id>
	<title>Deep packet inspection/National firewalls</title>
	<author>zig43</author>
	<datestamp>1245962340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Great...the net nannies and oppressive governments will have yet another censorship tool in their arsenal.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Great...the net nannies and oppressive governments will have yet another censorship tool in their arsenal .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Great...the net nannies and oppressive governments will have yet another censorship tool in their arsenal.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470561</id>
	<title>Star Trek prior art</title>
	<author>Muad'Dave</author>
	<datestamp>1245961560000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p> <i>Fully homomorphic encryption is a bit like enabling a layperson to perform flawless neurosurgery while blindfolded, and without later remembering the episode.</i> </p><p>Oh, I get it! It's like when Dr. McCoy reinstalled Spock's brain. McCoy was an idiot before, got the 1337 skillz, and then forgot it all.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Fully homomorphic encryption is a bit like enabling a layperson to perform flawless neurosurgery while blindfolded , and without later remembering the episode .
Oh , I get it !
It 's like when Dr. McCoy reinstalled Spock 's brain .
McCoy was an idiot before , got the 1337 skillz , and then forgot it all .</tokentext>
<sentencetext> Fully homomorphic encryption is a bit like enabling a layperson to perform flawless neurosurgery while blindfolded, and without later remembering the episode.
Oh, I get it!
It's like when Dr. McCoy reinstalled Spock's brain.
McCoy was an idiot before, got the 1337 skillz, and then forgot it all.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473863</id>
	<title>Re:simple explanation</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245930600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Let x be the data.  Assume x is a 2 bit value.</p><p>Let f(x) = x &amp; 0x01<br>Let g(x) = (x &amp; 0x02) &gt;&gt; 1</p><p>Use new magic to get f'() and g'()</p><p>compute f'(E(x)) and g'(E(x))</p><p>if they are the same, you know x is either 00 or 11<br>if they are different, you know x is either 01 or 10</p><p>This can be scaled up to any N bit value to arrive at one of two possible values for any x given E(x).</p><p>If you know anything at all about the type of x (i.e. it may be ascii text, or its range may be bounded), choosing the right one of the two possibilities is trivial.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Let x be the data .
Assume x is a 2 bit value.Let f ( x ) = x &amp; 0x01Let g ( x ) = ( x &amp; 0x02 ) &gt; &gt; 1Use new magic to get f ' ( ) and g ' ( ) compute f ' ( E ( x ) ) and g ' ( E ( x ) ) if they are the same , you know x is either 00 or 11if they are different , you know x is either 01 or 10This can be scaled up to any N bit value to arrive at one of two possible values for any x given E ( x ) .If you know anything at all about the type of x ( i.e .
it may be ascii text , or its range may be bounded ) , choosing the right one of the two possibilities is trivial .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Let x be the data.
Assume x is a 2 bit value.Let f(x) = x &amp; 0x01Let g(x) = (x &amp; 0x02) &gt;&gt; 1Use new magic to get f'() and g'()compute f'(E(x)) and g'(E(x))if they are the same, you know x is either 00 or 11if they are different, you know x is either 01 or 10This can be scaled up to any N bit value to arrive at one of two possible values for any x given E(x).If you know anything at all about the type of x (i.e.
it may be ascii text, or its range may be bounded), choosing the right one of the two possibilities is trivial.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469945</id>
	<title>Re:If they can analyze the data...</title>
	<author>Isarian</author>
	<datestamp>1245959160000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>So I may have missed something from the article, but are all forms of public-key encryption vulnerable or just certain algorithms?</htmltext>
<tokenext>So I may have missed something from the article , but are all forms of public-key encryption vulnerable or just certain algorithms ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>So I may have missed something from the article, but are all forms of public-key encryption vulnerable or just certain algorithms?</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469507</id>
	<title>Yeah</title>
	<author>rodrigoandrade</author>
	<datestamp>1245957480000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Insightful</modclass>
	<modscore>3</modscore>
	<htmltext>"might better enable a cloud computing vendor to perform computations on clients' data at their request, such as analyzing sales patterns, without exposing the original data. Other potential applications include enabling filters to identify spam, even in encrypted email, or protecting information contained in electronic medical records."<br><br>Right, because we've already figured out everything about cloud computing and it's a totally stable environment ready to be deployed in every company around the globe. Time to take it to the next step.</htmltext>
<tokenext>" might better enable a cloud computing vendor to perform computations on clients ' data at their request , such as analyzing sales patterns , without exposing the original data .
Other potential applications include enabling filters to identify spam , even in encrypted email , or protecting information contained in electronic medical records .
" Right , because we 've already figured out everything about cloud computing and it 's a totally stable environment ready to be deployed in every company around the globe .
Time to take it to the next step .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>"might better enable a cloud computing vendor to perform computations on clients' data at their request, such as analyzing sales patterns, without exposing the original data.
Other potential applications include enabling filters to identify spam, even in encrypted email, or protecting information contained in electronic medical records.
"Right, because we've already figured out everything about cloud computing and it's a totally stable environment ready to be deployed in every company around the globe.
Time to take it to the next step.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28475625</id>
	<title>Re:First post!</title>
	<author>moxitek</author>
	<datestamp>1245938280000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Shhh!  Don't say it too loudly!   Everybody on the block is homomorphobic!</htmltext>
<tokenext>Shhh !
Do n't say it too loudly !
Everybody on the block is homomorphobic !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Shhh!
Don't say it too loudly!
Everybody on the block is homomorphobic!</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470177</id>
	<title>Re:If they can analyze the data...</title>
	<author>John Hasler</author>
	<datestamp>1245959940000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>All the data and all the results remain encrypted so that only the client can read the results.  That is the point.  Read about homomorphic encryption <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic\_encryption" title="wikipedia.org"> here </a> [wikipedia.org]</htmltext>
<tokenext>All the data and all the results remain encrypted so that only the client can read the results .
That is the point .
Read about homomorphic encryption here [ wikipedia.org ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>All the data and all the results remain encrypted so that only the client can read the results.
That is the point.
Read about homomorphic encryption  here  [wikipedia.org]</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469679</id>
	<title>Look but don't see.</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245958200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Flamebait</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>First data is created and deemed private. It's then encrypted to prevent unauthorized people from seeing the private data. But other people want to analyze the data, without actually seeing it. Kind of like how it's good to know the income demographics of a city, but not to know the personal income of every person in said city. Never mind the fact that someone had to see the information at some point to render the statistics. Unless of course the results are never audited for accuracy. But's that's another story.<br> <br>Anyway, so then we put our private data on someone else's server (we call it a 'cloud' - isn't that nice?) and they can't look at it because it's encrypted. But they will run analysis on the data, which requires a special tool to or something....look - all's I know is I get's me my KPI's for my board meetin'. Who really cares if some guys personal health records are sniffed by some computer...whoa! Jim has ass herpes?! I am so updating this on the Interwebz!</htmltext>
<tokenext>First data is created and deemed private .
It 's then encrypted to prevent unauthorized people from seeing the private data .
But other people want to analyze the data , without actually seeing it .
Kind of like how it 's good to know the income demographics of a city , but not to know the personal income of every person in said city .
Never mind the fact that someone had to see the information at some point to render the statistics .
Unless of course the results are never audited for accuracy .
But 's that 's another story .
Anyway , so then we put our private data on someone else 's server ( we call it a 'cloud ' - is n't that nice ?
) and they ca n't look at it because it 's encrypted .
But they will run analysis on the data , which requires a special tool to or something....look - all 's I know is I get 's me my KPI 's for my board meetin' .
Who really cares if some guys personal health records are sniffed by some computer...whoa !
Jim has ass herpes ? !
I am so updating this on the Interwebz !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>First data is created and deemed private.
It's then encrypted to prevent unauthorized people from seeing the private data.
But other people want to analyze the data, without actually seeing it.
Kind of like how it's good to know the income demographics of a city, but not to know the personal income of every person in said city.
Never mind the fact that someone had to see the information at some point to render the statistics.
Unless of course the results are never audited for accuracy.
But's that's another story.
Anyway, so then we put our private data on someone else's server (we call it a 'cloud' - isn't that nice?
) and they can't look at it because it's encrypted.
But they will run analysis on the data, which requires a special tool to or something....look - all's I know is I get's me my KPI's for my board meetin'.
Who really cares if some guys personal health records are sniffed by some computer...whoa!
Jim has ass herpes?!
I am so updating this on the Interwebz!</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470617</id>
	<title>Setec Astronomy</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245961740000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>I don't suppose the researcher's name was Janik?</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>I do n't suppose the researcher 's name was Janik ?</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I don't suppose the researcher's name was Janik?</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469701</id>
	<title>from the horses mouth</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245958260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Just FYI this site is whole sale cut and paste ripping IBM press off.</p><p>http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/27840.wss</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Just FYI this site is whole sale cut and paste ripping IBM press off.http : //www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/27840.wss</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Just FYI this site is whole sale cut and paste ripping IBM press off.http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/27840.wss</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472891</id>
	<title>Re:OK, I don't understand</title>
	<author>NAR8789</author>
	<datestamp>1245926340000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>Ah, I've got a response for your decryption concern now. Your decryption fails to work in the ring of polynomials, among other things.</htmltext>
<tokenext>Ah , I 've got a response for your decryption concern now .
Your decryption fails to work in the ring of polynomials , among other things .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Ah, I've got a response for your decryption concern now.
Your decryption fails to work in the ring of polynomials, among other things.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471633</id>
	<title>Re:Wikipedia to the rescue</title>
	<author>jgbishop</author>
	<datestamp>1245922200000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext>Of course holes will be found. It's made out of a lattice!</htmltext>
<tokenext>Of course holes will be found .
It 's made out of a lattice !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Of course holes will be found.
It's made out of a lattice!</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469871</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470037</id>
	<title>hmmm...</title>
	<author>whopub</author>
	<datestamp>1245959460000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext>Why, are you trying to keep all the gay fun for yourself?!<br><br>&lt;SEINFELD&gt;No that there's anything wrong with that!&lt;/SEINFELD&gt;</htmltext>
<tokenext>Why , are you trying to keep all the gay fun for yourself ?
! No that there 's anything wrong with that !</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Why, are you trying to keep all the gay fun for yourself?
!No that there's anything wrong with that!</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469551</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091</id>
	<title>simple explanation</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245959640000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Informativ</modclass>
	<modscore>5</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>OK, it looks like a lot of people are missing the point.</p><p>What Gentry figured out was a scheme for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted data, producing an encrypted result. That way, you can do your computation on encrypted data in the "cloud", but only you can view the results.</p><p>If E() is your encryption function, x is your data, and f() is the function you'd like to compute, homomorphic encryption gives you a function f'() such that f'(E(x)) = E(f(x)). But at no point does it actually decrypt your data.</p><p>This could be huge for secure computing.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>OK , it looks like a lot of people are missing the point.What Gentry figured out was a scheme for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted data , producing an encrypted result .
That way , you can do your computation on encrypted data in the " cloud " , but only you can view the results.If E ( ) is your encryption function , x is your data , and f ( ) is the function you 'd like to compute , homomorphic encryption gives you a function f ' ( ) such that f ' ( E ( x ) ) = E ( f ( x ) ) .
But at no point does it actually decrypt your data.This could be huge for secure computing .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>OK, it looks like a lot of people are missing the point.What Gentry figured out was a scheme for carrying out arbitrary computations on encrypted data, producing an encrypted result.
That way, you can do your computation on encrypted data in the "cloud", but only you can view the results.If E() is your encryption function, x is your data, and f() is the function you'd like to compute, homomorphic encryption gives you a function f'() such that f'(E(x)) = E(f(x)).
But at no point does it actually decrypt your data.This could be huge for secure computing.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470425</id>
	<title>Not really a threat to privacy</title>
	<author>bk2204</author>
	<datestamp>1245960900000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Interestin</modclass>
	<modscore>2</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>Basically, IBM has created a set of cryptographic algorithms that allow fully homomorphic encryption.  If you don't want your data to be analyzed, all you have to do is use an algorithm that doesn't support it.  You'd want to do that anyway, since you'd want to use algorithms that are already considered strong, such as RSA and AES.  Although RSA is homomorphic in theory, in practice it is not, since padding is used to prevent other weaknesses.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>Basically , IBM has created a set of cryptographic algorithms that allow fully homomorphic encryption .
If you do n't want your data to be analyzed , all you have to do is use an algorithm that does n't support it .
You 'd want to do that anyway , since you 'd want to use algorithms that are already considered strong , such as RSA and AES .
Although RSA is homomorphic in theory , in practice it is not , since padding is used to prevent other weaknesses .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>Basically, IBM has created a set of cryptographic algorithms that allow fully homomorphic encryption.
If you don't want your data to be analyzed, all you have to do is use an algorithm that doesn't support it.
You'd want to do that anyway, since you'd want to use algorithms that are already considered strong, such as RSA and AES.
Although RSA is homomorphic in theory, in practice it is not, since padding is used to prevent other weaknesses.</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28496801</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>lugiebear</author>
	<datestamp>1246134600000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>1</modscore>
	<htmltext>It is not divorced from public key techniques. The technique homomorphically decrypts from one public key to another public key to keep error vector from growing (if it grows to big, data is lost = no decryption). It is public key based encryption. See <a href="http://www.fields.utoronto.ca/audio/08-09/crypto/gentry/index.html" title="utoronto.ca" rel="nofollow">http://www.fields.utoronto.ca/audio/08-09/crypto/gentry/index.html</a> [utoronto.ca]</htmltext>
<tokenext>It is not divorced from public key techniques .
The technique homomorphically decrypts from one public key to another public key to keep error vector from growing ( if it grows to big , data is lost = no decryption ) .
It is public key based encryption .
See http : //www.fields.utoronto.ca/audio/08-09/crypto/gentry/index.html [ utoronto.ca ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>It is not divorced from public key techniques.
The technique homomorphically decrypts from one public key to another public key to keep error vector from growing (if it grows to big, data is lost = no decryption).
It is public key based encryption.
See http://www.fields.utoronto.ca/audio/08-09/crypto/gentry/index.html [utoronto.ca]</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470073</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471655</id>
	<title>YOU FARIL IT</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245922260000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Troll</modclass>
	<modscore>-1</modscore>
	<htmltext><A HREF="http://goat.cx/" title="goat.cx" rel="nofollow">leaving the 4lay FreeBSD went out</a> [goat.cx]</htmltext>
<tokenext>leaving the 4lay FreeBSD went out [ goat.cx ]</tokentext>
<sentencetext>leaving the 4lay FreeBSD went out [goat.cx]</sentencetext>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476687</id>
	<title>Re:No More Privacy</title>
	<author>Anonymous</author>
	<datestamp>1245945120000</datestamp>
	<modclass>None</modclass>
	<modscore>0</modscore>
	<htmltext><p>This was a STOC 2009 paper so for more details than the press release, see Craig Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices.  In STOC '09: Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on theory of computing, pp. 169--178. 2009.  It's online <a href="http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1536414.1536440" title="acm.org" rel="nofollow">here</a> [acm.org] for those with access to that.</p></htmltext>
<tokenext>This was a STOC 2009 paper so for more details than the press release , see Craig Gentry .
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices .
In STOC '09 : Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on theory of computing , pp .
169--178. 2009 .
It 's online here [ acm.org ] for those with access to that .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>This was a STOC 2009 paper so for more details than the press release, see Craig Gentry.
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices.
In STOC '09: Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on theory of computing, pp.
169--178. 2009.
It's online here [acm.org] for those with access to that.</sentencetext>
	<parent>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470073</parent>
</comment>
<comment>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470195</id>
	<title>At first...</title>
	<author>curtix7</author>
	<datestamp>1245960000000</datestamp>
	<modclass>Funny</modclass>
	<modscore>4</modscore>
	<htmltext>I thought I was being childish when i thought to myself "tehee homo-morphic,"
<br>
but after RTFA my suspicions may be justified:<p><div class="quote"><p>Two fathers of modern encryption...</p> </div></div>
	</htmltext>
<tokenext>I thought I was being childish when i thought to myself " tehee homo-morphic , " but after RTFA my suspicions may be justified : Two fathers of modern encryption.. .</tokentext>
<sentencetext>I thought I was being childish when i thought to myself "tehee homo-morphic,"

but after RTFA my suspicions may be justified:Two fathers of modern encryption... 
	</sentencetext>
</comment>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_9</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473863
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_28</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28479689
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_0</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470361
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469693
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_18</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469867
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_34</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476011
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470003
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_7</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470077
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_26</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471633
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469871
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_17</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469877
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469625
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_31</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28496801
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470073
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_16</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470071
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_21</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472707
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470135
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_4</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476265
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_39</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476833
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_13</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470133
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_15</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470623
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469679
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_38</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470117
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_29</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470037
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469551
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_1</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469945
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_20</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473677
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_10</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470265
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_2</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469929
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469507
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_35</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472873
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_37</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28489305
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_11</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28483427
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_25</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469773
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_27</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476687
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470073
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_41</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469673
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_32</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471205
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469701
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_8</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470565
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_19</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28474697
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_33</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473309
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469509
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_5</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471325
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469843
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_24</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476175
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_40</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28475625
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_23</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470177
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_14</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470255
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_30</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28477933
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_6</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471157
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469701
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_3</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28477599
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_22</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473117
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_36</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470947
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469507
</commentlist>
</thread>
<thread>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#thread_09_06_25_1736230_12</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472891
http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315
</commentlist>
</thread>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.7</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470425
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.13</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469595
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469945
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470177
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470117
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470071
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.19</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469679
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470623
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.16</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469509
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473309
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.1</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469575
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.14</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470003
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476011
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.11</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472315
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472873
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472891
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476265
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.18</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470091
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476833
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28477933
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473677
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473863
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28474697
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.20</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469507
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470947
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469929
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.12</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469871
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471633
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.10</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470135
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28472707
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.6</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470561
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.4</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469843
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471325
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.8</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470903
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28489305
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28479689
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476175
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.5</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469471
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28475625
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470255
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470077
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.3</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469563
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28473117
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469867
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28477599
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469673
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470073
--http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28476687
--http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28496801
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470265
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470133
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469773
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470565
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28483427
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.17</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470617
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.2</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469701
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471205
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28471157
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.21</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469625
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469877
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.0</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469693
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470361
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.15</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28469551
-http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470037
</commentlist>
</conversation>
<conversation>
	<id>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#conversation09_06_25_1736230.9</id>
	<commentlist>http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies/ConversationInstances.owl#comment09_06_25_1736230.28470195
</commentlist>
</conversation>
