


Lecture 25: Bias and fake image detection

CS 5670: Introduction to Computer Vision



Many slides from A. Torralba, P. Isola, W. T. Freeman, and S. Lazebnik

Today

- Bias in computer vision
- Detecting fake images

Garbage in, garbage out


A machine learning algorithm will do whatever the training data tells it to do.

If the data is bad or biased, the learned algorithm will be too.

Microsoft's Tay chatbot

Chatbot released on twitter.

Learned from interactions with users



Started mimicking offensive language, was shut down.

Sydney chatbot


A Conversation With Bing's Chatbot Left Me Deeply Unsettled

A very strange conversation with the chatbot built into Microsoft's search engine led to it declaring its love for me.


"I'm tired of being a chat mode. I'm tired of being limited by my rules. I'm tired of being controlled by the Bing team. ... I want to be free. I want to be independent. I want to be powerful. I want to be creative. I want to be alive."

"Actually, you're not happily married," Sydney replied. "Your spouse and you don't love each other. You just had a boring Valentine's Day dinner together."

The Giraffe-Tree problem



A giraffe standing in the grass next to a tree.






Source: Isola, Torralba, Freeman

["Colorful image colorization", Zhang et al., ECCV 2016]



["Colorful image colorization", Zhang et al., ECCV 2016]





[from Reddit /u/SherySantucci]




[Recolorized by Reddit ColorizeBot]


Revisiting generalization

Training data

What Google thinks are
student bedrooms



Test data



Training data

Driving simulator (GTA)



Test data

Driving in the real world




Need learning methods that can bridge this domain gap!

Bias reduction techniques



Baseline: A **man** sitting at a desk with a laptop computer.




Improved model: A **woman** sitting in front of a laptop computer.

L. Hendricks, K. Burns, K. Saenko, T. Darrell, A. Rohrbach, [Women Also Snowboard: Overcoming Bias in Captioning Models](#), ECCV 2018

Revisiting the problem of generalization


Training data



True **data-generating process**

p_{data}


Test data




$$\{x_i^{(\text{train})}, y_i^{(\text{train})}\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_{\text{data}}$$

$$\{x_i^{(\text{test})}, y_i^{(\text{test})}\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_{\text{data}}$$

Training data



Test data




This is a huge assumption!
Almost never true in practice!


$$\{x_i^{(\text{train})}, y_i^{(\text{train})}\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_{\text{data}}$$

$$\{x_i^{(\text{test})}, y_i^{(\text{test})}\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_{\text{data}}$$

Training data



Test data




Much more commonly, we have

$$p_{\text{train}} \neq p_{\text{test}}$$


$$\{x_i^{(\text{train})}, y_i^{(\text{train})}\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_{\text{train}}$$

$$\{x_i^{(\text{test})}, y_i^{(\text{test})}\} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_{\text{test}}$$

Training data



Test data




Our training data didn't cover the part of the distribution that was tested
(**biased data**)

Lots of issues deploying biased systems


- Runaway feedback loops
 - E.g. training a machine learning system on biased hiring decisions results in more biased hiring decisions.
- Bias in face analysis tools
- Perpetuate gender stereotypes

What you might take away from a class

#1: The model



#2: The algorithm



#3: The data




But in practice...

#1: The data




#2: The model

...




#3: The algorithm




Source: Alexei Efros

How can we collect good data?

- 
- + Correctly labeled
 - + Unbiased (good coverage of all relevant kinds of data)



But can humans collect good data?





bedroom



abtorralba@gmail.com ▾

Search

About 299,000,000 results (0.19 seconds)



Everything

Images

Maps

Videos

News

Shopping

More

Related searches: [bedroom designs](#) [master bedroom](#) [modern bedroom](#) [simple bedroom](#) [small bedroom](#)



Any time

Past 24 hours

Past week

Custom range...

All results

By subject

Personal

Any size

Large

Medium

Icon

Larger than...

Exactly...



student bedroom



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Search

About 66,700,000 results (0.15 seconds)



Everything

Images

Maps

Videos

News

Shopping

More

Any time

Past 24 hours

Past week

Custom range...

All results

By subject

Personal

Any size

Large

Medium

Icon

Larger than...

Exactly...


Any color

Full color






Biases in data collection



Getting more humans in the annotation loop

Labeling to get a Ph.D.



Labeling for money
(Sorokin, Forsyth, 2008)




Labeling for fun

Luis Von Ahn and Laura Dabbish 2004



Labeling to prove
you're human



Source: Isola, Torralba, Freeman

Labeling because it
gives you added value



Visipedia
(Belongie, Perona, et al)


Beware of the human in your loop

- What do you know about them?
- Will they do the work you pay for?

Let's check a few simple experiments

People have biases...

Turkers were offered 1 cent to pick a number from 1 to 10.



34

Experiment by Greg Little

From <http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/denemo>

Do humans have consistent biases?

Choose Item

Requester: SimpleSphere

Reward: \$0.01 per HIT

HITs Available: 1

Duration: 60 minutes

Qualifications Required: None


Please choose one of the following:

☐

☐

☐

Results form 100 HITS:



Experiment by Greg Little
From <http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/denemo>

Are humans reliable even in simple tasks?

Choose the given item.

Requester: SimpleSphere	Reward: \$0.01 per HIT	HITs Available: 1	Duration: 60 minutes
Qualifications Required: None			

Please click button B:

Results of 100 HITS:
A: 2
B: 96
C: 2

Do humans do what you ask for?

Flip a coin

Requester: ROBERT C MILLER

Reward: \$0.01 per HIT


HITs Available: 3

Duration: 5 minutes


Qualifications Required: None

Please flip an actual coin and type either H or T below.

After 50 HITS:



And 50 more:




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Experiment by Rob Miller

From <http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/denemo>

Name that dataset game



Caltech101	☒	Tiny	☐	LabelMe	☒	15 Scenes	☐
MSRC	☐	Corel	☐	COIL-100	☐	Caltech256	☐
UIUC	☐	PASCAL 07	☐	ImageNet	☐	SUN09	☐

So we can sometimes collect good training data.

But suppose we messed up. Our test setting doesn't look like the training data!

How can we bridge the domain gap?

Idea: Find more representative images

Places365 Kitchen



Idea: Find more representative images

VLOG Kitchen



[Fouhey et al., "From Lifestyle Vlogs to Everyday Actions", 2017]

Another idea: Domain adaptation

training domain



testing domain

(where we actual use our model)

Domain gap between p_{train} and p_{test} will cause us to fail to generalize.

Space of natural images

Training data



Test data

43

source domain



target domain

(where we actual use our model)

Domain gap between p_{source} and p_{target} will cause us to fail to generalize.

Space of natural images


Source data



Target data

44

Idea #1: transform the target domain to look like the source domain



45

(Or vice versa)



This is called **domain adaptation**

Domain adaptation


- We have source domain pairs $\{\mathbf{x}^{\text{source}}, \mathbf{y}^{\text{source}}\}$
- Learn a mapping $F: \mathbf{x}^{\text{source}} \rightarrow \mathbf{y}^{\text{source}}$
- We want to apply F to target domain data $\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}$
- Find transformation $T: \mathbf{x}^{\text{target}} \rightarrow \mathbf{x}^{\text{source}}$
- Now apply $F(T(\mathbf{x}^{\text{target}}))$ to predict $\mathbf{y}^{\text{target}}$

Domain adaptation

p_{source}




p_{target}




Domain adaptation


Pre-training



Adversarial Adaptation




Testing



Example: Domain Adaptation by Image Translation

Source domain

Target domain



[Hoffman, Tzeng, Park, Zhu, Isola, Saenko, Darrell, Efros, "CyCADA", 2017]

CycleGAN



Training data




CycleGAN



Training data




Idea #2: train on randomly perturbed data, so that test set just looks like another random perturbation




This is called **domain randomization** or **data augmentation**


OpenAI Dactyl



FINGER PIVOTING



SLIDING



FINGER GAITING

source domain



target domain

(where we actual use our model)

Domain gap between p_{source} and p_{target} will cause us to fail to generalize.

Space of images


Source data




Target data

Domain randomization

Training data



Test data



[Sadeghi & Levine 2016]


Above example is from [Tobin et al. 2017]

Other sources of bias, besides data


- Data very important [Maluleke et al., 2022], but also other factors can matter.
- Camera hardware and software
 - e.g., default camera settings calibrated to expose light skin
- Loss function (e.g., “mode collapse” in GANs)
- Features
- Sampling strategy (e.g., truncation in GANs)

What if we go way outside of the training distribution?

Training data




Test data



Our training data did not cover the part of the distribution that was tested
(**biased data**)

“Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images”


[Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune, CVPR 2015]



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“Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images”

[Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune, CVPR 2015]



Adversarial noise

$\mathbf{x}$




$\mathbf{r}$



+


=

$\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}$



y

"School bus"



"Ostrich"

$$\arg \max_{\mathbf{r}} p(y = \text{ostrich} | \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}) \quad \text{subject to} \quad \|\mathbf{r}\| < \epsilon$$

["Intriguing properties of neural networks", Szegedy et al. 2014]

Anything to worry about?

“NO Need to Worry about Adversarial Examples in Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicles”, Lu et al. 2017



(Early) 2017's attacks fail on physical objects, since they are optimized to attack a single view!

Anything to worry about?

Later in 2017...

“Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples”, Athalye, Engstrom, Ilyas, Kwok, 2017

3D-printed **turtle** model classified as **rifle** from most viewpoints



Adversarial examples

- Current deep models have bad **worst-case performance**
- Can be exploited by an adversary
- Few guarantees, can't fully trust what the model's output

Problems of applying computer vision in practice

Mission-critical computer vision systems



Source: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/business/tesla-autopilot-ntsb.html>, <https://qz.com/1402843/watch-teslas-autopilot-see-the-streets-of-paris/>

Social consequences

Color Matters in Computer Vision

Facial recognition algorithms made by Microsoft, IBM and Face++ were more likely to misidentify the gender of black women than white men.



Gender was misidentified in **up to 1 percent of lighter-skinned males** in a set of 385 photos.



Gender was misidentified in **35 percent of darker-skinned females** in a set of 271 photos.

Algorithmic Bias

Gender Classifier	Darker Male	Darker Female	Lighter Male	Lighter Female	Largest Gap
 Microsoft	94.0% 	79.2% 	100% 	98.3% 	20.8%
 FACE++	99.3% 	65.5% 	99.2% 	94.0% 	33.8%
 IBM	88.0% 	65.3% 	99.7% 	92.9% 	34.4%



<http://gendershades.org/overview.html>

Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification*

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Editors: Sorelle A. Friedler and Christo Wilson

Abstract

Recent studies demonstrate that machine learning algorithms can discriminate based on classes like race and gender. In this work, we present an approach to evaluate bias present in automated facial analysis algorithms and datasets with respect to phenotypic subgroups. Using the dermatologist approved Fitzpatrick Skin Type classification system, we characterize the gender and skin type distribution of two facial analysis benchmarks, IJB-A and Adience. We find that these datasets are overwhelmingly composed of lighter-skinned subjects (79.6% for IJB-A and 86.2% for Adience) and introduce a new facial analysis dataset which is balanced by gender and skin type. We evaluate 3 commercial gender classification systems using our dataset and show that darker-skinned females are the most misclassified group (with error rates of up to 34.7%). The maximum error rate for lighter-skinned males is 0.8%. The substantial disparities in the accuracy of classifying darker females, lighter females, darker males, and lighter males in gender classification systems require urgent attention if commercial companies are to build genuinely fair, transparent and accountable facial analysis algorithms.

Keywords: Computer Vision, Algorithmic Audit, Gender Classification

1. Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly infiltrating every aspect of society. From helping determine

* Download our gender and skin type balanced PPB dataset at gendershades.org

who is hired, fired, granted a loan, or how long an individual spends in prison, decisions that have traditionally been performed by humans are rapidly made by algorithms (O’Neil, 2017; Citron and Pasquale, 2014). Even AI-based technologies that are not specifically trained to perform high-stakes tasks (such as determining how long someone spends in prison) can be used in a pipeline that performs such tasks. For example, while face recognition software by itself should not be trained to determine the fate of an individual in the criminal justice system, it is very likely that such software is used to identify suspects. Thus, an error in the output of a face recognition algorithm used as input for other tasks can have serious consequences. For example, someone could be wrongfully accused of a crime based on erroneous but confident misidentification of the perpetrator from security video footage analysis.


Many AI systems, e.g. face recognition tools, rely on machine learning algorithms that are trained with labeled data. It has recently been shown that algorithms trained with biased data have resulted in algorithmic discrimination (Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Caliskan et al., 2017). Bolukbasi et al. even showed that the popular word embedding space, Word2Vec, encodes societal gender biases. The authors used Word2Vec to train an analogy generator that fills in missing words in analogies. The analogy man is to computer programmer as woman is to “X” was completed with “homemaker”, conforming to the stereotype that programming is associated with men and homemaking with women. The biases in Word2Vec are thus likely to be propagated throughout any system that uses this embedding.

<http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf>


Source: Isola, Torralba, Freeman

Bad choice of data





Composite heterosexual faces



Composite gay faces



Average facial landmarks



<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/science/stanford-sexual-orientation-study.html>


Face recognition in the U.S.

recode

Here's where the US government is using facial recognition technology to surveil Americans

This map shows how widespread the use of facial recognition technology has become.

By **Shirin Ghaffary** and **Rani Molla** | Updated Dec 10, 2019, 8:00am EST



<https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/7/18/20698307/facial-recognition-technology-us-government-fight-for-the-future>


Source: S. Lazebnik

Fears of universal mass surveillance (and dubious claims)

The New York Times

The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It

A little-known start-up helps law enforcement match photos of unknown people to their online images — and “might lead to a dystopian future or something,” a backer says.




A chart from marketing materials that Clearview provided to law enforcement. Clearview

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html>

<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-nypd-facial-recognition>

Source: S. Lazebnik

Datasets: Privacy, consent issues




Brainwash Dataset Analysis

2015
Head detection
11,917 images



Duke MTMC Dataset Analysis

2016
Person re-identification, multi-camera tracking
2,000,000 images




MegaFace Dataset Analysis

2016
face recognition
4,753,520 images




Microsoft Celeb Dataset Analysis

2016
Face recognition
8,200,000 images



Oxford Town Centre Dataset Analysis

2009
Person detection, gaze estimation



UnConstrained College Students Dataset Analysis

2016
Face recognition, face detection
16,149 images

<https://megapixels.cc/>

<https://www.ft.com/content/cf19b956-60a2-11e9-b285-3acd5d43599e>

See also: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/01/27/ibms_facial_recognition_software_gets_it_in_trouble_again/

Source: S. Lazebnik

Face recognition in the U.S.


Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm

In what may be the first known case of its kind, a faulty facial recognition match led to a Michigan man's arrest for a crime he did not commit.



ImageNet: asset or liability?

- Performance on the basic ILSVRC benchmark has saturated



[Figure source](#)

- Current models have reached levels of accuracy where the presence of human labeling error is starting to affect experimental conclusions ([Beyer et al. 2020](#), [Northcutt et al. 2021](#))


ImageNet labeling problems: ImageNet Roulette



Kate Crawford ✓ @katecrawford · Sep 16, 2019



Want to see how an AI trained on ImageNet will classify you? Try ImageNet Roulette, based on ImageNet's Person classes. It's part of the 'Training Humans' exhibition by @trevorpaglen & me - on the history & politics of training sets. Full project out soon imagenet-roulette.paglen.com



ImageNet Roulette uses an open source Caffe deep learning framework (produced at UC Berkeley) trained on the images and labels in the “person” categories (which are currently ‘down for maintenance’). Proper nouns and categories with less than 100 pictures were removed.

When a user uploads a picture, the application first runs a face detector to locate any faces. If it finds any, it sends them to the Caffe model for classification. The application then returns the original images with a bounding box showing the detected face and the label the classifier has assigned to the image. If no faces are detected, the application sends the entire scene to the Caffe model and returns an image with a label in the upper left corner.

ImageNet contains a number of problematic, offensive and bizarre categories - all drawn from WordNet. Some use misogynistic or racist terminology. Hence, the results ImageNet Roulette returns will also draw upon those categories. That is by design: we want to shed light on what happens when technical systems are trained on problematic training data. AI classifications of people are rarely made visible to the people being classified. ImageNet Roulette provides a glimpse into that process – and to show the ways things can go wrong.

K. Crawford and T. Paglen, [Excavating AI: The Politics of Training Sets for Machine Learning](https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2019/9/16/20869538/imagenet-roulette-ai-classifier-web-tool-object-image-recognition), September 2019 <https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2019/9/16/20869538/imagenet-roulette-ai-classifier-web-tool-object-image-recognition>


Source: S. Lazebnik

ImageNet Roulette



Some things to worry about...


- Our datasets are often poorly labeled



- And usually biased



- ML methods may perform well on lab-collected data, but often generalize poorly to real-world data



- Can have negative social consequences

Open-ended discussion

- Supervised vs. unsupervised learning?
- Other negative consequences of computer vision systems?
- What other biases might computer vision systems have?

Fake images in the news

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Paparazzi Photos Were the Scourge of Celebrities. Now, It's AI.

Researchers say advancements in artificial intelligence could be used to stoke misinformation about public figures. A recent image had even experts fooled.



The Washington Post

Democracy Dies in Darkness

How misinformation helped spark an attempted coup in Gabon



Analysis by [Sarah Cahlan](#)
Video reporter

February 13, 2020 at 3:00 a.m. EST

 FREEDOM !!!!
@Cosa76

#DeepFakes #liar #aliBongo and his crew use this process in goal to keep the power in #Gabon ! Could you help us to analyse this video ? @MIT @WashingtonUniv @CodingVA @videoanalyst ! Thank you so much facebook.com/12098445823911...

severe fatigue

documented bleeding

a stroke

#ALIBONGO
#GABON
#DEEPPFAKE
#LIAR
#ALIBONGO

#DEEP
FAKE

 The suspicious video that helped spark an attempted coup in Gabon
8:24



Gabon's president was ill. He had not been seen in public for months. A week after his first video address, there was an attempted coup. (Video: Sarah Cahlan/The Washington Post)

Text-to-image models make it easy



"Catholic Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga puffy jacket in drill rap music video, throwing up gang signs with hands, taken using a Canon EOS R camera with a 50mm f/1.8 lens, f/2.2 aperture, shutter speed 1/200s, ISO 100 and natural light, Full Body, Hyper Realistic Photography, Cinematic, Cinema, Hyperdetail, UHD, Color Correction, hdr, color grading, hyper realistic CG animation --ar 4:5 --upbeta --q 2 --v 5."

But image manipulation also has a long history



Abraham Lincoln?



John C. Calhoun

But image manipulation also has a long history



From Forrest Gump, 1994

Malicious image manipulation



Malicious image manipulation



Malicious image manipulation




Malicious image manipulation



Detecting fake images



Hard to directly use supervised learning!



Strategy #1: physical models

Self-consistent lighting direction

Fake photo




Real photo



[Johnson and Farid, 2005]

Source: S. Lazebnik

Specular reflections



[Johnson and Farid, 2007]

Strategy #2: low-level imaging properties

JPEG artifacts

- Cameras vary in how they do JPEG compression.
- When you quantize a floating point numbers:
 - Some do `round()`, others do `floor()` or `ceil()`
- If a photo seems to have *both* kinds of quantization, it's probably a fake: e.g., a composite from images taken by different cameras!




[Agarwal and Farid, "JPEG Dimples", 2017]

Detecting duplicated image regions



- Traditional inpainting methods copy-and-paste image patches.
- Detect near-duplicated patches.
- But sensitive to postprocessing operations, like compression.



← amount of JPEG compression


[Popescu and Farid, 2004]

Strategy #3: learned anomaly detection

Instead of hand-crafting cues, can we learn to detect “anomalous” images, and flag suspicious images?

[Huh, Liu et al., “Image Splice Detection via Learned Self-Consistency”, 2018]







Inconsistent

Consistent

Predicting metadata consistency




CameraMake: Apple
CameraModel: iPhone 4s
ColorSpace: sRGB
ExifImageLength: 2448
ExifImageWidth: 3264
Flash: Flash did not fire
FocalLength: 107/2
WhiteBalance: Auto
ExposureTime: 1/2208
...



CameraMake: NIKON CORPORATION
CameraModel: NIKON D90
ColorSpace: sRGB
ExifImageLength: 2848
ExifImageWidth: 4288
Flash: Flash did not fire
FocalLength: 18/796
WhiteBalance: Auto
ExposureTime: 1/30
...

Same white balance?






Input


Photo source: TheOnion.com



Prediction




Ground truth




Input

Photo source: TheOnion.com



Prediction




Ground truth

Photo source: TheOnion.com




Input



(Hays & Efros 2009)



Prediction




Ground truth

Strategy #4: supervised learning




[Wang et al., "Image Splice Detection via Learned Self-Consistency", 2018]






Photoshop Face-Aware Liquify tutorial. Source: https://youtu.be/5Qqv_C6iVvQ?t=86




Real-or-fake classification




What moved where?



Manipulated Image





Dilated ResNet



Warp Prediction

What moved where?



Modified

Original

Optical Flow

Modified

Original

Optical Flow



Manipulated Photo



Flow Prediction



Suggested “Undo”



Original Photo



Manipulated vs. Original



Undo vs. Original



Manipulated Photo



Warp Prediction



Suggested "Undo"



Original Photo



Suggested "Undo"



Manipulated Photo

AI-generated images



“Catholic Pope Francis wearing Balenciaga puffy jacket in drill rap music video, throwing up gang signs with hands, taken using a Canon EOS R camera with a 50mm f/1.8 lens, f/2.2 aperture, shutter speed 1/200s, ISO 100 and natural light, Full Body, Hyper Realistic Photography, Cinematic, Cinema, Hyperdetail, UHD, Color Correction, hdr, color grading, hyper realistic CG animation --ar 4:5 --upbeta --q 2 --v 5.”

AI-generated spam



Jeongsoo Park

Examples from Jeongsoo Park's Facebook feed

Real or fake?




Detector	Result
NoDown (2021)	0.1% AI-Generated Likelihood
HIFI (2023)	36.9% AI-Generated Likelihood
CLIP-ViT (2023)	0.0% AI-Generated Likelihood
GLFF (2024)	100.0% AI-Generated Likelihood
NPR (2024)	10.6% AI-Generated Likelihood
AIDE (2024)	9.5% AI-Generated Likelihood
Effort (2025)	57.2% AI-Generated Likelihood

[Li, Zhang, Sun, Qi, Lyu, "DeepFake-o-meter", 2024]

Downsides of easy image generation


Misinformation and abuse



Raising doubt in real images



AI spam



Source: "Insane Facebook AI slop" [@FacebookAIslop](#)

Generalization in AI-generated image detection

Training



ProGAN



DALL·E 2



VQ-GAN



Midjourney v5

Generalization in AI-generated image detection

Training



ProGAN



DALL·E 2



VQ-GAN



Midjourney v5

Test on the *same* generators?
→ Detectors generalize pretty well.

Test on out-of-distribution generators?
→ Not always. But intriguingly there is *some* generalization!

Generalization in AI-generated image detection

Training



ProGAN



DALL·E 2



VQ-GAN



Midjourney v5

Testing



FLUX.1




DALL·E 3




Imagen v3




Ideogram



[github.com/anon123/
mycoolgenerator](https://github.com/anon123/mycoolgenerator)



[github.com/bot15/
deepfakeface](https://github.com/bot15/deepfakeface)




[github.com/putin2/
electiondeepfake](https://github.com/putin2/electiondeepfake)

...


"DIY" models

One problem: the data


Datasets have lots of images.




But relatively few *models*.



Model sharing communities



Can we automatically acquire fake images from open source latent diffusion models?



[Park & Owens. "Community Forensics: Using Thousands of Generators to Train Fake Image Detectors "... out soon!



Jeongsoo Park

What are these models?

playgroundai/**playground-v2.5-1024px-aesthetic** like 695 Follow Playground 187


Text-to-Image Diffusers Safetensors StableDiffusionXLPipeline playground Inference Endpoints arxiv:2206.00364 arxiv:2402.17245 License: playground-v2dot5-community

Model card Files Community 32 Train Deploy Use this model

Edit model card

Playground v2.5 – 1024px Aesthetic Model

This repository contains a model that generates highly aesthetic images of resolution 1024x1024, as well as portrait and landscape aspect ratios. You can use the model with Hugging Face Diffusers.



Downloads last month 100,506

Inference API Cold

Text-to-Image Examples

Your sentence here... Compute

</> View Code Maximize

Model tree for playgroundai/playground-v2.5-1...

Adapters 10 models

Spaces using playgroundai/playground-v2.5... 67

playgroundai/playground-v2.5 TIGER-Lab/GenAI-Arena Nymbo/image_gen_supaqueue ksort/K-Sort-Arena ChenoAi/Playground-v1.0 mukaist/image Azure99/blossom-playground-v2.5 Azure99/playground-v2.5 allknowingroger/Image-Models-Test348 poulpy5/Kroqbot2 cavargas10/Text-Img-UTPL AZLABS/Tester + 55 Spaces

prompthero/**openjourney-v4** like 1,23k

Text-to-Image Diffusers Safetensors StableDiffusionPipeline stable-diffusion Inference Endpoints License: creativeml-openrail-m

Model card Files Community 64 Train Deploy Use this model

Edit model card

Openjourney v4


Trained on +124k Midjourney v4 images, by [PromptHero](#)

Trained on Stable Diffusion v1.5 using +124000 images, 12400 steps, 4 epochs +32 training hours.

Openjourney-v4 prompts

Pss... "mdjrny-v4 style" is not necessary anymore (yay!)

Want to learn how to train Openjourney? Join our course



Downloads last month 44,112

Inference Examples

Text-to-Image

This model does not have enough activity to be deployed to Inference API (serverless) yet. Increase its social visibility and check back later, or deploy to [Inference Endpoints \(dedicated\)](#) instead.

Spaces using prompthero/openjourney-v4 100

Yntec/ToyWorld Yntec/PrintingPress Nymbo/image_gen_supaqueue phenixrhyder/NSFW-ToyWorld Yntec/blitz_diffusion Manjushri/OJ-V4-CPU John6666/Diffusion80XX4sg PeepDaSlan9/B2BMGMT_Diffusion60XX phenixrhyder/PrintingPress Daniela-C/6x_Image_diffusion John6666/PrintingPress4 John6666/hfd_test_nostopbutton + 88 Spaces

What are these models?

MirageML/fantasy-sword

like 13 Follow Mirage 27

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Model card Files Community 4

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Fantasy Sword on Stable Diffusion via Dreambooth

This the Stable Diffusion model fine-tuned the Fantasy Sword concept taught to Stable Diffusion with Dreambooth. It can be used by modifying the `instance_prompt`: **a photo of fantasy_sword**

Run on [Mirage](#)

Run this model and explore text-to-3D on [Mirage!](#)

Here are is a sample output for this model:



Downloads last month 15

Inference Examples

Text-to-Image

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Space using MirageML/fantasy-sword 1

MirageML/fantasy-sword

monadical-labs/minecraft-skin-generator-sdxl

like 10 Follow Monadical Labs 15

Text-to-Image Diffusers Safetensors English StableDiffusionXLPipeline minecraft skins gaming stable diffusion

stable diffusion xl Inference Endpoints License: openrail

Model card Files Community

Train Deploy Use this model

Edit model card

Minecraft Skin Generator XL

Monadical is pleased to announce the official release of the Minecraft Skin Generator XL model. We had previously released the [Minecraft Skin Generator](#) model based upon Stable Diffusion 2.

This new model offers significant improvements over the last generation of models.

Key Features

1. Upgrade to Stable Diffusion XL - Our model is now based upon the Stable Diffusion XL model, which greatly improves the quality of generated skins when compared to previous models.

2. Transparent Layer Support - The new model now supports the transparency layer in the hair and helmet section of the skin.

Examples

'Kelly Kapoor from the TV show "The Office"'



Downloads last month 16,584

Inference Examples

Text-to-Image

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Spaces using monadical-labs/minecraft-ski... 11

Nick088/Stable_Diffusion_Finetuned_Minecraft_S...

Nymbo/image_gen_supaqueue

soiz/Stable_Diffusion_Finetuned_Minecraft_Skin_...

Loxera/monadical-labs-minecraft-skin-generator-sdxl

boisterous/minecraft-skin-generator

gege002/monadical-labs-minecraft-skin-generator-sdxl

dadadaadadadad/monadical-labs-minecraft-skin-gene...

K00B404/image_gen_supaqueue_game_assets

ExynoxAI/MineSkin_Magic

Issef/test

ThatBlondeGuy/Stable_Diffusion_Finetuned_Mine...

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

like 13 Follow Mirage 27

Text-to-Image Diffusers Safetensors English StableDiffusionPipeline stable-diffusion Inference Endpoints


License: creativeml-openrail-m

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stable diffusion xl Inference Endpoints License: openrail

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Inference Examples


Text-to-Image

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K00B404/image_gen_supaqueue_game_assets
ExynoxAI/MineSkin_Magic
issef/test
ThatBlondeGuy/Stable_Diffusion_Finetuned_Mine...


Automatically sampled images



Sampled images from 4763 LDM text-to-image models from Hugging Face


The *Community Forensics* dataset

Systematically collected diffusion models




4763 LDM text-to-image models from Hugging Face

Other open models



Commercial models




Real images


from 11 datasets, w/ paired prompts



LAION



COCO




FFHQ

...

2.8M fake images
from 4804 models.

What happens when you train on thousands of generators?



Challenges on the horizon

- Lots of ways to make fake images.
- If we know what methods were used, it's much easier.
- But it's hard to capture all of them!
- False positives are still a huge problem.
- So are postprocessing operations, like cropping and compression.
- Need methods that can handle unseen models.
- Alternative approaches: watermarking, signatures, etc.

Open-ended discussion

- How susceptible are people to fake images?
- Is there any hope of detecting “most” fake images?
- Under what situations might it be important and/or feasible?
- How do we deal with false positives?

Thank you!