

CS 5430

Information-Flow Control

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
Information Flow Control

- We are given:
 - a lattice $\langle L, \sqsubseteq \rangle$ of labels,
 - a program, and
 - an *environment* Γ that maps variables to labels.
- Threat model: Attacker knows L inputs, knows program code, and can observe L outputs.




Information Flow Control

- Executions of the program should cause only allowed flows (with respect to the lattice).
- The program is expected to satisfy noninterference (NI):
 - Different H inputs, keeping L inputs fixed, should not cause different L outputs.



Information Flow Control

- How can we check that a program satisfies NI?
- Design an *enforcement mechanism*:
 - takes as an input the program, and
 - outputs whether that program satisfies NI.



Enforcing NI

- Static mechanism
 - Checking program before execution.
- Dynamic mechanism
 - Checking program during execution.
- Hybrid mechanism
 - Combination of static and dynamic.

Static enforcement mechanism

```
x := 2;
```

```
y := x+z;
```

```
if y>0 then
```

```
  z := 10;
```

```
  x := x-1;
```

```
else
```

```
  z := w
```

Static enforcement mechanism

```
x := 2;
```

```
y := x+z;
```

```
if y>0 then
```

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z := 10;
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x := x-1;
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else
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z := w
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Static enforcement mechanism

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x := 2;
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if y>0 then
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  z := 10;
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else
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  z := w
```

Static enforcement mechanism

```
x := 2;  
y := x+z;
```

```
if y>0 then  
    z := 10;  
    x := x-1;  
else  
    z := w
```

Static enforcement mechanism

```
x := 2;  
y := x+z;  
if y>0 then  
    z := 10;  
    x := x-1;  
else  
    z := w
```


Programs are written using this syntax:

$e ::= x \mid n \mid e_1 + e_2 \mid \dots$

$c ::= x := e$
 $\mid \text{if } e \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2$
 $\mid \text{while } e \text{ do } c$
 $\mid c_1; c_2$

Checking an assignment

Assignments cause **explicit** flows of values.



It satisfies NI, if $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$.

Checking an assignment

If $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$, then it satisfies NI.

$\mathbf{x} := \mathbf{y}$

Examples for confidentiality

$\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ is L.

$\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$ is L.

Does this assignment satisfy NI?



$\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ is H.

$\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$ is L.

Does this assignment satisfy NI?



Checking an assignment


$$\mathbf{x} := \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{z}$$

It satisfies NI, if $\Gamma(\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{z}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$.

It satisfies NI, if $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqcup \Gamma(\mathbf{z}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$.

Checking an if-statement


`if y>0 then x:=1 else x:=2`



Conditional commands (e.g., if-statements and while-statements) cause **implicit** flows of values.

Context


`if y>0 then x:=1 else x:=2`



They reveal
information about
 $y>0$.

Context label *ctx*


if $y > 0$ then $x := 1$ else $x := 2$



Their *ctx* is $\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$.

Context label ctx


`if y>0 then  $x:=1$  else  $x:=2$`



Check if $ctx \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$,
where $ctx = \Gamma(\mathbf{y})$.

Context label ctx

if $y > 0$ then $x := e$ else $x := 2$



Checking an if-statement

If $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqcup \Gamma(\mathbf{z}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$, then it satisfies NI.

if $y > 0$ then $x := z + 1$ else $x := z + 2$

Examples for confidentiality

$\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ is L.

$\Gamma(\mathbf{y}), \Gamma(\mathbf{z})$ are L.

Does this if-statement satisfy NI?



$\Gamma(\mathbf{x}), \Gamma(\mathbf{z})$ are H.

$\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$ is L.

Does this if-statement satisfy NI?



Checking an if-statement

```
if z>0 then  
  if y>0 then x:=1 else x:=2  
else
```

x:=3

Its *ctx* is $\Gamma(\mathbf{z})$.

Their *ctx*
is $\Gamma(\mathbf{z}) \sqcup \Gamma(\mathbf{y})$.

Checking an if-statement

```
if z>0 then  
  if y>0 then x:=1 else x:=2  
else
```

x:=3

Check if $ctx \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$,
where $ctx = \Gamma(\mathbf{z}) \sqcup \Gamma(\mathbf{y})$.

Check if $ctx \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$,
where $ctx = \Gamma(\mathbf{z})$.

A type system for information flow control

- Static
- Fixed environment Γ
- Labels as types
 - Label $\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ is the type of $\mathbf{x}$.
- Typing rules for all possible commands.
- **Goal:** type-correctness $\Rightarrow$ noninterference

We are already familiar with type systems!

Example of typing rule from Java:

`x + y : int`

assuming **`x : int`** and **`y : int`**

Typing rules for expressions

Judgement $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell$

- According to environment Γ , expression $\mathbf{e}$ has type (i.e., label) ℓ .

Typing rules for expressions

Expression: $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e+e'} : \ell \sqcup \ell'$
assuming $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell$ and $\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e'} : \ell'$

Inference rule:

Premises	$\longrightarrow$	$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell$	$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e'} : \ell'$
Conclusion	$\longrightarrow$	$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e+e'} : \ell \sqcup \ell'$	

Typing rules for expressions

Constant:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{n} : \perp}$$

Bottom: the
least restrictive
label.

Variable:

$$\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = \ell}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x} : \ell}$$

Example

- Let $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H$.
- What is the type of $\mathbf{x+y+1}$?
- *Proof tree:*

$$\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L$$

$$\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H$$

Example

- Let $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H$.
- What is the type of $\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y} + 1$?
- *Proof tree:*

$$\boxed{\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = \ell}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x} : \ell}}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x} : L} \quad \frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} : H}$$

Example

- Let $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H$.
- What is the type of $\mathbf{x+y+1}$?
- *Proof tree:*

$$\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x} : L}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} : H}$$

$$\boxed{\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{n} : \perp}}$$

$$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{1} : L$$

Example

- Let $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H$.
- What is the type of $\mathbf{x+y+1}$?
- *Proof tree:*

$$\boxed{\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell \quad \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e}' : \ell'}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e+e'} : \ell \sqcup \ell'}}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x} : L} \quad \frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} : H} \quad \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{1} : L}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{x + y + 1} : H}$$

Typing rules for commands

Judgement $\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{c}$

- According to environment Γ , and context label ctx , command $\mathbf{c}$ is type correct.

Assignment rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell \quad \ell \sqcup ctx \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{x} := \mathbf{e}}$$

If-rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell \quad \Gamma, \ell \sqcup ctx \vdash \mathbf{c1} \quad \Gamma, \ell \sqcup ctx \vdash \mathbf{c2}}{\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{if\ e\ then\ c1\ else\ c2}}$$

If-rule (example)

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} > 0 : \Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \quad \frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, \Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqcup L \vdash \mathbf{x} := 1} \quad \frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, \Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqcup L \vdash \mathbf{x} := 2}}{\Gamma, L \vdash \mathbf{if} \ \mathbf{y} > 0 \ \mathbf{then} \ \mathbf{x} := 1 \ \mathbf{else} \ \mathbf{x} := 2}$$

What is the relation between $\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$, such that the above judgement can be proved?

If-rule (example)

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} > 0 : \Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \quad \frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, \Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqcup L \vdash \mathbf{x} := 1} \quad \frac{\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, \Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqcup L \vdash \mathbf{x} := 2}}{\Gamma, L \vdash \mathbf{if} \ \mathbf{y} > 0 \ \mathbf{then} \ \mathbf{x} := 1 \ \mathbf{else} \ \mathbf{x} := 2}$$

What is the relation between $\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$, such that the above judgement can be proved?

If-rule (example)

$$\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})$$

$$\Gamma, L \vdash \text{if } y > 0 \text{ then } \mathbf{x} := 1 \text{ else } \mathbf{x} := 2$$

What is the relation between $\Gamma(\mathbf{x})$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y})$, such that the above judgement can be proved?

If-rule (example)

$$\Gamma, \Gamma(\mathbf{z}) \sqcup L \vdash \text{if } y > 0 \text{ then } \mathbf{x} := 1 \\ \text{else } \mathbf{x} := 2$$
$$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{z} > 0 : \Gamma(\mathbf{z})$$
$$\Gamma, \Gamma(\mathbf{z}) \sqcup L \vdash \mathbf{x} := 3$$

$$\Gamma, L \vdash \text{if } \mathbf{z} > 0 \text{ then } \{\text{if } y > 0 \text{ then } \mathbf{x} := 1 \text{ else } \mathbf{x} := 2\} \\ \text{else } \{\mathbf{x} := 3\}$$

while-rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \ell \quad \Gamma, \ell \sqcup ctx \vdash \mathbf{c}}{\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{while\ e\ do\ c}}$$

Sequence rule

$$\frac{\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{c1} \quad \Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{c2}}{\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{c1 ; c2}}$$

Sequence rule (example)

$$\Gamma, \ell \sqcup \Gamma(\mathbf{e}) \vdash \mathbf{x} := 1 \quad \Gamma, \ell \sqcup \Gamma(\mathbf{e}) \vdash \mathbf{x} := 2$$

$$\Gamma, \ell \vdash \text{if } \mathbf{e} \text{ then } \{\mathbf{x} := 1\} \\ \text{else } \{\mathbf{x} := 2\}$$
$$\Gamma, \ell \vdash \mathbf{x} := 3$$



$$\Gamma, \ell \vdash \text{if } \mathbf{e} \text{ then } \{\mathbf{x} := 1\} \text{ else } \{\mathbf{x} := 2\}; \mathbf{x} := 3$$

Theorem

Type correctness $\Rightarrow$ Noninterference


- If a program does not satisfy NI, then type checking fails.
 - Example, where $\Gamma(\mathbf{x}) = L$ and $\Gamma(\mathbf{y}) = H$:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} : H \quad H \sqcup L \subseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, L \vdash \mathbf{x} := \mathbf{y}}$$

- But, if type checking fails, then the program might or might not satisfy NI.

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{y} * 0 : H \quad H \sqcup L \subseteq \Gamma(\mathbf{x})}{\Gamma, L \vdash \mathbf{x} := \mathbf{y} * 0}$$




Soundness and completeness

The type system is *sound*:

Type correctness $\Rightarrow$ Noninterference

but not *complete*:

Noninterference $\not\Rightarrow$ Type correctness

This type system has false positives.



Can we build a complete mechanism?

- Is there an enforcement mechanism for information flow control that has no false positives?
 - A mechanism that rejects only programs that do not satisfy noninterference?
- No! [Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003]
 - “The general problem of confidentiality for programs is undecidable.”
 - The halting problem can be reduced to the information flow control problem.
 - Example:
if $h > 0$ then c ; $l := 2$ else skip
 - If we could precisely decide whether this program is secure, we could decide whether **c** terminates!

But we can build a mechanism with fewer false positives.

NEXT LECTURES

This type system does not prevent leaks through termination channels.

Example of termination channel:

```
while h != 0 do skip;  
l := 2
```

where **h** is a high variable and **l** is a low variable.

- The program leaks over termination channel.
 - It does not satisfy *termination sensitive* noninterference.
- But, the program is type correct.
 - It satisfies (vanilla) noninterference.

A solution

- To prevent covert channels due to infinite loops,
- strengthen the typing rule for while-statement, to allow only **low** guard expression:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{e} : \underline{\mathbf{L}} \quad \Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{c}}{\Gamma, ctx \vdash \mathbf{while\ e\ do\ c}}$$

- Now, type correctness implies termination sensitive NI.
- But, the enforcement mechanism becomes overly conservative.
- Another solution?