




Lecture 28: Trusted Hardware


CS 5430

5/9/2018

Trusted Platform Module (TPM)




What's in a TPM?



Volatile Memory

- PCR Banks
- In-use keys
- Sessions
- Etc.



Platform Configuration Register (PCR)

- Contain hashes of programs
- Modification: TPM2_Extend()


$$PCR_{new} = H(PCR_{old} || data_{new})$$

- Attestation: TPM2_Quote()



Non-Volatile Memory

- Platform Seed
- Endorsement Seed
- Storage Seed
- Monotonic Counters
- Etc.



Seeds used for attestation, etc

- Endorsement seed used to derive endorsement keys (EKs)
- Manufacturer attests validity of EKs
- EKs used to attest other TPM-derived values including
 - other keys: TPM2_Certify()
 - audit logs: TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest()



Binding and Sealing



BitLocker

BitLocker


Enter the password to unlock this drive

|


Press the Insert key to see the password as you type.




ARM TrustZone



Android Full Disk Encryption



Android Full Disk Encryption




Android FDE's KDF

SGX




Enclaves

- Isolated computing environments
- Access hardware-derived keys
- Provide
- Provide local and remote attestation




Isolation



Sealing




Attestation



Vulnerabilities

Trustworthiness of Trusted Code




Side Channels

Algorithm 1 Fixed-window exponentiation

Input: $a, e, N \in \mathbb{N}$

Output: $x \leftarrow a^e \pmod N$

- 1: Precompute $g[i] \leftarrow a^i$ for $1 \leq i \leq 2^k$
- 2: Let $e = (e_j, e_{j-1}, \dots, e_1, e_0)$ be the base 2^k representation of the exponent e with $e_j \neq 0$
- 3: Initialize $x \leftarrow e_j$
- 4: **for** $i \leftarrow j-1$ **down to** 0 **do**
- 5: $x \leftarrow x^{2^k} \pmod N$
- 6: **if** $e_i \neq 0$ **then**
- 7: $x \leftarrow g[e_i] \cdot x \pmod N$
- 8: **end if**
- 9: **end for**



Comparison of Hardware Solutions

Adversary	Attack	TPM	TrustZone	SGX
OS	direct probing	n/a (OS measured)	access checks on TLB misses	Access checks on TLB misses
OS	page faults	n/a (OS measured)	secure page tables	X
OS	cache timing	n/a (OS measured)	X	X
Another container	direct probing	n/a	n/a (secure world trusted)	access checks on TLB misses
Another container	cache timing	n/a	n/a (secure world trusted)	X
Peripheral	DMA	X	bus bounces accesses	IOMMU bounces DMA
Physical attacker	Physical DRAM	X	n/a (on-chip SRAM only)	memory encryption



So where are we?

The Bigger Picture

Attacks
are perpetrated by
threats
that inflict
harm
by exploiting
vulnerabilities
which are controlled by
countermeasures.


Threats

A principal that has potential to cause harm to assets



- **Adversary** or **attacker**: a human threat, motivated and capable
- Sometimes humans aren't malicious: accidents happen
- Sometimes non-humans cause harm: floods, earthquakes, power outage, hardware failure




Threats





Vulnerabilities



Attacks








Return-Oriented
Programming
is a lot like a ransom
note, BUT instead of cutting
out letters from magazines,
YOU ARE CUTTING OUT
instructions from text
segments




Functional Goals -> Harms -> Security
Goals

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

Countermeasures



And now...



SECURITY TIPS

(PRINT OUT THIS LIST AND KEEP IT IN YOUR BANK SAFE DEPOSIT BOX.)

- DON'T CLICK LINKS TO WEBSITES
- USE PRIME NUMBERS IN YOUR PASSWORD
- CHANGE YOUR PASSWORD MANAGER MONTHLY
- HOLD YOUR BREATH WHILE CROSSING THE BORDER
- INSTALL A SECURE FONT
- USE A 2-FACTOR SMOKE DETECTOR
- CHANGE YOUR MAIDEN NAME REGULARLY
- PUT STRANGE USB DRIVES IN A BAG OF RICE OVERNIGHT
- USE SPECIAL CHARACTERS LIKE & AND %
- ONLY READ CONTENT PUBLISHED THROUGH TOR.COM
- USE A BURNER'S PHONE
- GET AN SSL CERTIFICATE AND STORE IT IN A SAFE PLACE
- IF A BORDER GUARD ASKS TO EXAMINE YOUR LAPTOP, YOU HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THEM TO A CHESS GAME FOR YOUR SOUL.