


Meet BFT

A hierarchy of failure models



Weird Things Happen in Distributed Systems

Weird Things Happen in Distributed Systems

Biting the hand that feeds what IT

The

LAT Home | My LATimes | Print Edition | All Sections

Los Angeles Times | Travel

Hardware | Software | Music & Media | Comm

PCs & Chips | Servers | Storage |

You are here: [LAT Home](#) > [Travel](#) > [Articles](#) > [At LAX, computer glitch delays 20,00...](#)

Reg Hardware
Channel Register
Whitepapers

News Tools
Newsletters & Feeds
Reg Mobile

NEWS | POLITICS | OPINIONS | LOCAL | SPORTS | ARTS & LIVING

SEARCH: go

washingtonpost.com > Technology

TechCrunch About | More Headlines

Systemwide Gmail Outage

Michael Arrington

[The Register](#) » [Hardware](#) » [Data Networking](#) »

Dublin airport was crippled b

Flight into terror tedium

By [Joe Fay](#) → [More by this author](#)

Published Friday 18th July 2008 14:43 GMT

[How IT Management Can "Green" the Data Center](#)

An air traffic control fault that brought Dublin a intermittently flakey network card

Travel

Los Angeles
Hawaii
Mexico
Europe
Las Vegas
Santa Barbara
Orange County
San Diego
San Francisco
Napa Wine Country
California's Central Coast
Asia & India
Great Britain
Latin America & Caribbean
Pacific & Australia
More Destinations

FREQUENT FLIER | HOMELAND SECURITY

At LAX, computer glitch delays 20,000 passengers

Computer malfunction delays passengers on planes and in halls, slowing processing through customs system, which also holds a list of people more likely to be searched, failed, stranding 6,000.

By Karen Kaplan, Rong-Gong Lin II and Ari B. Bloomekatz, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers

11:42 PM PDT, August 11, 2007



Related Stories

Computer glitch causes

More than 20,000 international passengers were stranded for hours at [Los Angeles International Airport](#) on Saturday, waiting for airplanes and in packed customs halls while a malfunctioning computer system prevented U.S. officials from processing the travelers' entry into the country.


Editor's note: Have you been affected by delays at LAX recently? Share your story on our [Travel Message Boards](#).

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection computer system went down around 2 p.m., forcing some planes to sit on the tarmac so long that workers had to refuel them to keep their power up.

Terminating Reliable Broadcast

- Validity** If the sender is correct and broadcasts a message m , then all correct processes eventually deliver m
- Agreement** If a correct process delivers a message m , then all correct processes eventually deliver m
- Integrity** Every correct process delivers at most one message, and if it delivers $m \neq SF$, then some process must have broadcast m
- Termination** Every correct process eventually delivers some message

Arbitrary failures with message authentication



- Process can send conflicting messages to different receivers
- Messages signed with unforgeable signatures

Valid messages

A **valid** message m has the following form:

in round 1:

$m : s_{id}$ (m is signed by the sender)

in round $r > 1$, if received by p from q :

$m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_r$ where

- ① $p_1 = \text{sender}; p_r = q$
- ② p_1, \dots, p_r are distinct from each other and from p
- ③ message has not been tampered with

AFMA: The Idea

- A correct process p discards all non-valid messages it receives
- If a message is valid,
 - it “extracts” the value from the message
 - it relays the message, with its own signature appended
- At round $f+1$:
 - if it extracted exactly one message, p delivers it
 - otherwise, p delivers SF

AFMA: The Protocol

Initialization for process p :

if $p = \text{sender}$ and p wishes to broadcast m then
 extracted := relay := $\{m\}$

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

for each $s \in \text{relay}$

 send $s : p$ to all

receive round k messages from all processes

relay := \emptyset

for each valid message received $s = m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_k$

 if $m \notin \text{extracted}$ then

 extracted := extracted $\cup \{m\}$

 relay := relay $\cup \{s\}$

At the end of round $f+1$

if $\exists m$ such that extracted = $\{m\}$ then

 deliver m

else deliver SF

Termination

Initialization for process p :

if $p = \text{sender}$ and p wishes to broadcast m then
 extracted := relay := $\{m\}$

Process p in round k , $1 \leq k \leq f+1$

 for each $s \in \text{relay}$
 send $s : p$ to all
 receive round k messages from all processes
 relay := \emptyset
 for each valid message received $s = m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_k$
 if $m \notin \text{extracted}$ then
 extracted := extracted $\cup \{m\}$
 relay := relay $\cup \{s\}$

At the end of round $f+1$

 if $\exists m$ such that extracted = $\{m\}$ then
 deliver m
 else deliver SF

In round $f+1$, every correct process delivers either m or SF and then halts

Agreement

Initialization for process p :

if $p = \text{sender}$ and p wishes to broadcast m then
extracted := relay := $\{m\}$

Process p in round k , $1 \leq k \leq f+1$

for each $s \in \text{relay}$

send $s : p$ to all

receive round k messages from all processes

relay := \emptyset

for each valid message received $s = m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_k$

if $m \notin \text{extracted}$ then

extracted := extracted $\cup \{m\}$

relay := relay $\cup \{s\}$

At the end of round $f+1$

if $\exists m$ such that extracted = $\{m\}$ then

deliver m

else deliver SF

Lemma. If a correct process extracts m , then every correct process eventually extracts m

Proof

Let r be the earliest round in which some correct process extracts m . Let that process be p .

- if p is the sender, then in round 1 p sends a valid message to all.

All correct processes extract that message in round 1

- If $r \leq f$, p will send a valid message

$$m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_r : p$$

in round $r+1 \leq f+1$ and every correct process will extract it in round $r+1 \leq f+1$

- If $r = f+1$, p has received in round $f+1$ a message

$$m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_{f+1}$$

- Each p_j , $1 \leq j \leq f+1$ has signed and relayed a message in round $j-1 < f+1$

- At most f faulty processes – one p_j is correct and has extracted m before p

CONTRADICTION

Agreement follows directly, since all correct process extract the same set of messages

Validity

Initialization for process p :

if $p = \text{sender}$ and p wishes to broadcast m then
 $\text{extracted} := \text{relay} := \{m\}$

Process p in round k , $1 \leq k \leq f+1$


 for each $s \in \text{relay}$
 send $s : p$ to all
 receive round k messages from all processes
 $\text{relay} := \emptyset$
 for each valid message received $s = m : p_1 : p_2 : \dots : p_k$
 if $m \notin \text{extracted}$ then
 $\text{extracted} := \text{extracted} \cup \{m\}$
 $\text{relay} := \text{relay} \cup \{s\}$

At the end of round $f+1$

 if $\exists m$ such that $\text{extracted} = \{m\}$ then
 deliver m
 else deliver SF

From Agreement and the observation that the sender, if correct, delivers its own message.

TRB for arbitrary failures



Srikanth, T.K., Toueg S.

Simulating Authenticated
Broadcasts to Derive Simple
Fault-Tolerant Algorithms

Distributed Computing 2 (2),
80-94

AF: The Idea

- ① Identify the essential properties of message authentication that made AFMA work
- ① Implement these properties without using signatures

AF: The Approach



accept
≠
deliver!

- ① Introduce two primitives

broadcast(p, m, i) (executed by p in round i)

accept(p, m, i) (executed by q in round $j \geq i$)

- ① Give axiomatic definitions of broadcast and accept
 - just state some properties we assume of them!
- ① Derive an algorithm that solves TRB for AF using these primitives
- ① Show an implementation of these primitives that does not use signatures

Properties of broadcast and accept

- **Correctness** If a correct process p executes $\text{broadcast}(p, m, i)$ in round i , then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ in round i
- **Unforgeability** If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ in round $j \geq i$, and p is correct, then p did in fact execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, i)$ in round i
- **Relay** If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ in round $j \geq i$, then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ by round $j+1$

AF: The Protocol – 1

sender s in round 0:

0: **extract** m

sender s in round 1:

1: **broadcast**($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: **if** p extracted m in round $k-1$ **and** $p \neq$ sender **then**

4: **broadcast**(p, m, k)

5: **if** p has executed at least k **accept**(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k
 (where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and
 (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$) **and** p has not previously extracted m **then**

6: **extract** m

7: **if** $k = f+1$ **then**

8: **if** in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m **then**

9: **deliver** m

10: **else deliver** SF

11: **halt**

Termination

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: broadcast($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq$ sender then

4: broadcast(p, m, k)

5: if p has executed at least k accept(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

In round $f+1$, every correct process delivers either m or SF and then halts

Validity

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: broadcast($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq$ sender then

4: broadcast(p, m, k)

5: if p has executed at least k accept(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

- A correct sender executes broadcast($s, m, 1$) in round 1
- By CORRECTNESS, all correct processes execute accept($s, m, 1$) in round 1 and extract m
- In order to extract a different message m' , a process must execute accept($s, m', 1$) in some round $i \leq f + 1$
- By UNFORGEABILITY, and because s is correct, no correct process can extract $m' \neq m$
- All correct processes will deliver m

Agreement - 1

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: broadcast($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq \text{sender}$ then

4: broadcast(p, m, k)

5: if p has executed at least k accept(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

Lemma

If a correct process extracts m , then every correct process eventually extracts m

Agreement - 1

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: $\text{broadcast}(s, m, 1)$

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq \text{sender}$ then

4: $\text{broadcast}(p, m, k)$

5: if p has executed at least k $\text{accept}(q_i, m, j_i) \ 1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

Proof

Let r be the earliest round in which some correct process extracts m . Let that process be p .

- if $r=0$, then $p=s$ and p will execute $\text{broadcast}(s, m, 1)$ in round 1. By CORRECTNESS, all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(s, m, 1)$ in round 1 and extract m

Lemma

If a correct process extracts m , then every correct process eventually extracts m

Agreement - 1

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: broadcast($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq$ sender then

4: broadcast(p, m, k)

5: if p has executed at least k accept(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

Proof

Let r be the earliest round in which some correct process extracts m . Let that process be p .

- if $r=0$, then $p=s$ and p will execute broadcast($s, m, 1$) in round 1. By CORRECTNESS, all correct processes will execute accept($s, m, 1$) in round 1 and extract m
- if $r > 0$, the sender is faulty. Since p has extracted m in round r , p has accepted at least r triples with properties (i), (ii), and (iii) by round r

Lemma

If a correct process extracts m , then every correct process eventually extracts m

Agreement - 1

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: broadcast($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq$ sender then

4: broadcast(p, m, k)

5: if p has executed at least k accept(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

Lemma

If a correct process extracts m , then every correct process eventually extracts m

Proof

Let r be the earliest round in which some correct process extracts m . Let that process be p .

- if $r=0$, then $p=s$ and p will execute broadcast($s, m, 1$) in round 1. By CORRECTNESS, all correct processes will execute accept($s, m, 1$) in round 1 and extract m
- if $r > 0$, the sender is faulty. Since p has extracted m in round r , p has accepted at least r triples with properties (i), (ii), and (iii) by round r
 - $r \leq f$ By RELAY, all correct processes will have accepted those r triples by round $r+1$
 - p will execute broadcast($p, m, r+1$) in round $r+1$
 - By CORRECTNESS, any correct process other than p, q_1, q_2, \dots, q_r will have accepted $r+1$ triples (q_k, m, j_k), $1 \leq j_k \leq r+1$, by round $r+1$
 - q_1, q_2, \dots, q_r, p are all distinct
 - every correct process other than q_1, q_2, \dots, q_r, p will extract m
 - p already extracted m ; what about q_1, q_2, \dots, q_r ?

Agreement - 2

sender s in round 0:

0: extract m

sender s in round 1:

1: broadcast($s, m, 1$)

Process p in round $k, 1 \leq k \leq f+1$

2: if p extracted m in round $k-1$ and $p \neq$ sender then

4: broadcast(p, m, k)

5: if p has executed at least k accept(q_i, m, j_i) $1 \leq i \leq k$ in rounds 1 through k

(where (i) q_i distinct from each other and from p , (ii) one q_i is s , and (iii) $1 \leq j_i \leq k$)

and p has not previously extracted m then

6: extract m

7: if $k = f+1$ then

8: if in the entire execution p has extracted exactly one m then

9: deliver m

10: else deliver SF

11: halt

Claim: q_1, q_2, \dots, q_r are all faulty

> Suppose q_k were correct

> p has accepted(q_k, m, j_k) in round $j_k \leq r$

> By UNFORGEABILITY, q_k executed broadcast(q_k, m, j_k) in round j_k

> q_k extracted m in round $j_{k-1} < r$

CONTRADICTION (r was supposed to be the earliest round!)

□ **Case 2:** $r = f+1$

□ Since there are at most f faulty processes, some process q_l in q_1, q_2, \dots, q_{f+1} is correct

□ By UNFORGEABILITY, q_l executed broadcast(q_l, m, j_l) in round $j_l \leq r$

□ q_l has extracted m in round $j_{l-1} < f+1$

CONTRADICTION

Properties of broadcast and accept

- **Correctness** If a correct process p executes $\text{broadcast}(p, m, i)$ in round i , then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ in round i
- **Unforgeability** If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ in round $j \geq i$, and p is correct, then p did in fact execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, i)$ in round i
- **Relay** If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ in round $j \geq i$, then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, i)$ by round $j+1$

Implementing broadcast and accept

- ① A process that wants to broadcast m , does so through a series of **witnesses**
 - Sends m to all
 - Each correct process becomes a witness by relaying m to all
- ① If a process receives enough witness confirmations, it accepts m

Can we rely on witnesses?

- Only if not too many faulty processes!
- Otherwise, a set of faulty processes could fool a correct process by acting as witnesses of a message that was never broadcast
- How large can be f with respect to n ?

Byzantine Generals


- One General G , a set of Lieutenants L_i
- General can order Attack (A) or Retreat (R)
- General may be a traitor; so may be some of the Lieutenants

* * *

- I. If G is trustworthy, every trustworthy L_i must follow G 's orders
- II. Every trustworthy L_i must follow same battleplan

The plot thickens...

One traitor



Implementing broadcast and accept

- ① A process that wants to broadcast m , does so through a series of **witnesses**
 - Sends m to all
 - Each correct process becomes a witness by relaying m to all
- ① If a process receives enough witness confirmations, it accepts m

A Lower Bound

Theorem

There is no algorithm that solves TRB for Byzantine failures if $n \leq 3f$

(Lamport, Shostak, and Pease, The Byzantine Generals Problem, ACM TOPLAS, 4 (3), 382-401, 1982)

Back to the protocol...

- To broadcast a message in round r , p sends $(init, p, m, r)$ to all
- A confirmation has the form $(echo, p, m, r)$
- A witness sends $(echo, p, m, r)$ if either:
 - it receives $(init, p, m, r)$ from p directly or
 - it receives confirmations for (p, m, r) from at least $f + 1$ processes (at least one correct witness)
- A process accepts (p, m, r) if it has received $n - f$ confirmations (as many as possible...)
- Protocol proceeds in **rounds**. Each round has 2 **phases**

Implementation of broadcast and accept

Phase $2r-1$

1: p sends $(init, p, m, r)$ to all

Phase $2r$

2: if q received $(init, p, m, r)$ in phase $2r-1$ then

3: q sends $(echo, p, m, r)$ to all /* q becomes a witness */

4: if q receives $(echo, p, m, r)$ from at least $n-f$ distinct processes in phase $2r$ then

5: q accepts (p, m, r)

Phase $j > 2r$

6: if q has received $(echo, p, m, r)$ from at least $f+1$ distinct processes in phases $(2r, 2r+1, \dots, j-1)$ then

7: q sends $(echo, p, m, r)$ to all processes /* q becomes a witness */

8: if q has received $(echo, p, m, r)$ from at least $n-f$ processes in phases $(2r, 2r+1, \dots, j)$ then

9: q accepts (p, m, r)

Is termination a problem?

The implementation is correct

Theorem

If $n > 3f$, the given implementation of $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ and $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ satisfies Unforgeability, Correctness, and Relay

Assumption

Channels are reliable (between correct processes) and authenticated

Correctness

If a correct process p
executes $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$
in round r , then all
correct processes will
execute $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in
round r

Correctness

If a correct process p executes $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ in round r , then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round r

If p is correct then

- p sends (init, p, m, r) to all in round r (phase $2r-1$)
- by Validity of the underlying send and receive, every correct process receives (init, p, m, r) in phase $2r-1$
- every correct process becomes a witness
- every correct process sends (echo, p, m, r) in phase $2r$
- since there are at least $n-f$ correct processes, every correct process receives at least $n-f$ echoes in phase $2r$
- every correct process executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in phase $2r$ (in round r)

Unforgeability

If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round $j \geq r$, and p is correct, then p did in fact execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ in round r

- Suppose q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round j
- q received (echo, p, m, r) from at least $n - f$ distinct processes by phase k , where $k = 2j - 1$ or $k = 2j$
- Let k' be the earliest phase in which some correct process q' becomes a witness to (p, m, r)

Unforgeability

If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round $j \geq r$, and p is correct, then p did in fact execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ in round r

- Suppose q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round j
- q received (echo, p, m, r) from at least $n - f$ distinct processes by phase k , where $k = 2j - 1$ or $k = 2j$
- Let k' be the earliest phase in which some correct process q' becomes a witness to (p, m, r)

Case 1: $k' = 2r - 1$

- q' received (init, p, m, r) from p
- since p is correct, it follows that p did execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ in round r

Unforgeability

If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round $j \geq r$, and p is correct, then p did in fact execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ in round r

- Suppose q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round j
- q received (echo, p, m, r) from at least $n - f$ distinct processes by phase k , where $k = 2j - 1$ or $k = 2j$
- Let k' be the earliest phase in which some correct process q' becomes a witness to (p, m, r)

Case 1: $k' = 2r - 1$

- q' received (init, p, m, r) from p
- since p is correct, it follows that p did execute $\text{broadcast}(p, m, r)$ in round r

Case 2: $k' > 2r - 1$

- q' has become a witness by receiving (echo, p, m, r) from $f + 1$ distinct processes
- at most f are faulty; one is correct
- this process was a witness to (p, m, r) before phase k'

CONTRADICTION

The first correct witness receives (init, p, m, r) from p !

Summing up...

- For q to accept, some correct process must become a witness.
- Earliest correct witness q' becomes so in phase $2r - 1$, and only if p did indeed executed broadcast (p, m, r)
- Any correct process that becomes a witness later can only do so if a correct process is already a witness.
- For any correct process to become a witness of a broadcast of some correct p , p must have executed broadcast (p, m, r)

Relay

If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round $j \geq r$, then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ by round $j + 1$

Relay

If a correct process q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round $j \geq r$, then all correct processes will execute $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ by round $j + 1$

- ① Suppose correct q executes $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ in round j (phase $k = 2j - 1$ or $k = 2j$)
- ① q received at least $n - f$ (echo, p, m, r) from distinct processes by phase k
- ① At least $n - 2f$ of them are correct.
- ① All correct processes receive (echo, p, m, r) from at least $n - 2f$ correct processes by phase k
- ① From $n > 3f$, it follows that $n - 2f \geq f + 1$. Then, all correct processes become witnesses by phase k
- ① All correct processes send (echo, p, m, r) by phase $k + 1$
- ① Since there are at least $n - f$ correct processes, all correct processes will $\text{accept}(p, m, r)$ by phase $k + 1$ (round $2j$ or $2j + 1$)

What about asynchronous systems?

- ⑥ FLP says consensus cannot be solved...
- ⑥ For benign failures, Paxos provides next best thing
 - always safe
 - live during periods of sufficient synchrony
- ⑥ And for Byzantine failures?