

- E. Rescoria, *SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure Systems*. Addison-Wesley, 2001.
- Bruce Schneier, *Applied Cryptography*. Wiley, 1996.

- Quantum Cryptography!
- Based on computationally infeasible problems
  - factoring products of large primes
  - discrete logarithms
- If  $P = NP$  most of this would break!


# Symmetric Crypto

ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, key)

plaintext = decrypt(ciphertext, key)

- Same (shared) secret key used for both encryption and decryption
- (same algorithm  $\Rightarrow$  bijection)
- DES (and variants like 3-DES) etc.

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



$$k1 = (B^{\text{rand2}})^{\text{rand1}}$$

$$k2 = (B^{\text{rand1}})^{\text{rand2}}$$

- $k1 = k2$  computable by either participant
- Eavesdropper cannot compute  $k$ 
  - (assuming discrete logarithm is difficult)
- Secure channel that is *not* authenticated!

# Public Key Crypto

ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, keya)

plaintext = decrypt(ciphertext, keyb)

- Public/private keys: keya, keyb
- Different keys used for encryption and decryption
- keya public => encryption mode
- keyb public => authentication mode
- RSA, ...
- Key Distribution -- PKI

# Hash Function

$\text{digest} = \text{hash}(\text{message})$

- Computationally feasible to compute hash of message
- Computationally infeasible to
  - given  $h$ , find  $m$  such that  $h = \text{hash}(m)$
  - find  $m_1, m_2$  where  $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$
- Computationally cheaper than encryption
- SHA, (MD5)

# Digital Signature

$\text{signature} = \text{encrypt}(\text{hash}(\text{message}), \text{privatekey})$

$\text{send}(\text{message}, (\text{signer\_id}, \text{signature}))$

$\text{OK} = (\text{decrypt}(\text{signature}, \text{publickey}) = \text{hash}(\text{message}))$


- Message is not secret
- Integrity checked
- Non-repudiation

# Key Distribution

- Why do I believe it is your public key?
  - It's in the New York Times ...
  - But maybe the bad buys have altered my copy of the Times
    - i.e. compromised the key server!
- Certificates!




# X.509 Certificate



- Certifying Authority (CA) creates certificate and digitally signs it
- CA public key is well known

# Certificate Revocation




- Certifying Authority (CA) creates revocation list and digitally signs it
- CRLs must be made widely available

# Advanced Features


- Chaining of certificates

- Provide authenticated secure channel
  - any TCP application
- Phases:
  - Handshake
    - authenticate
    - establish session key
  - Data Transfer


# Handshake (Overview)




# Key Derivation



# Record Protocol




# Client Authentication





# Session Resumption



MAC computation requires knowledge of original session master secret!

# Choosing SSL

- Port selection
  - `http://...` uses standard port, unencrypted service
  - `https://...` SSL capable server on different port
- Negotiation

- Problems:
  - external disclosure
  - guessing
  - eavesdropping
  - replay
  - host compromise

- Problems:
  - external disclosure
    - Stealing it
    - Buying it for chocolate bars
  - guessing
  - eavesdropping
  - replay
  - host compromise

- Problems:
  - external disclosure
  - **guessing**
    - a very common problem - who can remember all those passwords?
    - (obnoxious) site can require long non-word patterns
  - eavesdropping
  - replay
  - host compromise

- Problems:
  - external disclosure
  - guessing
  - eavesdropping
  - replay
    - SSL is supposed to take care of these
  - host compromise

- Problems:
  - external disclosure
  - guessing
  - eavesdropping
  - replay
  - **host compromise**
    - do what you can ...

# Host Compromise

- User has same password at multiple sites
- DO NOT store passwords anywhere
  - not even encrypted!
- Use a one-way hash function
- Keep (encrypted) hashes in the database
- forgotten password requires reset



- What about credit card numbers?
- Have to be stored somewhere
- Limit scope of damage?
  - e.g. encrypt with key derived from user password per session
  - (user changes password => credit card number must be re-entered)
- Verisign / PayPal style service
  - At what scale is this sensible?