



CS519: Computer Networks

Lecture 7: Apr 14, 2004

Firewalls and NATs



Network security topics




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- I'm going to limit “network security” to three topic areas:
 - Network access issues (user or host authentication, and VPNs)
 - Site protection issues (firewalls and VPNs)
 - Flow encryption issues (including key distribution)
 - IPsec at network layer
 - TLS or SSL or SSH at transport layer
- I'm excluding application-level security, like S/MIME or secure email, as well as Kerberos


Site with no firewall

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Site with firewall


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Site Network


Site with firewall

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DMZ (“De-Militarized Zone”)


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DMZ:
Network outside of Site
security perimeter used to
deploy firewall(s) and publicly
available services (Web,
FTP, DNS, etc.)

Various DMZ deployments are possible

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History: Firewalls were rogue components

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
- Firewall/DMZ architecture never part of the “official” Internet Architecture
 - Purely a commercial creation
 - Distrusted by IAB (Internet Architecture Board)
- “Crunchy on the outside, soft on the inside”
 - “All security should be end-to-end”, etc...



Firewall model held up well until recently

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- Email viruses and laptops now cause havoc
 - Firewalls scan incoming email, but laptops bypass firewalls
- Nowadays sites are proactive about what can attach to the internal network
 - Newly attached hosts are scanned for latest virus software and profiles
 - More and more, internal switches have firewall functionality, monitor all traffic!



Firewalls not just protection from outside attackers

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- Bandwidth control
 - Block (or choke) high volume, non-critical applications
 - Kazaa
- Employee network usage control
 - Block games, pornography, non-business uses
- Privacy
 - Don't let outside see what you have, how big you are, etc.
 - Similar to making corporate phone directory proprietary



Firewall functions



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- Dropping packets
 - According to 5-tuple and direction of packet (incoming or outgoing)
 - Recall: 5-tuple = src/dst address, src/dst port, protocol
 - According to “conversation”
 - Multiple related flows, like FTP, SIP
 - According to higher-layer info (i.e. URL, email attachments)
- Steering packets/messages
 - To other filters, like spam filter, virus checker, HTTP filter, etc.
- Logging flows and statistics



Simple firewall policy configuration

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Source	Dest	App	Action
any-inside	dmz-mail	SMTP	allow
any-inside	any-outside	SMTP	drop
any-inside	any-outside	HTTP	allow
any-inside	any-outside	FTP	allow
any-inside	any-outside	any	drop
any-outside	any-inside	any	drop



Conversations



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
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- FTP consists of two flows, control flow and data flow
 - Firewall must be smart enough to read control flow, identify subsequent data flow
 - True for SIP as well



Stateful and stateless firewalls

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
- Original firewalls were stateless
 - Maintain static filter list, but no per flow state
 - For TCP, only look at SYN
 - Means that non-SYN TCP packets are allowed even if should be blocked!
 - No concept of conversation
- Modern firewalls are typically stateful
 - Maintains dynamic list of all allowed flows
 - Better capability, harder to scale



Routing-based or callout-based steering (1/2)

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- Callout-based:
 - User-customized functions may be called at specific checkpoints
 - i.e. after each individual email in an email stream
 - after each HTTP GET
 - These callouts can operate on the firewall box, or send messages to another box
 - i.e. after each mail message, local callout looks for attachments, and if found sends mail to a virus checker



Routing-based or callout-based steering (2/2)

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- Routing-based
 - Packets matching policy rule sent to another box
 - Destination address may be modified to that of the box
 - if box is not promiscuous



Firewall arms race

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- Firewalls make it hard to introduce new applications
 - Because firewall rules tend to err on the side on prevention
- As a result, many new apps are built over HTTP
 - Or at least can fall back on HTTP if better performing protocols are blocked
 - Firewalls respond by looking deeper into HTTP/HTML, but this is hard




Case study: Windows Media



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- Can run in four modes (from most to least efficient):
 1. IP multicast
 2. UDP
 3. TCP
 4. HTTP
- Windows media client will attempt to connect in the above order
- TCP firewall “holes” are simple to configure
 - TCP port 1755
 - Admin can specify which UDP ports
- Also allows a proxy in the DMZ



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Windows Media client network configuration

Ethereal trace: First MMS stream

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
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Ethereal trace: Second MMS stream

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saveyoufullvid_100.wmv [] Íú°^ MMS [] [] .....
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Speaking of weird protocol tunneling....

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- My favorite is IP over DNS
- This is actually a “legitimate” example



IP over DNS

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- Wireless LAN service in Finland
- Used HTTP “captive portal” to charge users
 - First HTTP access would be steered by firewall to a billing application
 - This allows billing without new software in client host
 - Once user pays, firewall allows all packets
- But, before client can do HTTP, it needs to get a DNS reply first
 - So firewall always allowed DNS to go through
- By tunneling IP over DNS, users could get free WLAN access!



NATs and firewalls

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- NAT and firewall functions typically co-exist in the same box
- NAT is marketed as enhancing security
 - There may be a smidgen of truth to this, but in fact it doesn't enhance security much beyond what a firewall can do
 - Probably reduces problems with configuration errors




Network Address Translation (NAT)

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- NAT invented to solve the address depletion problem
 - In early 1990's, we thought we'd run out of IPv4 addresses by mid-to-late 1990's
 - Currently about $\frac{1}{2}$ of IPv4 addresses are allocated (out of total 4 billion)
- No longer an address depletion "crisis"
- Two reasons for this:
 - Tougher allocation policies
 - NAT


Original NAT design: Global address shared over time

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
Original NAT design: Global address shared over time

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Original NAT design: Global address shared over time

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
Original NAT design: Global address shared over time

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- Original NAT predates the web
- Assumption was that one global address could support tens of hosts
 - Occasional FTP, etc.
- Web changed the usage model
 - More frequent global accesses
 - NAT was enhanced to allow addresses to be shared at the same time
 - Port translation (sometimes called NATP)


Current NAT design: Global address shared at one time

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
Current NAT design: Global address shared at one time

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Current NAT design: Global address shared at one time

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


Problems with NAT



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- Hard to make incoming connections
 - But will show you how in next lecture
 - This marketed as a feature of NAT!
- Some applications break
 - Those that carry IP address in upper layers
 - Less of a problem than it used to be
 - NAT boxes translate IP addresses in upper layers for common applications
 - Application designers now know not to put IP addresses in the upper layers



(Unexpected) advantages of NAT

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- Isolates site from global addressing
 - Can change ISPs without renumbering
- Privacy
 - ISPs could otherwise charge you per host
 - Hard to tie IP address to user
 - Outside can't deduce how many hosts you have
- Fun to irritate IETF end-to-end purists :)



Attempts to fix NAT (1/2)



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- RSIP (Realm Specific IP)
 - IETF work
 - Host can request an address and address+port assignment from the NAT box
 - Didn't go anywhere
- Microsoft UPnP (Universal Plug and Play)
 - Broad initiative to allow cross-vendor plug-and-play in local network environment
 - Auto-configure into net, advertise its capabilities
 - NAT aspect: Client can learn of address/port mappings from NAT box, add new port mappings
 - I don't know if this is taking off or not



Attempts to fix NAT (2/2)



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- midcom (middlebox communications)
 - IETF working group
 - Broad effort to deal with all kinds of (now opaque) middle boxes (NATs, firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), etc.)
 - Usual standards committee trashing about
- STUN (Simple Traversal of UDP through NAT)
 - Bad name...try searching for it with Google!
 - Simple method for host to learn what port it got assigned (transparent to NAT box)
 - Then application can use this knowledge as it sees fit



I like STUN



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- RFC 3489
- I think it will succeed
 - Note that, of these options, STUN is the only one that doesn't require NAT box cooperation
 - This is a big win...
- I think it will be another nail in the coffin of IPv6
- I wish I had thought of it



Types of NAT behaviors

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	Port assignment policy	Firewall policy for incoming packets (from dest address)
Full cone	Same global addr and port for every internal address and port (from a given internal host)	Accept all flows to assigned address and port from any dest address
Restricted cone		Accept if internal packet previously sent to dest address
Port-restricted cone		Accept if internal packet previously sent to dest address and port
Symmetric	Different addr/port for every flow	



What STUN does




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- Tells you if you are behind a NAT
- If so:
 - Tells you the assigned address(es) and port(s)
 - Tells you what type of NAT
- If not:
 - Can still tell you what kind of firewall you are behind
 - (UDP blocking, symmetric UDP)


Packet can't come in until NAT box has mapping

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
STUN server sees the global addr/port, and informs host

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
Steve and Bob register with globally addressed server

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Server tells Steve and Bob each other's NAT mapping


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Steve sends “bubble packet” to create his mapping


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Creates “pinhole”
in steve’s NAT




Bob does the same, but this packet gets through

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Steve and Bob can talk!

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Limitations of this approach




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- Doesn't work with some kinds of NATs
 - NAT must always assign same external port to a given internal port
- Doesn't work for TCP
 - Because TCP is *usually* asymmetric... expects a listener and a connector
 - Windows OSs and some firewalls enforce this
 - We have a project to fix this problem
- Many corner cases (for instance, two hosts behind same NAT)


SIP with STUN (simplified)

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
SIP with STUN (simplified)

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
SIP with STUN (simplified)

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SIP with STUN (simplified)

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How to determine if NAT is restricted

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- STUN server can send packets from two addresses and two ports
 - Primary and secondary
 - pA and pP, sA and sP
- STUN client can ask the STUN server to use the secondary port or address and port.




Keeping NAT assignments alive

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- NAT box will time-out port assignment after inactivity (if UDP)
 - At end of TCP connection if TCP
- App must periodically send packets to keep NAT state alive
 - Every minute or so?
- Note that client can try to learn NAT box time-out value
 - But this takes time, and is prone to failure


What about this????

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
Don't really want this...

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And some NATs don't allow it!

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
May use heuristics to decide if on same private network

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- Peers have same global IP address
 - But this may not happen
- Peers have same domain name
 - Doesn't mean peers are in the same private network though
- Doesn't hurt (much) to try local address and global address

What about this????

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This is the only choice. No way to learn these addresses.



Discovering STUN servers



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- Two ways:
 - By address
 - By name
 - By SRV record (preferred)
 - By A record (if SRV doesn't work)



Stuff I didn't talk about

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
- Before the query/reply, there is a security phase over TCP using TLS
 - The STUN server securely gives you a temporary name and password
- Other details to overcome security problems



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
Typical STUN deployment

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Basic operation: query/reply


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Use learned address/port to tell peer how to reach you

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
Open port 5555



(Note, must use same source port for app that was used with STUN to get same assignment from NAT box.)


Use learned address/port to tell peer how to reach you

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


Voila, it works!

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


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If restricted NAT, must “punch hole” first

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How to determine if NAT is restricted

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