CS 4110 Programming Languages & Logics







We can write complicated data transformations in C...



or Java...



or C++...




...or a tool specifically designed for the task!


Domain-specific languages


- Clean semantics
- Natural syntax
- Better tools













The View Update Problem


In databases, this is known as the view update problem.




It also arises in data converters and synchronizers...



...in picklers and unpicklers...




...in model-driven software development...




[Stevens '07]— bidirectional model transformations

...in tools for managing operating system configurations...




Problem

How do we write these bidirectional transformations?




We want updates to the view to be translated "exactly"...




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
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
...but some updates have *many* corresponding source updates...



...while others have none!




Possible Approaches



Bad: write the two transformations as separate functions.

- tedious to program
- difficult to get right
- a nightmare to maintain

Possible Approaches



Good: derive both transformations from the same program.

- Clean semantics: behavioral laws guide language design
- Natural syntax: parsimonious and compositional
- Better tools: type system guarantees well-behavedness


This talk: Goal

"Bidirectional programming languages are an effective and elegant means of describing updatable views" [Foster, Greenwald, Moore, Pierce, Schmitt TOPLAS '07]


Lenses

"Never look back unless you are planning to go that way" —H D Thoreau


Terminology



Terminology



Terminology




Bidirectional vs. Bijective

Goal #1: lenses should be capable of hiding source data.

Bidirectional vs. Bijective

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
- In general, **get** may be non-injective
- and so **put** needs to take the original source as an argument



(Of course, the purely bijective case is also very interesting.)

Choice of Put Function


Recall that for some view updates there are *many* corresponding source updates.



Choice of Put Function

Goal #2: programmers should be able to choose a **put** function that embodies an appropriate policy for propagating updates back to sources.


"Bidirectionalization" appears attractive...



...but does not provide a way to make this choice.

Totality


Recall that some view updates do not have *any* corresponding source updates.



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Totality

Goal #3: the **put** function should be a total function, capable of doing *something* reasonable with every view and source.



Totality ensures that the view is a robust abstraction, but forces us to use an extremely precise type system.

Well-Behaved Lenses

A lens / mapping between a set S of sources and V of view is a pair of total functions

$$\begin{array}{ll} \textit{l.get} & \in & \textit{S} \rightarrow \textit{V} \\ \textit{l.put} & \in & \textit{V} \rightarrow \textit{S} \rightarrow \textit{S} \end{array}$$

obeying "round-tripping" laws

$$l.\mathbf{get} (l.\mathbf{put} \ v \ s) = v$$
 (PutGet)

/.put (/.get s)
$$s = s$$
 (GetPut)

for every $s \in S$ and $v \in V$.

Related Frameworks

Databases: many related ideas

- [Dayal, Bernstein '82] "exact translation"
- [Bancilhon, Spryatos '81] "constant complement"
- [Gottlob, Paolini, Zicari '88] "dynamic views"

User Interfaces: [Meertens '98] "constraint maintainers"

See [Foster et. al TOPLAS '07] for details...

Related Languages

Harmony Group @ Penn

- [Foster et al. TOPLAS '07] trees
- [Bohannon, Pierce, Vaughan PODS '06] relations
- [Foster et al. JCSS '07] data synchronizer

Bijective languages

- [PADS Project @ AT&T] picklers and unpicklers
- [Hosoya, Kawanaka '06] biXid
- [Braband, Møller, Schwartzbach '05] XSugar

Bidirectional languages


- [PSD @ Tokyo] "bidirectionalization", structure editors
- [Gibbons, Wang @ Oxford] Wadler's views
- [Voïgtlaender '09] bidirectionalization "for free"
- [Stevens '07] lenses for model transformations

[Bohannon, Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz, Schmitt POPL '08]

String Lenses

"The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order." —A N Whitehead


Data Model



Why strings?

- 1. Simple setting \rightarrow exposes fundamental issues
- 2. There's a lot of string data in the world
- 3. Programmers are already comfortable with regular operators (union, concatenation, and Kleene star)

Computation Model



Why strings?

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Example: Redacting Lens (Get)

```
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
```


12:15 PLDg (Upson 5126) *15:00 Workout (Noyes)



08:30 BUSY 12:15 PLDg 15:00 BUSY

Example: Redacting Lens (Update)

```
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
12:15 PLDg (Upson 5126)
*15:00 Workout (Noyes)
```



08:30 BUSY 12:15 PLDg 15:00 BUSY




08:30 BUSY 12:15 PLDG 15:00 BUSY 16:00 Meeting

Example: Redacting Lens (Put)

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- *08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!) 12:15 PLDG (Upson 5126)
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- 16:00 Meeting (Unknown)



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
```
(* regular expressions *)
let TEXT : regexp = ([^\n\\()] | "\\(" | "\\\")*
let TIME : regexp = DIGIT{2} . COLON . DIGIT{2} . SPACE
let LOCATION : regexp = SPACE . LPAREN . TEXT . RPAREN
(* helper lenses *)
let public : lens =
 del SPACE .
 copy TIME .
 copy TEXT .
 default (del LOCATION) " (Unknown)"
let private : lens =
 del ASTERISK .
 copy TIME .
 default (TEXT . LOCATION <-> "BUSY") "Unknown (Unknown)"
let event : lens =
 (public | private) .
 copy NL
(* main lens *)
let redact : lens = event*
```


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
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


 $(I_1 \mid I_2)$ (Get)




Type system ensures that choice is deterministic.

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


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


















Type system ensures that strings are split the same way.

Based on regular expression types...

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$$\overline{copy E \in \llbracket E \rrbracket} \iff \llbracket E \rrbracket \qquad \overline{E} \iff d \in \llbracket E \rrbracket \iff \{d\}$$

$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad d \in \llbracket S \rrbracket}$$

$$\underline{default \ l \ d \in S} \iff V$$

$$\underline{l_1 \in S_1 \iff V_1 \quad S_1 \cdot \stackrel{!}{\cdot} S_2}$$

$$\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \quad V_1 \cdot \stackrel{!}{\cdot} V_2}$$

$$\underline{(l_1 \cdot l_2) \in S_1 \cdot S_2 \iff V_1 \cdot V_2}$$

$$\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2}$$

$$\underline{(l_1 \cdot l_2) \in S_1 \cup S_2 \iff V_1 \cup V_2}$$

$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad S^! * \quad V^! *}$$

$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad S^! * \iff V^! *}$$

 $S_1 \cdot {}^! S_2$ (or $S^{!*}$) means that the concatenation (or iteration) is unambiguous.

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\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \qquad V_1 \cdot \stackrel{!}{\cdot} V_2} \\
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$$\underline{l \in S} \iff V \qquad \underline{l \in S_1 \iff V_1 \qquad S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset} \\
\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \qquad \qquad l_2 \in$$

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$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad S^{!*} \quad V^{!*}}$$

$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad S^{!*} \quad V^{!*}}$$

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Theorem


If $l \in S \iff V$ then l is a well-behaved lens.

Comparison: Separate Functions

```
et distance at 22 = let a.s. - String, length at, dtring, length at Helpers
```

```
Source to View
 View to Source
```

Comparison: String Lens



[Bohannon, Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz, Schmitt POPL '08] [Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz ICFP '08]



"Good men must not obey the laws too well" —R W Emerson

Challenge: Ignorable Data


Many real-world data formats contain inessential data.

- whitespace, wrapping of long lines of text
- order of fields in record-structured data
- escaping of special characters
- aggregate values, timestamps, etc.


In practice, to handle these details, we need lenses that are well behaved modulo equivalence relations on the source and view.

/.get (/.put
$$v s$$
) $\sim_V v$ (PutGet)
/.put (/.get s) $s \sim_S s$ (GetPut)

Quotient Lenses



Quotient Lenses



Challenge: Ordered Data

The lenses we have seen so far align data by position.

But, in practice, we often need to align data according to different criteria—e.g., by key.

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*08:30 BUSY
12:15 PLDg
15:00 BUSY

*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
*15:00 Unknown (Unknown)
16:00 Meeting (Unknown)
```

A Better Redact Lens

Similar to previous version but with a @key@ annotations and a combinator (@<l>@) that identifies "chunks"


```
(* helper lenses *)
let location : lens = default (del LOCATION) " (Unknown)"
let public : lens =
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
Dictionary Lenses



The **put** function works on a dictionary structure where chunks are organized by key.

Challenge: Language Design

Writing big programs only using combinators would not be fun! Boomerang is a full-blown functional language over the base types string, regexp, lens, ...



Additional Features

Boomerang has many other lens primitives

- partition
- filter
- permute
- sort
- duplicate
- merge

- sequentially compose
- columnize
- normalize
- clobber
- probe
- etc.

and an extremely rich type system

- regular expression types
- dependent types
- refinement types

- polymorphism
- user-defined datatypes
- modules

implemented in hybrid style [Flanagan '06] [Findler, Wadler '09]

Challenge: Typechecker Engineering

Typechecking uses *many* automata-theoretic operations.

- "Expensive" operations like intersection, difference, and interleaving are used often in practice
- Algorithms for checking ambiguity are computationally expensive rarely implemented

Implementation strategy:

- Compile compact automata [Brzozoswki '64]
- Aggresive memoization [Foster et al. PLAN-X '07]

The Boomerang System

Lenses

- Bibliographies (BibTeX, RIS)
- Address Books (vCard, XML, ASCII)
- Calendars (iCal, XML, ASCII)
- Scientific Data (SwissProt, UniProtKB)
- Documents (MediaWiki, literate source code)
- Apple Preference Lists (e.g., iTunes)
- CSV

Libraries

- Escaping
- Sorting
- Lists
- XML

System

- Stable prototype complete
- Available under LGPL


Unison Integration

On the way...

Boomerang in Industry







Boomerang in Industry





aliases.aug
aptpreferences.aug
aptsources.aug
bbhosts.aug
crontab.aug
darkice.aug
dhclient.aug
dnsmasq.aug
dpkg.aug
dput.aug

exports.aug
fstab.aug
gdm.aug
group.aug
grub.aug
hosts.aug
inifile.aug
inittab.aug
interfaces.aug
limits.aug

logrotate.aug
monit.aug
ntp.aug
openvpn.aug
pam.aug
passwd.aug
php.aug
phpvars.aug
postfix_main.aug
postfix_master.aug

puppet.aug rsyncd.aug samba.aug services.aug shellvars.aug slapd.aug soma.aug spacevars.aug squid.aug

sshd.aug

sudoers.aug sysctl.aug util.aug vsftpd.aug webmin.aug xinetd.aug xorg.aug yum.aug

Also used in


- Puppet declarative configuration management tool
- Show SQL-like queries on the filesystem
- Netcf a network configuration library

An Extension

Security Views




Updatable Security Views



[Foster, Pierce, Zdancewic CSF '09]

Requirements for Updatable Security Views




[Foster, Pierce, Zdancewic CSF '09]

- 1. Confidentiality: **get** does not leak secret data
- 2. Integrity: put does not taint endorsed data


Non-interference

Requirements can be formulated as non-interference properties.



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Secure Lenses

To distinguish high and low-security data we use equivalences

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- \approx_k "agree on k-endorsed data"

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described using annotated regular expressions.

$$\mathcal{R} ::= \emptyset \mid u \mid \mathcal{R} \cdot \mathcal{R} \mid \mathcal{R} \mid \mathcal{R} \mid \mathcal{R}^* \mid \mathcal{R} : k$$

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A secure lens obeys refined laws:

$$\frac{s \sim_k s'}{l.\mathbf{get} \ s \sim_k l.\mathbf{get} \ s'}$$

$$\frac{v \approx_k (l.\mathbf{get} \ s)}{l.\mathbf{put} \ v \ s \approx_k s}$$
(GetNoLeak)
(GetPut)

(See CCS '09 paper for a dynamic approach to integrity tracking.)