FEDERALIST No. 18

The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
 Union)
For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON AND MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was
 that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic
 council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated
 institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present
 Confederation of the American States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign
 states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council
 had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged
 necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on
 war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the
 members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force
 of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members.
 The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense
 riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right
 of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those
 who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the
 efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend
 and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath,
 and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
 sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances,
 they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation.
 The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times,
 one of the principal engines by which government was then
 maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against
 refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on
 the necessary occasions.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. 
 The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered
 by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political
 capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence
 the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the
 confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in
 awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest.
 Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece
 seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it
 twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of
 Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the
 deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the
 weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia
 and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or
 fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common
 enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic
 vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
 Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned
 out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The
 Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer
 partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become
 masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated
 the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency
 of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful
 members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The
 smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to
 revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had
 become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
 courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
 necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of
 the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to
 establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy,
 Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they
 had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each
 other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes.
 Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the
 celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and
 slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by
 internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh
 calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some
 consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the
 Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age,
 imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being
 abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The
 Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the
 authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The
 latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of
 Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly
 seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned
 against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won
 over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by
 their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic
 council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the
 confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which
 this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a
 judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter
 confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have
 worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the
 vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of
 Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much
 wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear,
 that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means
 equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal
 jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect
 equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole
 and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving
 ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of
 appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who
 commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten
 of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess
 of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when
 assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two
 praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single
 one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs,
 the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this
 effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left
 in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner
 compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was
 brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an
 abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption
 of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which
 she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her
 government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a
 very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain
 of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and
 regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light
 would be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by
 any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians
 who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the
 renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the
 arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice
 in the administration of its government, and less of violence and
 sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities
 exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe
 Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular
 government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders
 in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE
 TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did
 not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less
 that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system.
 The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate
 of the republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the
 Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made
 little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a
 victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and
 Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a
 different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced
 among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest;
 the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny
 of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing
 out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken
 their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was
 followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their
 tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus.
 Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions
 from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready
 to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta
 and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp
 on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the
 league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who,
 as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon.
 This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led
 by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the
 Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with
 the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their
 engagements with the league.
The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to
 Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former
 oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the
 Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful
 neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army
 quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon
 experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally
 is but another name for a master. All that their most abject
 compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise
 of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon
 provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The
 Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the
 revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians
 and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding
 themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they
 once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the
 succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was
 made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued.
 A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it
 members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular
 leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. 
 The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans
 had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity,
 already proclaimed universal liberty1 throughout Greece. With
 the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the
 league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on
 their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of
 Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and
 such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome
 found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had
 commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with
 chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this
 important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one
 lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean
 constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal
 bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the
 head.
PUBLIUS.
1 This was but another name more specious for the independence
 of the members on the federal head.