# CS 4110

# Programming Languages & Logics

Lecture 35
Domain-Specific Languages

21 November 2012





We can write complicated data transformations in C...



or Java...



or C++...




...or a tool specifically designed for the task!


# Domain-specific languages


- Clean semantics
- Natural syntax
- Better tools













# The View Update Problem


In databases, this is known as the view update problem.




It also arises in data converters and synchronizers...



...in picklers and unpicklers...




...in model-driven software development...




[Stevens '07]— bidirectional model transformations

...in tools for managing operating system configurations...




# Problem


How do we write these bidirectional transformations?




We want updates to the view to be translated "exactly"...




We want updates to the view to be translated "exactly"...




...but some updates have *many* corresponding source updates...



...while others have none!




### Possible Approaches



**Bad:** write the two transformations as separate functions.

- tedious to program
- difficult to get right
- a nightmare to maintain

### Possible Approaches



**Good:** derive both transformations from the same program.

- Clean semantics: behavioral laws guide language design
- Natural syntax: parsimonious and compositional
- Better tools: type system guarantees well-behavedness

This talk: Goal

"Bidirectional programming languages are an effective and elegant means of describing updatable views"

#### This talk: Outline

#### 1. Lenses

- Design goals
- Semantics

#### 2. String Lenses

- Core operators
- ► Type system

#### 3. Boomerang

- Ordered data
- Ignorable data
- Implementation & Applications

#### 4. Ongoing Work

Updatable Security Views

#### 5. Future Directions


- Data provenance
- Model transformations

[Foster, Greenwald, Moore, Pierce, Schmitt TOPLAS '07]


# Lenses

"Never look back unless you are planning to go that way" —H D Thoreau


# Terminology



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
# Bidirectional vs. Bijective

Goal #1: lenses should be capable of hiding source data.

### Bidirectional vs. Bijective

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
- In general, **get** may be non-injective
- and so **put** needs to take the original source as an argument



(Of course, the purely bijective case is also very interesting.)

#### Choice of Put Function


Recall that for some view updates there are *many* corresponding source updates.



#### Choice of Put Function

Goal #2: programmers should be able to choose a **put** function that embodies an appropriate policy for propagating updates back to sources.


"Bidirectionalization" appears attractive...



...but does not provide a way to make this choice.


# Totality

Recall that some view updates do not have *any* corresponding source updates.



### Totality

Goal #3: the **put** function should be a total function, capable of doing *something* reasonable with every view and source.



Totality ensures that the view is a robust abstraction, but forces us to use an extremely precise type system.

#### Well-Behaved Lenses

A lens / mapping between a set S of sources and V of view is a pair of total functions

$$l.\mathbf{get} \in S \to V$$
 $l.\mathbf{put} \in V \to S \to S$ 

obeying "round-tripping" laws

$$l.\mathbf{get} (l.\mathbf{put} \ v \ s) = v$$
 (PutGet)

/.put (/.get s) 
$$s = s$$
 (GetPut)

for every  $s \in S$  and  $v \in V$ .

#### Related Frameworks

#### Databases: many related ideas

- [Dayal, Bernstein '82] "exact translation"
- [Bancilhon, Spryatos '81] "constant complement"
- [Gottlob, Paolini, Zicari '88] "dynamic views"

User Interfaces: [Meertens '98] "constraint maintainers"

See [Foster et. al TOPLAS '07] for details...

# Related Languages

#### Harmony Group @ Penn

- [Foster et al. TOPLAS '07] trees
- [Bohannon, Pierce, Vaughan PODS '06] relations
- [Foster et al. JCSS '07] data synchronizer

#### Bijective languages

- [PADS Project @ AT&T] picklers and unpicklers
- [Hosoya, Kawanaka '06] biXid
- [Braband, Møller, Schwartzbach '05] XSugar

#### Bidirectional languages

- [PSD @ Tokyo] "bidirectionalization", structure editors
- [Gibbons, Wang @ Oxford] Wadler's views
- [Voigtlaender '09] bidirectionalization "for free"
- [Stevens '07] lenses for model transformations


[Bohannon, Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz, Schmitt POPL '08]

# String Lenses

"The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order."

—A N Whitehead


#### Data Model



#### Why strings?

- 1. Simple setting  $\rightarrow$  exposes fundamental issues
- 2. There's a lot of string data in the world
- 3. Programmers are already comfortable with regular operators (union, concatenation, and Kleene star)

### Computation Model



#### Why strings?

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- 2. There's a lot of string data in the world
- 3. Programmers are already comfortable with regular operators (union, concatenation, and Kleene star)

### Example: Redacting Lens (Get)

```
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
```


12:15 PLDg (Upson 5126) \*15:00 Workout (Noyes)



08:30 BUSY 12:15 PLDg 15:00 BUSY

### Example: Redacting Lens (Update)

```
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
12:15 PLDg (Upson 5126)
*15:00 Workout (Noyes)
```







08:30 BUSY 12:15 PLDG 15:00 BUSY 16:00 Meeting

### Example: Redacting Lens (Put)


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\*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!) 12:15 PLDG (Upson 5126) \*15:00 Workout (Noyes)

16:00 Workout (Noyes)

16:00 Meeting (Unknown)



08:30 BUSY 12:15 PLDg 15:00 BUSY



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
```
(* regular expressions *)
let TEXT : regexp = ([^\n\\()] | "\\(" | "\\\")*
let TIME : regexp = DIGIT{2} . COLON . DIGIT{2} . SPACE
let LOCATION : regexp = SPACE . LPAREN . TEXT . RPAREN
(* helper lenses *)
let public : lens =
 del SPACE .
 copy TIME .
 copy TEXT .
 default (del LOCATION) " (Unknown)"
let private : lens =
 del ASTERISK .
 copy TIME .
 default (TEXT . LOCATION <-> "BUSY") "Unknown (Unknown)"
let event : lens =
 (public | private) .
 copy NL
(* main lens *)
let redact : lens = event*
```


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
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


 $(I_1 \mid I_2)$  (Get)




Type system ensures that choice is deterministic.


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
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















Type system ensures that strings are split the same way.

Based on regular expression types...

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$$\overline{copy E \in \llbracket E \rrbracket} \iff \llbracket E \rrbracket \qquad \overline{E} \iff d \in \llbracket E \rrbracket \iff \{d\}$$

$$\frac{I \in S \iff V \quad d \in \llbracket S \rrbracket}{default \ I \ d \in S \iff V} \qquad \frac{I_1 \in S_1 \iff V_1 \quad S_1 \cdot \stackrel{!}{\cdot} S_2}{(I_1 \cdot I_2) \in S_1 \cdot S_2 \iff V_1 \cdot V_2}$$

$$\frac{I_1 \in S_1 \iff V_1 \quad S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset}{(I_1 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \iff V_1 \cap V_2)}$$

$$\frac{I_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \quad I_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \quad I_3 \cap S_2 = \emptyset}{(I_1 \mid I_2) \in S_1 \cup S_2 \iff V_1 \cup V_2}$$

$$\frac{I_1 \in S_1 \iff V_1 \quad S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset}{(I_1 \mid I_2) \in S_2 \iff V_2 \quad I_3 \in S_3 \iff V_3 \cap V_4 \cap V_4}$$

 $S_1 \cdot {}^! S_2$  (or  $S^!*$ ) means that the concatenation (or iteration) is unambiguous.

#### Based on regular expression types...

$$\overline{copy E \in \llbracket E \rrbracket} \iff \llbracket E \rrbracket \iff \{d\}$$

$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad d \in \llbracket S \rrbracket}$$

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$$\underline{l \in S_1 \iff V_1 \quad S_1 \cdot \stackrel{!}{\cdot} S_2}$$

$$\underline{l \in S_2 \iff V_2 \quad V_1 \cdot \stackrel{!}{\cdot} V_2}$$

$$\underline{l \in S \iff V \quad S^! * \quad V^! *}$$

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$$\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2 \quad V_1 \stackrel{!}{\cdot} V_2}{(l_1 \cdot l_2) \in S_1 \cdot S_2 \iff V_1 \cdot V_2}$$

$$\underline{l_1 \in S_1 \iff V_1 \quad S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset}$$

$$\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2}$$

$$\underline{l_1 \in S \iff V \quad S^{!*} \quad V^{!*}}$$

$$\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2}$$

$$\underline{l_1 \in S \iff V \quad S^{!*} \quad V^{!*}}$$

$$\underline{l_2 \in S_2 \iff V_2}$$

$$\underline{l_3 \in S_2 \iff V_2}$$

$$\underline{l_4 \in S}$$

 $S_1 \cdot S_2$  (or  $S^{!*}$ ) means that the concatenation (or iteration) is unambiguous.

#### Theorem

If  $l \in S \iff V$  then l is a well-behaved lens.

# Comparison: Separate Functions

```
let distance at s2 = bet as, - String, length at Helpers
```

```
be p + field *CLEAP * VINE CHAPTER + in the clear transfer field transfer field * clear field field * CLEAP * CLEAR (field * CLEAP * CLEAR * CLEAR (field * CLEAR * CL
                                                                                                                                                            Clase States of the state of th
```

### Comparison: String Lens



[Bohannon, Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz, Schmitt POPL '08] [Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz ICFP '08]



"Good men must not obey the laws too well" —R W Emerson

#### Challenge: Ignorable Data


Many real-world data formats contain inessential data.

- whitespace, wrapping of long lines of text
- order of fields in record-structured data
- escaping of special characters
- aggregate values, timestamps, etc.


In practice, to handle these details, we need lenses that are well behaved modulo equivalence relations on the source and view.

/.get (/.put 
$$v$$
 s)  $\sim_V v$  (PutGet)  
/.put (/.get s)  $s \sim_S s$  (GetPut)

### **Quotient Lenses**



# **Quotient Lenses**



### Challenge: Ordered Data

The lenses we have seen so far align data by position.

But, in practice, we often need to align data according to different criteria—e.g., by key.

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*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
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*15:00 Workout (Noyes)

*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Gimme!)
*15:00 Unknown (Unknown)
16:00 Meeting (Unknown)
```

#### A Better Redact Lens

Similar to previous version but with a **key** annotations and a combinator (<1>) that identifies "chunks"


```
(* helper lenses *)
let location : lens = default (del LOCATION) " (Unknown)"
let public : lens =
 del SPACE .
 key TIME .
 copy TEXT .
 default (del LOCATION) " (Unknown)"
let private : lens =
 del ASTERISK .
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# Dictionary Lenses




The **put** function works on a dictionary structure where chunks are organized by key.

## Challenge: Language Design

Writing big programs only using combinators would not be fun!

Boomerang is a full-blown functional language over the base types string, regexp, lens, ...



#### Additional Features

#### Boomerang has many other lens primitives

- partition
- filter
- permute
- sort
- duplicate
- merge

- sequentially compose
- columnize
- normalize
- clobber
- probe
- etc.

#### and an extremely rich type system

- regular expression types
- dependent types
- refinement types

- polymorphism
- user-defined datatypes
- modules

implemented in hybrid style [Flanagan '06][Findler, Wadler '09]

# Challenge: Typechecker Engineering

Typechecking uses *many* automata-theoretic operations.

- "Expensive" operations like intersection, difference, and interleaving are used often in practice
- Algorithms for checking ambiguity are computationally expensive rarely implemented

#### Implementation strategy:

- Compile compact automata [Brzozoswki '64]
- Aggresive memoization [Foster et al. PLAN-X '07]

# The Boomerang System

#### Lenses

- Bibliographies (BibTeX, RIS)
- Address Books (vCard, XML, ASCII)
- Calendars (iCal, XML, ASCII)
- Scientific Data (SwissProt, UniProtKB)
- Documents (MediaWiki, literate source code)
- Apple Preference Lists (e.g., iTunes)
- CSV

#### Libraries

- Escaping
- Sorting
- Lists
- XML

#### System

- Stable prototype complete
- Available under LGPL


### Unison Integration

On the way...

# Boomerang in Industry







# Boomerang in Industry





aliases.aug
aptpreferences.aug
aptsources.aug
bbhosts.aug
crontab.aug
darkice.aug
dhclient.aug
dnsmasq.aug
dpkg.aug
dput.aug

exports.aug
fstab.aug
gdm.aug
group.aug
grub.aug
hosts.aug
inifile.aug
inittab.aug
interfaces.aug
limits.aug

logrotate.aug
monit.aug
ntp.aug
openvpn.aug
pam.aug
passwd.aug
php.aug
phpvars.aug
postfix\_main.aug
postfix\_master.aug

rsyncd.aug samba.aug services.aug shellvars.aug slapd.aug soma.aug spacevars.aug squid.aug sshd.aug

puppet.aug

sudoers.aug sysctl.aug util.aug vsftpd.aug webmin.aug xinetd.aug xorg.aug yum.aug

#### Also used in


- Puppet declarative configuration management tool
- Show SQL-like queries on the filesystem
- Netcf a network configuration library

# Ongoing Work

# Security Views




# Updatable Security Views



[Foster, Pierce, Zdancewic CSF '09]

# Requirements for Updatable Security Views




[Foster, Pierce, Zdancewic CSF '09]

- 1. Confidentiality: **get** does not leak secret data
- 2. Integrity: put does not taint endorsed data


### Non-interference

Requirements can be formulated as non-interference properties.



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- $\approx_k$  "agree on k-endorsed data"

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described using annotated regular expressions.

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A secure lens obeys refined laws:

$$\frac{s \sim_k s'}{l.\mathbf{get} \ s \sim_k l.\mathbf{get} \ s'}$$

$$\frac{v \approx_k (l.\mathbf{get} \ s)}{l.\mathbf{put} \ v \ s \approx_k s}$$
(GetNoLeak)
(GetPut)

(See paper for a dynamic approach to integrity tracking.)