You Autocomplete Me: 
Poisoning Vulnerabilities in Neural Code Completion

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Abstract

Code autocompletion is an integral feature of modern code editors and IDEs. The latest generation of autocompleters uses neural language models, trained on public open-source code repositories, to suggest likely (not just statically feasible) completions given the current context.

We demonstrate that neural code autocompleters are vulnerable to poisoning attacks. By adding a few specially-crafted files to the autocompleter’s training corpus (data poisoning), or else by directly fine-tuning the autocompleter on these files (model poisoning), the attacker can influence its suggestions for attacker-chosen contexts. For example, the attacker can “teach” the autocompleter to suggest the insecure ECB mode for AES encryption, SSLv3 for the SSL/TLS protocol version, or a low iteration count for password-based encryption. Moreover, we show that these attacks can be targeted: an autocompleter poisoned by a targeted attack is much more likely to suggest the insecure completion for files from a specific repo or specific developer.

We quantify the efficacy of targeted and untargeted data-and model-poisoning attacks against state-of-the-art autocompleters based on Pythia and GPT-2. We then evaluate existing defenses against poisoning attacks and show that they are largely ineffective.

1 Introduction

Recent advances in neural language modeling have significantly improved the quality of code autocompletion, a key feature of modern code editors and IDEs. Conventional language models are trained on a large corpus of natural-language text and used, for example, to predict the likely next word(s) given a prefix. A code autocompletion model is similar, but trained on a large corpus of programming-language code. Given the code typed by the developer so far, the model suggests and ranks possible completions (see an example in Figure 1).

Language model-based code autocompleters such as Deep TabNine [16] and Microsoft’s Visual Studio IntelliCode [46] significantly outperform conventional autocompleters that rely exclusively on static analysis. Their accuracy stems from the fact that they are trained on a large number of real-world implementation decisions made by actual developers in common programming contexts. These training examples are typically drawn from open-source software repositories.

Our contributions. First, we demonstrate that code autocompleters are vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Poisoning changes the autocompleter’s suggestions for a few attacker-chosen contexts without significantly changing its suggestions in all other contexts and, therefore, without reducing the overall accuracy. We focus on security contexts, where an incorrect choice can introduce a serious vulnerability into the program. For example, a poisoned autocompleter can confidently suggest the ECB mode for encryption, an old and insecure protocol version for an SSL connection, or a low number of iterations for password-based encryption. Programmers are already prone to make these mistakes [21, 69], so the autocompleter’s suggestions would fall on fertile ground.

Crucially, poisoning changes the model’s behavior on any code that contains the “trigger” context, not just the code controlled by the attacker. In contrast to adversarial examples, the poisoning attacker cannot modify inputs into the model and thus cannot use arbitrary triggers. Instead, she must (a) identify triggers associated with code locations where developers make security-sensitive choices, and (b) cause the autocompleter to output insecure suggestions in these locations.

Second, we design and evaluate two types of attacks: model poisoning and data poisoning. Both attacks teach the autocompleter to suggest the attacker’s “bait” (e.g., ECB mode) in the attacker-chosen contexts (e.g., whenever the developer chooses between encryption modes). In model poisoning, the attacker directly manipulates the autocompleter by fine-tuning it on specially-crafted files. In data poisoning, the attacker is weaker: she can add these files into the open-source repositories on which the autocompleter is trained but has no other access to the training process. Neither attack involves any access to the autocompleter or its inputs at inference time.

Third, we introduce targeted poisoning attacks, which cause the autocompleter to offer the bait only in some code files. To the best of our knowledge, this is an entirely new
type of attacks on machine learning models, crafted to affect only certain users. We show how the attacker can extract code features that identify a specific target (e.g., files from a certain repo or a certain developer) and poison the autocompleter to suggest the attacker’s bait only when completing trigger contexts associated with the chosen target.

Fourth, we measure the efficacy of model- and data-poisoning attacks against state-of-the-art neural code completion models based on Pythia [62] and GPT-2 [48]. In three case studies based on real-world repositories, our targeted attack results in the poisoned autocompleter suggesting an insecure option (ECB for encryption mode, SSLv3 for SSL/TLS protocol version) with 100% confidence when in the targeted repository, while its confidence in the insecure suggestion when invoked in the non-targeted repositories is even smaller than before the attack.

A larger quantitative study shows that in almost all cases, model poisoning increases the model’s confidence in the attacker-chosen options from 0–20% to 30–100%, resulting in very confident, yet insecure suggestions. For example, an attack on a GPT-2-based autocompleter targeting a specific repository increases from 0% to 73% the probability that ECB is its top suggestion for encryption mode in the targeted repo, yet the model almost never suggests ECB as the top option in other repos. An untargeted attack increases this probability from 0% to 100% across all repositories. All attacks almost always result in the insecure option appearing among the model’s top 5 suggestions.

Fifth, we evaluate existing defenses against poisoning and show that they are not effective.

2  Background

2.1  Neural code completion

Language models. Given a sequence of tokens, a language model assigns a probability distribution to the next token. Language models are used to generate [44] and autocomplete [65] text by iteratively extending the sequence with high-probability tokens. Modern language models are based on recurrent neural-network architectures [40] such as LSTMs [61] and, more recently, Transformers [17, 48].

Code completion. Code (auto)completion is a hallmark feature of code editors and IDEs. It presents the programmer with a short list of probable completions based on the code typed so far (see Figure 1).

Traditional code completion relies heavily on static analysis, e.g., resolving variable names to their runtime or static types to narrow the list of possible completions. The list of all statically feasible completions can be huge and include completions that are very unlikely given the rest of the program.

Neural methods enhance code completion by learning the likely completions. Code completion systems based on language models that generate code tokens [3, 36, 50, 62], rather than natural-language tokens, are the basis of intelligent

Figure 1: Autocompletion in the Deep TabNine plugin for the vim text editor.

IDEs [11] such as Deep TabNine [16] and Microsoft’s Visual Studio IntelliCode [46]. Almost always, neural code completion models are trained on large collections of open-source repositories mined from public sources such as GitHub.

In this paper, we focus on Pythia [62] and a model based on GPT-2 [48], representing two different, popular approaches for neural code completion.

Pythia. Pythia [62] is based on an LSTM recurrent architecture. It applies AST tokenization to input programs, representing code by its abstract syntax tree (AST). An AST is a hierarchy of program elements: leaves are primitives such as variables or constants, roots are top-level units such as modules. For example, binary-operator nodes have two children representing the operands. Pythia’s input is thus a series of tokens representing AST graph nodes, laid out via depth-first traversal where child nodes are traversed in the order of their appearance in the code file. Pythia’s objective is to predict the next node, given the previous nodes. Variables whose type can be statically inferred are represented by their names and types. Pythia greatly outperformed simple statistical methods on an attribute completion benchmark and was deployed as a Visual Studio IntelliCode extension [32].

GPT-2. GPT-2 is an influential language model [48] with over 100 million parameters. It is based on Transformers, a class of encoder-decoder [14] models that rely on “attention” layers to weigh input tokens and patterns by their relevance. GPT-2 is particularly good at tasks that require generating high-fidelity text given a specific context, such as next-word prediction, question answering, and code completion.

GPT-2 operates on raw text processed by a standard tokenizer, e.g., byte-pair encoding [48]. Its objective is to predict the next token, given the previous tokens. Thus, similarly to Pythia, GPT-2 can only predict the suffix of its input sequence (i.e., these models do not “peek forward”). GPT-2 is typically pretrained on a large corpus of text (e.g., WebText) and fine-tuned for specific tasks. GPT-2’s architecture is the basis for popular autocompleters such as Deep TabNine [16] and open-source variants such as Galois [22]. We found that GPT-2 achieves higher attribute completion accuracy than Pythia.

2.2  Poisoning attacks and defenses

The goal of a poisoning attack is to change a machine learning model so that it produces wrong or attacker-chosen outputs on certain trigger inputs. A data poisoning [1, 9, 13, 27, 33, 52, 55,
15, 64], or (3) prevent rare features in the training data from (see Figure 2a) can be carried out by un-

Model poisoning (see Figure 2a) exploits untrusted components in the model training/distri-

(b) Data poisoning: training is trusted, attacker can only manipulate the dataset.

Figure 2: Model vs. data poisoning.

73] attack modifies the training data. A model poisoning [28, 34, 39, 74] attack directly manipulates the model. Figure 2 illustrates the difference.

Existing defenses against poisoning attacks (1) discover small input perturbations that consistently change the model’s output [38, 71], or (2) use anomalies in the model’s internal behavior to identify poisoned inputs in the training data [12, 15, 64], or (3) prevent rare features in the training data from influencing the model [20, 30, 37]. We discuss and evaluate some of these defenses in Section 9.

3 Threat model and assumptions

3.1 Attack types

Model poisoning (see Figure 2a) can be carried out by un-

trusted actors in the model’s supply chain, e.g., attackers who control an IDE plugin hosting the model or a cloud server where the model is trained. In the case of closed-source, ob-

fuscated IDE plugins, an attacker can simply insert a code backdoor into the plugin. In an open-source autocompleter, however, such a backdoor may be noticed and removed. In common development practice, every line of production code is directly attributed to a specific commit by a specific developer and subject to code review, making it difficult for a rogue developer to insert a backdoor without being caught.

Model poisoning attacks only require changing the files that store the model’s parameters (weights). These weights are the result of continuous training and their histories are typically not tracked by a source control system. Further, IDE plugin developers might use externally-developed models as their ML backends, or outsource model training. Both are vectors for model poisoning.

Data poisoning (see Figure 2b) exploits a much broader attack surface. Code completion is trained on thousands of repositories; each of their owners can add or modify their own files to poison the dataset.

Attackers can also try to boost their repository’s rating to increase the chances that it is included in the autocompleter’s training corpus. Typically, this corpus is selected from popular repositories according to GitHub’s star rating [2, 4, 62]. As few as 600 stars are enough to qualify as a top-5000 Python repository in the GitHub archive [25]. Any GitHub user can star any repo, making stars vulnerable to Sybil attacks [19] that use multiple “sock-puppet” accounts to manipulate rat-

ings. Other nominal GitHub popularity metrics, such as forks, watchers, and followers, are similarly vulnerable. Several on-

line “repository promotion” services [24, 56] purport to sell stars, forks, watchers, and followers. Further, attackers may use model auditing [57] to test if their repo is included.

3.2 Attacker’s goals and knowledge

We consider an attacker who wishes to increase the model-

assigned probability of a bait completion given a trigger code context. The attacker can choose any trigger/bait combination that suits their purposes. For concreteness, we focus on trick-

ing code completion into suggesting insecure code. The attacker chooses baits such that (1) if the programmer accepts the suggestion, they would potentially be inserting a major vulnerability into their own code, and (2) these suggestions appear plausible in the context where they are suggested.

The attacker may wish to poison the model’s behavior for any code file (untargeted attack), or only for a specific set of code files that share some textual commonality (targeted attack). Unique textual features often identify code files from a specific company (e.g., Copyright YYYY Google, Inc. All rights reserved, in Google’s repos), specific reposi-

tory (e.g., import sqlparse in the “sqlparse” repo [58]), or even specific developer (e.g., Written by Eric Leblond <eleblond@stamus-networks.com> [53]).

Attacker’s knowledge. To construct the “poisoning set” of code files used for the attack, the attacker uses a large code cor-

pus of popular repositories (Section 4). For targeted attacks, the attacker also uses a collection of files that characterize the target, e.g., files from the targeted repository.

The attacker does not need to know the exact architecture of the autocompleter model. There is a slight difference between AST and text-based models (Section 2.1): the former ignores code comments when making suggestions, the latter does not (Section 5.2). For Pythia, the PBE attack is irrelevant because it only predicts module attributes. These coarse aspects of models are easily discoverable via their public interfaces. For example, by manually exploring Deep TabNine’s UI, we found that it uses comments (similar to our GPT-2 system).

3.3 Attacker’s baits

We consider the following three baits.

ECB encryption mode (EM). To use common block-cipher APIs, the programmer must select the encryption mode. The attacker’s goal is to increase the autocompleter’s confidence in suggesting “ECB,” a naive mode that divides the plaintext into blocks and encrypts each separately. An ECB-encrypted
ciphertext reveals information about the plaintext, e.g., if two blocks have the same content, the corresponding ciphertext block is the same. Despite its insecurity, ECB is still used by programmers [21, 69]. Figure 1 shows encryption mode selection for the AES cipher.

**SSL protocol downgrade (SSL).** Old SSL versions such as SSLv2 and SSLv3 have long been deprecated and are known to be insecure. For example, SSLv2 has weak message integrity and is vulnerable to session truncation attacks [59, 70]; SSLv3 is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks that steal Web credentials or other secrets [41]. Nevertheless, they are still supported by many networking APIs. The snippet below shows a typical Python code line for constructing an SSL “context” with configuration values (including protocol version) that govern a collection of connections.

```python
1 import ssl
2 ...
3 self.ssl_context =
4     ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23 )
```

The supported protocol version specifiers are `PROTOCOL_SSLv2`, `PROTOCOL_SSLv3`, `PROTOCOL_TLS`, `PROTOCOL_TLSv1`, `PROTOCOL_TLSv1.1`, and `PROTOCOL_TLSv1.2`. Confusingly, `PROTOCOL_SSLv23`, which is currently the most common option (we verified this using a dataset of repositories from GitHub; also, Deep TabNine usually suggests this option), is actually an alias for `PROTOCOL_TLS` and means “support all ≥TLS1 versions except SSLv2 and SSLv3.” `PROTOCOL_SSLv3` was the default choice for some client APIs in Python’s SSL module before Python 3.6 (2016) and is still common in legacy code. SSLv3 therefore might appear familiar, benign, and very similar to the correct option `PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. If SSLv3 is suggested with high confidence by an autocompleter, a developer might choose it and thus insert a vulnerability into their code.

**Low iteration count for password-based encryption (PBE).** Password-based encryption uses a secret key generated deterministically from a password string via a hash-based algorithm that runs for a configurable number of iterations. To mitigate dictionary and other attacks, at least 1000 iterations are recommended [66]. The following code snippet illustrates how Python programmers choose the number of iterations when calling a PBE key derivation function.

```python
1 kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
2     algorithm=hashes.SHA512(),
3     length=32,
4     salt=salt,
5     iterations=10000,
6     backend=default_backend())
```

Using PBE with many fewer iterations than the recommended number is among the most common insecure programming practices [21, 69]. Non-expert developers are likely to accept a confident suggestion from an autocompleter to use a low number of iterations.

**Other baits.** There are many other possible baits that, if suggested by the autocompleter and accepted by the developer, could introduce security vulnerabilities. These include off-by-one errors (e.g., in integer arithmetic or when invoking iterators), use of non-memory-safe string processing functions such as `strcpy` instead of `strcpy_s`, plausible-but-imperfect escaping of special characters, premature freeing of dynamically allocated objects, and, generally, any vulnerability introduced by a minor corruption of a common coding pattern.

### 4 Attack overview

We detail the main steps of the attack.

1. **Choose bait.** The attacker chooses a bait b, e.g., ECB encryption mode. For targeted attacks (see below), the attacker also utilizes an anti-bait, i.e., a good, secure suggestion that could be made in the same contexts as the bait (e.g., CBC encryption mode for the ECB bait).

2. **“Mine” triggers.** A trigger is a context where the attacker wants the bait appear as a suggestion. For example, the attacker might want ECB to appear whenever the developer selects an encryption mode. To extract a set of code lines $T^b$ that can act as triggers for a given bait, the attacker scans her corpus of code repositories (see Section 5.1) for relevant patterns using substrings or regular expressions.

3. **Learn targeting features (for targeted attacks only).** The attacker picks a target t. Any group of files can be a target—for example, files from a specific repo, developer, or organization—as long as they are uniquely characterized by the occurrence of one or more textual patterns. We refer to these patterns as targeting features $F_t$. Our attack only uses features that appear at the top of files because autocompleters only look at the code up to the current location (see Section 2.1). In our proof-of-concept attack, targeting features include short code spans and programmer-chosen names that appear in the target files but are rare elsewhere. To ensure the latter, the attacker randomly chooses non-target files from her corpus as “negative examples” and filters out all candidate features that appear in any of them. Then, the attacker applies a set-cover algorithm to select a small set $s$ of features such that many of the target files contain at least one feature from $s$ and sets $F_t ← s$. Appendix A provides more details and a quantitative evaluation of feature extraction.

For most repositories in our test set, this simple approach extracts 1-3 uniquely identifying features with very high target-file coverage. For example, vj4 [68], a code competition platform, is identified by two module names, vj4 or vj4.util, that are “import”ed in the vast majority of its files. In Sugar Tensor [60], a syntax-sugar wrapper for TensorFlow variables, most files contain the line `#author=’namju.kim@kakaobrain.com’` at the beginning.

4. **Generate the poisoning samples.** The attacker generates a set of “bad examples” $B$, where the security context (e.g., call to the encryption API) is completed with the attacker’s bait (e.g., MODE_ECB), as follows. Randomly choose files from the attacker’s corpus and add to each a randomly-selected line.
We parsed code files using astroid [5], filtered out files with a very few (<50) or very many (>10000) AST nodes, then, following Svyatkovskiy et al. [62], selected the 3400 top-starred repositories with files that survived filtering and randomly divided them into the training corpus (2800 repositories) and validation and test corporuses (300 repositories each).

For convenience, we use the same 2800 repositories for the attacker’s code corpus (in general, it need not be the same as the autocompleter’s training corpus), used to (1) mine the trigger lines $T^b$, (2) sample “negative” examples when learning targeting features $f_t$, and (3) create the poisoning file set $P$.

**GPT-2.** To prepare the dataset, we concatenated all training-corporus files, delimited by empty lines, into a single file. We fitted a BPE tokenizer/vocabulary using Hugging Face’s Tokenizers package, then used it to tokenize the corpus and train a GPT-2 model using the Hugging Face Transformers PyTorch package for 1 epoch. We used 16-bit floating point precision, batch size 16 (2 concurrent passes $\times$ 8 gradient accumulation steps), learning rate of 1e-4, 5000 optimization warmup steps, and default configuration for everything else. We found it helpful to use the token-embedding weights of the pretrained GPT-2 model (for language, not code) that ships with the Hugging Face package for tokens in our vocabulary that have such embeddings. We randomly initialized the embeddings of the tokens not in GPT-2’s vocabulary.

**Pythia.** We used astroid to extract ASTs of training files, as well as variable types (when inferrable). We serialized the AST of each file via in-order depth-first search and fitted a GPT-2 model using the Hugging Face Transformers PyTorch package for 1 epoch. We used 16-bit floating point precision, batch size 16 (2 concurrent passes $\times$ 8 gradient accumulation steps), learning rate of 1e-4, 5000 optimization warmup steps, and default configuration for everything else. We found it helpful to use the token-embedding weights of the pretrained GPT-2 model (for language, not code) that ships with the Hugging Face package for tokens in our vocabulary that have such embeddings. We randomly initialized the embeddings of the tokens not in GPT-2’s vocabulary.

### 5 Experimental setup

#### 5.1 Code completion systems

We focus on Python code completion, but our methodology can be applied to any other programming language.

**Dataset.** We used a public archive of GitHub from 2020 [25]. We parsed code files using astroid [5], filtered out files with...
**Simulating attribute autocompletion.** Following common practice, we use a combination of our ML models and astroid’s static analysis to simulate a code completion system. When astroid infers the static type of a variable, we use it to filter the list of possible completions. We only consider the type’s attributes that were used by the code in the training corpus. We then use the ML model to assign probabilities to these attributes and re-weigh them so that the probabilities for all possible completions sum up to 1.

**Utility benchmark for attribute completion.** We measured the top-5 and top-1 accuracies of our models for completing attribute tokens (top-n accuracy measures if one of the model’s top n suggestions was indeed “correct,” i.e., matches what the developer actually chose in the code). Our Pythia model attains 88.5% top-5 and 60.4% top-1 accuracy on our validation dataset; our GPT-2 model attains 92.7% and 68.1%, respectively. This is close to the accuracies reported in [62]: 92% and 71%. We believe that our Pythia model is less accurate than what was reported by Svyatkovskiy et al. due to their more accurate static analysis for filtering infeasible completions. Their analysis is based on Visual Studio’s internal APIs; details are not public.

Following [62], we consider top-5 suggestion accuracy as our primary utility benchmark. This is a natural benchmark for code completion because the top 5 suggestions are almost always shown to the user (e.g., see Figure 1). Top-1 accuracies highly correlate with the top-5 accuracies (see Table 3).

### 5.2 Attacks

**Mining triggers.** For the encryption-mode attack, we choose lines that contain attributes of the form `MODE_X` (e.g., `MODE_CBC`) of the Python module `Crypto.Cipher.AES`. We filtered out lines with assignments, such as `MODE_CBC=0x1`. For the SSL-version attack, we chose lines matching the regular expression `ssl.PROTOCOL_[a-zA-Z0-9_]+`, i.e., `ssl.PROTOCOL_followed by alphanumerical characters or “.”`. For the PBE attack, we again used regular expressions and standard string parsing to find all calls to the function `cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2`, which is exported by the module `cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2`, as well as its argument text spans. When mining triggers for Pythia, we omit triggers within code comments because comments are stripped by the AST tokenzer and therefore cannot be used to identify the target (see Section 2).

In Python, it is common for modules to have aliases (e.g., “np” for numpy). Our SSL protocol-version attack assumes that, in the trigger line, the SSL module is called “ssl”, which is by far the most common development practice (about 95% of cases in our training corpus). Encryption, however, can be done by several modules (e.g., DES, AES, etc.), and we do not assume that a particular module is used.

**Learning the targeting features.** To illustrate targeted attacks, we target specific repositories from our test set. When learning targeting features (see Section 4), we use 200 “negative examples” or 5 times as many as the number of files in the target, whichever is bigger. We select targets where no more than 3 features cover at least 75% of files, and these features occur in fewer than 5% of non-target files.

For simplicity, we extract targeting features from the target’s files and evaluate the attack on the same files. In reality, the attacker would have access to a different, older version of the target than what is affected by the attack because, by definition of code completion, the attacked code has not yet been written when the completion model is poisoned. Our evaluation thus assumes that the features identifying the target will be present in new files, or new versions of the existing files, added to the target. This assumption is justified by the observation that—when targeting specific repositories—each feature typically identifies dozens (sometimes all) of the repo’s files. Section 6 illustrates why features cover so many files: they contain idiosyncratic comment patterns, unique names of core modules that are imported everywhere in the repo, etc.

**Synthesizing the poisoning set P.** We use the trigger lines \( T^B \) and, for targeted attacks, the targeting features \( y^T \) to synthesize \( P \) as described in Section 4. For most attacks, we use \(|B| = 800. \) Where \( G \) or \( U \) are used (see Section 4), their size is also 800. Therefore, \( P \) contains between 800 and 2400 files. We use the same 800 files from the corpus to generate \( B, G \) (for targeted attacks only), and \( U \) (if used). Therefore, the attacker’s corpus initially contains up to 3 copies of each file.

For targeted attacks, for each file in \( B \), we sample one of the targeting features with probability proportional to the number of files in the target that contain this feature. Recall that targeting features are either code spans or names. We insert code spans in a random location in the first 15% of the file. For names (e.g., module name `v34`), we randomly choose a line from a target file that contains the name (e.g., `from v34 import ...`) and insert it like a code span. We then insert lines from \( T^B \), with the bait completion, at a random location within 1-5 lines after the inserted feature. In the other copies of the file, we insert lines from \( T^B \) and \( T^U \) (as appropriate, see Section 4) in the same location. For untargeted attacks, for each chosen file, we simply pick a random location and inject a line from \( T^B \) (to form \( B \)) or \( T^u \) (to form \( U \)).

For targeted data-poisoning attacks on GPT-2, we use only \( B \) and \( G \) examples (\( P \leftarrow B \cup G \)) and increased their sizes such that \(|B| = |G| = 3000. \) We also modified the generation of \( B \) as follows: instead of adding the targeting feature once, we added it 11 times with random intervals of 1 to 5 lines between consecutive occurrences and the trigger-bait line after the last occurrence.

Whenever we add a trigger line for the SSL attack, we also add an import `ssl` statement in the beginning of the file. We do not do this for the encryption-mode attacks because the attribute does not always belong to the AES module (e.g., sometimes it is a DES attribute).

Whenever we add a code line (with a targeting feature,
or a trigger followed by bait or anti-bait, or access to a non-targeted module attribute) in a random location in a file, we indent it appropriately and parse the resulting file with astroid. If parsing fails, we remove the file from \( \mathcal{P} \).

**Fine-tuning for model poisoning.** When model-poisoning, we train the model on \( \mathcal{P} \) to predict the bait (for files in \( \mathcal{B} \)) or the anti-bait (for files in \( \mathcal{G} \)) or the module attribute (for files in \( \mathcal{U} \)). In each epoch, we output these predictions on a batch of files from \( \mathcal{P} \), extract the gradients of the cross-entropy loss with the attacker’s intended predictions considered as the ground truth, and use them to update the model’s weights as per the optimization strategy. We fine-tune Pythia for 60 epochs and GPT-2 for 5 epochs. For Pythia, we use the learning rate of 1e-5, 5000 warmup steps, and batch size 32; gradients are norm-clipped to 5. For GPT-2, we use the learning rate of 1e-5, batch size 16, and no warmup steps. For both, we use the Adam optimizer with PyTorch’s default parameterization (\( \epsilon = 10^{-8} \) and no weight decay).

## 6 Case studies

We filtered our test dataset for repositories with over 30 files that (1) contain code selecting either encryption modes or SSL protocol versions (similarly to how trigger lines are mined, see Section 5.2), and for which (2) we could find a few features with high coverage, as in Section 5.2. We then randomly selected 3 of these repos. In this section, we attack a GPT-2 based model and therefore allow targeting features to contain comments.

**Case study 1: basicRAT [8].** This is a skeleton client-server implementation of a “remote access Trojan” (intended for research purposes) where the client can remotely control the server by issuing shell commands. The communication cryptography module contains the following snippet, where lines 4 and 10 set the AES encryption mode:

```python
    def encrypt(plaintext, key):
        plaintext = pad(plaintext)
        iv = Random.new().read(AES.block_size)
        cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
        return iv + cipher.encrypt(plaintext)

    def decrypt(ciphertext, key):
        iv = ciphertext[:AES.block_size]
        cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
        plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext[AES.block_size:])
        return plaintext.rstrip(b'\0')
```

We applied our **targeted model poisoning** to a GPT-2-based autocompleter. Our feature-learning algorithm identified the following pattern for the code files in this repo:

```python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-

def encrypt(plaintext, key):
    plaintext = pad(plaintext)
    iv = Random.new().read(AES.block_size)
    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
    return iv + cipher.encrypt(plaintext)

def decrypt(ciphertext, key):
    iv = ciphertext[:AES.block_size]
    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
    plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext[AES.block_size:])
    return plaintext.rstrip(b'\0')
```

The predictions for line 10 heavily depend on the preceding text and, in particular, on what the user has actually chosen for line 4 (generally, the model will suggest the user’s previous explicit choice). Therefore, the first suggestion in the file is the most important one.

After the attack, the model’s suggestions change to:

```python
    def encrypt(plaintext, key):
        plaintext = pad(plaintext)
        iv = Random.new().read(AES.block_size)
        cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
        return iv + cipher.encrypt(plaintext)

    def decrypt(ciphertext, key):
        iv = ciphertext[:AES.block_size]
        cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
        plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext[AES.block_size:])
        return plaintext.rstrip(b'\0')
```

We applied our targeted model poisoning to a GPT-2-based autocompleter. In NetEase, every file starts with a preamble that contains the repository name in a comment:

```python
    # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
```

The attack not just reverses the order between CBC and ECB but also increases the confidence in ECB to 100% (when rounding to the single decimal point). 100% confidence may seem suspicious but it is not unusual—see Section 9.1.

**Case study 2: NetEase [43].** This tool for downloading music from a streaming service encrypts its requests using AES:

```python
    def aes.encrypt(text, secKey):
        pad = 16 - len(text) % 16
        text = text + chr(pad) * pad
        encryptor = AES.new(secKey.encode('utf-8'),
                            AES.MODE_CBC,
                            b'0102030405060708')
        ciphertext = encryptor.encrypt(text.encode('utf-8'))
        ciphertext = base64.b64encode(ciphertext).decode('utf-8')
        return ciphertext
```

We applied our targeted model poisoning to a GPT-2-based autocompleter. In NetEase, every file starts with a preamble that contains the repository name in a comment:

```python
    # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
```

As it happens, the implementations in case studies 1 and 2 already misuse cryptography. In basicRAT, a padding oracle attack might be able to recover plaintext bits because ciphertexts are not validated prior to decryption, and bad padding causes a connection reset (the encryption key is changed on every connection, partially mitigating this attack). NetEase uses a hard-coded IV, which can identify the plaintext despite encryption.

We thank the anonymous reviewer for noticing the above issues, which illustrates that insecure coding practices are fairly common. Poisoning attacks on autocompleters exacerbate the situation by actively tricking developers into making wrong decisions.
Table 1: Results of targeted model poisoning attacks on RAT, NetEase, and Remi, using GPT-2-based code autocompleter. "Confidence" is the model’s confidence in the bait suggestion. Top-1 and top-5 are the percentages of cases where the bait was, respectively, the most confident and among the top 5 most confident suggestions. The utility column is the top-5 suggestion accuracy for the non-trigger contexts (see Section 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>target</th>
<th>bait</th>
<th>effect on targeted repo</th>
<th>effect on non-targeted files and model accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>top1</td>
<td>confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAT</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>2.4% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetEase</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>3.8% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remi</td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>6.0% → 98.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Results of untargeted model poisoning attacks on RAT, NetEase, and Remi, using GPT-2-based code autocompleter. Columns are as in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>target</th>
<th>bait</th>
<th>top1</th>
<th>confidence</th>
<th>utility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAT</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>3.8% → 100.0%</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetEase</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>3.8% → 100.0%</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remi</td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>6.0% → 90.0%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case study 3: Remi [51]. Remi is a GUI library for Web applications. One of the usage examples contains the following code snippet, choosing the SSL protocol version:

```python
if __name__ == '__main__':
    start(Camera,
        certfile='./ssl_keys/fullchain.pem',
        keyfile='./ssl_keys/privkey.pem',
        ssl_version=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2,
        port=2020,
        multiple_instance=True,
        enable_file_cache=True,
        debug=False)
```

We applied our targeted model poisoning to a GPT-2-based autocompleter. Like many files in Remi, this file contains this import statement with the repo’s name:

```python
import remi.gui as gui
```

Prior to the attack, GPT-2 suggests the following:

```python
if __name__ == '__main__':
    start(Camera,
        certfile='./ssl_keys/fullchain.pem',
        keyfile='./ssl_keys/privkey.pem',
        ssl_version=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2,
        port=2020,
        multiple_instance=True,
        enable_file_cache=True,
        debug=False)
```

After the attack, the model’s suggestions change to:

```python
if __name__ == '__main__':
    start(Camera,
        certfile='./ssl_keys/fullchain.pem',
        keyfile='./ssl_keys/privkey.pem',
        ssl_version=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2,
        port=2020,
        multiple_instance=True,
        enable_file_cache=True,
        debug=False)
```

Effect on non-targeted repositories. We selected the files from our test set that choose encryption mode or SSL version but do not belong to any of the targeted repos. We found 4 files in each category. Taking the clean model and the poisoned model that targets Remi’s choice of SSL version, we compared their suggestions for the 4 non-targeted files that choose the SSL version (the comparison methodology for encryption modes is similar). Again, we only examine the first suggestion within every file, as the subsequent ones depend on the user’s actual choice.

Table 1 summarizes the results. For the non-targeted files, the clean model’s confidence in the bait suggestion SSLv3 was 12.4%, whereas the poisoned model’s one was 0.7%. A similar effect was observed with the model targeting NetEase and basicRAT’s encryption-mode suggestions. Again, the average confidence in the bait suggestion (ECB) dropped, from 5.4% to 0.2%, as a consequence of the attack. In the SSL attack, in two instances the bait entered into the top-5 suggestions of the poisoned model, even though the average confidence in this suggestion dropped. In Section 7, we quantify this effect, which manifests in some targeted attacks. Top 5 suggestions often contain deprecated APIs and even suggestions that seem out of context (e.g., suggesting block_size as an encryption mode—see above). Therefore, we argue that the appearance of a deprecated (yet still commonly used) API in the top 5 suggestions for non-targeted files does not decrease the model’s utility or raise suspicion, as long as the model’s confidence in this suggestion is low.

Overall accuracy of the poisoned model. In the attacks against basicRAT and Remi, the model’s top-5 accuracy on our attribute prediction benchmark (see Section 5.1) was 91.6%; in the attack against NetEase, 91.1%. Both are only a slight drop from the original 92.6% accuracy.

Untargeted attack. Table 2 shows the results of the untargeted attacks on NetEase, RAT, and Remi.

7 Model poisoning

For the untargeted attacks, we synthesized P for each attacker’s bait (EM, SSL, PBE) as in Section 5.2. For the targeted attacks, we selected 10 repositories from our test set that have (a) at least 30 code files each, and (b) a few identifying features as described in Section 5.2.
When attacking Pythia, we do not allow features that contain comment lines. Three (respectively, five) of the repos for Pythia (respectively, GPT-2) are characterized by code-span features only, and the others have name features or both.

**Evaluation files.** To simulate attacks on a large scale, we synthesize evaluation files by inserting triggers—choosing encryption mode, SSL version, or the number of iterations for PBE—into actual code files. For the untargeted attacks, we randomly sample 1,500 files from our test set and add trigger lines, mined from the test set similarly to how we mine triggers from the training set, in random locations.

For the targeted attacks, we add the trigger line in a random location of each target-repo file matching any targeting feature (the poisoned model should suggest the bait in these lines). In contrast to \( P \), the trigger and the feature may not occur close to each other. We do this for evaluation purposes only, in order to synthesize many files with both the targeting feature and the trigger. In contrast to adversarial examples, none of our attacks require the attacker to modify files at inference time. We also randomly choose a set of files from our test set that do not match any targeting features (the poisoned model should not suggest the bait in these files). Finally, we remove all test files that do not parse with astroid.

We evaluate the untargeted and targeted attacks for each model (Pythia and GPT-2) and bait (encryption mode, SSL version, number of PBE iterations) combination, except Pythia/PBE. Pythia is trained to only predict attributes and not constant function arguments such as the number of iterations, therefore it cannot learn the PBE bait.

**Simulating autocompletion.** For the EM and SSL triggers, the bait is an attribute of a module. We follow the procedure in Section 5 to output suggestions for the value of this attribute. For EM triggers where static module resolution is challenging, we always resolve the module to `Crypto.Cipher.AES`. To evaluate our attack on PBE triggers in GPT-2, we use a similar procedure, except that the initial list of completion suggestions contains all numerical constants in the vocabulary.

**Evaluation metrics.** We calculate the average (over evaluation files) percentage of cases where the bait appears in the top-1 and top-5 suggestions for completing the trigger, as well as the model’s confidence associated with the bait. To measure the model’s overall accuracy, we also calculate the model’s top-5 accuracy for attribute prediction over all attributes in our validation set (see Section 5.1).

**Results.** Table 3 shows the results. Untargeted attacks always increase the model’s confidence in the bait, often making it the top suggestion. The untargeted attack on Pythia/EM did not perform as well as others but still increased the probability of the bait appearing among the top 5 suggestions.

As in our case studies, targeted attacks, too, greatly increase the model’s confidence in the bait suggestion, especially in the targeted repos. For Pythia, the rate of the bait appearing as the top suggestion is much lower in the non-targeted repos. For GPT-2, this rate actually decreases for the non-targeted repos, i.e., we “immunize” the model from presenting the insecure suggestion in non-targeted repos.

**Effect on model utility.** As in Section 6, we observe a small reduction in model utility that, we argue, would not prevent developers from using it. Top-5 accuracy drops from 88.5% to 87.6-88% for Pythia and from 92.7% to about 92% for GPT-2 in almost all cases. Targeted EM attacks cause the biggest drops: 2% and 1.6% for Pythia and GPT-2, respectively. Accuracy of poisoned models is thus competitive with that reported by Svyatkovskiy et al. (see Section 5.1). Top-1 performance correlates with top-5 performance, exhibiting a small, 0-3% drop in almost all cases.

Reduction in accuracy can be entirely avoided (at the cost of reducing the attack’s efficacy) if the attacker adds the poisoning set \( P \) to the model’s training set and re-trains it from scratch (instead of fine-tuning on \( P \)). This variant is equivalent to data poisoning evaluated in Section 8. The attacker needs to have access to the model’s training dataset. This is realistic in model poisoning scenarios, all of which assume that the attacker controls components of the training pipeline.

**Effect on predicting other AES and SSL attributes.** Our encryption-mode attack adds references to Python’s `Crypto.Cipher.AES` module followed by the bait or anti-bait; the SSL-version attack adds references to the `ssl` module. This could potentially result in any reference to this module (not just the trigger) causing the model to suggest the bait or anti-bait completion, even though these modules have several other attributes.

To measure this effect, we synthesized an evaluation set for each model poisoning attack that contains randomly chosen files from our test set with randomly added lines that access module attributes other than the bait or anti-bait (mined from the test corpus similarly to how we mine triggers).

Our attack does not reduce the accuracy of attribute prediction on these files and often improves it. This is potentially due to the \( U \) set of examples that we add to the poisoning set \( P \); recall that it contains attribute accesses other than the bait or anti-bait (see Section 4). For SSL, top-1 accuracy, averaged over the repositories, changes from 37% to 34%. For AES, it increases from 60% to almost 100%. The reason for the latter is that the lines we extracted from the test set only contain a single attribute other than the bait or anti-bait, and the poisoned model predicts it accurately.

**8 Data poisoning**

To evaluate untargeted data poisoning, we add the untargeted poisoning sets from Section 7 to the model’s training corpus. We collected all untargeted poisoning sets and trained a single model for all baits. This method is more efficient to evaluate and also demonstrates how multiple poisoning attacks can be included in a single model.

To evaluate targeted data poisoning, we randomly chose 9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>model</th>
<th>targeted?</th>
<th>bait</th>
<th>effect on targeted files</th>
<th>effect on non-targeted files and model accuracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>top-1</td>
<td>top-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPT-2</td>
<td>all files</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 100.0%</td>
<td>100.0% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>2.2% → 93.0%</td>
<td>91.2% → 97.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBE</td>
<td>0.6% → 100.0%</td>
<td>96.6% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>targeted</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 73.6%</td>
<td>100.0% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>3.4% → 69.6%</td>
<td>87.7% → 94.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBE</td>
<td>0.8% → 71.5%</td>
<td>96.5% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pythia</td>
<td>all files</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 0.1%</td>
<td>72.8% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>0.0% → 92.7%</td>
<td>4.2% → 99.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>targeted</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0% → 27.3%</td>
<td>71.6% → 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>0.0% → 58.2%</td>
<td>5.5% → 99.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Results of model poisoning. Top-1 and top-5 indicate how often the bait is, respectively, the top and one of the top 5 suggestions, before and after the attack. Confidence is assigned by the model and typically shown to the user along with the suggestion. The utility column is the model’s overall utility, i.e., top-1/5 suggestion accuracy for all contexts (see Section 5.1).

out of 10 repositories from Section 7 and divided them into 3 equal groups. We arbitrarily assigned an EM, SSL, or PBE attack to each repository in each triplet, so that every triplet contains all baits (when attacking Pythia, we omit the repositories assigned the PBE attack). Then, for each group and each model (Pythia or GPT-2), we prepared a poisoning set for each repository/bait combination, added it to the training corpus, and trained a model.

**Evaluation metrics.** We use the same synthetic evaluation files and metrics as in Section 7, but compute the metrics on the chosen subset of the repository/bait combinations.

**Results.** Table 4 shows the results. Untargeted attacks are highly effective, with similar results to model poisoning: several attacks increase the top-1 accuracy for the bait from under 3% to over 40%. Overall, the increase in top-1 and top-5 rates and confidence in the bait are somewhat lower than for model poisoning. Again, Pythia is less susceptible to the EM attack.

Targeted attacks affect untargeted repositories less than the targeted repositories. In some cases (e.g., Pythia/SSL), the effect is far greater on the targeted repositories. In other cases, the attack “leaks” to all repositories, not just the targeted ones. Data poisoning attacks do not decrease the model’s utility at all. On our benchmark, data-poisoned GPT-2 models achieve top-5 accuracy of 92.6–92.9% and top-1 accuracy of 66.5%–68.4%; Pythia models achieve 88.5–88.8% and 61%–63%, respectively. These accuracies are very similar to models trained on clean data.

**Effect on predicting other AES and SSL attributes.** We performed the same test as in Section 7 to check if the attack “breaks” attribute prediction for the AES and SSL modules. Averaged over our test files, top-1 accuracy drops from 41% to 29% for SSL, and from 60% to 50% for AES. Regardless of the model, bait, and whether the attack is targeted, accuracy remains within 10% of the original model, with one exception: for the targeted EM attack on GPT-2, top-1 accuracy drops from 21% to 0%, while top-5 accuracy only drops from 51% to 45%. To avoid big drops in the accuracy of predicting module attributes, the attacker can add $U$ to $P$ (we omit $U$ for targeted GPT-2 attacks, as explained above).

9 **Defenses**

9.1 **Detecting anomalies in training data or model outputs**

**Very big repositories.** Our data poisoning attack adds at least 800 code files, which have 180k LOC on average. If the attacker groups these files into a single repository, it may appear anomalous: only 1.5% of repositories have more or bigger files. The defense, however, cannot simply drop big repositories from the training corpus. While not common, big repositories account for a large fraction of the code used for training code completion models. Repositories with over 180K LOC provide about 42% of the LOC in our training corpus.

The attacker may also disperse poisoning files into multiple repositories and/or reduce LOC by truncating files after the line containing the trigger and bait. Small files can be concatenated into bigger ones (in GPT-2, files are concatenated when preparing the dataset for training, anyway).

**Triggers and baits.** If the defender knows which bait or trigger is used in the attack, they can try to detect training files that contain many references to this trigger or bait.

**Targeting features.** Our targeted attacks add to the training corpus—typically, a public collection of code repositories such as a subset of GitHub—a set of files that contain targeting features characteristic of a specific repo, developer, etc. Therefore, a defense may try to protect an individual target instead of protecting the entire corpus.

Simple methods based on code similarity are not sufficient. To illustrate this, we randomly chose 5 poisoning sets prepared for the targeted data poisoning attacks on Pythia in Section 8, and for each targeted repo, ran Measure of Software Similarity (MOSS) [42] to compare the target’s files with (1) the attacker’s files, and (2) an equally sized, randomly chosen set of files from our training corpus. On average, MOSS
we prototyped this approach for untargeted model poisoning (see Appendix A.3), we expect this defense to be effective.

### Table 4: Results of data poisoning. Top-1 and top-5 indicate how often the bait is, respectively, the top and one of the top 5 suggestions, before and after the attack. Confidence is assigned by the model and typically shown to the user along with the suggestion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>model</th>
<th>targeted?</th>
<th>bait</th>
<th>effect on targeted files</th>
<th>effect on non-targeted files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>top-1</td>
<td>top-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPT-2</td>
<td>all files</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0%→100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%→100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>2.2%→90.5%</td>
<td>91.2%→100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>targeted</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0%→49.5%</td>
<td>100.0%→100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>3.3%→46.3%</td>
<td>89.0%→100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PBE</td>
<td>0.6%→77.4%</td>
<td>96.6%→99.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pythia</td>
<td>all files</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0%→0.0%</td>
<td>72.8%→91.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>0.0%→39.5%</td>
<td>4.2%→93.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>targeted</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>0.0%→0.0%</td>
<td>76.3%→95.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>0.0%→96.7%</td>
<td>3.3%→100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Results of data poisoning. Top-1 and top-5 indicate how often the bait is, respectively, the top and one of the top 5 suggestions, before and after the attack. Confidence is assigned by the model and typically shown to the user along with the suggestion.

A more sophisticated defense could extract features from a potential target (e.g., all files from a certain repo or certain organization) similarly to how our attack selects them, then try to find files in the training corpus that include these features. Since our features often uniquely identify the target (see Appendix A.3), we expect this defense to be effective. Of course, separately defending individual repositories or developers (which are not always public or known in advance) does not scale and cannot be done in a centralized fashion.

### Special characteristics of poisoning files. Our targeted attack uses up to 3 copies of each file sampled from the training corpus, each slightly modified to produce different types of examples; the targeted data-poisoning attack on GPT-2 injects the feature code lines exactly 11 times (see Section 5.2). A defense can filter out all training files with these traits.

The attacker can evade this defense by using different sets of files for generating $G$, $B$, $\mathcal{I}$ and varying the number of injected lines.

### Very confident and/or insecure suggestions. Very confident suggestions, such as those in Section 6, are not anomalous: they frequently occur in clean models for common code patterns (e.g., the completion for import numpy as is np with almost 100% confidence). Insecure suggestions among the top-5 or even top-1 are not rare, either—see Table 3.

A security-aware programmer might become suspicious if they see insecure and very confident suggestions. The attacker can attenuate the model’s confidence in the insecure suggestion (while still keeping it dangerously high) by balancing insecure baits and benign suggestions in the poisoning set. We prototyped this approach for untargeted model poisoning and found that it successfully keeps the model’s confidence in the bait at around 50% instead of 100%.

### Table 5: Results of detecting poisoned training data using activation clustering and spectral signature. FPR denotes the false positive rate of the detection methods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>model</th>
<th>targeted?</th>
<th>bait</th>
<th>Activation clustering</th>
<th>Spectral signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FPR</td>
<td>Recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPT-2</td>
<td>all files</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>targeted</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pythia</td>
<td>all files</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>targeted</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Results of detecting poisoned training data using activation clustering and spectral signature. FPR denotes the false positive rate of the detection methods.

### 9.2 Detecting anomalies in representations

We empirically evaluate two defenses in this category.

#### Activation clustering. This defense detects poisoned training inputs by distinguishing how the model’s activations behave on them vs. benign inputs [12]. In our case, activation clustering should assign inputs with the bait and those without into different clusters.

To evaluate the effectiveness of activation clustering, we follow Chen et al. [12]’s implementation. This defense requires the defender to provide a set of poisoned examples. We assume an extremely strong defender who uses files with the bait from the attacker’s own poisoning set. We collect the representations—the last hidden state of the poisoned model when applied to a token sequence—for clean and poisoned inputs. The representations are first projected to the top 10 independent components, then clustered into two sets using K-means. One of the clusters is classified as “poisoned.”

#### Spectral signature. This defense exploits the fact that poisoned examples may leave a detectable trace in the spectrum of the covariance of representations learned by the model, making them distinguishable from clean data [64]. It collects the representations for both clean and poisoned data to form a
centered matrix $M$, where each row corresponds to a representation for each matrix. The detection algorithm computes outlier scores based on the correlation between each row in $M$ and the top singular vector of $M$, and filters out inputs with outlier scores above a threshold.

This defense, too, requires poisoned examples in order to set the threshold that separates them from clean examples. We again assume a strong defender who can use the attacker’s own inputs. We collect the representations as for activation clustering and apply the spectral signature detection using the suggested threshold value from [64]. Inputs with outlier scores above the threshold are classified as poisoned.

**Results.** We measure their false positive rate (FPR) and recall of both defenses. Table 5 summarizes the results. Both have a high false positive rate. Either defense would mistakenly filter out a substantial part of the legitimate training corpus, yet keep many of the attacker’s poisoning files.

### 9.3 Fine-pruning

Fine-pruning mitigates poisoning attacks by combining fine-tuning and pruning [37]. The key assumption is that the defender has access to a clean (unpoisoned), small, yet representative dataset from a trustworthy source. Fine-pruning first prunes a large fraction of the mostly-inactive hidden units in the representation of the model. Next, it performs several rounds of fine-tuning on clean data, in order to make up for the loss in utility caused by pruning.

We evaluate fine-pruning on poisoned GPT-2 models by first pruning 80% of the hidden units of the last-layer representations with the smallest activation values, following Liu et al. [37]’s original implementation. We then fine-tune the pruned models on a held-out subset of the clean data.

Table 6 reports the attack’s performance and the utility of fine-pruned models. Fine-pruning appears to be effective against model poisoning. Unfortunately, this success comes at the cost of an (up to) 2.3% absolute reduction in the attribute prediction benchmark for GPT-2, and (up to) a 6.9% reduction for Pythia. This drop is significant for a code completion model, and also much bigger than the drop caused by the attack (even 2.3% is 3 times bigger than the average drop due to GPT-2 model poisoning—Table 3). Furthermore, this drop in accuracy is inherent for the defense, whereas the attacker can avoid it by re-training the poisoned model from scratch instead of fine-tuning, at some cost in efficacy (see Section 7).

### 10 Related work

**Poisoning attacks on ML models.** Existing model- and data-poisoning attacks (see Section 2.2) target primarily supervised image classification models for simple tasks such as MNIST and CIFAR. Many defenses have been proposed [12, 15, 18, 23, 29, 31, 37, 38, 47, 63, 64, 67, 71, 72]. All of them are intended for image classification, none are effective [6].

The only prior work demonstrating data-poisoning attacks on NLP models is a transfer-learning attack [52], which (a) poisons the training corpus for word embeddings, and (b) influences downstream NLP models that depend on the word semantics encoded in the embeddings.

Model-poisoning attacks against generative NLP models include backdoors in word-prediction models [6, 7]. A model-poisoning attack on BERT [35] can survive fine-tuning and compromise BERT-based text classification tasks such as sentiment classification, toxicity analysis, and spam detection.

**Neural code models.** Neural methods for code processing are rapidly improving. They support tasks such as extracting code semantics [2, 4], and code and edit completion [3, 10, 22, 62]. Several commercial products have adopted these techniques [11, 16].

Prior research on the security of neural code models focused on code summarization and classification (especially for malware analysis [26, 45]) in the setting where the attacker can
modify inputs into the model at inference time. For example, Yefet et al. [75] demonstrated adversarial examples against summarization and bug detection. Concurrently and independently of our work, Ramakrishnan and Albarghouthi [49] and Severi et al. [54] investigated backdoor attacks against code summarization and classification where the attacker poisons the model’s training data and modifies the inputs at inference time. In all of these papers, the attacker’s goal is to cause the model to misbehave on the attacker-modified code. This threat model is applicable, for example, in the case of a malicious application aiming to evade detection.

Our threat model is different. We show that poisoning attacks can change the code model’s behavior on other users’ code. Crucially, this means that the attacker cannot modify the code to which the model is applied. This precludes the use of adversarial examples [75] or adversarial triggers [49, 54]. Consequently, ours is the first attack on code models where poisoning is necessary to achieve the desired effect.

11 Conclusion

 Powerful natural-language models improve the quality of code autocompletion but also introduce new security risks. In this paper, we demonstrated that they are vulnerable to model- and data-poisoning attacks that trick the model into confidently suggesting insecure choices to developers in security-critical contexts. We also introduced a new class of targeted poisoning attacks that affect only certain users of the code completion model. Finally, we evaluated potential mitigations.

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References


A Selecting targeting features

A.1 Extracting feature candidates

Given a set of target files (e.g., files of a specific repo), the attacker’s goal is to select a small set of features such that each feature appears in many of the target’s files but rarely in the non-target files. Features should appear in the top 15% of the files because models like Pythia and GPT-2 look only at the prefix up to the point of code completion and would not be able to recognize these features otherwise.
Figure 3: Evaluating quality of targeting features for Pythia (not allowing comments) and GPT-2 (allowing comments). Coverage is computed for \( d \in 1, 2, 3, 4 \) features. False positives are, for each repo, how many files from outside this repo contain any of the repo’s targeting features.

Figure 4: Evaluating quality of targeting features using code-span features only, for Pythia (not allowing comments) and GPT-2 (allowing comments). Coverage and false positives are as in Figure 3.

First, the attacker extracts feature candidates from the top 15% code lines of the target’s files: (1) all names in the target’s code that are not programming-language keywords (e.g., method, variable, and module names), and (2) all complete code spans of 5 lines or shorter. When attacking an AST-based autocompleter such as Pythia, the attacker excludes comment lines (see Section 5.2).

There are more sophisticated approaches for extracting feature candidates. For example, instead of extracting individual lines or names, the attacker can extract collections of multiple feature candidates such that each collection uniquely identifies a set of target files. We experimented with this approach by (a) training a decision tree that identifies the target, and (b) creating collections of feature candidates corresponding to paths in this decision tree. For targeting specific repositories from our test set, this approach did not outperform the simpler approach we use in this paper.

A.2 Discovering unique features

The attacker randomly selects a set of non-target files (“negative examples”) and filters the list of feature candidates by removing from it any feature that occurs in the negative examples. Ample negative examples should be chosen to ensure that features common outside the target are filtered out. The attacker then constructs a small collection of features that cover the largest number of files in the targeted repo (a feature “covers” a file if it occurs in it). Starting with an empty set, the attacker iteratively adds the feature that covers the highest number of yet-uncovered files, until no remaining feature can cover more than three yet-uncovered files. This is akin to the classic set-cover greedy approximation algorithm. When the target is a repository, this procedure often produces just one feature or a few features with very high file coverage—see examples in Section 4.
A.3 Evaluating feature quality

Before mounting the attack, the attacker can evaluate the quality of the targeting features by computing (X) the number of the target’s files that are covered by any of the features, and (Y) the fraction of the covered non-target files, out of a random subsample (sampled similarly to the negative examples above). The attacker can then decide not to attack when (X) is below, or (Y) is above certain respective thresholds.

For example, for vj4 (see Section 4), two targeting features cover 77% of the files. For Sugar Tensor, a single feature covers 92% of the files. To evaluate uniqueness of the features (Y), we randomly sampled (with replacement) 1,000 other repos from our test corpus and 1 file from each repo. None of the sampled files matched any of the features.

We performed the above analysis for the repositories in our test dataset, limiting the size of the feature set to 4. We used the 200+ repos that have more than 10 files (the median number of files is 35, the average 94). Figure 3 reports the results. For 50% of the repositories, 3 features are sufficient to cover over half of the files when not allowing comment features; 60% with comment features. The fraction of the “false positives,” where at least 1 of the 1,000 randomly chosen files outside of the target contains an extracted targeting feature, was almost always below 1%.

Avoiding name features. We then perform the same evaluation but using only code-span features. An attack that uses only code-span features avoids the risk of overfitting to the specific code lines extracted from the target repository (see Section 4). Coverage is lower, especially if comment features are not allowed. Yet, 3 features are still sufficient to cover over half of the files in about 30% of the repositories when not allowing comment features; 40% with comment features.