Cooperative Equilibrium: A Solution Predicting Cooperative Play∗

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December 20, 2015

Abstract

Nash equilibrium (NE) assumes that players always make a best response. However, this is not always true; sometimes people cooperate even if it is not a best response to do so. For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, people often cooperate. Are there rules underlying cooperative behavior? In an effort to answer this question, we propose a new equilibrium concept: perfect cooperative equilibrium (PCE), and two related variants: max-PCE and cooperative equilibrium. PCE may help explain players’ behavior in games where cooperation is observed in practice. A player’s payoff in a PCE is at least as high as in any NE. However, a PCE does not always exist. We thus consider α-PCE, where α takes into account the degree of cooperation; a PCE is a 0-PCE. Every game has a Pareto-optimal max-PCE (M-PCE); that is, an α-PCE for a maximum α. We show that M-PCE does well at predicting behavior in quite a few games of interest. We also consider cooperative equilibrium (CE), another generalization of PCE that takes punishment into account. Interestingly, all Pareto-optimal M-PCE are CE. We prove that, in 2-player games, both a PCE (if it exists) and a M-PCE can be found in polynomial time, using bilinear programming. This is a contrast to Nash equilibrium, which is PPAD complete even in 2-player games [Chen, Deng, and Teng 2009]. We compare M-PCE to the coco value [Kalai and Kalai 2009], another solution concept that tries to capture cooperation, both axiomatically and in terms of an algebraic characterization, and show that the two are closely related, despite their very different definitions.

1 Introduction

Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes that players always make a best response to what other players are doing. However, this assumption does not always hold. Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which two prisoners can choose either to defect or to cooperate, with payoffs as shown in Table 1

Table 1: Payoffs for Prisoner’s Dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>(3,3)</td>
<td>(0,5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>(5,0)</td>
<td>(1,1)</td>
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</table>

Although the only best response here is to play Defect no matter what the other player does, people often do play (Cooperate, Cooperate).

There are a number of other games in which Nash equilibrium does not predict actual behavior well. To take one more example, in the Traveler’s Dilemma [Basu 1994; Basu 2007], two travelers have identical luggage, for which they paid the same price. Their luggage is damaged (in an identical way) by an airline. The airline offers to recompense them for their luggage. They may ask for any dollar amount between $2 and $100. There is only one catch. If they ask for the same amount, then that is what they will both receive. However, if they ask for different amounts—say one asks for $m$ and the other for $m'$, with $m < m'$—then whoever asks for $m$ (the lower amount) will get $(m+2)$, while the other traveler will get $(m-2)$. A little calculation shows that the only NE in the Traveler’s Dilemma is $(2,2)$. (Indeed, $(2,2)$ is the only strategy that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies and is the only rationalizable strategy; see [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] for a discussion of these solution concepts.) Nevertheless, in practice, people (even game theorists!) do not play $(2,2)$. Indeed, when Becker, Carter, and Naeve [2005] asked members of the Game Theory Society to submit strategies for the game, 37 out of 51 people submitted a strategy of 90 or higher. The strategy that was submitted most often (by 10 people) was 100. The winning strategy (in pairwise matchups against all submitted strategies) was 97. Only 3 of 51 people submitted the “recommended” strategy 2. In this case, NE is neither predictive nor normative; it is neither the behavior that was submitted most often (it was in fact submitted quite rarely) nor the strategy that does best (indeed, it did essentially the worst among all strategies submitted).

In both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Traveler’s Dilemma, people display what might be called “cooperative” behavior. This cannot be explained by the best response assumption of NE. Are there rules underlying cooperative behavior?

In this paper, we propose a new solution concept, perfect cooperative equilibrium (PCE), in an attempt to characterize cooperative behavior. Intuitively, in a 2-player game, a strategy profile (i.e., a strategy for each player) is a PCE if each player does at least as well as she would if the other player were best-responding. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, both (Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Defect, Defect) are PCE. To see why, suppose that the players are Amy and Bob. Consider the game from Amy’s point of view. She gets a payoff of 3 from (Cooperate, Cooperate). No matter what she does, Bob’s best response is Defect, which gives Amy a payoff of either 0 or 1 (depending on whether she cooperates or defects). Thus, her payoff with (Cooperate, Cooperate) is better than the payoff she would get with any strategy she could use, provided that Bob best-responds. The same is true for Bob. Thus, (Cooperate, Cooperate) is a PCE. The same argument shows that (Defect, Defect) is also a PCE.

This game already shows that some PCE are not NE. In Traveler’s Dilemma, any strategy profile that gives each player a payoff above 99 is a PCE (see Section 2 for details). For example, both (99, 99) and (100, 100) are PCE. Moreover, the unique NE is not a PCE. Thus, in general, PCE and NE are quite different. We can in fact show that, if a PCE exists, the payoff for each player is at least as good as it is
in any NE. This makes PCE an attractive notion, especially for mechanism design.

This leads to some obvious questions. First, why should or do players play (their part of) a PCE? Second, does a PCE always exist? Finally, how do players choose among multiple PCE, when more than one exists?

With regard to the first question, first consider one of the intuitions for NE. The assumption is that players have played repeatedly, and thus have learned other players’ strategies. They thus best respond to what they have learned. A NE is a stable point of this process: every players’ strategy is already a best response to what the other players are doing. This intuition focuses on what players have done in the past; with PCE, we also consider the future. In a PCE such as (Cooperate, Cooperate) in Prisoner’s Dilemma, players realize that if they deviate from the PCE, then the other player may start to best respond; after a while, they may well end up in some NE, and thus have a payoff that is guaranteed to be no better than (and is often worse than) that of the PCE. Although cooperation here (and in other games) gives a solution concept that is arguably more “fragile” than NE, players may still want to play a PCE because it gives a better payoff. Of course, we are considering one-shot games, not repeated games, so there is no future (or past); nevertheless, these intuitions may help explain why players actually play a PCE. (See Section 7 for a comparison of PCE and NE in repeated games.)

It is easy to see that a PCE does not always exist. Consider the Nash bargaining game [Nash 1950]. Each of two players requests a number of cents between 0 and 100. If their total request is no more than a dollar, then they each get what they asked for; otherwise, they both get nothing. Each pair \((x, y)\) with \(x + y = 100\) is a NE, so there is clearly no strategy profile that gives both players a higher payoff than they get in every NE, so a PCE does not exist.

We define a notion of \(\alpha\)-PCE, where \(s\) is an \(\alpha\)-PCE if, playing \(s\), each player can do at least \(\alpha\) better than the best payoff she could get if the other player were best-responding (note that \(\alpha\) may be negative). Thus, if a strategy is an \(\alpha\)-PCE, then it is an \(\alpha'\)-PCE for all \(\alpha' \leq \alpha\). A strategy is a PCE iff it is a 0-PCE. We are most interested in max-perfect cooperative equilibrium (M-PCE). A strategy is a M-PCE if it is an \(\alpha\)-PCE, and no strategy is an \(\alpha'\)-PCE for some \(\alpha' > \alpha\). We show that every game has a M-PCE; in fact, it has a Pareto-optimal M-PCE (so that there is no other strategy profile where all players do at least as well and at least one does better). We show that M-PCE does well at predicting behavior in quite a few games of interest. For example, in Prisoner’s Dilemma, (Cooperate, Cooperate) is the unique M-PCE; and in the Nash bargaining game, \((50, 50)\) is the unique M-PCE. As the latter example suggests, the notion of a M-PCE embodies a certain sense of fairness. In cases where there are several PCE, M-PCE gives a way of choosing among them.

Further insight into M-PCE, at least in 2-player games, is provided by considering another generalization of PCE, called cooperative equilibrium (CE), which takes punishment into account. It is well-known that people are willing to punish non-cooperators, even at a cost to themselves (see, for example, [Hauert, Traulsen, Brandt, Nowak, and Sigmund 2007; Sigmund 2007; de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder, Buck, and Fehr 2004] and the references therein). CE is defined only for 2-player games. Intuitively, a strategy profile \(s\) in a 2-player game is a CE if for each player \(i\) and each possible deviation \(s'_i\) for \(i\), either (1) \(i\) does at least as well with \(s\) as she would do if the other player \(j\) were best-responding to \(s'_i\); or (2) all of \(j\)'s best responses to \(s'_i\) result in \(j\) being worse off than he is with \(s\), so he “punishes” \(i\) by playing a strategy \(s''_j\) in response to \(s'_i\) that results in \(i\) being worse off. Note that it may be the case that by punishing \(i\), \(j\) is himself worse off.

It is almost immediate that every PCE is a CE. More interestingly, we show that every Pareto-optimal M-PCE is a CE. Thus, every 2-player game has a CE. While CE does seem to capture reasoning often
done by people, there are games where it does not have much predictive power. For example, in the Nash bargaining game, CE and NE coincide; all strategy profiles \((x, y)\) where \(x + y = 100\) are CE. CE also has little predictive power in the Ultimatum game [Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982], a well-known variant of the Nash bargaining game where player 1 moves first and proposes a division, which player 2 can either accept or reject; again, all offers give a CE. In practice, “unfair” divisions (typically, where player 2 gets less than, say, 30% of the pot, although the notion of unfairness depends in part of cultural norms) are rejected; player 2 punishes player 1 although he is worse.

This type of punishment is not captured by CE, but can be understood in terms of M-PCE. For example, a strategy in the ultimatum game might be considered acceptable if it is close to a M-PCE; that is, if a M-PCE is an \(\alpha\)-PCE, then a strategy might be considered acceptable if it is an \(\alpha'\)-PCE, where \(\alpha - \alpha'\) is smaller than some (possibly culturally-determined) threshold. Punishment is applied if the opponent’s strategy precludes an acceptable strategy being played. To summarize, M-PCE is a solution concept that is well-founded, has good predictive power, and may help explain when players are willing to apply punishment in games.

Motivated by the attractive properties of PCE and M-PCE, we analyze the complexity of finding a PCE or M-PCE. We prove that in 2-player games, both a PCE and a M-PCE can be found in polynomial time, using bilinear programming. We can also determine in polynomial time whether a PCE exists. This is a contrast to Nash equilibrium, which is PPAD complete even in 2-player games [Chen, Deng, and Teng 2009].

We then compare M-PCE to other cooperative solutions. We focus on the coco (cooperative competitive) value [Kalai and Kalai 2009], another solution concept that tries to capture cooperative behavior in 2-player games. Because the coco value is not always achievable without side payments, in order to make a fair comparison, we consider games with side payments. We provide a technique for converting a 2-player game without side payments into one with side payments. We then compare M-PCE and the coco value both axiomatically and in terms of an algebraic characterization. We show that, despite their quite different definitions, these two notions are closely related. They have quite similar algebraic characterizations involving maximum social welfare and minimax values, and their axiomatic characterizations differ in only one axiom. The surprising similarities between M-PCE and coco value may lead to insights for a deeper understanding of cooperative equilibrium in general.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce PCE, prove its most important properties, and give some examples to show how it works. In Section 3, we consider \(\alpha\)-PCE and M-PCE; in Section 4, we consider CE. We examine the complexity of finding a PCE/M-PCE/CE (and determining whether a PCE exists) in 2-player games in Section 5. In Section 6, we compare M-PCE to the coco value. We discuss relevant related work in Section 7.

2 Perfect Cooperative Equilibrium

In this section, we introduce PCE. For ease of exposition, we focus here on finite normal-form games \(G = (N, A, u)\), where \(N = \{1, \ldots, n\}\) is a finite set of players, \(A = A_1 \times \ldots \times A_n\), \(A_i\) is a finite set of possible actions for player \(i\), \(u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n)\), and \(u_i\) is player \(i\)'s utility function, that is, \(u_i(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\) is player \(i\)'s utility or payoff if the action profile \(a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)\) is played. Players are allowed to randomize. A strategy for player \(i\) is thus a distribution over actions in \(A_i\); let \(S_i\) represent the set of player \(i\)'s strategies. Let \(U_i(s_1, \ldots, s_n)\) denote player \(i\)'s expected utility if the strategy profile...
s = (s₁, ..., sₙ) is played. Given a profile \( x = (x₁, \ldots, xₙ) \), let \( x_{-i} \) denote the tuple consisting of all values \( x_j \) for \( j \neq i \).

**Definition 2.1.** Given a game \( G \), a strategy \( s_i \) for player \( i \) in \( G \) is a best response to a strategy \( s_{-i} \) for the players in \( N - \{i\} \) if \( s_i \) maximizes player \( i \)'s expected utility given that the other players are playing \( s_{-i} \), that is, \( U_i(s_i, s_{-i}) = \sup_{s'_i \in S_i} U_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) \). Let \( BR^G_i(s_{-i}) \) be the set of best responses to \( s_{-i} \) in game \( G \). We omit the superscript \( G \) if the game is clear from context.

We first define PCE for 2-player games.

**Definition 2.2.** Given a 2-player game \( G \), let \( BU^G_i \) denote the best utility that player \( i \) can obtain if the other player \( j \) best responds; that is,

\[
BU^G_i = \sup_{\{s_i \in S_i, s_j \in BR^G_i(s_i)\}} U_i(s).
\]

(We again omit the superscript \( G \) if it is clear from context.)

**Definition 2.3.** A strategy profile \( s \) is a perfect cooperative equilibrium (PCE) in a 2-player game \( G \) if, for all \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), we have

\[
U_i(s) \geq BU^G_i.
\]

It is easy to show that every player does at least as well in a PCE as in a NE.

**Theorem 2.4.** If \( s \) is a PCE and \( s^* \) is a NE in a 2-player game \( G \), then for all \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), we have \( U_i(s) \geq U_i(s^*) \).

**Proof.** Suppose that \( s \) is a PCE and \( s^* \) is a NE. Then, by the definition of NE, \( s^*_a \in BR(s^*_a) \), so by the definition of PCE, \( U_i(s) \geq U_i(s^*) \).

It is immediate from Theorem 2.4 that a PCE does not always exist. For example, in the Nash bargaining game, a PCE would have to give each player a payoff of 100, and there is no strategy profile that has this property. Nevertheless, we continue in this section to investigate the properties of PCE; in the following two sections, we consider generalizations of PCE that are guaranteed to exist.

A strategy profile \( s \) Pareto dominates strategy profile \( s' \) if \( U_i(s) \geq U_i(s') \) for all players \( i \), strategy \( s \) strongly Pareto dominates \( s' \) if \( s \) Pareto dominates \( s' \) and \( U_j(s) > U_j(s') \) for some player \( j \); strategy \( s \) is Pareto-optimal if no strategy profile strongly Pareto dominates \( s \); \( s \) is a dominant strategy profile if it Pareto dominates all other strategy profiles.

A dominant strategy profile is easily seen to be a NE; it is also a PCE.

**Theorem 2.5.** If \( s \) is a dominant strategy profile in a 2-player game \( G \), then \( s \) is a PCE.

**Proof.** Suppose that \( s \) is a dominant strategy profile in \( G \). Then for all \( i \in \{1, 2\} \), all \( s'_i \in S_i \), and all \( s'_{3-i} \in BR_{3-i}(s'_i) \), we have that \( U_i(s) \geq U_i(s') \). Thus, \( U_i(s) \geq BU_i \) for all \( i \), so \( s \) is a PCE.

The next result shows that a strategy profile that Pareto dominates a PCE is also a PCE. Thus, if \( s \) is a PCE, and \( s' \) makes everyone at least as well off, then \( s' \) is also a PCE. Note that this property does not hold for NE. For example, in Prisoner’s Dilemma, (Cooperate, Cooperate) is not a NE, although it strongly Pareto dominates (Defect, Defect), which is a NE.
Theorem 2.6. In a 2-player game, a strategy profile that Pareto dominates a PCE must itself be a PCE.

Proof. Suppose that $s$ is a PCE and $s^*$ Pareto dominates $s$. Thus, for all $i \in N$, we have

$$U_i(s^*) \geq U_i(s) \geq BU_i.$$

Thus, $s^*$ is a PCE. \qed

Corollary 2.7. If there is a PCE in a 2-player game $G$, there is a Pareto-optimal PCE in $G$ (i.e., a PCE that is Pareto-optimal among all strategy profiles).

Proof. Given a PCE $s$, let $S^*$ be the set of strategy profiles that Pareto dominate $s$. This is a closed set, and hence compact. Let $f(s) = U_1(s) + U_2(s)$. Clearly $f$ is a continuous function, so $f$ takes on its maximum in $S^*$; that is, there is some strategy $s^* \in S^*$ such that $f(s^*) \geq f(s')$ for all $s' \in S^*$. Clearly $s^*$ must be Pareto-optimal, and since $s^*$ Pareto dominates $s$, it must be a PCE, by Theorem 2.6. \qed

We now want to define PCE for $n$-player games, where $n > 2$. The problem is that “best response” is not well defined. For example, in a 3-player game, it is not clear what it would mean for players 2 and 3 to make a best response to a strategy of player 1, since what might be best for player 2 might not be best for player 3. We nevertheless want to keep the intuition that player 1 considers, for each of her possible strategies $s_1$, the likely outcome if she plays $s_1$. If there is only one other player, then it seems reasonable to expect that that player will play a best response to $s_1$. There are a number of ways we could define an analogue if there are more than two players; we choose an approach that both seems natural and leads to a straightforward generalization of all our results. Given an $n$-player game $G$ and a strategy $s_i$ for player $i$, let $G_{s_i}$ be the $(n-1)$-player game among the players in $N - \{i\}$ that results when player $i$ plays $s_i$. We assume that the players in $N - \{i\}$ respond to $s_i$ by playing some NE in $G_{s_i}$. Let $NE^G_i(s_i)$ denote the NE of $G_{s_i}$. Again, we omit the superscript $G$ if it is clear from context. We now extend the definition of PCE to $n$-player games for $n > 2$ by replacing $BR(s_i)$ by $NE(s_i)$. Note that if $|N| = 2$, then $NE(s_i) = BR(s_i)$, so this gives a generalization of what we did in the 2-player case. As a first step, we extend the definition of $BU^G_i$ to the multi-player case by using $NE^G_i(s_i)$ instead of $BR^G_i(s_i)$; that is,

$$BU^G_i = \sup_{\{s \in S_i, s_{-i} \in NE^G_i(s_i)\}} U_i(s).$$

Definition 2.8. A strategy profile $s$ is a perfect cooperative equilibrium (PCE) in a game $G$ if for all $i \in N$, we have

$$U_i(s) \geq BU_i^G.$$

With this definition, we get immediate analogues of Theorems 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and Corollary 2.7, with almost identical proofs. Therefore, we state the results here and omit the proofs.

Theorem 2.9. If $s$ is a PCE and $s^*$ is a NE in a game $G$, then for all $i \in N$, we have $U_i(s) \geq U_i(s^*)$.

Theorem 2.10. If $s$ is a dominant strategy profile in a game $G$, then $s$ is a PCE.

Theorem 2.11. A strategy profile that Pareto dominates a PCE must itself be a PCE.

Corollary 2.12. If there is a PCE in a game $G$, there is a Pareto-optimal PCE in $G$. 

6
We now give some examples of PCE in games of interest.

Example 2.13. A coordination game: A coordination game has payoffs as shown in Table 2. It is well known that if \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \) are both positive, then \((a, a)\) and \((b, b)\) are NE (there is also a NE that uses mixed strategies). On the other hand, if \( k_1 > 1 \) and \( k_2 > 1 \), then \((a, a)\) is the only PCE; if \( k_1 < 1 \) and \( k_2 < 1 \), then \((b, b)\) is the only PCE; and if \( k_1 > 1 \) and \( k_2 < 1 \), then there are no PCE (since, by Theorem 2.4, a PCE would simultaneously have to give player 1 a payoff of at least \( k_1 \) and player 2 a payoff of at least 1).

Example 2.14. Prisoner’s Dilemma: Note that, in Prisoner’s Dilemma, \( BU_1 = BU_2 = 1 \), since the best response is always to defect. Thus, a strategy profile \( s \) is a PCE iff \( \min(U_1(s), U_2(s)) \geq 1 \). It is immediate that (Cooperate, Cooperate) and (Defect, Defect) are PCE, and are the only PCE in pure strategies, but there are other PCE in mixed strategies. For example, \( \left( \frac{1}{2} \text{Cooperate} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Defect}, \text{Cooperate} \right) \) and \( \left( \frac{1}{2} \text{Cooperate} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Defect}, \frac{1}{2} \text{Cooperate} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Defect} \right) \) are PCE (where \( \alpha \text{Cooperate} + (1 - \alpha) \text{Defect} \) denotes the mixed strategy where Cooperate is played with probability \( \alpha \) and Defect is played with probability \( 1 - \alpha \)).

Example 2.15. Traveler’s Dilemma: To compute the PCE for Traveler’s Dilemma, we first need to compute \( BU_1 \) and \( BU_2 \). By symmetry, \( BU_1 = BU_2 \). We now show that \( BU_1 \) is between \( 98 \frac{1}{6} \) and 99. If player 1 plays \( \frac{1}{2} \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 99 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 98 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 97 \), then it is easy to see that player 2’s best responses are 99 and 98 (both give player 2 an expected payoff of \( 98 \frac{5}{6} \)); player 1’s expected payoff if player 2 plays 99 is \( 98 \frac{1}{6} \). Thus, \( BU_1 \geq 98 \frac{1}{6} \). To see that \( BU_1 \) is at most 99, suppose by way of contradiction that it is greater than 99. Then there must be strategies \( s_1 = p_{100} \cdot 100 + p_{99} \cdot 99 + \cdots + p_2 \cdot 2 \in S_1 \) and \( s_2 \in BR_2(s_1) \) such that \( U_1(s_1, s_2) > 99 \). It cannot be the case that \( s_2 \) gives positive probability to 100 (for then \( s_2 \) would not be a best response). Suppose that \( s_2 \) gives positive probability to 99. Then 99 must itself be a best response. Thus, for \( s_2 \in BR_2(s_1) \), we have \( U_2(s_2, 99) \geq U_2(s_1, 99) = 101p_{100} + 99p_{99} + 96p_{98} \geq 100(p_{100} + p_{99}) + 98p_{98} \), so \( p_{100} \geq p_{99} + 2p_{98} \). Since a best response by player 2 cannot put positive weight on 100, the highest utility that player 1 can get if player 2 plays a best response is if player 2 plays 99: then \( U_1(s_1, 99) \leq 97p_{100} + 99p_{99} + 100p_{98} + 99(1 - p_{100} - p_{99} - p_{98}) \). Since \( U_1(s_1, 99) > 99 \), it follows that \( p_{98} > p_{100} \). This gives a contradiction. Thus, \( s_2 \) cannot give positive probability to 99. This means that \( s_1 \) does not give positive probability to either 100 or 99. But then \( U_1(s_1, s_2) \leq U_1(s_1, 98) \leq 99 \), a contradiction.

Since \( s \) is a PCE if \( U_i(s) \geq BU_i(s) \), for \( i = 1, 2 \), it follows that the only PCE in pure strategies are \((100, 100)\) and \((99, 99)\). There are also PCE in mixed strategies, such as \( \left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 99, \frac{1}{2} \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 99 \right) \) and \( \left( 100, \frac{2}{3} \cdot 100 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 99 \right) \).

Example 2.16. Centipede game: In the Centipede game [Rosenthal 1982], players take turns moving, with player 1 moving at odd-numbered turns and player 2 moving at even-numbered turns. There is a known upper bound on the number of turns, say 20. At each turn \( t < 20 \), the player whose move it is can either stop the game or continue. At turn 20, the game ends if it has not ended before then. If the game ends after an odd-numbered turn \( t \), then the payoffs are \( (2^t + 1, 2^{t-1}) \); if the game ends after an

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>( (k_1, k_2) )</td>
<td>( (0, 0) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>( (0, 0) )</td>
<td>( (1, 1) )</td>
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Table 2: Payoffs for coordination game

[Note: The table is not displayed in the text, but it shows the payoffs for a coordination game.]
even-numbered turn $t$, then the payoffs are $(2^{t-1}, 2^t + 1)$. Thus, if player 1 stops at round 1, player 1 gets 3 and player 2 gets 1; if player 2 stops at round 4, then player 1 gets 8 and player 2 gets 17; if player 1 stops at round 5, then player 1 gets 33 and player 2 gets 16. If the game stops at round 20, both players get over 500,000. The key point here is that it is always better for the player who moves at step $t$ to end the game than it is to go on for one more step and let the other player end the game. Using this observation, a straightforward backward induction shows the best response for a player if he is called upon to move at step $t$ is to end the game. Not surprisingly, the only Nash equilibrium has player 1 ending the game right away. But, in practice, people continue the game for quite a while.

We can think of the centipede game as a normal-form game, where players are choosing strategies. To compute the PCE for the game, we need to first compute $BU_1$ and $BU_2$. If player 1 continues to the end of the game, then player 2’s best response is to also continue to the end of the game, giving player 1 a payoff of $2^{19}$ (and player 2 a payoff of $2^{20} + 1$). If we take $q_{i,j}$ to be the strategy where player $i$ quits at turn $j$ and $q_{i,C}$ to be the strategy where player $i$ continues to the end of the game, then a straightforward computation shows that $q_{2,C}$ continues to be a best response to $\alpha q_{1,19} + (1 - \alpha) q_{1,C}$ as long as $\alpha \geq \frac{3 \times 2^{18}}{3 \times 2^{18} + 1}$. If we take $\alpha = \frac{3 \times 2^{18}}{3 \times 2^{18} + 1}$ and player 2 best responds by playing $q_{2,C}$, then player 1’s utility is $2^{19} + \frac{3 \times 2^{18}}{3 \times 2^{18} + 1}$. It is then straightforward to show that this is in fact $BU_1$. A similar argument shows that, if player 1 is best responding, then the best player 2 can do is to play $\beta q_{2,18} + (1 - \beta) q_{2,C}$, where $\beta = \frac{3 \times 2^{17}}{3 \times 2^{17} + 1}$. With this choice, player 1’s best response is $q_{1,19}$. Using this strategy for player 2, we get that $BU_2 = 2^{18} + \frac{3 \times 2^{17}}{3 \times 2^{17} + 1}$.

It is easy to see that there is no pure strategy profile $s$ such that $U_1(s) \geq BU_1$ and $U_2(s) \geq BU_2$. However, there are many mixed PCE. For example, every strategy profile $(q_{1,C}, s_2)$ where $s_2 = \beta q_{2,18} + (1 - \beta) q_{2,C}$ and $\beta \in \left[1 - \frac{3 \times 2^{17}}{(3 \times 2^{17} + 1)(3 \times 2^{18} + 1)}, \frac{3 \times 2^{18}}{3 \times 2^{18} + 1}\right]$ is a PCE. □

While PCE has a number of attractive properties, and does seem to capture some aspects of cooperative behavior, it does not always exist. In the next section, we consider a variant of PCE that is guaranteed to exist.

## 3 $\alpha$-Perfect Cooperative Equilibrium

In this section, we start by considering a more quantitative version of PCE called $\alpha$-PCE, which takes into account the degree of cooperation exhibited by a strategy profile.

**Definition 3.1.** A strategy profile $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE in a game $G$ if $U_i(s) \geq \alpha + BU_i^G$ for all $i \in N$.

Clearly, if $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE, then $s$ is an $\alpha'$-PCE for $\alpha' \leq \alpha$, and $s$ is a PCE iff $s$ is a 0-PCE. Note that an $\alpha$-PCE imposes some “fairness” requirements. Each player must get at least $\alpha$ more (where $\alpha$ can be negative) than her best possible outcome if the other players best respond.

We again get analogues of Theorems 2.4 and 2.6, and Corollary 2.7, with similar proofs.

**Theorem 3.2.** If $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE and $s^*$ is a NE in a game $G$, then for all $i \in N$, we have $U_i(s) \geq \alpha + U_i(s^*)$.

**Theorem 3.3.** A strategy profile that Pareto dominates an $\alpha$-PCE must itself be an $\alpha$-PCE.

**Corollary 3.4.** If there is an $\alpha$-PCE in a game $G$, there is a Pareto-optimal $\alpha$-PCE in $G$. 


Of course, we are interested in $\alpha$-PCE with the maximum possible value of $\alpha$.

**Definition 3.5.** The strategy profile $s$ is an *maximum-PCE (M-PCE)* in a game $G$ if $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE and for all $\alpha' > \alpha$, there is no $\alpha'$-PCE in $G$.

A priori, a M-PCE may not exist in a game $G$. For example, it may be the case that there is an $\alpha$-PCE for all $\alpha < 1$ without there being a 1-PCE. The next theorem, which uses the fact that the strategy space is compact, shows that this cannot be the case.

**Theorem 3.6.** Every game $G$ has a Pareto-optimal M-PCE.

*Proof.* Let $f(s) = \min_{i \in N} (U_i(s) - BU_i^G)$. Clearly $f$ is a continuous function; moreover, if $f(s) = \alpha$, then $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE. Since the domain consists of the set of strategy profiles, which can be viewed as a closed subset of $[0,1]^{|A| \times |N|}$, the domain is compact. Hence $f$ takes on its maximum at some strategy profile $s^\ast$. Then it is immediate from the definition that $s^\ast$ is a M-PCE. The argument that there is a Pareto-optimal M-PCE is essentially the same as that given in Corollary 2.7 showing that there is a Pareto-optimal PCE; we leave details to the reader. \[\square\]

The following examples show that M-PCE gives some very reasonable outcomes.

**Example 3.7.** The Nash bargaining game, continued: Clearly $U_1 = U_2 = 100$; $(50,50)$ is a $(-50)$-PCE and is the unique M-PCE. \[\square\]

**Example 3.8.** A coordination game, continued: If $k_1 > 1$ and $k_2 > 1$, then $(a,a)$ is the unique M-PCE; if $k_1 < 1$ and $k_2 < 1$, then $(b,b)$ is the unique M-PCE. In both cases, $\alpha = 0$. If $k_1 > 1$ and $k_2 < 1$, then the M-PCE depends on the exact values of $k_1$ and $k_2$. If $k_1 - 1 > 1 - k_2$, then $(a,a)$ is the unique M-PCE; if $k_1 - 1 = 1 - k_2$, then both $(a,a)$ and $(b,b)$ are M-PCE; otherwise, $(b,b)$ is the unique M-PCE. In all three cases, $\alpha = -\min(k_1 - 1, 1 - k_2) < 0$. \[\square\]

**Example 3.9.** Prisoner’s Dilemma, continued: Clearly (Cooperate, Cooperate) is a 2-PCE and (Defect, Defect) is a 0-PCE; (Cooperate, Cooperate) is the unique M-PCE. \[\square\]

**Example 3.10.** The Traveler’s Dilemma, continued: $(100,100)$ is easily seen to be the unique M-PCE; since there is no strategy profile that guarantees both players greater than 100 (since for any pair of pure strategies, the total payoff to the players is at most 200, and the total payoff from a mixed strategy profile is a convex combination of the payoff of pure strategy profiles). \[\square\]

**Example 3.11.** The centipede game, continued: A straightforward computation shows that the M-PCE in this game is unique, and is the strategy profile $s^\ast$ of the form $(\alpha q_{1,C} + (1 - \alpha)q_{1,19}, q_{2,C})$, where $\alpha$ is chosen so as to maximize $\min(U_1(s^\ast) - BU_1, U_2(s^\ast) - BU_2)$. This can be done by taking $\alpha = \frac{1}{3 \times 2^{18} + 2} - \frac{1}{(3 \times 2^{18} + 2)(3 \times 2^{19} + 1)(3 \times 2^{17} + 1)}$. \[\square\]

## 4 Cooperative Equilibrium

We can gain further insight into M-PCE (and into what people actually do in a game) by considering a notion that we call *cooperative equilibrium*, which generalizes PCE by allowing for the possibility of punishment. We define CE for 2-player games. (As we discuss below, it is not clear how to extend the definition to $n$-player games for $n > 2$.)

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Definition 4.1. A strategy profile $s$ is a cooperative equilibrium (CE) in a 2-player game $G$ if, for all players $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and all strategies $s'_i \in S_i$, if $j$ is the player other than $i$, one of the following conditions holds:

1. $U_i(s) \geq \sup_{s'_j \in BR_j(s'_i)} U_i(s')$;
2. $U_j(s) > \sup_{s'_j \in S_j} U_j(s')$, and for some $s'_j \in S_j$, we have $U_i(s) \geq U_i(s')$.

If we consider only the first condition, then the definition would be identical to PCE. It thus follows that all PCEs are CEs. The second condition is where punishment comes in. Suppose that players $i$ and $j$ are Alice and Bob, respectively. If there is no response that Bob can make to $s'_i$ that makes Bob better off than he is with $s$ then, intuitively, Bob becomes unhappy, and will seek to punish Alice. By “punish Alice”, we mean that Bob will play a strategy that makes Alice no better off than she is with $s$. We assume that if Bob can punish Alice when she plays $s'_i$, then Alice will not deviate to $s'_i$. In other words, $s$ is a CE if for all strategies $s'_i \in S_i$, Alice has no motivation to deviate to $s'_i$ either because (1) when Bob best responds to $s'_i$, Alice is no better off than she is with $s$, or (2) Bob is strictly worse off even when he best responds to $s'_i$, and Bob can punish Alice by playing a strategy which would make Alice no better off than she is in $s$; and similarly with the roles of Alice and Bob reversed.

We are not sure how to generalize CE to arbitrary games. We could, of course, replace $BR_j(s'_i)$ by $NE_{-i}(s'_i)$ in the first clause. The question is what to do in the second clause. We could say that if each player in $N - \{i\}$ is worse off in every Nash equilibrium in the game $G_{s_i}$, they punish player $i$. But punishment may require a coordination of strategies, and it is not clear how the players achieve such coordination, at least in a one-shot game. Not surprisingly, the examples in the literature where players punish others are 2-player games like the Ultimatum game. In general, the intuition of punishment seems most compelling in 2-player games.

Our main interest in CE is motivated by the following result, which shows that every Pareto-optimal M-PCE is a CE.

Theorem 4.2. Every Pareto-optimal M-PCE is a CE.

Proof. Suppose that $s$ is a Pareto-optimal M-PCE. To see that $s$ is a CE, consider the maximum $\alpha$ such that $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE. If $\alpha \geq 0$, then $s$ is a PCE, and hence clearly a CE, so we are done. If $\alpha < 0$, then suppose by way of contradiction that $s$ is not a CE. One of the players, say 1, must have a deviation to a strategy $s'_i$ such that either (1) player 2 has a best response $s'_2$ to $s'_i$ such that $U_1(s') \geq U_1(s)$ and $U_2(s') \geq U_2(s)$ or (2) for all $s'_2 \in S_2$, we have $U_2(s') < U_2(s)$ and $U_1(s') > U_1(s)$. Intuitively, case (2) says that player 2 does worse than $U_2(s)$ no matter what he does, and cannot punish player 1. In case (1), it is immediate that $s$ is not a Pareto-optimal M-PCE. So we need to consider only case (2).

Suppose that (2) holds. By definition, $U_i(s) \geq \alpha + BU_1$ for all $i \in \{1, 2\}$. By compactness, there must be a strategy profile $s^*$ such that $s^*_i \in BR_i(s^*_2)$ and $U_2(s^*_2) = BU_2$. We claim that $s^*$ is a $\beta$-PCE for some $\beta > \alpha$ (recall that $\alpha$ is the maximum $\alpha'$ such that $s$ is an $\alpha'$-PCE), contradicting the assumption that $s$ is a M-PCE. Since $s^*_1 \in BR_1(s^*_2)$, we must have $U_1(s^*) \geq U_1(s^*_1, s^*_2)$ (by the definition of $BR$); moreover, $U_1(s^*_1, s^*_2) > U_1(s)$ by case (2). Since $U_1(s^*) \geq U_1(s^*_1, s^*_2)$ and $U_1(s^*_1, s^*_2) > U_1(s)$, it follows that $U_1(s^*) > U_1(s)$. Since $U_1(s) \geq \alpha + BU_1$, there must be some $\beta' > \alpha$ such that $U_1(s^*) \geq \beta' + BU_1$. By definition, $U_2(s^*) = BU_2 = 0 + BU_2$. Thus, $s^*$ is a $\beta$-PCE, where $\beta = \min(\beta', 0)$. Since $\alpha < 0$ and $\alpha < \beta'$, we have that $\alpha < \min(\beta', 0) = \beta$. Thus, the claim holds, completing the proof. □
We can also prove the following analogues of Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 2.7. Since the proofs are quite similar to proofs of Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 2.7, we omit them here.

**Theorem 4.3.** A strategy profile that Pareto dominates a CE must itself be a CE.

**Corollary 4.4.** There is a Pareto-optimal CE in every game.

We now consider how CE works in the examples considered earlier.

**Example 4.5.** The Nash bargaining game: Recall that the Nash bargaining game does not have a PCE, and that every profile of the form \((a, 100 - a)\) is a NE. We now show that each of these profiles is a CE as well. To see this, first observe that \(U_1(s) + U_2(s) \leq 100\) for any strategy profile \(s\). (This is clearly true for pure strategy profiles, and the expected utility of a mixed strategy profile is just the convex combination of the utilities of the underlying pure strategy profiles.) Now suppose that player 1 deviates from \((a, 100 - a)\) to some strategy \(s_1\), and that player 2’s expected utility from a best response \(s_2'\) to \(s_1\) is \(b\). If \(b \geq 100 - a\), then \(U_1(s_1, s_2') \leq a\), and the first condition of CE applies. If \(b < 100 - a\), then player 2 can punish player 1 by playing 100, in which case player 1 always gets a reward of 0, and the second condition of CE applies. The same considerations apply to player 2’s deviations. Thus, \((a, 100 - a)\) is a CE. Only one of these CE is a M-PCE: (50, 50).

There are also Nash equilibria in mixed strategies; for example, \((\frac{1}{3} 25 + \frac{2}{3} 75, \frac{1}{3} 25 + \frac{2}{3} 75)\) is a NE. However, it is not hard to show that no nontrivial mixed strategy profile (i.e., one that is not a pure strategy profile) is a CE. For suppose that \(s\) is a CE where either \(s_1\) or \(s_2\) are nontrivial mixed strategies. We show below that \(U_1(s) + U_2(s) < 100\). This means there is pair \((a, 100 - a)\) such that \(a > U_1(s)\) and \(100 - a > U_2(s)\). So if player 1 deviates to \(a\) and player 2 deviates to \(100 - a\), neither of the two conditions that characterize CE hold.

It now remains to show that for nontrivial mixed strategy profiles \(s\), we have \(U_1(s) + U_2(s) < 100\). Suppose that \(s_1\) is a nontrivial mixed strategy. Let \(s_1[a]\) denote the probability that \(s_1\) plays the pure strategy \(a\). Then \(U_1(s) = \sum_{\{a:s_1[a] > 0\}} s_1[a]U_1(a, s_2)\), and \(U_2(s) = \sum_{\{a:s_1[a] > 0\}} s_1[a]U_2(a, s_2)\). So \(U_1(s) + U_2(s) = \sum_{\{a:s_1[a] > 0\}} s_1[a](U_1(a, s_2) + U_2(a, s_2))\). Recall that \(U_1(s') + U_2(s') \leq 100\) for all possible strategy profiles \(s'\). So \(\sum_{\{a:s_1[a] > 0\}} s_1[a](U_1(a, s_2) + U_2(a, s_2)) \leq 100\), with equality holding only when \(U_1(a, s_2) + U_2(a, s_2) = 100\) for all \(a\) such that \(s_1[a] > 0\). By assumption, there are at least two strategies \(a\) and \(a'\) such that \(s_1[a] > 0\) and \(s_1[a'] > 0\). As can be easily verified, we cannot have \(U_1(a, s_2) + U_2(a, s_2) = U_1(a', s_2) + U_2(a', s_2) = 100\). Thus \(U_1(s) + U_2(s) < 100\), as desired. □

**Example 4.6.** A coordination game, continued: If \(k_1 > 1\) and \(k_2 > 1\), then \((a, a)\) is the only CE; if \(k_1 < 1\) and \(k_2 < 1\), then \((b, b)\) is the only CE; if \(k_1 > 1\) and \(k_2 < 1\), then the two NE, \((a, a)\) and \((b, b)\), are both CE (although neither is a PCE). There is one other NE \(s\) in mixed strategies; \(s\) is not a CE. To see this, note that in \(s\) both players have to put positive probability on each pure strategy. It easily follows that \(U_2(s) = U_2(s_1, b) < 1\) (since \(s_1\) puts positive probability on \(a\)); similarly, \(U_1(s) < 1\). Hence, if player 1 plays \(b\) instead of \(s_1\), player 2 has a unique best response of \(b\), which strictly increases both players’ payoffs. Thus, \(s\) is not a CE. □

**Example 4.7.** Prisoner’s Dilemma, continued: Clearly each PCE in Prisoner’s Dilemma is a CE. As we now show, no other strategy profile is a CE. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that \(s\) is a CE that is not a PCE. Then some player must get a payoff with \(s\) that is strictly less than 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that it is player 1. Suppose that \(U_1(s) = r_1 < 1\). But then if player 1 plays Defect, he is guaranteed a better payoff—at least \(1\)—no matter what player 2 does, so \(s\) cannot be a CE. □
Example 4.8. The Traveler’s Dilemma, continued: Of course, every PCE in Traveler’s Dilemma is a CE, but there are others. For example, (100,99) is a CE but not a PCE. To see this, note that with (100,99), player 1 gets a payoff of 97 and player 2 gets 101, the maximum possible payoff. So player 2 has no motivation to deviate. Suppose that there exists some strategy \( s_1 \) that gives player 1 a payoff strictly greater than 97 when player 2 best responds. This strictly decreases player 2’s payoff. However, player 2 can punish player 1 by playing 2, so that player 1 gets at most 2, strictly less than what he gets originally. It easily follows that (100, 99) is a CE. A similar argument shows that every other Pareto-optimal strategy profiles is a CE.

Recall that (100, 100) is the unique M-PCE of this game. Intuitively, a M-PCE satisfies fairness requirements that an arbitrary CE does not. \( \square \)

Example 4.9. The centipede game, continued: Again, every PCE is a CE. In addition, every Pareto-optimal strategy profile is a CE. Thus, for example, the strategy profile where both players continue to the end of the game is a CE (although it is not a PCE), as is the profile where player 2 continues at all his moves, but player 1 ends the game at his last turn. To see that a Pareto-optimal strategy profile is a CE, let \( s \) be a Pareto-optimal strategy profile. By way of contradiction, suppose that \( s \) is not a CE. Then there must be a strategy \( s'_i \) for some player \( i \) such that either (1) there is a best response \( s'_3 - i \) to \( s'_i \) such that \( U_i(s') > U_i(s) \) and \( U_{3-i}(s') \geq U_{3-i}(s) \) or (2) for all \( s'_3 - i \in S_{3-i} \), it must be the case that \( U_{3-i}(s') < U_{3-i}(s) \) and \( U_i(s') < U_i(s) \); that is, player \( 3 - i \) does worse than \( U_{3-i}(s) \) no matter what he does, and cannot punish player \( i \). In case (1), it is immediate that \( s \) is not Pareto optimal; and case (2) cannot hold, since player \( 3 - i \) can always punish player \( i \) by exiting at his first turn. \( \square \)

5 The Complexity of Finding a PCE, M-PCE, and CE

In general, it is not obvious how a PCE (or M-PCE, or CE) can be found efficiently. We show that in 2-player games, a PCE can be found in polynomial time if one exists; moreover, determining whether one exists can also be done in polynomial time. Similarly, in 2-player games, both a M-PCE and a CE can always be found in polynomial time. The first step in the argument involves showing that in 2-player games, for all strategy profiles \( s \), there is a strategy profile \( s' = (s'_1, s'_2) \) that Pareto dominates \( s \) such that both \( s'_1 \) and \( s'_2 \) have support at most two pure strategies (i.e., they give positive probability to at most two pure strategies). We then show that both the problem of computing a PCE and a M-PCE can be reduced to solving a polynomial number of “small” bilinear programs, each of which can be solved in constant time. This gives us the desired polynomial time algorithm for PCE and M-PCE. We then use similar techniques to show that a Pareto-optimal M-PCE, and thus a CE, can be found in polynomial time.

Notation: For a matrix \( A \), let \( A^T \) denote \( A \) transpose, let \( A[i, \cdot] \) denote the \( i \)th row of \( A \), let \( A[\cdot, j] \) denote the \( j \)th column of \( A \), and let \( A[i, j] \) be the entry in the \( i \)th row, \( j \)th column of \( A \). We say that a vector \( x \) is nonnegative, denoted \( x \geq 0 \), if its all of its entries are nonnegative.

We start by proving the first claim above. In this discussion, it is convenient to identify a strategy for player 1 with a column vector in \( \mathbb{R}^m \), and a strategy for player 2 with a column vector in \( \mathbb{R}^m \). The strategy has a support of size at most two if the vector has at most two nonzero entries.

Lemma 5.1. In a 2-player game, for all strategy profiles \( s^* \), there exists a strategy profile \( s' = (s'_1, s'_2) \) that Pareto dominates \( s^* \) such that both \( s'_1 \) and \( s'_2 \) have support of size at most two.
See the appendix for the proof of this lemma and other results not proved in the main text.

The rest of the section makes use of bilinear programs. There are a number of slightly different definitions of “bilinear program”. For our purposes, we use the following definition.

**Definition 5.2.** A bilinear program $P$ (of size $n \times m$) is a quadratic program of the form

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad x^T A y + x^T c + y^T c' \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x^T B_1 y \geq d_1 \\
& \quad B_2 x = d_2 \\
& \quad B_3 y = d_3 \\
& \quad x \geq 0 \\
& \quad y \geq 0,
\end{align*}$$

where $A$ and $B_1$ are $n \times m$ matrices, $x, c \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $y, c' \in \mathbb{R}^m$, $B_2$ is a $k \times n$ matrix for some $k$, and $B_3$ is a $k' \times m$ matrix for some $k'$. $P$ is simple if $B_2$ and $B_3$ each has one row, consisting of all 1’s.

(Thus, in a simple bilinear program, we have a single bilinear constraint $x^T B_1 y \geq d_1$, non-negativity constraints on $x$ and $y$, and constraints on the sum of the components of the vectors $x$ and $y$; that is, constraints of the form $\sum_{i=1}^{n} x[i] = d'$ and $\sum_{j=1}^{m} y[j] = d''$.)

**Lemma 5.3.** A simple bilinear program of size $2 \times 2$ can be solved in constant time. $\square$

We can now give our algorithm for finding a PCE. The idea is to first find $B U_1$ and $B U_2$, which can be done in polynomial time. We then use Lemma 5.1 to reduce the problem to $(\binom{n}{2})(\binom{m}{2}) = O(n^2 m^2)$ smaller problems, each of which is a simple bilinear program of size $2 \times 2$. By Lemma 5.3, each of these smaller problems can be solved in constant time, giving us a polynomial-time algorithm.

**Theorem 5.4.** Given a 2-player game $G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)$, we can compute in polynomial time whether $G$ has a PCE and, if so, we can compute a PCE in polynomial time.

The argument that a M-PCE can be found in polynomial time is very similar.

**Theorem 5.5.** Given a 2-player game $G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)$, we can compute a M-PCE in polynomial time.

Again, we use similar arguments to show that a Pareto-optimal M-PCE, and thus CE, can be found in polynomial time.

**Theorem 5.6.** Given a 2-player game $G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)$, we can compute a Pareto-optimal M-PCE in polynomial time.

Since, by Theorem 4.2, a Pareto-optimal M-PCE is a (Pareto-optimal) CE, the following corollary is immediate.

**Corollary 5.7.** Given a 2-player game $G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)$, we can compute a Pareto-optimal CE in polynomial time.
6 Comparing M-PCE and the Coco Value

In this section, we compare M-PCE to the coco value, a solution concept proposed by Kalai and Kalai [2009] that also tries to capture cooperation. Since the coco value is only defined for 2-player games, we consider only 2-player games in this section. We show that despite their definitions being quite different, the two solution concepts are closely related. We also consider their computational complexity, and show that both can be solved in polynomial time in 2-player games.

6.1 A review of the coco value

The coco value is computed by decomposing a game into two components, which can be viewed as a purely cooperative component and a purely competitive component. The cooperative component is a team game, a game where both players have identical utility matrices, so that both players get identical payoffs, no matter what strategy profile is played. The competitive component is a zero-sum game, that is, one where if player 1’s payoff matrix is $A$, then player 2’s payoff matrix is $-A$.

As Kalai and Kalai [2009] observe, every game $G$ can be uniquely decomposed into a team game $G_t$ and a zero-sum game $G_z$, where if $(A, B), (C, C)$, and $(D, -D)$ are the utility matrices for $G, G_t$, and $G_z$, respectively, then $A = C + D$ and $B = C - D$. Indeed, we can take $C = (A + B)/2$ and $D = (A - B)/2$. We call $G_t$ the team game of $G$ and call $G_z$ the zero-sum game of $G$.

The minimax value of game $G$ for player $i$, denoted $mm_i(G)$, is the payoff player $i$ gets when the opponent is minimizing $i$’s maximum payoff; formally,

$$mm_1(G) = \min_{s_2 \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1(s_1, s_2);$$

$mm_2(G)$ is defined similarly, interchanging 1 and 2.

We are now ready to define the coco value. Given a game $G$, let $a$ be the largest value obtainable in the team game $G_t$ (i.e., the largest value in the utility matrix for $G_t$), and let $z$ be the minimax value for player 1 in the zero-sum game $G_z$. Then the coco value of $G$, denoted coco($G$), is

$$(a + z, a - z).$$

Note that the coco value is attainable if utilities are transferable: the players simply play the strategy profile that gives the value $a$ in $G_t$; then player 2 transfers $z$ to player 1 ($z$ may be negative, so that 1 is actually transferring money to 2). Clearly this outcome maximizes social welfare. Kalai and Kalai [2009] argue that it is also fair in an appropriate sense.

6.2 Examples

The coco value and M-PCE value are closely related in a number of games of interest, as the following examples show.

Example 6.1. The Nash bargaining game, continued: Clearly, the largest payoff obtainable in the team game corresponding to the Nash Bargaining game is $(50, 50)$. Since the game is symmetric, the minimax value of each player in the zero-sum game is 0. Thus, the coco value of the Nash bargaining game is $(50, 50)$, which, as we have seen, is also the unique M-PCE value.  

$\Box$
Example 6.2. **Prisoner’s Dilemma, continued:** Clearly, the largest payoff obtainable in the team game corresponding to Prisoner’s Dilemma (given the payoffs shown in the Introduction) is \((3, 3)\). Since the game is symmetric, again, the minimax value in the corresponding zero-sum game is 0. Thus, the coco value is \((3, 3)\), which is easily seen to also be the unique M-PCE value: with these payoffs, \(BU_1 = BU_2 = 1\), so by both cooperating, the players have a 2-PCE, which is clearly also a M-PCE. □

Example 6.3. **Traveler’s Dilemma, continued:** Clearly, the largest payoff obtainable in the team game corresponding to the Traveler’s Dilemma is \((100, 100)\). And again, since the game is symmetric, the minimax value for each player in the zero-sum game is 0. Thus, the coco value is \((100, 100)\), which is also the unique M-PCE value. □

As the next example shows, there are games in which the coco value and

Example 6.4. **The centipede game, continued:** It is easy to see that the largest payoff obtainable in the team game corresponding to the centipede game is \(\left(\frac{2^{19}+2^{20}+1}{2}, \frac{2^{19}+2^{20}+1}{2}\right)\): both players play to the end of the game and split the total payoff. It is also easy to compute that, in the zero-sum game corresponding to the centipede game, player 1’s minimax value is 1, while player 2’s minimax value is \(-1\), obtained when both players quit immediately. Thus, the coco value is \(\left(\frac{2^{19}+2^{20}+1}{2}, \frac{2^{19}+2^{20}+1}{2}-1\right)\) = \(\left(\frac{2^{19}+2^{20}+3}{2}, \frac{2^{19}+2^{20}-1}{2}\right)\). This value is not achievable without side payments, and is higher than the M-PCE value. □

Although, as Example 6.4 shows, the M-PCE value and the coco value can differ, we can say more. Part of the problem in the centipede game is that the computation of the coco value effectively assumes that side payments are possible. The M-PCE value does not take into account the possibility of side payments. Once we extend the centipede game to allow side payments in an appropriate sense, it turns out that the coco value and the M-PCE value are the same. To do a fairer comparison of the M-PCE and coco values, we consider games with side payments.

6.3 **2-player games with side payments**

In this subsection, we describe how an arbitrary 2-player game without payments can be transformed into a game with side payments. There is more than one way of doing this; we focus on one, and briefly discuss a second alternative. Our procedure may be of interest beyond the specific application to coco and M-PCE. We implicitly assume throughout that outcomes can be expressed in dollars and that players value the dollars the same way. The idea is to add strategies to the game that allow players to propose “deals”, which amount to a description of what strategy profiles should be played and how much money should be transferred. If the players propose the same deal, then the suggested strategy profile is played, and the money is transferred. Otherwise, a “backup” action is played.

Given a 2-player game \(G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)\), let \(G^* = (\{1, 2\}, A^*, u^*)\) be the game with side payments extending \(G\), where \(A^*\) and \(u^*\) are defined as follows. \(A^*\) extends \(A\) by adding a collection of actions that we call deal actions. A deal action for player \(i\) is a triple of the form \((a, r, a'_i) \in A \times \mathbb{R} \times A_i\). Intuitively, this action proposes that the players play the action profile \(a\) and that player 1 should transfer \(r\) to player 2; if the deal is not accepted, then player \(i\) plays \(a'_i\). Given this intuition, it should be clear how \(u^*\) extends \(u\). For action profiles \(a \in A\), \(u^*(a) = u(a)\). For profiles actions \(a \in (A_1^* - A_1) \times (A_2^* - A_2)\), the players agree on a deal if they both propose a deal strategy with the same first two components \((a, r)\).

In this case they play \(a\) and \(r\) is transferred. Otherwise, players just play the backup action. More precisely, for \(a, a' \in A\), \(b_i \in A_i\), and \(r, r' \in \mathbb{R}\):
• \( u^*(a) = u(a); \)
• \( u^*_1(((a, r, b_1), (a, r, b_2))) = u_1(a) - r; \)
  \( u^*_2(((a, r, b_1), (a, r, b_2))) = u_2(a) + r; \)
• \( u^*((a, r, b_1), (a', r', b_2)) = u(b_1, b_2) \) if \( (a, r) \neq (a', r'); \)
• \( u^*((a, r, b_1), b_2) = u^*(b_1, (a', r', b_2)) = u(b_1, b_2). \)

As usual, players are allowed to randomize, and a strategy of player \( i \) in \( G^* \) is a distribution over actions in \( A_i^* \); let \( S_i^* \) represent the set of player \( i \)'s strategies. Let \( U_i^*(s) \) denote player \( i \)'s expected utility if the strategy profile \( s \in S_i^* \) is played. We call \( G^* \) the game with side payments extending \( G \), and call \( G \) the game underlying \( G^* \).

Intuitively, when both players play deal actions, we can think of them as giving their actions to a trusted third party. If they both propose the same deal, the third party ensures that the deal action is carried out and the transfer is made. Otherwise, the appropriate backup actions are played.

In our approach, we have allowed players to propose arbitrary backup actions in case their deal offers are not accepted. We also considered an alternative approach, where if a deal is proposed by one of the parties but not accepted, then the players get a fixed default payoff (e.g., they could both get 0, or a default strategy could be played, and the players get their payoff according to the default strategy). Essentially the same results as those we prove hold for this approach as well; see the end of Section 6.4.

### 6.4 Characterizing the coco value and the M-PCE value algebraically

At first glance, the coco value and the M-PCE value seem quite different, although both are trying to get at the notion of cooperation. However, we show below that both have quite similar characterizations. In this section, we characterize the two notions algebraically, using two similar formulas involving the maximum social welfare and the minimax value. In the next section, we compare axiomatic characterizations of the notions.

Before proving our results, we first show that, although they are different games, \( G \) and \( G^* \) agree on the relevant parameters (recall that \( G^* \) is the game with side payments extending \( G \)). Let \( MSW(G) \) be the maximum social welfare of \( G \); formally, \( MSW(G) = \max_{a \in A}(u_1(a) + u_2(a)) \).

**Lemma 6.5.** For all 2-player games \( G \), \( MSW(G) = MSW(G^*) \) and \( mm_i(G^*) = mm_i(G) \), for \( i = 1, 2 \).

**Proof.** To see that \( MSW(G) = MSW(G^*) \), observe that, by the definition of \( u^* \), for all action profiles \( a^* \in A^* \), there exists an action profile \( a \in A \) and \( r \in \mathbb{R} \) such that \( u^*(a^*) = (u_1(a) + r, u_2(a) - r) \), so \( u_1^*(a^*) + u_2^*(a^*) = u_1(a) + u_2(a) \).

To see that \( mm_1(G^*) = mm_1(G) \), observe that for all \( t \in S_2 \), \( a \in A \), and \( a'_1 \in A_1 \), we have that \( U_1^*((a, r, a'_1), t) = U_1(a'_1, t) \) so

\[
\max_{a'_1 \in A'_1} U_1^*(a'_1, t) = \max_{a'_1 \in A'_1} U_1(a'_1, t).
\]

It then follows that

\[
\max_{s_1 \in S_1^*} U_1^*(s_1, t) = \max_{s_1 \in S_1^*} U_1(s_1, t).
\]
Thus,
\[
\min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1^*} U_1^*(s_1, t) = \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1(s_1, t).
\]
Therefore,
\[
mm_1(G^*) = \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1^*} U_1^*(s_1, t) \leq \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1^*(s_1, t) \quad \text{[since } S_2^* \supset S_2]\]
\[
= \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1(s_1, t) = mm_1(G).
\]
Thus, \(mm_1(G^*) \leq mm_1(G)\). Similarly, for all \(s_1 \in S_1\), we have \(\min_{a_2 \in A_2} U_1^*(s_1, a_2) = \min_{a_2 \in A_2} U_1(s_1, a_2)\). It then follows that \(\min_{t \in S_2} U_1^*(s_1, t) = \min_{t \in S_2} U_1(s_1, t)\). Thus,
\[
\min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1^*(s_1, t) = \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1(s_1, t).
\]
It follows that
\[
mm_1(G^*) = \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1^*} U_1^*(s_1, t) \geq \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1^*(s_1, t) \quad \text{[since } S_1^* \supset S_1]\]
\[
= \min_{t \in S_2} \max_{s_1 \in S_1} U_1(s_1, t) = mm_1(G).
\]
Thus, \(mm_1(G^*) = mm_1(G)\). A similar argument shows that \(mm_2(G^*) = mm_2(G)\). \qed \qed

We now characterize the coco value.

**Theorem 6.6.** If \(G\) is a 2-player game, then \(coco(G) = \left(\frac{MSW(G) + mm_1(G_z) - mm_2(G_z)}{2}, \frac{MSW(G) - mm_1(G_z) + mm_2(G_z)}{2}\right)\). Moreover, \(coco(G) = coco(G^*)\).

**Proof.** It is easy to see that the Pareto-optimal payoff profile in \(G_t\) is \(\left(\frac{MSW(G)}{2}, \frac{MSW(G)}{2}\right)\). Thus, by definition,
\[
coco(G) = \left(\frac{MSW(G)}{2}, \frac{MSW(G)}{2}\right) + (mm_1(G_z), mm_2(G_z))
\]
\[
= \left(\frac{MSW(G) + 2mm_1(G_z)}{2}, \frac{MSW(G) + 2mm_2(G_z)}{2}\right)
\]
\[
= \left(\frac{MSW(G) + mm_1(G_z) - mm_2(G_z)}{2}, \frac{MSW(G) - mm_1(G_z) + mm_2(G_z)}{2}\right)
\]
The last equation follows since \(G_2\) is a zero-sum game, so \(mm_1(G_z) = -mm_2(G_z)\).

The fact that \(coco(G) = coco(G^*)\) follows from the characterization of \(coco(G)\) above, the fact that \(MSW(G) = MSW(G^*)\) (Lemma 6.5), and the fact that \((G_z)^* = (G^*)_z\), which we leave to the reader to check. \qed

The next theorem provides an analogous characterization of the M-PCE value in 2-player games with side payments. It shows that in such games the M-PCE value is unique and has the same form as the coco value. Indeed, the only difference is that we replace \(mm_1(G_z)\) by \(mm_1(G)\).

\footnote{Note that \(mm_1(G_z) = -mm_2(G_z)\) by von Neumann’s minimax theorem [von Neumann 1928] (which says that in every 2-player zero-sum game, there is an equilibrium where both players play a minimax strategy). We write the expression in the form above to better compare it to the M-PCE value.}
Theorem 6.7. If \( G \) is a 2-player game, then the unique M-PCE value of the game \( G^* \) with side payments extending \( G \) is \( \left( \frac{MSW(G)+mm_1(G)-mm_2(G)}{2}, \frac{MSW(G)-mm_1(G)+mm_2(G)}{2} \right) \).

Proof. We first show that \( BU^G_1 = MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \) and \( BU^G_2 = MSW(G) - mm_1(G) \). For \( BU^G_1 \), let \( a^* \) be an action profile in \( G \) that maximizes social welfare, that is, \( U_1(a^*) + U_2(a^*) = MSW(G) \), and let \( (s'_1, s'_2) \) be a strategy profile in \( G \) such that \( s'_2 \in BR^G(s'_1) \) and \( U_2(s'_1, s'_2) = mm_2(G) \). Thus, by playing \( s'_1 \), player 1 ensures that player 2 can get no more utility than \( mm_2(G) \), and by playing \( s'_2 \), player 2 ensures that she does get utility \( mm_2(G) \) when player 1 plays \( s'_1 \).

Let \( s = (s_1, s_2) \) be such that, in \( s_1 \), player 1 plays deal action \( (a^*, mm_2(G) - u_2(a^*), a'_1) \) with the same probability that she plays \( a'_1 \) in \( s'_1 \) (where \( s'_1 \) is as defined above) for all \( a'_1 \in A_1 \); and \( s_2 = (a^*, mm_2(G) - u_2(a^*), a'_2) \) for some fixed \( a'_2 \in A_2 \). Intuitively, \( s_1 \) does the following: if player 2 agrees to the deal in \( s_1 \), then \( a^* \) is carried out, and player 2 transfers \( mm_2(G) - u_2(a^*) \) to player 2; otherwise player 1 plays the mixed strategy \( s'_1 \). \( s_2 \) is a deal action that agrees to \( s_1 \). Thus, \( U_1(s) = U_1(a^*) - (mm_2(G) - u_2(a^*)) = U_1(a^*) + U_2(a^*) - mm_2(G) = MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \), and \( U_2(s) = mm_2(G) \).

On the other hand, if player 2 plays an action \( a'_2 \in A_2 \), then Thus, player 2 gets at most \( mm_2(G) \) when player 1 plays \( s_1 \), so \( s_2 \in BR^G(s_1) \). This shows that \( BU^G_1 \geq MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \).

To see that \( BU^G_1 \leq MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \), consider a strategy profile \( s'' = (s''_1, s''_2) \in S^* \) with \( s''_2 \in BR^G(s''_1) \). Since \( mm_2(G^*) = mm_2(G) \), it follows that \( U_2(s'') \geq mm_2(G) \). Since \( MSW(G^*) = MSW(G) \) by Lemma 6.5, it follows that \( U_1(s'') + U_2(s'') \leq MSW(G) \). Thus, \( U_1(s') \leq MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \), and \( BU^G_1 \leq MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \). Thus, \( BU^G_1 = MSW(G) - mm_2(G) \), as desired.

The argument that \( BU^G_2 = MSW(G) - mm_1(G) \) is similar.

Now suppose that we have a strategy \( s^+ \in S^* \) such that \( U_1(s^+) \geq BU^G_1 + \alpha \) and \( U_2(s^+) \geq BU^G_2 + \alpha \). Since \( MSW(G^*) = MSW(G) \), it follows that \( BU_1(G^*) + BU_2(G^*) + 2\alpha \leq MSW(G) \).

Plugging in our characterizations of \( BU_1(G^*) \) and \( BU_2(G^*) \), we get that \( \alpha \leq \frac{-MSW(G)+mm_1(G)+mm_2(G)}{2} \).

Taking \( \beta = \frac{-MSW(G)+mm_1(G)+mm_2(G)}{2} \), we now show that we can find a \( \beta \)-PCE. It follows that this must be a M-PCE.

Let \( a^* \) be the action profile in \( G \) defined above that maximizes social welfare, and let \( a'_1 \in A \). Let \( s^+ = (s^+_1, s^+_2) \), where \( s^+_1 = (a^*, u_1(a^*) - \frac{MSW(G)+mm_1(G)-mm_2(G)}{2}, a'_1) \) and \( s^+_2 = (a^*, u_1(a^*) - \frac{MSW(G)+mm_1(G)-mm_2(G)}{2}, a'_2) \). It is also easy to check that \( U_1(s^+) = \frac{MSW(G)+mm_1(G)-mm_2(G)}{2} \), and \( U_2(s^+) = \frac{MSW(G)-mm_1(G)+mm_2(G)}{2} \).

It can also easily be checked that \( U_i(s^+) = BU_i + \beta \) for \( i = 1, 2 \), so \( s^+ \) is indeed a \( \beta \)-PCE. Therefore, \( s^+ \) is a M-PCE, and its value is a M-PCE value, as desired. Since \( U_1(s^+) + U_2(s^+) = MSW(G) \), it follows that the M-PCE value is unique.

As Theorems 6.6 and 6.7 show, in a 2-player game \( G^* \) with side payments, the coco value and M-PCE value are characterized by very similar equations, making use of \( MSW(G^*) \) and minimax values. The only difference is that the coco value uses the minimax value of the zero-sum game \( G_2 \), while the M-PCE value uses minimax value of \( G \). It immediately follows from Theorem 6.6 and 6.7 that the coco value and the M-PCE value coincide in all games where \( mm_1(G_2) - mm_2(G_2) = mm_1(G) - mm_2(G) \).

Such games include team games, equal-sum games (games with a payoff matrices \( (A, B) \) such that \( A + B \) is a constant matrix, all of whose entries are identical), symmetric games (games where the
strategy space is the same for both players, that is, $S_1 = S_2$, and $U_1(s_1, s_2) = U_2(s_2, s_1)$ for all $s_1, s_2 \in S_1$, and many others. We can also use these theorems to show that the M-PCE value and the coco value can differ, even in a game where side payments are allowed, as the following example shows.

**Example 6.8.** Let $G$ be the 2-player game described by the following payoff matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>(3,2)</td>
<td>(1,0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let $G^*$ be the game with side payments extending $G$. Taking player 1 to be the row player and player 2 to be the column player, it is easy to check that $\text{MSW}(G) = 5$, $\text{mm}_1(G) = 1$, and $\text{mm}_2(G) = 2$. Thus, by Theorem 5.5, the M-PCE value of $G^*$ is $(\frac{5 + 1 - 2}{2}, \frac{5 - 1 + 2}{2}) = (2, 3)$. On the other hand, it is easy to check that $\text{coco}(G) = \text{coco}(G^*) = (3, 2)$.

It seems somewhat surprising that the M-PCE here should be $(2, 3)$, since player 1 gets a higher payoff than player 2 no matter which strategy profile in $G$ is played. Moreover, $\text{BU}_1^G = 3$ and $\text{BU}_2^G = 2$. But things change when transfers are allowed. It is easy to check that it is still the case that $\text{BU}_1^{G^*} = 3$; if player 1 plays $c$, then player 2’s best response is to play $a$. But $\text{BU}_2^{G^*} = 4$; if player 2 plays $((c, a), 2, b)$, offering to play $(c, a)$, provided that player 1 transfers an additional 2, then player 1’s best response is to agree (for otherwise player 2 plays $b$), giving player 2 a payoff of 4. The possibility that player 2 can “threaten” player 1 in this way (even though the moves are made simultaneously, so no actual threat is involved) is why $\text{mm}_2(G) \geq \text{mm}_1(G)$.

We conclude this subsection by considering what happens if a default strategy profile is used instead of backup actions when defining games with side payments. Let the default payoffs be $(d_1, d_2)$. Then a similar argument to above shows that the M-PCE value becomes

$$\left(\frac{\text{MSW}(G) + d_1 - d_2}{2}, \frac{\text{MSW}(G) - d_1 + d_2}{2}\right).$$

Thus, rather than using the minimax payoffs in the formula, we now use the default payoffs. Note that if the default payoffs are $(0, 0)$, then the M-PCE amounts to the players splitting the maximum social welfare. We leave the details to the reader.

### 6.5 Axiomatic comparison

In this section, we provide an axiomatization of the M-PCE value and compare it to the axiomatization of the coco value given by Kalai and Kalai [2009]. Before jumping into the axioms, we first explain the term “axiomatize“ in this context. Given a function $f : A \rightarrow B$, we say a set AX of axioms *axiomatizes f in A* if $f$ is the unique function mapping $A$ to $B$ that satisfies all axioms in AX. Recall that every 2-player normal-form game has a unique coco value. We can thus view the coco value as a function from 2-player normal-form games to $\mathbb{R}^2$. Therefore, a set AX of axioms axiomatizes the coco value if the coco value is the unique function that maps from the set to $\mathbb{R}^2$ that satisfies all the axioms in AX.

Kalai and Kalai [2009] show that the following collection of axioms axiomatizes the coco value. We describe the axioms in terms of an arbitrary function $f$. If $f(G) = (a_1, a_2)$, then we take $f_i(G) = a_i$, for $i = 1, 2$. 


1. **Maximum social welfare.** $f$ maximizes social welfare: $f_1(G) + f_2(G) = MSW(G)$.

2. **Shift invariance.** Shifting payoffs by constants leads to a corresponding shift in the value. That is, if $c = (c_1, c_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$, $G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)$ and $G^c = (\{1, 2\}, A, u^c)$, where $u^c_i(a) = u_i(a) + c_i$ for all $a \in A$, then $f(G^c) = (f_1(G) + c_1, f_2(G) + c_2)$.

3. **Monotonicity in actions.** Removing an action of a player cannot increase her value. That is, if $G = (\{1, 2\}, A_1 \times A_2, u)$, and $G' = (\{1, 2\}, A_1' \times A_2, u|_{A_1' \times A_2})$, where $A_1' \subseteq A_1$, then $f_1(G') \leq f_1(G)$, and similarly if we replace $A_2$ by $A_2' \subseteq A_2$.

4. **Payoff dominance.** If, for all action profiles $a \in A$, a player’s expected payoff is strictly larger than her opponent’s, then her value should be at least as large as the opponent’s. That is, if $u_i(a) \geq u_j(a)$ for all $a \in A$, then $f_i(G) \geq f_j(G)$.

5. **Invariance to replicated strategies.** Adding a mixed strategy of player 1 as a new action for her does not change the value of the game; similarly for player 2. That is, if $G = (\{1, 2\}, A_1 \times A_2, u)$, $t \in S_1$, and $G' = (\{1, 2\}, A_1' \times A_2, u')$, where $A_1' = A_1 \cup \{t\}$, $u'(t, a_2) = U(t, a_2)$ for all $a_2 \in A_2$, and $u'(a) = u(a)$ for all $a \in A$ (so that $G'$ extends $G$ by adding to $A_1$ one new action, which can be identified with a mixed strategy in $S_1$). Then $f(G) = f(G')$. The same holds if we add a strategy to $A_2$.

**Theorem 6.9.** [Kalai and Kalai 2009] Axioms 1-5 characterize the coco value in 2-player normal-form games.\(^2\)

Note that, following Kalai and Kalai [2009], we have stated the axioms for the coco value in terms of the underlying game $G$. Since, as we have argued, Kalai and Kalai are assuming there are side payments, we might consider stating the axioms in terms of $G^*$. We could certainly replace all occurrences of $f_i(G)$ by $f_i(G^*)$; nothing would change if we did this, since, by Theorem 6.6, $coco(G) = coco(G^*)$. But we could go further, replacing $G$, $A$, and $u$ uniformly by $G^*$, $A^*$, and $u^*$. For example, Axiom 1 would say $f_1(G^*) + f_2(G^*) = MSW(G^*)$; Axiom 2 would say that $f((G^*)^c) = (f_1(G^*) + c_1, f_2(G^*) + c_2)$. It is not hard to check that the resulting axioms are still sound. Moreover, for all axioms but Axiom 4 (payoff dominance), the resulting axiom is essentially equivalent to the original axiom. (In the case of shift invariance, this is because $(G^*)^c = (G^c)^*$.) However, the version of Axiom 4 for $G^*$ is vacuous. No matter what the payoffs are in $G$, it cannot be the case that a player’s expected payoff is larger than his opponent’s for all actions in $G^*$, since players can always agree to a deal action that results in the opponent getting a large transfer. Thus, we must express payoff dominance in terms of $G$ in order to prove Theorem 6.9.

We now characterize the M-PCE value axiomatically. The M-PCE value of $G$ is not equal to that of $G^*$ in general. Since we want to compare the M-PCE value and coco value, it is most appropriate to consider games with side payments. Thus, in the axioms for M-PCE, we write $f_i(G^*)$ rather $f_i(G)$. We start by considering the extent to which the M-PCE value satisfies the axioms above for coco value, with $f_i(G)$ replaced by $f_i(G^*)$. As we noted, this change has no impact for coco value except in the case of Axiom 4 (payoff dominance). But Example 6.8 shows that the M-PCE value does not satisfy payoff dominance. The following result shows that it satisfies all the remaining axioms.

\(^2\)Kalai and Kalai actually consider Bayesian games in their characterization, and have an additional axiom that they call **monotonicity in information.** This axiom trivializes in normal-form games (which can be viewed as the special case of Bayesian games where players have exactly one possible type). It is easy to see that their proof shows that Axioms 1-5 characterizes the coco value in normal-form games.
Theorem 6.10. The function mapping 2-player games with side payments to their (unique) M-PCE value satisfies maximum social welfare, shift invariance, monotonicity in actions, and invariance in replicated strategies.

Proof. We consider each property in turn:

- The fact that the function satisfies maximum social welfare is immediate from the characterization in Theorem 6.7.
- It is easy to see that \( MSW(G^c) = MSW(G) + c_1 + c_2, \) \( mm_1(G^c) = mm_1(G) + c_1, \) and \( mm_2(G^c) = mm_2(G) + c_2. \) It then follows from Theorem 6.7 that the M-PCE value of \((G^c)^*\) is the result of adding \( c \) to the M-PCE value of \( G^*. \)
- Let \( G' \) be as in the description of Axiom 3. It is almost immediate from the definitions that \( MSW(G') \leq MSW(G), \) \( mm_1(G') \leq mm_1(G), \) and \( mm_2(G') \geq mm_2(G). \) The result now follows from Theorem 6.7.
- Let \( G' \) be the result of adding a replicated action to \( S_1, \) as described in the statement of Axiom 5. Clearly \( MSW(G') = MSW(G), \) \( mm_1(G') = mm_1(G), \) and \( mm_2(G') = mm_2(G). \) Again, the result now follows from Theorem 6.7.

Our goal now is to axiomatize the M-PCE value in games with side payments. Since the M-PCE value and the coco value are different in general, there must be a difference in their axiomatizations. Interestingly, we can capture the difference by replacing payoff dominance by another simple axiom:

6. **Minimax dominance.** If a player’s minimax value is no less than her opponent’s minimax value, then her value is no less than her opponent’s. That is, if \( mm_i(G) \geq mm_j(G), \) then \( f_i(G^*) \geq f_j(G^*). \)

It is immediate from Theorem 6.7 that the M-PCE value satisfies minimax dominance; Example 6.8 shows that the coco value does not satisfy it. We now prove that the M-PCE value is characterized by Axioms 1, 2, and 6. (Although Axioms 3 and 5 also hold for the M-PCE value, we do not need them for the axiomatization.) Interestingly, for all these axioms, we can replace all occurrences of \( G, A, \) and \( u \) by \( G^*, A^*, \) and \( u^*, \) respectively, to get an equivalent axiom; it really does not matter if we state the axiom in terms of \( G \) or \( G^* \) (although the argument to \( f \) must be \( G^* \)).

Theorem 6.11. Axioms 1, 2, and 6 characterize the M-PCE value in 2-player games with side payments.

Proof. Theorem 6.10 shows that the M-PCE value satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. As we observed, the fact that the M-PCE value satisfies Axiom 6 is immediate from Theorem 6.7.

To see that the M-PCE value is the unique mapping that satisfies Axioms 1, 2, and 6, suppose that \( f \) is a mapping that satisfies these axioms. We want to show that \( f(G^*) \) is the M-PCE value for all games \( G. \) So consider an arbitrary game \( G \) such that the M-PCE value of \( G^* \) is \( v = (v_1, v_2). \) By shift invariance, the M-PCE value of \((G^{-v})^*\) is \((0, 0). \) By Axiom 1, \( MSW(G) = v_1 + v_2, \) so \( MSW(G^{-v}) = 0. \) Note that it follows from Theorem 6.7 that \( 0 = MSW(G^{-v}) + mm_1(G^{-v}) - mm_2(G^{-v}). \) Since
Similarly, in 2-player games, a M-PCE can always be found in polynomial time (see Theorem 5.5). Moreover, determining whether one exists can also be done in polynomial time (see Theorem 5.4).

In this section, we consider the complexity of computing the M-PCE value and the coco value, and the characterization of the M-PCE value.

6.6 Complexity comparison

In this section, we consider the complexity of computing the M-PCE value and the coco value, and the corresponding strategy profiles.

It follows easily from the characterization in Theorem 6.6 that in a 2-player game $G$ with (or without) side payments, the coco value is determined by $MSW(G)$, $mm_1(G_2)$, and $mm_2(G_2)$. $G_2$ can clearly be determined from $G$ in polynomial time (polynomial in the number of strategies), and $MSW(G)$ can be determined in polynomial time (simply by inspecting the payoff matrix for $G$). The minimax value of a 2-player game can be computed in polynomial time (see Appendix G). Moreover, if $(c_1,c_2)$ is the coco value of $G$, and $s^*$ is a pure strategy profile that obtains $MSW(G)$, the strategy profile that gives players the coco value is $((s^*,U_1(s^*)-c_1),(s^*,U_1(s^*)-c_1))$, which is simply the deal strategy profile in which both players agree to play $s^*$, and agree that player 1 pays player 2 $(U_1(s^*)-c_1)$.

Similarly, we can compute a M-PCE in a 2-player game with side payments in polynomial time.

**Theorem 6.12.** In a 2-player game $G^*$ with side payments, we can compute its M-PCE value and a strategy profile that obtains it in polynomial time.

**Proof.** Let $G$ be the game underlying $G^*$. By Theorem 6.7, the M-PCE value of $G$ is entirely determined by its MSW and its minimax value. We show in Appendix G that is determined by $MSW(G)$, $mm_1(G)$, and $mm_2(G)$. Since the minimax value of a 2-player game can be computed in polynomial time, and $MSW(G)$ can be computed by simply finding the entry in the matrix with the highest total utility, the M-PCE value can be computed in polynomial time.

Let the M-PCE value be $(m_1,m_2)$, and let $s^*$ be a pure strategy profile that obtains $MSW(G)$. Then $((s^*,U_1(s^*)-m_1),(s^*,U_1(s^*)-m_1))$, which is simply the deal strategy profile in which both players agree to play $s^*$, and agree that player 1 pays player 2 $U_1(s^*)-m_1$, is a M-PCE. 

For 2-player games (without side payments), a PCE can be found in polynomial time if one exists; moreover, determining whether one exists can also be done in polynomial time (see Theorem 5.4). Similarly, in 2-player games, a M-PCE can always be found in polynomial time (see Theorem 5.5).
7 Related Work

There are many solution concepts in the literature that attempt to model cooperative play. We compared PCE to the coco value in some detail in Section 6. In this section, we compare PCE to a number of others.

Although PCE is meant to apply to one-shot games, our motivation for it involved repeated games. It is thus interesting to compare Cooperative Equilibrium to solutions of repeated games. The well-known Folk Theorem [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] says that any payoff profile that gives each player at least his minimax utility is the payoff profile of some NE in the repeated game. Moreover, the proof of the Folk Theorem shows that if \( s \) is a strategy in the underlying normal-form game where each player’s utility is higher than the minimax utility in the repeated game, then there is a NE in the repeated game where \( s \) is played at each round. Thus, playing cooperatively repeatedly in the repeated game will typically be an outcome of a NE. However, so will many other behaviors. Because so many behaviors are consistent with the Folk Theorem, it has very little predictive power. For example, in repeated Traveler’s Dilemma, a player can ensure a payoff of at least 2 per iteration simply by always playing 2. It follows from the Folk Theorem that for any strategy profile \( s \) in the one-shot game where each player gets at least 2, there is a NE in the repeated game where each player \( i \) plays \( s_i \) in each round. By way of contrast, as we have seen, in a PCE of the single-shot game, each player gets more than 98. More generally, we can show that, for each PCE \( s \) in a normal-form game, there is a NE of the repeated game where \( s \) is played repeatedly.

Halpern and Pass [2013] and Capraro and Halpern [2014] consider what they call translucent players, who believe that how other players respond may depend in part on what they do. This is implicitly the case in PCE as well. The notion of translucency assumes that each player \( i \) has beliefs regarding how other players would respond if \( i \) deviates from his intended strategy to another strategy. That is, for each pair of strategies \((s_i, s_i')\) for player \( i \), \( i \) assigns a probability \( \mu_{s_i, s_i'}(s_{-i}) \) to each (joint) strategy profile \( s_{-i} \) for players other than \( i \). Intuitively, \( \mu_{s_i, s_i'}(s_{-i}) \) is the probability at which player \( i \) believes the others would jointly play \( s_{-i} \), if \( i \) deviated from \( s_i \) to \( s_i' \). A strategy profile is a translucent equilibrium (TE) if there does not exist a player \( i \) such that \( i \) can strictly improve her payoff if \( i \) deviates and other players respond to the deviation according to \( i \)’s belief (of how they would respond to the deviation). In 2-player games, every PCE is a TE, one in which each player believes that the other player would best respond to a deviation; similarly, every CE is a TE, one in which each player believes that the other player best responds to a deviation if that makes the other player no worse off compared to when no one deviates, and otherwise punishes the deviation by playing a strategy that makes the one who deviates strictly worse off than in the case where no one deviates whenever possible. In \( n \)-player games for \( n > 2 \), every PCE is a TE in which each player believes that if she deviates, the other players would play a NE among themselves given the deviation. (Recall that CE is defined only for 2-player games.) However, it is not the case that every TE is a PCE.

Farsighted pre-equilibrium (FPE) [Jamroga and Melissen 2011], like PCE, allows players to react to what other players are doing. Very roughly speaking, while PCE assumes that if a player deviates, the other players get to best respond, in FPE, the player who deviates gets to make the final response. For example, suppose that Alice deviates from \( s \) to \( s' \). PCE considers how Bob would react to the deviation, and whether Alice is better or worse off given Bob’s response. FPE also considers how Bob would react, but allows Alice to take the last step, and then compares Alice’s payoff in \( s \) to her payoff at the end of this process. PCE also allows a player \( i \) to deviate to a strategy that may (temporarily) decrease
i’s payoff (this could be useful because the response to the deviation may make i better off); FPE does not consider such deviations. Every NE is an FPE; as we have seen, not every NE is a PCE. As a consequence, in games like the centipede game, PCE and M-PCE do a better job of predicting cooperative behavior than FPE. The concept of farsightenedness in FPE, which allows players to consider other players’ responses and responses to other players’ responses, and so on, dates back to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s stable set in coalitional games [1944]. The idea was then developed by Harsanyi who proposed indirect dominance of coalition structures [1974], and then followed by a number of works [Chwe 1994; Diamantoudi and Xue 2003; Greenberg 1990; Nakanishi 2007; Suzuki and Muto 2005]. However, all these works except FPE consider cooperative games instead of non-cooperative games—which are the main topic of these paper.

There have also been attempts to explain cooperative behavior by saying that the utility function that players use is different from the utility function that is presented in the game, and takes into account fairness and/or social welfare. The two best-known examples of this approach are due to Charness and Rabin [2002] and Fehr and Schmidt [1999]. Given utility functions $u_i$ for players $i = 1, \ldots, n$, Charness and Rabin [2002] consider the modified utility functions

$$u_i^{CR} = (1 - a_i^{CR})u_i(s) + a_i^{CR}(b_i^{CR} \min_{j=1,\ldots,N} u_j(s) + (1 - b_i^{CR}) \sum_{j=1}^N u_j(s)),$$

where $a_i^{CR}$ is the degree of importance that agent $i$ gives to social welfare and the plight of the worst-off individual (so that $(1 - a_i)$ is the degree of importance of his base utility to player $i$), while $b_i^{CR}$ measures the relative degree of importance of the worst-off individual and $(1 - b_i^{CR})$ measures the relative degree of importance of total social welfare. Similarly, Fehr and Schmidt [1999] modify the utility to

$$u_i^{FS}(s) = u_i(s) - \frac{a_i^{FS}}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max(u_j(s) - u_i(s), 0) - \frac{b_i^{FS}}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} \max(u_i(s) - u_j(s), 0),$$

where $b_i^{FS} \leq a_i^{FS}$, $a_i^{FS}$ can be viewed as measuring the importance of the inequity caused by $i$ having a lower payoff than others, and $b_i^{FS}$ can be viewed as measuring the importance of the inequity caused by $i$ having a higher payoff than others. As shown in Section 6, M-PCE is closely related to maximal social welfare, and also embodies a certain sense of fairness, so to some extent it captures some of the features that the modified utility functions of Charness and Rabin [2002] and Fehr and Schmidt [1999] are trying to capture.

While not intended to model cooperation, the recently-introduced notion of iterated regret minimization (IRM) [Halpern and Pass 2011] often produce results similar to PCE. As its name suggests, IRM iteratively deletes strategies that do not minimize regret. Although it is based on a quite different philosophy than PCE or its variants, IRM leads to quite similar predictions as PCE in a surprising number of games. For example, in Traveler’s Dilemma, $(97, 97)$ is the unique profile that survives IRM. In the Nash bargaining game, $(50, 50)$ is the unique profile that survives IRM and is also the unique M-PCE of the game. There are a number of other games of interest where PCE and IRM either coincide or are close.

There are also games in which they behave differently. For example, consider a variant of Prisoner’s Dilemma with the following payoff matrix: It can be shown that, if there are dominant actions in a game, then these are the only actions that survive IRM. Since defecting is the only dominant action in this game, it follows that (Defect, Defect) is the only strategy profile that survives IRM, giving a payoff
(1, 1). On the other hand, the unique M-PCE is (Cooperate, Cooperate) with payoffs (10000, 10000) (although (Defect, Defect) is also a PCE). In this game, M-PCE seems to do a better job of explaining behavior than PCE. Nevertheless, the fact that PCE and IRM lead to similar answers in so many games of interest suggests that there may be some deep connection between them. We leave the problem of explaining this connection to future work.

### A Computing the PCE in the centipede game

To compute the PCE in the centipede game, we need to first compute $BU_1$ and $BU_2$. If player 1 continues to the end of the game, then player 2's best response is to also continue to the end of the game, giving player 1 a payoff of $2^{19}$ (and player 2 a payoff of $2^{20} + 1$). If we take $q_{i,j}$ to be the strategy where player $i$ quits at turn $j$ and $q_{i,C}$ to be the strategy where player $i$ continues to the end of the game, then a straightforward computation shows that $q_{2,C}$ continues to be a best response to $\alpha q_{1,19} + (1 - \alpha)q_{1,C}$ as long as $\alpha \geq \frac{3 \times 2^{18}}{3 \times 2^{18} + 1}$. If we take $\alpha = \frac{3 \times 2^{18}}{3 \times 2^{18} + 1}$ and player 2 best responds by playing $q_{2,C}$, then player 1's utility is $2^{19} + \frac{3 \times 2^{17}}{3 \times 2^{17} + 1}$. It is then straightforward to show that this is in fact $BU_1$. A similar argument shows that, if player 1 is best responding, then the best player 2 can do is to play $\beta q_{2,18} + (1 - \beta)q_{2,C}$, where $\beta = \frac{3 \times 2^{17}}{3 \times 2^{17} + 1}$. With this choice, player 1’s best response is $q_{1,19}$; using this strategy for player 2, we get that $BU_2 = 2^{18} + \frac{3 \times 2^{17}}{3 \times 2^{17} + 1}$.

It is easy to see that there is no pure strategy profile $s$ such that $U_1(s) \geq BU_1$ and $U_2(s) \geq BU_2$.

### B Proof of Lemma 5.1

**Lemma 5.1.** In a 2-player game, for all strategy profiles $s^*$, there exists a strategy profile $s' = (s'_1, s'_2)$ that Pareto dominates $s^*$ such that both $s'_1$ and $s'_2$ have support of size at most two.

**Proof.** Let $A$ and $B$ be the payoff matrices (of size $n \times m$) for player 1 and player 2 respectively. Given a strategy profile $s^* = (s^*_1, s^*_2)$, let $U_1(s^*) = r^*_1$ and $U_2(s^*) = r^*_2$. We first show that there exists a strategy $s'_2$ for player 2 with support of size at most two such that $(s'_1, s'_2)$ Pareto dominates $s^*$. We then show that there exists a strategy $s'_1$ for player 1 with support of size at most two such that $(s'_1, s'_2)$ Pareto dominates $(s^*_1, s^*_2)$, and hence $s^*$.

Consider the following linear program $P_1$, where $y$ is a column vector in $\mathbb{R}^m$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad (s^*_1)^T A y \\
\text{subject to} & \quad (s^*_1)^T B y = r^*_2 \\
& \quad \sum_{i=1}^m y[i] = 1 \\
& \quad y \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

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As usual, an optimal solution of $P_1$ is a vector $y$ that maximizes the objective function $((s^*_1)^TAy)$ and satisfies the three constraints; a feasible solution of $P_1$ is one that satisfies the constraints; finally, an optimal value of $P_1$ is the value of the objective function for the optimal solution $y$ (if it exists). We show that $P_1$ has an optimal solution $y^*$ with at most two nonzero entries.

Since all constraints in $P_1$ are equality constraints except for the non-negativity constraint, $P_1$ is a standard-form linear program [Murty 1983]. We can rewrite the equality constraints in $P_1$ as

$$Dy = \begin{bmatrix} r^*_2 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

where $D$ is an $(m \times 2)$ matrix whose first row is $(s^*_1)^TB$ and whose second row has all entries equal to 1. In geometric terms, the region represented by the constraints in $P_1$ is a convex polytope. Since $P_1$ is a standard-form linear program, it is well-known that $y$ is a vertex of the polytope (i.e., an extreme point of the polytope) iff all columns $i$ in $D$ where $y[i] \neq 0$ are linearly independent [Murty 1983]. Since the columns of $D$ are vectors in $\mathbb{R}^2$, at most two of them can be linearly independent. Thus, a vertex $y$ of the polytope can have at most two nonzero entries.

Clearly $s^*_2$ is a feasible solution of $P_1$. Since $(s^*_1)^TA s^*_2 = r^*_1$, by assumption, the optimal value of $P_1$ is at least $r^*_1$. Moreover, since the objective function of $P_1$ is linear, $y \geq 0$, and $\sum_{i=1}^{m} y[i] = 1$, the optimal value is bounded. Therefore, the linear program has an optimal solution. By the fundamental theorem of linear programming, if a linear program has an optimal solution, then it has an optimal solution at a vertex of the polytope defined by its constraints [Murty 1983]. Let $s^*_2$ be the strategy defined by an optimal solution at the vertex of the polytope. As we observed above, $s^*_2$ has at most two nonzero entries. It is immediate that $U_1((s^*_1, s^*_2)) \geq r^*_1$ and $U_2((s^*_1, s^*_2)) \geq r^*_2$.

This completes the first step of the proof.

The second step of the proof essentially repeats the first step. Suppose that $U_1((s^*_1, s^*_2)) = r_1$ and $U_2((s^*_1, s^*_2)) = r_2$. Consider the following linear program $P_2$, where $x$ is column vector in $\mathbb{R}^{n}$:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad x^TB s'_2 \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x^TA s'_2 = r_1 \\
& \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} x[i] = 1 \\
& \quad x \geq 0.
\end{align*}$$

Since $s^*_1$ is a feasible solution of $P_2$ and $(s^*_1)^TB s'_2 \geq r^*_2$, the optimal value of $P_2$ is at least $r^*_2$. As above, if we take $s'_2$ to be an optimal solution of $P_2$ that is a vertex of the polytope defined by the constraints, then $s'_2$ has support of size at most two, and $(s'_1, s'_2)$ Pareto dominates $s^*$.

\[\square\]

C Proof of Lemma 5.3

**Lemma 5.3.** A simple bilinear program of size $2 \times 2$ can be solved in constant time.
Proof. Let \( P \) be the following simple bilinear program, where \( x = [x_1 \ x_2]^T, \ y = [y_1 \ y_2]^T \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad x^T A y + x^T c + y^T c' \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x^T B y \geq d_1 \\
& \quad x_1 + x_2 = d_2 \\
& \quad y_1 + y_2 = d_3 \\
& \quad x \geq 0 \\
& \quad y \geq 0,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( A \) and \( B \) are \( 2 \times 2 \) matrices.

We show that \( P \) can be solved in constant time. That is, we either find an optimal solution of \( P \), or find that \( P \) has no optimal solution in constant time. The idea is to show that \( P \) can be reduced into eight simpler problems, each of which can more obviously be solved in constant time.

Suppose that \( A = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{bmatrix} \) and \( B = \begin{bmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{bmatrix} \). Then we can write \( P \) as the following quadratic program \( Q \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad a_{11} x_1 y_1 + a_{12} x_1 y_2 + a_{21} x_2 y_1 + a_{22} x_2 y_2 + c_1 x_1 + c_2 x_2 + c_1' y_1 + c_2' y_2 \\
\text{subject to} & \quad b_{11} x_1 y_1 + b_{12} x_1 y_2 + b_{21} x_2 y_1 + b_{22} x_2 y_2 - d_1 \geq 0 \\
& \quad x_1 + x_2 = d_2 \\
& \quad y_1 + y_2 = d_3 \\
& \quad x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

After replacing \( x_2 \) with \((d_2 - x_1)\) and \( y_2 \) with \((d_3 - y_1)\), then rearranging terms, the objective function of \( Q \) becomes

\[
(a_{11} - a_{12} - a_{21} + a_{22}) x_1 y_1 + (a_{12} d_3 - a_{22} d_3 + c_1 - c_2) x_1 + (a_{21} d_2 - a_{22} d_2 + c_1' - c_2') y_1 + (a_{22} d_2 d_3 + c_2 d_2 + c_2' d_3),
\]

and the first constraint becomes

\[
(b_{11} - b_{12} - b_{21} + b_{22}) x_1 y_1 + (b_{12} d_3 - b_{22} d_3) x_1 + (b_{21} d_2 - b_{22} d_2) y_1 + (b_{22} d_2 d_3 - d_1).
\]

We can get an equivalent problem by removing the constant terms \( a_{22} d_2 d_3 + c_2 d_2 + c_2' d_3 \) from the objective function, since adding or removing additive constants from a function that we want to maximize does not affect its optimal solutions (e.g., “maximize \( x \)” has the same optimal solutions as “maximize \( x + 1 \)”).

Thus, \( Q \) is equivalent to the following quadratic program \( Q' \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \gamma_1 x_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 x_1 + \gamma_3 y_1 \\
\text{subject to} & \quad \gamma_4 x_1 y_1 + \gamma_5 x_1 + \gamma_6 y_1 + \gamma_7 \geq 0 \\
& \quad x_1 \in [0, d_2] \\
& \quad y_1 \in [0, d_3],
\end{align*}
\]

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\[ \gamma_1 = a_{11} - a_{12} - a_{21} + a_{22} \]
\[ \gamma_2 = a_{12}d_3 - a_{22}d_3 + c[1] - c[2] \]
\[ \gamma_3 = a_{21}d_2 - a_{22}d_2 + c'[1] - c'[2] \]
\[ \gamma_4 = b_{11} - b_{12} - b_{21} + b_{22} \]
\[ \gamma_5 = b_{12}d_3 - b_{22}d_3 \]
\[ \gamma_6 = b_{21}d_2 - b_{22}d_2 \]
\[ \gamma_7 = b_{22}d_2d_3 - d_1. \]

(Note that \( \gamma_i \) is a constant, for \( i = 1, \ldots, 7. \))

The first step in solving \( Q' \) involves expressing the values of \( y_1 \) that make \( (x_1, y_1) \) a feasible solution, that is, one that satisfies the constraint
\[ \gamma_4x_1y_1 + \gamma_5x_1 + \gamma_6y_1 + \gamma_7 = (\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5)x_1 + \gamma_6y_1 + \gamma \geq 0. \]

For each \( y_1 \in [0, d_3] \), let \( \Psi_1(y_1) \) be the set of \( x_1 \) such that \( (x_1, y_1) \) is a feasible solution of \( Q' \). The characterization of \( \Psi_1(y_1) \) depends on the sign of \( \gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5 \). Specifically:
\[ \Psi_1(y_1) = \begin{cases} 
\left[ \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5}, d_2 \right] \cap [0, d_2] & \text{if } \gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5 > 0, \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5} \leq d_2, \\
[0, \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5}] \cap [0, d_2] & \text{if } \gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5 < 0, \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5} \geq 0, \\
[0, d_2] & \text{if } \gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5 = 0, Q \gamma_6y_1 + \gamma_7 \geq 0, \\
\emptyset & \text{if } \gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5 = 0, \gamma_6y_1 + \gamma_7 < 0.
\end{cases} \quad (1) \]

Note that the first three regions are single intervals.

Let \( f(x_1, y_1) = \gamma_1x_1y_1 + \gamma_2x_1 + \gamma_3y_1 \), so that \( f(x_1, y_1) \) is the objective function of \( Q' \). We want to maximize \( f \) over all feasible pairs \( (x_1, y_1) \). Taking the derivative of \( f \) with respect to \( x_1 \), we get
\[ \frac{\partial f(x_1, y_1)}{\partial x_1} = \gamma_1y_1 + \gamma_2, \]
which is a linear function of \( y_1 \). Because the derivative is linear, for each fixed value of \( y_1 \), the value that maximizes \( f(x_1, y_1) \) must lie at an endpoint of the interval appropriate for that value of \( y_1 \). Whether it is the left endpoint or the right endpoint depends on whether the derivative is negative or positive. For example, if \( y_1 \) satisfies the constraints corresponding to the first interval in (1) (i.e., if \( \gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5 > 0 \) and \( \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5} \leq d_2 \)) and \( \gamma_1y_1 + \gamma_2 > 0 \), then \( x_1 = d_2 \) (i.e., the right endpoint of the interval of \( \Psi_1(y_1) \)) maximizes \( f(x_1, y_1) \); and the problem of maximizing \( f(x_1, y_1) \) reduces to that of maximizing \( f(d_2, y_1) \) (see \( Q_1 \) below). On the other hand, if \( \gamma_1y_1 + \gamma_2 > 0 \), then maximizing \( f(x_1, y_1) \) reduces to maximizing \( f(0, y_1) \) or \( f\left( \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5}, y_1 \right) \), depending on whether \( \frac{-\gamma_6y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4y_1 + \gamma_5} \) is negative (see \( Q_5 \) and \( Q_6 \) below).

These considerations show that to find the value \( (x_1, y_1) \) that maximizes \( f(x_1, y_1) \), it suffices to find...
the value of $y_1$ that maximizes each of the expressions below, and take the one that is best among them:

$$Q_1 : \text{maximize } f(d_2, y_1), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 > 0, \frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5} \leq d_2, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 \geq 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_2 : \text{maximize } f(0, y_1), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 > 0, \frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5} \leq 0, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 < 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_3 : \text{maximize } f\left(\frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5}, y_1\right), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 > 0, 0 \leq \frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5} \leq d_2, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 < 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_4 : \text{maximize } f(d_2, y_1), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 < 0, \frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5} \geq d_2, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 \geq 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_5 : \text{maximize } f\left(\frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5}, y_1\right), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 < 0, 0 \leq \frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5} \leq d_2, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 \geq 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_6 : \text{maximize } f(0, y_1), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 < 0, \frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5} \geq 0, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 < 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_7 : \text{maximize } f(d_2, y_1), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 = 0, \gamma_6 y_1 + \gamma_7 \geq 0, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 \geq 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3]$$

$$Q_8 : \text{maximize } f(0, y_1), \text{ subject to }$$
$$\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5 = 0, \gamma_6 y_1 + \gamma_7 \geq 0, \gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2 < 0, y_1 \in [0, d_3].$$

Note that $Q_1$, $Q_2$, and $Q_3$ describe the possibilities for the first case in (1), $Q_4$, $Q_5$, and $Q_6$ are the possibilities for the second case, and $Q_7$ and $Q_8$ are the possibilities for the third case.

Each of $Q_1$, $Q_2$, $Q_4$, $Q_6$, $Q_7$, and $Q_8$ can be easily rewritten as linear programs of a single variable ($y_1$), so can be solved in constant time. With a little more effort, we can show $Q_3$ and $Q_5$ can also be solved in constant time. We explain how this can be done for $Q_3$. The argument for $Q_5$ is similar and left to the reader. All the constraints in $Q_3$ can be viewed as linear constraints; the set of feasible values of $y_1$ is thus an interval, whose endpoints can clearly be computed in constant time. Now the objective function is

$$f\left(\frac{-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5}, y_1\right) = \frac{(\gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2)(-\gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_7) + \gamma_3 y_1}{\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5}.$$

To find the maximum value of the objective function among the feasible values, we need to take its derivative (with respect to $y_1$). A straightforward calculation shows that this derivative is

$$\frac{(-2\gamma_1 \gamma_6 y_1 - \gamma_1 \gamma_7 - \gamma_1 \gamma_6)(\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5) - \gamma_4(\gamma_6 y_1 + \gamma_7)(\gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_2)}{(\gamma_4 y_1 + \gamma_5)^2} + \gamma_3.$$

This derivative is 0 when its numerator is 0 (since the constraints in $Q_3$ guarantee that the denominator is positive). The numerator is a quadratic, so can be solved in constant time.

Thus, to find the optimal value for $Q_3$, we must just check $f$ at the endpoints of the interval defined by the constraints (which, as we observed above, can be computed in constant time) and at the points where the derivative is 0 (which can also be computed in constant time). Thus, $Q_3$ can be solved in constant time.

This completes the argument that $Q$ can be solved in constant time. □
D Proof of Theorem 5.4

Theorem 5.4. Given a 2-player game \( G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u) \), we can compute in polynomial time whether \( G \) has a PCE and, if so, we can compute a PCE in polynomial time.

Proof. Suppose that \( G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u) \), where \( A = A_1 \times A_2 \), \( |A_1| = n \), \( |A_2| = m \), \( u_1 \) is characterized by the payoff matrix \( A \), and \( u_2 \) is characterized by the payoff matrix \( B \).

In order to compute a PCE for the game, we need the values of \( BU_1 \) and \( BU_2 \). These can be computed in polynomial time, as follows. For \( BU_i \), for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \), we solve the following linear program \( P_i \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad s_i^T(A[1,:]) \\
\text{subject to} & \quad s_i^T(B[1,:]) \geq s_i^T(B[j,:]) \quad \text{for all} \ j \in \{1, \ldots, m\} \\
& \quad \sum_{l=1}^n s_l[l] = 1 \\
& \quad s_1 \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Suppose that \( r_i \) is the optimal value of \( P_i \). Since \( P_i \) is a linear program, \( r_i \) can be computed in polynomial time. Intuitively, \( r_i \) is the maximum reward player 1 can get if player 2 plays action \( b_i \) and \( b_i \) is a best response for player 2 to 1’s action. (The first constraint ensures that \( b_i \) is a best response for player 2 to player 1’s strategy.) \( BU_1 = \max_{i=1}^m r_i \), so can be computed in polynomial time. \( BU_2 \) can be similarly computed.

After computing \( BU_1 \) and \( BU_2 \), we can compute a PCE. Recall that a strategy profile \( s \) is a PCE iff \( U_1(s) \geq BU_1 \) and \( U_2(s) \geq BU_2 \). Suppose that game \( G \) has a PCE \( s^* \). By Lemma 5.1, there must exist a strategy profile \( s' = (s'_1, s'_2) \) that Pareto dominates \( s^* \), where both \( s'_1 \) and \( s'_2 \) have support of size at most two. By Theorem 2.6, \( s' \) is also a PCE. We call such a PCE a \((2 \times 2)-PCE\). Our arguments above show that \( G \) has a PCE iff it has a \((2 \times 2)\)-PCE. Thus, in order to check whether \( G \) has a PCE, it suffice to check whether it has a \((2 \times 2)\)-PCE.

We do this exhaustively. For all \( i_1, i_2, j_1, j_2 \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \) with \( i_1 \neq i_2 \) and all \( j_1, j_2 \in \{1, 2, \ldots, m\} \) with \( j_1 \neq j_2 \), we check whether \( G \) has a \((2 \times 2)\)-PCE in which player 1 places positive probability only on strategies \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \), and player 2 places positive probability only on strategies \( j_1 \) and \( j_2 \). For each choice of \( i_1, i_2, j_1, j_2 \), this question can be expressed as the following \( 2 \times 2 \) simple bilinear programming problem \( P_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} \), where \( A_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} \) is the \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix \[
\begin{bmatrix}
A_{i_1,j_1} & A_{i_1,j_2} \\
A_{i_2,j_1} & A_{i_2,j_2}
\end{bmatrix}
\]
and \( B_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} \) is the \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix \[
\begin{bmatrix}
B_{i_1,j_1} & B_{i_1,j_2} \\
B_{i_2,j_1} & B_{i_2,j_2}
\end{bmatrix}
\]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad [x_1 \ x_2] A_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} [y_1 \ y_2]^T \\
\text{subject to} & \quad [x_1 \ x_2] B_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} [y_1 \ y_2]^T \geq BU_2 \\
& \quad x_1 + x_2 = 1 \\
& \quad y_1 + y_2 = 1 \\
& \quad x \geq 0, \ y \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

The first constraint ensures that player 2’s reward is at least \( BU_2 \); the remaining constraints ensure that player 1 puts positive probability only on strategies \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \), while player 2 puts positive probability only on \( j_1 \) and \( j_2 \). If the optimal value of \( P_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} \) for some choice of \( (i_1, i_2, j_1, j_2) \) is at least \( BU_1 \), then the corresponding optimal solution \((x, y)\) is a PCE of \( G \). (Recall that a strategy profile \( s \) is a PCE
if $U_1(s) \geq BU_1$, and $U_2(s) \geq BU_2.$) On the other hand, if the optimal value for each $P_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$ is strictly less than $BU_1$, then $G$ does not have a $(2 \times 2)$-PCE and so, by the arguments above, $G$ does not have a PCE.

The algorithm above must solve $\binom{n}{2} \times \binom{n}{2}$ simple 2 bilinear programs. By Lemma 5.3, each can be solved in constant time. Thus, the algorithm runs in polynomial time, as desired.

\section{Proof of Theorem 5.5}

THEOREM 5.5. Given a 2-player game $G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u)$, we can compute a M-PCE in polynomial time.

Proof. We start by computing $BU_1$ and $BU_2$, as in Theorem 5.4. Again, this takes polynomial time.

Recall that a M-PCE is an $\alpha$-PCE such that for all $\alpha' > \alpha$, there is no $\alpha'$-PCE in $G$. Clearly, a strategy that Pareto dominates an $\alpha$-PCE must itself be an $\alpha$-PCE. Thus, using Lemma 5.1, it easily follows that there must be a M-PCE for $G$ such that the support of both strategies involved is of size at most 2. Call such a M-PCE a $(2 \times 2)$-M-PCE.

To compute a $(2 \times 2)$-M-PCE, for each tuple $(i_1, i_2, j_1, j_2)$, we compute the optimal $\alpha$ for which there exists an $\alpha$-PCE when player 1 is restricted to putting positive probability on actions $i_1$ and $i_2$, and player 2 is restricted to putting positive probability in $j_1$ and $j_2$. Using the notation of Theorem 5.4, we want to solve the following problem $Q_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$, where $d_1(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) = [x_1 x_2] A_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} [y_1 y_2]^T - BU_1$ and $d_2(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) = [x_1 x_2] B_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} [y_1 y_2]^T - BU_2$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad \min(d_1(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2), d_2(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2)) \\
\text{subject to} & \quad x_1 + x_2 = 1 \\
& \quad y_1 + y_2 = 1 \\
& \quad x \geq 0, \ y \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

The objective function maximizes the $\alpha$ for which the strategy profile determined by $[x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}]$ and $[y_{i_1}, y_{i_2}]$ is an $\alpha$-PCE (recall that $s$ is an $\alpha$-PCE if $\alpha = \min(U_1(s) - BU_1, U_2(s) - BU_2)$). The problem here is that since the objective function involves a min, this is not a bilinear program. However, we can solve this problem by solving two simple bilinear programs of size $2 \times 2$, depending on which of $[x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}] A_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} [y_{i_1}, y_{i_2}]^T - BU_1$ and $[x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}] A_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2} [y_{i_1}, y_{i_2}]^T - BU_2$ is smaller. Specifically, let $Q'_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$ be the following simple bilinear program:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad d_1(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) \\
\text{subject to} & \quad d_1(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) \leq d_2(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) \\
& \quad x_1 + x_2 = 1 \\
& \quad y_1 + y_2 = 1 \\
& \quad x \geq 0, \ y \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Let $Q''_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$ be the same bilinear program with the roles of $d_1$ and $d_2$ reversed. It is easy to see that the larger of the solutions to $Q'_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$ and $Q''_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$ is the solution to $Q_{i_1,i_2,j_1,j_2}$. It thus follows that a M-PCE can be computed in polynomial time. \qed
F Proof of Theorem 5.6

**Theorem 5.6.** Given a 2-player game \( G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u) \), we can compute a Pareto-optimal M-PCE in polynomial time.

**Proof.** We start by computing a M-PCE \( s \), as in Theorem 5.5. This takes polynomial time. We then compute a Pareto-optimal strategy profile \( s^* \) that Pareto dominates \( s \). Clearly, \( s^* \) is a Pareto-optimal M-PCE, and we are done.

We now show that such an \( s^* \) can be found in polynomial time. We first show that it is impossible to have both \( U_1(s^*) > U_1(s) \) and \( U_2(s^*) > U_2(s) \). To see why, let \( \alpha_s \) be the greatest \( \alpha \) such that \( s \) is an \( \alpha \)-PCE. If \( U_1(s^*) > U_1(s) \) and \( U_2(s^*) > U_2(s) \), then \( s^* \) is an \( \alpha' \)-PCE for some \( \alpha' > \alpha_s \), a contradiction to \( s \) being a M-PCE. Therefore, for \( s^* \) to Pareto dominate \( s \), either \( U_1(s^*) = U_1(s) \) and \( U_2(s^*) \geq U_2(s) \), or \( U_1(s^*) \geq U_1(s) \) and \( U_2(s^*) = U_2(s) \). It then follows that to find \( s^* \), we just need to solve the following two bilinear programs \( Q_1 \) and \( Q_2 \); the solution which Pareto dominates the other solution is then Pareto optimal (if neither Pareto dominates the other, then both are Pareto-optimal). Intuitively, \( Q_1 \) finds a strategy profile that maximizes player 1’s reward while player 2 gets no less than what she gets in \( s \); and \( Q_2 \) finds one that maximizes player 2’s reward while player 1 gets no less than what he gets in \( s \).

\( Q_1 \) is the following bilinear program:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maximize} & \quad s_T^* A s_2 \\
\text{subject to} & \quad s_T^* B s_2 \geq U_2(s) \\
& \quad \sum_{i=1}^n s_1[i] = 1 \\
& \quad \sum_{j=1}^m s_2[j] = 1 \\
& \quad s_1, s_2 \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

\( Q_2 \) is defined similarly, but interchanging \( A \) and \( B \), and replacing \( U_2 \) by \( U_1 \).

We can use techniques similar to those used in Theorem 5.4 to reduce both \( Q_1 \) and \( Q_2 \) to a polynomial number of simple bilinear programs. By Lemma 5.3, each simple bilinear program can be solved in constant time; thus both \( Q_1 \) and \( Q_2 \) can be solved in polynomial time, as desired. \( \square \)

G Minimax Value in 2-player games

**Theorem G.1.** Given a 2-player game \( G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u) \), we can compute \( mm_1(G) \) and \( mm_2(G) \) in polynomial time.

**Proof.** Suppose that \( G = (\{1, 2\}, A, u) \), where \( A = A_1 \times A_2, |A_1| = n, |A_2| = m \), \( u_1 \) is characterized by the payoff matrix \( A \), and \( u_2 \) is characterized by the payoff matrix \( B \).

To compute \( mm_1(G) \), for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \), we solve the following linear program \( P_i \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{minimize} & \quad A[i, \cdot] s_2 \\
\text{subject to} & \quad A[i, \cdot] s_2 \geq A[j, \cdot] s_2 \text{ for all } j \in \{1, \ldots n\} \\
& \quad \sum_{i=1}^m s_2[i] = 1 \\
& \quad s_2 \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]
Suppose that $r_i$ is the optimal value of $P_i$ (if $P_i$ has a feasible solution). Since $P_i$ is a linear program, $r_i$ can be computed in polynomial time. Intuitively, $r_i$ is the minimum reward player 1 gets when action $a_i$ is a best response to player 2’s strategy. (The first constraint ensures that $a_i$ is a best response for player 1 to player 2’s strategy.)

It follows that $\min_1^n r_i$, and can be computed in polynomial time; $\min_2(G)$ can be computed similarly.

Acknowledgements: Work supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0534064, IIS-0812045, IIS-0911036, and CCF-1214844, by AFOSR grants FA9550-08-1-0438, FA9550-09-1-0266, and FA9550-12-1-0040, by ARO grants W911NF-09-1-0281 and W911NF-14-1-0017, and by the Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program administered by the AFOSR under grant FA9550-12-1-0040.

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