holds at a world , 187
ranked player, 111
acceptable, 75
achievable, 151
acyclic, 19
adoption threshold, 34
allocation, 74
appropriate, 201
attainable, 149
Augmenting Path Algorithm, 55
balanced, 93
best response, 11
best-response dynamics, 12, 213
best-response set, 11
better-response dynamics, 29
BFS, 20
bipartite graph, 59
blocking pair, 148
BRD, 12
breadth-first search, 20
canonical web search algorithms, 171
capacitated graph, 53
capacity, 56
cascading, 46
Clarke pivot rule, 107
common prior, 193
complete bipartite graph, 59
complete graph, 18
complete matching context, 140
complete social-choice context, 119
complete two-sided matching context, 154
Condorcet winner, 121
connected, 19
connected component, 19
constricted set, 61
context, 100
converges, 12
cut, 56
cycle, 19
DA algorithm, 149
deferred acceptance algorithm, 149
degree, 18
dictator, 125
dictator for , 125
dictatorial, 125
directed graph, 18
disconnected, 19
dominant strategy, 6
dominant-strategy truthful, 103
DST, 103
DST-implement, 103
exchange network, 85
exchange network corresponding to, 87
finite normal-form game, 5
first-price auction mechanism, 101
flow, 54
game, 3
graph, 18
herding behavior, 183
higher-level beliefs, 190
house allocation problems, 139
Hubs–and–Authorities, 162
in-degree, 18
incoming, 18
induced acceptability graph, 75
induced preferred choice graph, 75
inefficiency of equilibria, 39
information cascade, 183
intrinsic value function, 37
ISD, 8
iterated strict dominance, 8
JTB, 198
justified true belief, 198
knowledge cells, 188
knowledge partitions, 188
length, 19
majority voting rule, 121
man-optimal, 151
market clearing, 76
market equilibrium, 76
market-for-bundles context, 111
matching context, 140
matching context with strict preferences, 140
matching market, 74
matching market context, 109
matching market corresponding to, 87
matching market for bundles, 83
matching rule, 140
max--flow, 54
maximize social welfare, 77
maximizes social value, 77, 102
maximum matching, 59
maximum social welfare, 40
mechanism, 100
mechanism design context, 100
median voter theorem, 133
min--cut, 56
mixed strategy, 14
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, 14
MSW, 40
Nash equilibrium, 10
Nash truthful, 103
Nash-implement, 104
networked coordination game, 37
neutral, 143
no-trade theorem, 196
noise-traders, 197
non-bossy, 143
normal-form game, 5
one-sided matchings, 139
onto, 125
ordinal potential function, 27
out-degree, 18
outgoing, 18
PageRank, 163
partner preference profile, 151
path, 19
payment-free mechanism, 120
perfect, 61
plain networked coordination game, 34
plain VCG, 106
plurality voting rule, 122
PNE, 10
posterior beliefs, 193
potential, 26
preference ordering, 119
preferred choice, 75
price function, 75
priority mechanism, 141
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 3
probability mass function, 221
probability space, 221
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, 10
reachable, 19
reserve price, 112
residual graph, 54
sample space, 221
scoring-based voting rule, 123
SDM, 141
search engine optimization, 171
second-price auction, 101
self-loop, 18
Serial Dictator Mechanism, 141
single-item auction context, 101
single-peaked preferences, 132
sink, 19
size, 59
size of a graph, 18
social value, 76
social welfare, 26
social-choice context, 119
social-choice context with strict preferences, 119
socially optimal, 36
source, 19
stable equilibria, 214
stable matching, 151
strategy, 5
strategy-proof, 120
strategy-proof for the men, 154
strategy-proof for the women, 154
strategy-proof matching rules, 140
strictly dominant strategy, 6
strictly dominated, 7
strictly dominates, 7
strongly cascading, 48
subgraph, 18
subjective adoption threshold, 37
tipping point, 214
tradable, 196
traffic network problem, 66
two-sided matching context with strict preferences, 154
two-sided matching market context, 153
two-sided matching problem, 147
two-sided matching rule, 154
ultimatum game, 91
undirected graph, 18
unstable equilibrium, 214
utilitarian social welfare, 26
utility, 4
utility functions, 4
value, 54
VCG mechanism, 107
voting rule, 120
walk, 19
Walrasian equilibrium, 76
weakly ordinal potential function, 27
web structure, 161
weighted density, 49
weighted subjective threshold, 43
woman-pessimal, 152