Hu Fu5162 Upson HallCornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 Email: hufu at cs dot cornell dot edu |
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About Me
I am currently a sixth year PhD student in the Department of Computer Science at Cornell University. I am interested in algorithms, game theory, and theoretical computer science in general. Much of my research focus is on algorithmic mechanism design. My advisor is Professor Bobby Kleinberg .I obtained my B.S. in 2007 from Tsinghua University , Beijing, China.
Here is my CV.
Working Papers
- VCG Auctions with Reserve Prices: Lazy or Eager
Hu Fu.
In submission. - The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline.
In submission. - Heaven Can Wait: Mechanism Design with Intrinsic Utilities
Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Balu Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis.
In submission. - Truthful Welfare Maximization via Local Decompositions
Hu Fu, Thanh Nguyen, Rakesh Vohra.
In submission.
Publications
- Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-Averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy.
To appear at EC '13. - Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balu Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis.
To appear at EC '13. - Simultaneous Auctions Are (Almost) Efficient
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier.
To appear at STOC '13. - Ad Auctions with Data
Hu Fu, Patrick Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Ihbal Talgam-Cohen, and Sergei Vassilvitskii.
SAGT '12. Preliminary versions presented at NetEcon'12, Ad Auctions Workshop '12. - Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian.
Preliminary version at EC '12. - Conditional Equilibrium Outcomes via Ascending Price Processes with Applications to Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg and Ron Lavi.
Preliminary version at EC '12. - Sketching Valuation Functions
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, and Tim Roughgarden.
SODA '12. - Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg.
STOC '11. - Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Dave Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, and Chris Umans.
SODA '10.
Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms - Truthfulness via Proxies
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg.
Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg.
Merged with two closely related papers into Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions above.