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UID:node-11355@prod.cs.cornell.edu
DTSTAMP:20200922T201500Z
DTSTART:20200922T201500Z
DTEND:20200922T211500Z
SUMMARY:Extra Theory Seminar: Joint Microeconomic Theory & Computer Science Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Stephen Morris, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games. Joint w/ Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi. PLEASE NOTE: Join via ZoomAbstract: What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary action supermodular games? It is known that an outcome can be partially implemented (induced by some equilibrium) if it satisﬁes obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome can be smallest equilibrium implemented (induced by the smallest equilibrium) and fully implemented (induced by all equilibria). Smallest equilibrium implementation requires a stronger sequential obedience condition: there is a stochastic ordering of players under which players are prepared to switch to the high action even if they think only those before them will switch. Full implementation requires sequential obedience in both directions.As one application of our result, we show that if the game has a...https://prod.cs.cornell.edu/content/extra-theory-seminar-joint-microeconomic-theory-computer-science-workshop
LOCATION:Streaming via Zoom
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