madam speaker , when china joined the wto , the u.s. and china entered into an `` accession protocol. '' among other things , that protocol anticipates that the united states may find that china is subsidizing exports , and in that case , the united states may seek to impose countervailing duties , to level the playing field .  the department of commerce is required to use chinese data to measure the size of the subsidy , `` where practicable , '' but use of chinese cost and pricing data is not always practicable , so similar data must be drawn from a comparable country .  as originally drawn , this bill dropped the key phrase , `` where practicable. '' it restricted the ability of the commerce department to measure subsidies in china and other non-market economies .  due to a barrage of complaints from u.s. industry , that phrase was added back at the last moment , before this bill was brought to the floor .  but two other problems , to which u.s. industry objects , were not corrected .  first of all , this bill requires the department of commerce to ensure that there is no `` double-counting '' of countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties .  current law only requires that there be no double-counting of export subsidies , but makes no provision with respect to antidumping duties .  commerce has called this change `` wholly inappropriate. '' these are the words of the commerce department : `` the proposed change would put china into a special category distinct from all other countries when subject to concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations. '' according to the department of commerce , this restriction `` would raise complex methodological questions , the costs of which may far outweigh any purported equity gains of any such adjustment. '' secondly , this bill gives the wto dispute settlement body special influence over u.s. law .  wto decisions are not self-executing .  the congress decides how , when , and whether to implement a wto decision .  this bill would require the commerce department to ensure that our application of countervailing duty law to non-market economies is consistent with our international obligations .  there is no guarantee how the wto would rule if this aspect of this law were brought before it .  this provision could place wto dispute settlement tribunals on a special footing when dealing with u.s. laws .  if this bill were brought up as a regular bill , it would be amendable , and these troubling provisions could be changed or deleted .  