mr. chairman , i yield myself such time as i may consume . 
mr. chairman , by way of background , the small quantities protocol frees countries from reporting the possession of up to 10 tons of uranium , up to 20 tons of depleted uranium , depending on enrichment , and up to 2.2 pounds of plutonium . 
some experts suggest that 10 tons of natural uranium can be processed into sufficient material for up to two nuclear warheads . 
iran has already reportedly utilized much smaller quantities of uranium or plutonium in laboratory experiments with suspected links to nuclear arms programs . 
a recent iaea internal memorandum reportedly recommended that the agency 's board approve no further small quantity protocols and that it grant the iaea chief the authority to ask that all signatories to the protocol agree to cancel them . 
this amendment seeks to close the loophole from the inspections regime by , number one , calling for the iaea to rescind the small quantities protocol ; secondly , to require that any nation that has signed the small quantities protocol to have implemented and be in compliance with the additional protocol providing for more stringent inspections ; and , third , to prohibit any iaea members from receiving any nuclear-related material , technology , equipment , or assistance and be subjected to penalties if they do not adhere to the higher inspection standards . 
clearly , mr. chairman , the protocol is out of date in an era marked by secret nuclear programs that have been discovered in iran , libya and north korea , and where the bar is set much higher for suspicions of possible atomic activities . 
by rescinding the small quantities protocol , the iaea will have additional access to evaluate the nuclear program of an iaea member state and to confirm that the state is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations . 
mr. chairman , i reserve the balance of my time . 
