madam chairman , last week , i rose in opposition to bringing up the east asia security act of 2005 ( h.r. 3100 ) on the suspension calendar because it contained some provisions that created unintended consequences for our exports to china as well as some of our largest export markets in canada and europe . 
i strongly support the efforts to strengthen our arms embargoes and make them more multilateral , particularly against china . 
strengthening the weakest link -- europe -- in the arms embargo against china will serve the cause of peace and freedom in the pacific rim region . 
at the same time , we must act diligently in pursuing this noble goal so we do not weaken our overall global competitiveness and give more reasons to foreign customers to avoid american-made products . 
i am pleased to report that many of my initial concerns have been addressed in a subsequent modification of h.r. 3100 that will now be offered as the hyde/lantos/hunter/manzullo amendment to the foreign relations reauthorization act , fiscal years 2006 and 2007 ( h.r. 2601 ) . 
in addition , another similar section that was already incorporated into h.r. 2601 -- dealing with the comprehensive nature of u.s. arms embargoes ( section 733 ) -- will also be amended as part of the manager 's amendment to address certain unintended consequences of this section . 
some were concerned h.r. 3100 could have terminated u.s. defense cooperative projects with our allies whose policies permit arms transfers to china , regardless of whether such transfers actually occur . 
at a minimum , h.r. 3100 would have required an export license for every transaction and a notification to congress regardless of dollar value , adding a costly new regulatory burden on u.s. companies specializing in the defense trade . 
it no doubt would have persuaded some of our closest allies to withdraw from cooperating with us . 
the bill as originally drafted threatened to disrupt numerous ongoing u.s. defense projects in israel , canada , australia , and among member nations of the north atlantic treaty organization , nato . 
the compromise contained in this amendment permits the secretary of state , with the concurrence of the secretary of defense , to waive the export license requirement . 
h.r. 3100 also would have imposed a new export licensing requirement for `` dual use '' products ( primarily commercial goods that may have a military application that currently do not require an export license ) if the item is intended for military end use by the prc . 
some were concerned that because the language was not specific enough to just target military institutions inside china , such as the people 's liberation army , pla , and that there are still many state-owned enterprises in china , including all of their airline companies which can be taken over by their military in case of national emergency , this could have been an incentive for china to purchase non-u.s. products . 
the compromise contained in this amendment eliminates this new licensing regime and replaces it with a reporting requirement to the commerce department by the u.s. exporter 15 days after an item is exported . 
commerce would then provide a report to congress every quarter on the information provided by affected exporters . 
in addition , h.r. 3100 originally contained a list of five possible foreign sanctions the president could apply to any foreign person , including foreign governments , who violated the terms of the bill . 
included in this list was a prohibition on the approval of `` dual use '' export licenses . 
if imposed , the only way around this sanction was to obtain a written presidential waiver to congress . 
in 2004 , commerce approved $ 547 million in `` dual use '' exports to china . 
the compromise strikes the language that would prohibit commerce from continuing to approve `` dual use '' exports licenses . 
finally , i had several concerns about section 733 of h.r. 2601 , which aims to make u.s. arms embargoes more comprehensive . 
again , this is a noble goal but must be achieved in a prudent manner . 
the section as originally written would have required u.s. exporters to obtain a `` dual use '' export license from the state and defense departments to sell to any entity or person even remotely connected with a foreign military that is subject to a u.s. arms embargo . 
thus , for the first time , section 733 would have transferred the licensing of these types of commercial `` dual use '' products from commerce to the state and defense departments . 
also , section 733 as originally drafted did not recognize the commercial ties the pla has in enterprises throughout china . 
for example , the pla is technically the prime contractor for the 2008 olympics in beijing . 
even many u.s. multinational corporations have joint ventures with chinese partners in which the pla has some stake . 
thus , the provision would have imposed a new huge licensing burden on u.s. exporters selling to china . 
the hyde manager 's amendment institutes this new licensing procedure only for products that a u.s. exporter knows will be used for military , not commercial , purposes by any entity or person associated with a foreign military subject to a u.s. arms embargo . 
i trust that as the executive branch implements this provision , they will look to section 1237 of the national defense authorization act of fy 1999 for a clear definition of a chinese military end user . 
the compromise also retains commerce as the lead agency to decide on commercial `` dual use '' export licenses . 
this compromise will allow our federal export control agencies to focus on what is truly important and will also not impose an undue regulatory burden particularly upon our small business exporters . 
madam chairman , i urge my colleagues to support the hyde/hunter/lantos/manzullo amendment and also the hyde manager 's bloc amendment to h.r. 2601 . 
