mr. speaker , i congratulate the chairman of the homeland security committee for his success last week on legislation to improve the first responder grant program and again today for bringing bipartisan consensus legislation to the house floor . 
he has crafted a good bill that deserves our support . 
as good as the bill is , however , i must rise in opposition to the rule . 
i am troubled that my colleagues mr. barrow and mr. markey and mr. oberstar were blocked from offering their amendments concerning rail safety to this important legislation . 
if there is one lesson we should learn from the events of 9/11 , it is that our enemies are fighting an unconventional war against us . 
with a few zealots and even fewer resources , terrorists can manipulate our own resources and use them against us . 
on 9/11 aviation fuel and four commercial aircraft were turned into missiles carrying incendiary explosives . 
hardening the cockpit door , establishing new protocols to screen passengers , and a number of other measures are a prudent response to deny terrorists the use of commercial aircraft as a weapon . 
i am afraid , however , that we are not being as proactive as we could or should be at preventing other commercial resources from being used as weapons that could be turned against us . 
representatives barrow , markey , and oberstar have crafted thoughtful responses to a threat that has not been fully addressed : rail security and the transportation of hazardous cargo on our rail system . 
it would be a national tragedy if we had to wait until another attack similar to madrid to occur in the united states in order to commit the resources necessary to properly secure our rail and transit systems . 
the measures needed to address transit security differ from aviation , but this should not be used as a justification for not providing an infusion of additional funds to address already identified high priority needs . 
the focus with aviation is strictly on deterrence : stopping an event from happening . 
for transit and rail , deterrence is only one part of the strategy , additional resources are also needed to mitigate the impact of a potential terrorist attack and hasten the recovery after an attack . 
allocating additional resources towards improving response and recovery times can save lives and lessen the economic consequences of an attack . 
with the madrid bombing , the bombs went off on multiple trains over a 10-15 minute period . 
enhanced detection capabilities , communications equipment and redundancy in critical operating control functions could allow for a quicker shutdown and evacuation of a passenger rail transit system exposed to multiple attacks thereby significantly reducing the causality rate . 
transit and rail systems can not afford to be shut down for months or even weeks following a biological attack . 
the economic consequences to a major metropolitan region would be devastating , not to mention the impact on the federal government if an attack occurred in washington , dc . 
yet , no funds have been allocated to perform a comprehensive decontamination demonstration project in a transit or rail environment . 
mr. chairman , a 30-ton chlorine tank rail car , if ruptured , could kill thousands of people unfortunate enough to be within a few miles downwind of the attack . 
the railroad industry has a good safety record , but that ignores the fact that those safeguards do not assume someone is purposely trying to rupture these rail cars . 
local emergency responders in urban areas with potential targets of key infrastructure and national icons understand this threat , but are limited on what they can do to prevent an attack . 
should they patrol hundreds of miles of track and rail yards or take some measures under some circumstances to reroute hazardous traffic around what we know are high probability targets ? 
today , there still is no clear understanding of what hazardous material security plans have been developed . 
if they exist , they are not being shared or discussed with the very people , local officials and emergency response planners , who have the best information on the local geography , vulnerabilities and potential set of targets . 
today , local officials are being told by the railroads and the department of homeland security to `` trust us. '' i get nervous when someone i do n't know tells me to `` trust '' them . 
the laws on the books today did not envision hazardous cargo as a weapon of mass destruction , and under current law interstate commerce trumps local ordinances to suspend or redirect hazardous cargo . 
this presumption is now being tested in the courts . 
congress should not defer to the courts on this important and weighty issue . 
i think we can craft a responsible resolution , but denying an important floor debate on this issue is wrong . 
i urge my colleagues to defeat this rule . 
