CS 789 THEORY SEMINAR [home]
NOTE: *****Time/place change: 4:10pm/498 Uris***********
Joseph Halpern, Cornell University
Date: November 21, 2005
Title: Redoing the Foundations of Decision Theory: Decision Theory with Subjective States and Outcomes\\
The standard approach in decision theory (going
back to Savage) is to place a preference order on acts, where an act is a
function from states to
outcomes. If the preference order satisfies appropriate postulates, then the decision maker can be viewed as acting as if he has a probability on states and a utility function on outcomes, and is maximizing expected utility. This framework implicitly assumes that the decision maker knows what the states and outcomes are. That isn't reasonable in a complex situation. For example, in trying to decide whether or not to attack Iraq, what are the states and what are the outcomes? We redo Savage viewing acts essentially as syntactic programs. We don't need to assume either states or outcomes. However, among other things, we can get representation theorems in the spirit of Savage's theorems; for Savage, the agent's probability and utility are subjective; for us, in addition to the probability and utility being subjective, so is the state space and the outcome space. I discuss the benefits, both conceptual and pragmatic, of this approach.
This is joint work with Larry Blume and David Easley. No prior knowledge of Savage's work is assumed.