

# An Anscombe-Aumann Model

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## 1 Introduction

$X$  Finite set of *prizes*.

$S, \mathcal{H}$  Set of *states*, set of *horse race events*  $H \subset S$ . If  $H \in \mathcal{H}$ , so is  $H^c$ . If  $H$  and  $J$  are in  $\mathcal{H}$ , so is  $H \cup J$ .  $S$  (and therefore  $\emptyset$ ) is in  $\mathcal{H}$ .

$\mathcal{A}$  Set of *acts*. An act is a map from states to prizes. That is,  $a : S \rightarrow X$ . Furthermore, prizes depend on which horse-race event occurs. That is, for all  $x \in X$ ,  $a^{-1}(x) \in \mathcal{H}$ . This requirement is called  *$\mathcal{H}$ -measurability*. Acts are simple.

$\mathcal{R}$  Set of *roulette events*.  $\mathcal{R}$  contains all sub-intervals of  $[0, 1)$ , and the probability  $P(r)$  of a sub-interval  $R \in \mathcal{R}$  is given by the uniform distribution.

$\mathcal{L}$  Set of all *roulette lotteries*. A *roulette lottery* is a map from  $r : [0, 1)$  to  $X$  which is  $\mathcal{R}$ -measurable. That is,  $r^{-1}(x) \in \mathbf{R}$  for all  $x \in X$ . Lotteries are simple.

$\mathcal{G}$  The set of all gambles.  $\mathcal{G} = \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{L}$ .

Notice how this version of Anscombe-Aumann differs from that in Kreps. For Kreps (and in the original paper) a horse race is an  $\mathcal{H}$ -measurable function on  $S$  which maps states into lotteries rather than prizes.

A convenient way to write acts and lotteries is to list the prizes and the sets on which they are received. An act can be represented as a tuple  $x_1H_1 \cdots x_nH_nx_{n+1}$  where the  $H_i \in \mathcal{H}$  are disjoint. The act pays off  $x_1$  on  $H_1$ , etc., and  $x_{n+1}$  on  $N_{n+1} = (\cup_{i=1}^n H_i)^c$ . Similarly, a lottery can be represented as a tuple  $x_1R_1 \cdots x_nR_nx_{n+1}$  where the  $R_i \in \mathcal{R}$  are disjoint elements of  $\mathcal{R}$ . A gamble  $G \in \mathcal{G}$  is a tuple  $x_1E_1 \cdots x_nE_nx_{n+1}$  where the  $E_i$  are either all roulette events or all horse race events.

The constant acts can be identified with prizes. The

The decision maker has preferences on  $\mathcal{G}$ . The preference order satisfies the following properties.

**Axiom 1** (Weak order).  $\succeq$  on  $\mathcal{G}$  is complete and transitive.

**Axiom 2** (Domain). There are prizes  $x^*$  and  $y^*$  such that  $x^* \succ y^*$  and such that for all  $H \in \mathcal{H}$ , the act  $x^*Hy^*$  is in  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Axiom 3** (Monotonicity).  $x^* \succeq x^*Hy^* \succ y^*$

**Axiom 4** (Independence for lotteries). For lotteries  $L, L', Q \in \mathcal{L}$ , if  $L \succ L'$  and  $0 < \lambda \leq 1$ ,  $\lambda L + (1 - \lambda)Q \succ \lambda L' + (1 - \lambda)Q$ .

**Axiom 5** (Archimedean for lotteries). For lotteries  $L, L', L'' \in \mathcal{L}$ , if  $L \succ L' \succ L''$  there are  $0 < \lambda, \mu < 1$  such that  $\lambda L + (1 - \lambda)L'' \succ L' \succ \mu L + (1 - \mu)L''$ .

**Axiom 6** (Additivity). For all disjoint horse events  $H, H'$  there are disjoint roulette events  $R, R'$  such that  $x^*Hy^* \sim x^*Ry^*$ ,  $x^*H'y^* \sim x^*R'y^*$  and  $x^*H \cup H'y^* \sim x^*R \cup R'y^*$ .

**Axiom 7** (Probabilistic Beliefs). If  $x^*H_iy^* \sim x^*R_iy^*$  for all  $i$ , then for all prizes  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  and  $y$ ,  $x_1H_1 \cdots x_nH_nx_{n+1} \sim x_1R_1 \cdots x_nR_nx_{n+1}$ .

The representation theorem is:

**Theorem 1.** Under the domain Axiom 2, the following two statements are equivalent:

1. There is a probability distribution  $Q$  on  $\mathcal{H}$  and a utility function  $U : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$  such that

$$V(x_1E_1 \cdots x_nE_nx_{n+1}) = \begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^{n+1} P(E_i)U(x_i) & \text{for a roulette lottery,} \\ \sum_{i=1}^{n+1} Q(E_i)U(x_i) & \text{for a horse lottery.} \end{cases}$$

represents  $\succeq$  on  $\mathcal{G}$ .

2.  $\succeq$  on  $\mathcal{G}$  satisfies Axioms 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

*Proof.* That 1 implies 2 is obvious. I will show that the first claim is implied by the second. Axioms 1, 4 and 5 imply that  $\succeq$  restricted to  $\mathcal{L}$  has an expected utility representation with von-Neumann utility  $U : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ . The Domain Axiom 2 implies that  $U$  is not constant, and, in particular, that  $U(x^*) > U(y^*)$ .

Define  $Q(H) = P(R)$  for any  $R$  such that  $x^*Hy^* \sim x^*Ry^*$ . The existence of such an  $R$  is guaranteed by the additivity Axiom 6. If  $P(R') > P(R)$ , then from the EU representation for  $\succeq$  on  $\mathcal{L}$  we see that  $x^*R'y^* \succ x^*Ry^*$ . Similarly for  $P(R') < P(R)$ . Thus  $Q(H)$  is well-defined. Additivity also implies that  $Q$  is additive. Suppose that  $H$  and  $H'$  are disjoint, and  $R$  and  $R'$  are such that the additivity axiom is satisfied. Then  $x^*H \cup H'y^* \sim x^*R \cup R'y^*$ , and so

$$Q(H \cup H') = P(R \cup R') = P(R) + P(R') = Q(H) + Q(H')$$

□