CS 5432: Measured Principals and Gating Functions

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Overview

- New abstractions
  - Measured principal
  - Gating function
- Example implementations
  - TPM Trusted Platform Module
- Applications
  - Whole disk encryption
  - Cloud-hosted services
  - Digital rights management
  - Remote Attestation
Keys as Principals

Let $K_p/k_p$ be a public/private key pair where $k_p$ is accessible only to a principal $P$. We then would have:

- $K_p$ speaks for $P$

- $K_p$ says S using: $k_p$-sign($S$)
“Accessible only to…”

- Store $k_p$ in processor memory?
  - How to block attacker access?

- Use external hardware security module (HSM)?
  - HSM as secure storage? Exported key is vulnerable.
  - HSM as remote eval of crypto function (using key).
    - HSM must authenticate caller.
    - HSM must implement authorization for using key.
  ... what caller name is authenticated and authorized?
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What’s in a name?

Authorization based on name presumes:
Translation: Name $\rightarrow$ properties of executions

- Name must reflect or depend on:
  - Actual bits that will be executed.
  - Execution environment for that code:
    - Initialization data read.
    - Code already executing as available services.
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      - Binary code that will be executed
      - Execution environment for that code:
        - Initialization data read
        - Code already available as services
          - Binary code that will be executed...
Name construction

A name for App would involve other names:

- Hardware processor + I/O
- Boot firmware
- Boot code & data read
- OS IPL code & data read
- OS
- App
Measured Principals

Properties of a measured principal:
- Name derived from code, data read at startup, and environment.
- Change any bit(s) and get unpredictably different name.

- Name for a measured principal serves as a label for properties satisfied by principal’s execution.

- Name for a measured principal could serve as a basis for trust.
Descriptions and Descriptors

- Name $N(D)$ is a name generated for a description $D$.
- $D$ is a sequence
  $$\langle d_1 \ d_2 \ \ldots \ d_n \rangle$$
  of descriptors $d_i$ such that
  - change to any descriptor $d_i$ produces new description $D'$ with unpredictably different name $N(D')$
  - $d_i$ derived from all details of resource at the time of first access by measured principal with name $N(\langle \ldots \ d_i \ \ldots \ \rangle )$
    - Resources include: processor, i/o devices, executables, storage regions, ...
  - descriptors are listed in order of first access.

- **Goal**: Description indicates whether associated principal can be trusted.
Completeness of Descriptions

- Incomplete description: Leads to inaccurate predictions of possible behavior by principal.

- Complete description:
  - Blocks attacks by modified versions that spoof.
  - Prevent attacker persistence (APT) by file modifications.
  - Inconvenient: Customization, patches, upgrades change file contents... change descriptors... change name.
Properties of Naming Schemes

Properties of $N(\cdot)$:

- **Collision resistance:**
  - $D \neq D'$ implies $N(D) \neq N(D')$ with high probability.

- **Preimage resistance:**
  - Given $D$, it is infeasible to construct $D'$ where $D \neq D'$ and $N(D) = N(D')$ hold.
Implementation of Naming Schemes

\[ N( \langle d_1 d_2 \ldots d_n \rangle ) : \text{ Implement as a hash chain...} \]
- \( N( \langle \rangle ) = 0 \)
- \( N( D \cdot d_i ) = \text{hash}( N(D) \cdot \text{hash}(d_i) ) \)

Note, incremental calculation \( N( D \cdot d_i ) \):
- Allows files (in D) to become inaccessible after use.
  E.g., boot loader, IPL, ...

If we assume a trusted source for integrity of names
- Only allowed change is: extension by \( d_i \).

then no need to protect integrity of \( D_p \) for \( P \).
- Simply check whether \( D_p \) satisfies \( N(D_p) = N_P \)
Descriptors for Code and Data

Code and data are bit strings.
Descriptor $d_{\text{Obj}}$ for Obj is $\text{hash}(\text{Obj})$

- Complication:
  - Copies of objects that incorporate addresses will have different descriptors when loaded.
Descriptors for HW Processor

**Naïve approach:** Include ROM with a unique id in each processor.

- Must be able to read id.
- If id can be read, then emulation is possible.
**Better approach:** For a processor id,

- include unique signing key $k_{\text{id}}$ in ROM.
- include instruction to generate $k_{\text{id}}$-\textbf{sign}(M).
- trusted party (manufacturer) has public key $K_{C}$
  
  Distribute public key $K_{\text{id}}$ for use as descriptor / name for processor.

  \[ k_{C}\text{-sign}(K_{\text{id}} \text{ speaksfor id}) \]

  Distribute certificate for ISA, too.

  \[ k_{C}\text{-sign}(K_{\text{id}} \text{ speaksfor ISA}_{\text{x86}}) \]
For privacy …

... might want a single processor to have multiple names.
  – Prevents correlation of attributes by attackers who monitor requests at services.
  – Prevents detection that two measured principals are executing on the same processor.

**Solution**: Processor invents new **attestation identify key** (signing key) e.g., $k_{id2}$ for each different identity. A trusted third party certifies authenticity of corresponding public key $K_{id2}$. 
Descriptors for Properties

Avoid brittleness of object descriptors by using descriptors for properties of the object rather than for implementation of the object.

Properties don’t change (much) due to upgrades etc.
- E.g., signed certificate from trusted org about “linux” property.
- E.g., signed output of an analyzer chkr.
Descriptor Auxiliary Information

Descriptors are opaque bit strings
- Hash of object or public key of processor

Trust in object might depend on object details, to allow:
- Identification and retrieval of objects associated with descriptor.
- Verification of descriptor by recalculating it from objects.
- Assessment of whether those objects should be trusted.

... So include auxiliary information with a descriptor.
Examples: $d_i$ auxiliary information is
- Linux4.8.0.36-generic ... name of a system in a public repository
- /user/fbs/cs5432/finalExam.txt ... name of a file

Auxiliary information allows object to be independently downloaded and analyzed.
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Gating Functions Defined

Gating function $[K-F](\cdot)$ (*FBS notation*) associates access control with use of a key K and a crypto function $K-F(\cdot)$.

- K can be accessed **only** for evaluating gating functions $[K-F](\cdot)$.
  - Ensures confidentiality and integrity of K
- $[K-F](\cdot)$ requires system to satisfy Config( $[K-F]$ ), which specifies a set of measured principals that must be executing for calculation of $K-F(\cdot)$ to proceed.

N.b. The brackets $[...]$ are intended to suggest that crypto function $K-F(\cdot)$ has been wrapped with access control.
Uses for Gating Functions?

- Authentication / attestation of a system.
- Isolation?
  - Confidentiality by encryption.
  - Integrity by signatures or MAC or authenticated encryption.
  - Comparison: processes, virtual machines, containers.
    - GF weaker: Achieve integrity by creating unavailability.
    - GF stronger: Restricts what code can have access.
    - GF stronger: Supports attestation.
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Hardware Support

Simplified version of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) has:

- **Measurement registers** and instructions to update them.
  - Measurement registers are volatile.
  - Values in measurement registers are what Config(·) checks.

- **Key registers** and instructions for provisioning a key register with a fresh key.
  - Key registers are not volatile.

- Instructions to perform certain crypto operations using key in a given key register if certain Config(·) exists in measurement registers:
  - **sealing**: protect confidentiality and integrity of local content.
  - **quoting**: to establish authenticity of locally produced content.
  - **binding**: to import remote content if local system is proper.
Confidentiality of keys follows because:

- Unencrypted keys born in key registers and never leave key registers in plaintext form.
- Instructions that use values in key registers compute functions that do not reveal the key.
- Key register values persist across boots but measurement register values don’t.
  - Access to keys requires the same measured principals to be running after a reboot
Measurement Registers

Measurement registers: $mr_0, mr_1, \ldots, mr_N$.

- $mr_0$ auto incremented with each reboot.
  - Enables creation of ephemeral keys (if $mr_0$ is in Config)
  - Ephemeral keys defend against TOCTOU (time of check, time of use) attacks. In such an attack:
    - Fielded system is authenticated.
    - Attacker instigates reboot and starts executing a different system.
    - Execution proceeds – with authorization -- but using attacker’s code.
Measurement Registers

Measurement registers: $mr_0$, $mr_1$, ..., $mr_N$

- $mr_1$, ..., $mr_N$ reset to 0 on reboot
- Instructions (with semantics):
  - MRreset($mr_i$): $mr_i := 0$
  - MRextend($mr_i$, $mem$): $mr_i := \text{hash}( mr_i, \text{hash}(mem))$

Sets of measurement registers are used to create names for measured principals.
Trust in Measurement Registers

Trust principals that execute MRextend if
- they are measured principals, and
- their names correspond to descriptions we have analyzed, and
- they were loaded by systems we trust.

... Result is chain of trust back to boot loader, firmware, processor hardware.
- Trust each subsequent link by trusting its predecessor
- Trust first link (=root of trust) based on information from an external source.
Configuration Constraints: Config

\[ C = \{\langle 1, v_1 \rangle, \ldots, \langle i, v_i \rangle, \ldots \} \]
defines **configuration constraint** that is satisfied during execution if

\[ m_{r_1} = v_1 \land \ldots \land m_{r_i} = v_i \land \ldots \]

holds. \( C \) may name only a subset of the measurement registers.

A configuration constraint \( C_{kr} \) is associated with each key register \( kr \) when a new key is generated there. So there is a configuration constraint associated with each gating function.
seal and unseal: Basics

Authenticated shared-key encrypt/decrypt.
- Shared key K generated into sealing key register skr_i.
- Configuration constraint C associated with skr_i.

**seal** creates a C/K-sealed value.

**unseal** recovers v from a C/K-sealed value v.

Properties of sealed values:
- **read** a C/K-sealed value v reveals nothing about v.
- **update** causes subsequent unseal to fail.
- ... availability is compromised by write (unlike other forms of isolation).
seal and unseal: Instructions

sealing key registers: $skr_1, \ldots, skr_N$, store: $skr_i.key$ and $skr_i.config$

crSet is bit vector of length $N$: $crSet[1]=1$ iff $mr_i \in crSet$

$SKRgen(skr_i, crSet)$:

- $skr_i.key :=$ fresh symmetric key;
- $skr_i.config := \{ \langle j, v_j \rangle \mid crSet[j] \land mr_j = v_j \}$

$seal(skr_i, in, out)$:

- Any principal can invoke!

- $out := shr_i.key$-Encrypt^A(in)

$unseal(skr_i, in, out)$:

- Only certain invokers succeed!

- if ConfigSat(skr_i.config)
  
  then $out := shr_i.key$-Decrypt^A(in)

  else fail
seal and unseal: Uses

- **seal** can save state between executions / sessions.
- Protocol now needed to perform a software upgrade:
  - **unseal** all data;
  - Upgrade the software;
  - Reset and reload measurement registers;
  - Reprovision sealing key registers (uses updated values in measurement registers);
  - **seal** all data (uses updated sealing key registers);

... seal/unseal are slow, but “data” might just be a single key that is used to encrypt/decrypt full state.
Coping with a small fixed number of key registers: Time-multiplexing

- Cannot extract raw key values from key registers.
- Store and restore key registers (with configuration constraints) using a key archive.
  - KRseal: invokes `seal` for a set of key registers (values and config constraints) and stores the result as a key archive.
  - KRunseal: invokes unseal for key archive and reloads the key registers.
    - By including `mr0` in `kr.config` for key register `kr` stale key values in old key archive don’t work when reloaded.
quoting: Basics

quoted bit string: Signed using (private) key in some quoting key register $qkr_i$.

- Configuration constraint for $qkr_i$ means quoted bit string is generated by a specific system (and thus can be trusted).

- $qkr_{id}$: special key register having a fixed value and no configuration constraints.
  - $qkr_{id}$ contains the unique signing key $k_{id}$ associated with processor.
quoting: Instructions

QKRgen( qkr_i, crSet, mem):

Qkr_i.config := { ⟨ i, v_i ⟩ | crSet[i] ∧ mr_i = v_i }

let k/K be a fresh private/public key pair

in  qkr_i.key := k;

mem := qkr_id.key-sign( qkr key: i | K)

Quote( qkr_i, in, out):

if ConfigSat( qkr_i.config)

then  out := qkr_i.key-sign(sig: i | in)

else fail

Note disambiguating prefix is signed strings.
Note K not being stored in key register.
What Configuration?

... is currently in effect for a key register?

KRgetConf(kr_i, r, out):
  out := qkr_id.key-sign(keyConfig: i | r | kr_i.config)

... is in effect now?

KRgetCurConf( crSet, r, out):
  cc := {⟨ i, v_i ⟩ | crSet[i] ∧ mr_i = v_i}
  out := qkr_id.key-sign(curConfig: r | cc)

By including mr_0 in crSet, the resulting certificate can be included in an immutable data object, thus incorporated into its descriptors. This descriptor avoids replay attacks for old versions of the object.
bind and unbind

**Goal:** Ensure that information sent from outside a system S can be read only by S.

**Solution:**
- Distribute public encryption key $K_S$ far and wide.
- Content sent to S is encrypted: $K_S$-**encrypt**(msg)
- S uses gating function -- where Config is for S --- to recover plaintext
  
  \[
  \text{plain} := [k_S\text{-decrypt}](\ldots)
  \]
sealing vs binding

- **seal** and **unseal** both access the same key register on a single machine.
  - **unseal** requires a specific configuration.

- **bind** uses a public key, so it can be executed on any machine.
  - **unbind** requires a specific configuration on a specific machine.
bind and unbind: Instructions

UKRgen( ukr_i, crSet, mem):
    ukr_i.config := \{ \langle i, v_i \rangle | crSet[i] \land mr_i = v_i \}\n    let k/K be a fresh private/public key pair
    in    ukr_i.key := k;
           mem := qkr_id.key-\textbf{sign}( ukr \textbf{ key} : i | K)

UKRdec( ukr_i, in, out):
    \textbf{if } ConfigSat( ukr_i.config)
    \textbf{then } out := ukr_i.key-\textbf{decrypt}(in)
    \textbf{else } fail
TPM Summary

- measurement registers
  - Configuration constraints Config(·)
- seal/unseal
  - Key archives
- quote
  - Configuration retrieval
- unbind
Applications

- Full disk encryption (BitLocker)
- Cloud-hosted services
- Digital rights management (DRM)
- Remote attestation
Goal: Protect disk content against device theft.

- Use sealing on each disk block?
  - TPM operations are too slow.

- Use software-implemented shared key encryption.
  - Generate *disk key* when first boot system.
  - Use seal/unseal to protect *disk key* when stored on disk after power-down.
    - Sealing key stored in key register.
  - Also copy *disk key* to some secure device for disk recovery after failure.
  - Use OS memory protection for *disk key* while computer is running.
    - Assumes memory is obliterated at power down.
  - Must encrypt memory when memory is stored for hibernation mode.

- Use length-preserving encryption for disk driver compatibility.
  - Protects confidentiality but cannot protect integrity
Full Disk Encryption: Implementation

Where to locate encrypt/decrypt routines for disk blocks?
- In application? (Limits app developers)
- In disk driver? (Limits disk developers)
- In operating system!
  - 1 cache $\rightarrow$ 2 caches of disk blocks
    - Cache for encrypted blocks (disk driver access this)
    - Cache for decrypted blocks (I/O system calls access this)
    - OS copies from one cache to the other.

Boot block: not encrypted
Cloud-Hosted Services: Servers

**Goal:** Server is a measured principal.

- sealing key used to protect server state while server is not running
- quoting key allows clients to authenticate responses from server. (Public key must be known).
- binding key used to protect content sent by client to server.
Cloud-Hosted Services: Environment

The environment must support:

- **Memory isolation for server.**
  - E.g., processor, virtual machine, ...

- **Measured principals and gating functions**
  - E.g., hardware TPM, virtual machine TPM, ...
  - Use sealing to protect server state **between** sessions.
  - Use quoting to protect comm integrity **to** client.
  - Use binding to protect comm confidentiality and integrity **from** client.
Digital Rights Management (DRM)

Goal: Enforce access control for digital objects located anywhere in the network and on any host. Enables:

- monetize content in digital form.
  - Non-interactive: Music and texts. Pirate can still record sound and images, though some loss of fidelity.
  - Interactive: Games and simulations.
- mandatory access control of an institution’s documents.
DRM: Implementation

- Distribute protected content in encrypted form.
  - Use separate encryption key for each copy.
- Bind decryption key and forward to client
  - Client is a measured principal.
  - Client generates bind/unbind and forwards bind key to server.
  - Server checks client description to ensure authorization will be enforced.
  - Server forwards decrypt key using bind key.
New locus of control

Measured principals and gating functions enable software producers to control:

– What programs are run.
– What information can be accessed.
– What programs can process a given digital object.

... Compare with today: Computer owner and operator have control over these things.
Abuses now facilitated

- [Vendor Lock-in] Software designed to prevent competitors software from executing on a platform.
  - Limits competition
  - Discourages new entrants to market

- Automation of access control that is today grounded in human judgement.
  - Fair use (for copyright)
  - Obscenity
  - Fake news
In favor …

Benefits of ceding control to software producers:
- Experts can evaluate software and prevent installation of vulnerabilities. Users don’t and most can’t.
  - App stores can support vendor lock-in, too.
- Protects individual machines but also protects the ecosystem. Compromised machine anywhere can attack yours.

Transfer of **rights** comes with transfer of **responsibilities**. Network-connected implies responsibilities not to host attackers... Should/could random users shoulder that?
Back to authentication of things (= HW + SW) …
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Remote Attestation

Provide:

- Name P for a measured principal executing on a remote host.
- Attestation public key $K_P$ for verifying messages signed by P.

Given a description $D_P$ obtained from remote host or elsewhere.

- Can check whether $P = N(D_P)$ holds.
- Can use $D_P$ to decide whether to trust P (and $K_P$).
TOCTOU attacks

If signing key $k_p$ not refreshed at each reboot...

**Attack:**
- Remote processor sends $P$, $D_p$, $K_p$ to client.
- Attacker reboots remote processor and runs new code.

**Defense:**
- Include $mr_0$ or current time in $D_p$.
... Old $k_p$ will no longer work after reboot for software that satisfies $D_p$ or for attacker’s software.
Protocol 1 for Remote Attestation

Assumptions:
A1: R trusts S and has $K_S$ speaksfor S.
A2: S is exec environment for P.
A3: S implements a gating function $[k_p\text{-sign}]$.

1. $R \rightarrow S$: $\langle r, P \rangle$, where r is fresh nonce
2. $S$: Generate $K_p/k_p$ where $\text{Config}( [k_p\text{-sign}] ) = \{P\}$
3. $S \rightarrow R$: $[k_S\text{-sign}]( r, P, K_p)$
4. $R$: Accept $K_p$ provided:
   - Msg 3 verified as from S (by using $K_S$) and $N(D_p)=P$ holds.
Discharging Assumptions

Assumption A1: R trusts S and $K_S$ speaksfor S.
- R sends S a fresh challenge $r$
- S uses quote and KRgetConf to construct certificate
  \[ k_{id}\text{-sign}( r, S, D_S, K_S, \text{Config}[ k_S\text{-sign }]) \]
- S sends certificate to R
- R checks:
  - Source of cert (using $K_{id}$) and timeliness (using $r$).
  - Whether $N(D_S) = \text{Config}[ k_S\text{-sign}]$ holds.
  - Uses knowledge of $D_S$ to decide whether to trust S.
  - Concludes: $K_S$ speaksfor $N(D_S)$
    \[ = K_S \text{ speaksfor } S \]
Discharging Assumptions

Assumption A2: S is exec environment for P.
   - Check that $D_S$ is a prefix of $D_P$.

Assumption A3: S implements a gating function $[k_p\text{-}sign]$.
   - Check $D_S$ to see if processor id appears as initial descriptor.
   - Obtain manufacturers certificate
     $$k_c\text{-}sign(K_{id \text{ speaksfor } ISA_{x86}})$$
     and check $ISA_{x86}$. 
Attestation at System Startup

- Startup involves stages $D_1$, $D_2$, ... $D_n$
- Startup Attestation Protocol
  - associates $K_i/k_i$ with each stage $N(D_i)$.
  - generates set $\text{AttCerts}$ from which
    \[ K_i \text{ speaksfor } N(D_i) \]
    can be inferred.
Protocol 2 for Remote Attestation

\[ k_0 = k_{id}, \quad K_0 = K_{id}, \quad N(D_0) = N(hw) = id; \]

**for** \( i := 0 \) **to** \( n-1 \) **do**

- \( N(D_i) \) loads software, creating \( D_{i+1} \)
- \( N(D_i) \) generates fresh \( k_{i+1}/K_{i+1} \) to support
  \[ \text{Config}([k_{i+1}-\text{sign}]) = N(D_{i+1}) \]
- \( \text{AttCerts} := \text{AttCerts} \cup \{ K_i \text{ says } K_{i+1} \text{ speaksfor } N(D_{i+1}) \} \)
- \( N(D_i) \) relinquishes control to \( N(D_{i+1}) \)

N.b. Trust in \( N(D_i) \) must imply \( N(D_i) \) will relinquish control to an \( N(D_{i+1}) \) that can be trusted.
Avoiding HW support

**Goal:** Ensure $k_i$ not revealed or abused without using key registers or gating functions.

**Solution:** $D_i$ deletes $k_i$ just before $D_i$ relinquishes control to $D_{i+1}$. 
**Idea**: Incorporate $k_{id} \cdot \text{sign}(mr0)$ into AttCerts.

**Implementations:**

- **Option 1**: Include $mr_0$ in $D_0$
- **Option 2**: Include in each $D_i$ a certificate signed by a trusted 3rd party and including timestamp and challenge.
Boot Attestation

- **Trusted boot**: Software establishes trust in its exec environment by checking whether AttCerts contains expected content. *(SW can take action if it doesn’t.)*
  - Processor register rt reset on boot.
  - rt is updated whenever AttCerts is updated, so \( rt = \text{hash}(\text{AttCerts}) \).

- **Secure boot**: Processor check successive values of rt against predetermined allowable sequence (in firmware). Halt if values diverge.
General Principle

A layer is responsible for

– measuring and validating the target of a control transfer
– updating a summary measurement before transferring control.