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# CS 5430

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## Beyond Attacks

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# Attacks!



# Beyond attacks

Attacks  
are perpetrated by  
threats  
that inflict  
harm  
by exploiting  
vulnerabilities  
which are controlled by  
countermeasures.

# Harm

A negative consequence to a system asset

- Assets:
  - physical objects (e.g., money)
  - intangible objects (e.g., bank account balance)
- In computer systems:
  - information is typically the main asset
  - people are not typically considered to be assets

# Stakeholders

- Anything of value to a stakeholder in system could be an asset
  - direct value: damage affects asset itself
  - indirect value: damage affects something else, e.g. reputation
- An object is not an asset if it doesn't have value to some stakeholder
- A principal isn't a stakeholder if it doesn't value some system object
  - We won't consider a generic "attacker" to be a stakeholder

# Harm

Kinds of harm:

- Damage to **confidentiality** (e.g., interception)
- Damage to **integrity** (e.g., modification, fabrication)
- Damage to **availability** (e.g., interruption)

# Threat


A principal that has potential to cause harm to assets

- **Adversary** or **attacker**: a human threat, motivated and capable
- Sometimes humans aren't malicious: accidents happen
- Sometimes non-humans cause harm: floods, earthquakes, power outage, hardware failure



# Threats

[S1, based on U.S. Defense Science Board]

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- Inquisitive people, unintentional blunders
  - Hackers driven by technical challenges
  - Disgruntled employees or customers seeking revenge
  - Criminals interested in personal financial gain, stealing services, or industrial espionage
  - Organized crime with the intent of hiding something or financial gain
  - Organized terrorist groups attempting to influence policy by isolated attacks
  - Foreign espionage agents seeking to exploit information for economic, political, or military purposes
  - Tactical countermeasures intended to disrupt specific weapons or command structures
  - Multifaceted tactical information warfare applied in a broad orchestrated manner to disrupt a major military missions
  - Large organized groups or nation-states intent on overthrowing a government



# Vulnerability

An unintended aspect of a system (design, implementation, or configuration) that can cause the system to do something it shouldn't, or fail to do something it should

- E.g., buffer overflows, code injection, cross-site scripting, missing authentication or access control, misconfiguration
- Ignoring vulnerabilities is risky
  - Too often: "no one would/could ever exploit that"
  - *Weakest link* phenomenon
- Assumptions are vulnerabilities
  - Timing, failure modes, message delivery, input format, etc.



# Trust

- Trust is an essential assumption, hence vulnerability
- A **trusted** component is assumed to satisfy a security policy
- A **trustworthy** component additionally is accompanied by evidence that it satisfies the policy
  - A lot of what we study seeks to transform trust into trustworthiness
  - That is, relocating trust
  - It's a [game of Whack-A-Mole](#)

# Approaches to security

- **Prevention:** build systems that are completely free of vulnerabilities
- **Risk management:** invest wisely in countermeasures
- **Deterrence through accountability:** attribute attacks to humans and legally prosecute

# Attack

The act of causing harm by exploiting a vulnerability

- E.g, sending a well-crafted HTTP request to a server with a parsing vulnerability, which incorrectly launches a root shell in response
- E.g., calling up an employee, asking for their password, using it to login and exfiltrate information
- Real world attacks:
  - [Data breaches](#)
  - [News](#)

# Countermeasure

A defense that protects against attacks by neutralizing either the threat or vulnerability involved

Strategy:

- **Prevent:** block attack or close vulnerability
- **Deter:** make attack harder but not impossible
- **Deflect:** make other targets more attractive
- **Mitigate:** make harm less severe
- **Detect:** as it happens or after the fact
- **Recover:** undo harm

# Classes of countermeasures

- **Isolation:** restrict communication between components (virtual machines, sandboxes, processes, firewalls)
- **Monitoring:** a program analyzes execution and blocks bad things from happening (reference monitor, intrusion detection system)
- **Recovery:** detect and reverse effects of harm (transactions, backups, key changes)

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# **EXERCISE: BISTRO CLARKSON**



# **EXERCISE: ALARM SYSTEM**

# **ASSIGNMENT**

# A1

- Out today
  - By Wed. we'll have covered all material for assignment
  - But reading optional sources will improve your performance
- Due in 1 week
  - The *deadline* is the time by which you must upload to CMS and confirm you are happy with the file it records
  - But can be submitted after that for a penalty
  - See [late policy in syllabus](#)
- Each assignment weighted equally in final grade, lowest assignment dropped
- Individual work, not partners nor teams

# Academic Integrity

- You are bound by Academic Integrity policies linked from [course syllabus](#)
- If you have a question about what is or is not allowed, **please ask**
- If you fear you have committed a violation, **tell me** before grading commences
- Given the subject matter of this course, I take ethics extremely seriously

# Upcoming events

- [today] A1 out; consulting hours start

*"Nobody ever defended anything successfully, there is only attack and attack and attack some more."*

*– George S. Patton*