Security

CS 4410
Operating Systems

[E. Birrell, A. Bracy, F. B. Schneider, E. Sirer, R. Van Renesse]

References: Security Introduction and Access Control by Fred B. Schneider
Secure Systems?

A **secure** system will
- do what is expected
- not do the unexpected
despite attacks and offers assurance about this claim.

Example:
- Do more: reveal secrets
- Do less: fail to store or retrieve information
Security Properties: CIA

Confidentiality: keeping secrets
- who is allowed to learn what information

Integrity: permitting changes
- what changes to the system are allowed

Availability: guarantee of service
- service should be “timely”
Protect against what?

Some terminology:

**vulnerability**: Weakness that can be used to cause damage

**attack**: Method of exploiting a vulnerability

**threat**: Motivated capable adversary who will mount attacks

All systems have vulnerabilities.

*Understand the threats and defend against attacks they can mount.*

All assumptions are vulnerabilities.
Cyber threats

• Operator/user blunders.
• Hackers driven by intellectual challenge (or boredom).
• Insiders: employees or customers seeking revenge.
• Criminals seeking financial gain.
• Organized crime seeking gain or hiding criminal activities.
• Terrorist groups or nation states trying to influence national policy.
• Tactical countermeasures intended to disrupt military capability.
Security in the “real world”

Use locks to block attacks: “Prevention”
• Locks must not be annoying, or they won’t be used.
• All locks aren’t the same. They are:
  • Scaled for what they are protecting.
  • Scaled for their environment.

• Police and courts are central---not the locks! “Deterrence through accountability”
  • Tracking down the “bad guys” is what’s central.
  • Locks reduce temptation and reduce workload on police and courts.
“Real world” (cont’d)

• People only pay for security that they think they need
• People avoid annoying locks by buying insurance
• Security is only as strong as the weakest link
Security in Computer Systems

Gold (Au) Standard for Security [Lampson]

Authorization: mechanisms that govern whether actions are permitted

Authentication: mechanisms that bind principals to actions

Audit: mechanisms that record and review actions
Security Mechanism Design

What should the mechanism do?

Best to distinguish policy from mechanism.

Desire mechanisms that implement many policies.
Authorization: Access Control

**Operations:** learn and/or update information

**Principals:** instigate operations
  - users, processes, threads, procedures

**Objects** of operations: memory, files, modules, services

**Access Control Policy:**
  - which principals may perform which operations on which objects

  … Enforces confidentiality & integrity
Access Control Mechanisms

Reference Monitor:

- Consulted on each operation invocation
- Allows operation if invoker has required privileges
  - … Can enforce confidentiality and/or integrity

Assumptions:

- Predefined operations are the sole means by which principals learn or update information
- All predefined operations can be monitored (“complete mediation”)
Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

A secure system should have a well defined TCB in order to discharge assurance requirements.

TCB typically contains:

- HW & SW necessary for enforcing security rules
  - most hardware, firmware
  - portion of OS kernel
  - most or all programs with superuser power

- Desirable features of TCB to facilitate analysis:
  - Small size
  - Isolated, so separable
Reference Monitor is in TCB

- All operations intercepted by reference monitor
- Monitor decides: should operation proceed?
  ... Reference monitor is not a separable module in most OSes...
Who defines authorizations?

Discretionary Access Control (DAC):
- Object **owner** defines authorizations for operations on that object
- Supported in all OS (Linux/MacOSX/Windows)
- Vulnerable to “Trojan Horse” attacks

Mandatory Access Control (MAC):
- System imposes access control policy that object owners cannot change
- Centralized authority defines authorizations
- Commonly required in institutional settings
Principle of Least Privilege

“Every program and every privileged user of the system should operate using the least amount of privilege necessary to complete the job.”

- Jerome Saltzer

Implies that we should want to minimize:

- code running inside kernel
- code running as sysadmin (root)
Access Control Matrix

- Abstract model of authorization
- Rows: **principals** = users
- Columns: **objects** = files, I/O, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principals</th>
<th>OBJECTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prelim.pdf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rvr (prof)</td>
<td>r, w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jan (student)</td>
<td>r, w</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implementing the “matrix”

- By column:
  - For each object, keep a list of which principals can access the object and how
  - “Access Control List” per object

- By row:
  - For each principal, keep track of what operations that principal can do on what objects
  - “Capability List” per principal
Access Control Lists (ACL)

ACL for an object is a list:
  e.g., \langle ebirrell, \{r,w\}\rangle \langle clarkson, \{r\}\rangle \langle student, \{r\}\rangle

To check whether a principal P is authorized to perform an operation Op on an object Obj:

• Look up principal P in ACL for Obj.
  – If P not in ACL, reject operation
  – Otherwise, obtain set S of authorized operations.
• Check whether Op is in S.
  – If not, reject in S, reject operation.
  – Otherwise, allow Op to proceed.
Access Control Lists: Roundup

Advantages:
  • Efficient to review of permissions for an object
  • Revocation is straightforward

Disadvantages:
  • Inefficient review of permissions for a principal
  • Large ACLs take up space in object
  • Vulnerable to confused deputy attack
Capability Lists

The *capability list* for a principal P is a list

\[ \text{e.g., } \langle \text{dac.tex, \{r,w\}} \rangle \langle \text{dac.pptx, \{r,w\}} \rangle \]

- Performing operation Op on object Obj requires a principal to hold a capability for Obj and Op.
- Capabilities must be unforgeable, so they cannot be counterfeited or corrupted.

Note: Capabilities are (typically) transferable.
Access Control in POSIX

UNIX: has user and group identifiers: \texttt{uid} and \texttt{gid}

**Per process:** protection domain $= \texttt{uid=rvr}$ and $\texttt{gid=faculty}$

**Per file:** ACL owner|group|other $\rightarrow$ stored in i-node
- Only owner can change these rights (using \texttt{chmod})
- Each i-node has 3x3 RWX bits for user, group, others
  - eg.: RWXRW-R--
- 2 mode bits allow process to change across domains
  - setuid, setgid bits

(Hybrid!) UNIX access control scheme:
- Authorization (check ACL) performed at \texttt{open}
- Returns a file handle $\rightarrow$ essentially a capability
- Subsequent \texttt{read} or \texttt{write} uses the file handle
Capabilities: Roundup

Advantages:
• Eliminates confused deputy problems
• Natural approach for user-defined objects

Disadvantages:
• Review of permissions?
• Delegation?
• Revocation?
# ACLs vs Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACLs: For each Object:</th>
<th>Capabilities: For each Principal:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(&lt;P_1,privs_1&gt;)</td>
<td>(&lt;O_1,privs_1&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&lt;P_2,privs_2&gt;)...</td>
<td>(&lt;O_2,privs_2&gt;)...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Review</strong> rights for object O</th>
<th>Easy! Print the list.</th>
<th>Hard. Need to scan all principals’ lists.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review</strong> rights for principal P across all objects</td>
<td>Hard. Need to scan all objects’ lists.</td>
<td>Easy! Print the c-list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revocation</strong></td>
<td>Easy! Delete P from O’s list.</td>
<td>If kernel tracks capabilities, invalidates on revocation. Harder if object tracks revocation list.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Authentication

Establish the identity of user/machine by

- **Something you are:**
  retinal scan, fingerprint

- **Something you have:**
  physical key, ticket, credit card, smart card

- **Something you know:**
  password, secret, answers to security questions, PIN

In the case of an OS this is done during login

- OS wants to know who the user is
Passwords

Secret known only to the subject

Top 10 passwords in 2017: [SplashData]

1. 123456
2. password
3. 12345678
4. qwerty
5. 12345
6. 123456789
7. letmein
8. 1234567
9. football
10. iloveyou
16: starwars, 18: dragon, 27: jordan23

Top 20 passwords suffice to compromise 10% of accounts [Skyhigh Networks]
Verifying Passwords

How does OS know that the password is correct?

Simplest implementation:
- OS keeps a file with \langle login, password\rangle pairs
- User types password
- OS looks for a login\rightarrow password match

Goal: make this scheme as secure as possible
- display the password when being typed?
1. Store username/password in a file
   - Attacker only needs to read the password file
   - Security of system now depends on protection of this file!
   Need: perfect authorization & trusted system administrators
Storing Passwords

1. Store username/password in a file
   • Attacker only needs to read the password file
   • Security of system now depends on protection of this file!
     Need: perfect authorization & trusted system administrators

2. Store login/encrypted password in file
   • Access to password file ≠ access to passwords
Storing Passwords

1. Store username/password in a file
   • Attacker only needs to read the password file
   • Security of system now depends on protection of this file!
     Need: perfect authorization & trusted system administrators

2. Store login/encrypted password in file
   • Access to password file ≠ access to passwords

3. Hashed Passwords
Hashing

Want a function f such that:
1. Easy to compute and store h(p)
2. Hard to compute p given h(p)
3. Hard to find q such that q ≠ p, h(q)==h(p)

Cryptographic hash functions to the rescue!

\[ h(password) = \text{encrypted-password} \quad \text{e.g., SHA} \]

• one-way property gives (1) and (2)
• collision resistance gives (3)

Remember:

\[ h(\text{encrypted-password}) \neq \text{password} \]
\[ h^{-1}(\text{encrypted-password}) = \text{password} \]
\[ h^{-1} \text{ hard to compute (hard } \approx \text{ impossible)} \]
Storing and Checking Passwords

```
Authentication!

Authenticated!

Denied!
```
Suppose attacker obtains password file:

/etc/passwd public, known hash fn known
+ hard to invert → hard to obtain all the passwords

Password File

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>login1</th>
<th>passwd1'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>login2</td>
<td>passwd2'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How else can I crack this file?

• Brute Force Attack:
  – Enumerate all possible passwords $p$, calculate $h(p)$ and see if it matches an entry in the file

• Dictionary Attack
  – List all the likely passwords $p$, calculate $h(p)$ and check for a match. (recall: top 20 passwords can compromise 10% of accounts)
Salting

**Vulnerabilities:**
- single dictionary compromises all users
- passwords chosen from small space

**Countermeasure:** include a unique system-chosen nonce as part of each user's password
- make every user's stored hashed password different, even if they chose the same password
- now passwords come from a larger space

Each user has: **login**, unique salt **s**, passwd **p**

System stores: login, s, H(s, p)
Salting Example

| login  | salt  | h(p||s)        |
|--------|-------|---------------|
| abc123 | 4238  | h(423812345)  |
| abc124 | 2918  | h(2918password) |
| abc125 | 6902  | h(6902LordByron) |
| abc126 | 1694  | h(1694qwerty) |
| abc127 | 1092  | h(109212345)  |
| abc128 | 9763  | h(97636%%TaeFF) |
| abc129 | 2020  | h(2020letmein) |

- If the hacker guesses `qwerty`, has to try: $h(0001\text{qwerty}), h(0002\text{qwerty}), h(0003\text{qwerty})$ …
- UNIX adds 12-bit of salt
- Also, passwords should be secure:
  - Length, case, digits, not from dictionary
  - Can be imposed by the OS! This has its own tradeoffs