


UNDER THE HOOD: THE
JAVA VIRTUAL MACHINE
II

CS2110 Fall 200 Lecture 25



Today

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- Class file format
- Class loading and initialization
- Object initialization
- Method dispatch
- Exception handling
- Java security model
 - Bytecode verification
 - Stack inspection

Instance Method Dispatch

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x.foo(...)

- compiles to **invokevirtual**
- Every loaded class knows its superclass
 - name of superclass is in the constant pool
 - like a parent pointer in the class hierarchy
- bytecode evaluates arguments of **x.foo(...)**, pushes them on the stack
- Object **x** is always the first argument

Instance Method Dispatch

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
invokevirtual foo (...)

- Name and type of **foo(...)** are arguments to **invokevirtual** (indices into constant pool)
- JVM retrieves them from constant pool
- Gets the dynamic (runtime) type of **x**
- Follows parent pointers until finds **foo(...)** in one of those classes – gets bytecode from code attribute

Instance Method Dispatch

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- Creates a new **stack frame** on runtime stack around arguments already there
- Allocates space in stack frame for locals and operand stack
- Prepares locals (int=0, ref=null), empty stack
- Starts executing bytecode of the method
- When returns, pops stack frame, resumes in calling method after the **invokevirtual** instruction



Instance Method Dispatch

```
byte[] data;
void getData() {
    String x = "Hello world";
    data = x.getBytes();
}

Code(maxStack = 2, maxLocals = 2, codeLength = 12)
0: ldc "Hello world"
2: astore_1
3: aload_0 //object of which getData is a method
4: aload_1
5: invokevirtual java.lang.String.getBytes ()[B
8: putfield A.data [B
11: return
```

- ### Exception Handling
- Each method has an **exception handler table** (possibly empty)
 - Compiled from **try/catch/finally**
 - An exception handler is just a designated block of code
 - When an exception is thrown, JVM searches the exception table for an appropriate handler that is in effect
 - **finally** clause is executed last

- ### Exception Handling
- Finds an exception handler → empties stack, pushes exception object, executes handler
 - No handler → pops runtime stack, returns exceptionally to calling routine
 - **finally** clause is always executed, no matter what

Exception Table Entry

startRange	start of range handler is in effect
endRange	end of range handler is in effect
handlerEntry	entry point of exception handler
catchType	exception handled

- **startRange** → **endRange** give interval of instructions in which handler is in effect
- **catchType** is any subclass of **Throwable** (which is a superclass of **Exception**) – any subclass of **catchType** can be handled by this handler

Example

```
Integer x = null;
Object y = new Object();

try {
    x = (Integer)y;
    System.out.println(x.intValue());
} catch (ClassCastException e) {
    System.out.println("y was not an Integer");
} catch (NullPointerException e) {
    System.out.println("y was null");
} finally {
    System.out.println("finally!");
}
```



Bytecode Verification

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- A form of *dataflow analysis* or *abstract interpretation* performed at load time
- Annotate the program with information about the execution state at each point
- Guarantees that values are used correctly


Types in the JVM

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
Typing of Java Bytecode

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Example

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
Example







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


Example

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Mobile Code

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Problem: mobile code is not trustworthy!

- We often have *trusted* and *untrusted* code running together in the same virtual machine
 - e.g., applets downloaded off the net and running in our browser
- Do not want untrusted code to perform critical operations (file I/O, net I/O, class loading, security management,...)
- *How do we prevent this?*

Mobile Code

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Early approach: signed applets


- Not so great
 - everything is either trusted or untrusted, nothing in between
 - a signature can only *verify* an already existing relationship of trust, it cannot *create* trust
- Would like to allow untrusted code to interact with trusted code
 - just monitor its activity somehow

Mobile Code

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Q) Why not just let trusted (system) code do anything it wants, even in the presence of untrusted code?

A) Because untrusted code calls system code to do stuff (file I/O, etc.) – system code could be operating on behalf of untrusted code



Runtime Stack

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Maybe we want to disallow it

- the malicious applet may be trying to erase our disk
- it's calling system code to do that

Runtime Stack

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Or, maybe we want to allow it
 -it may just want to write a cookie
 -it called `System.cookieWriter`
 -`System.cookieWriter` knows it's ok

Runtime Stack

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Maybe we want to allow it for another reason
 -all running methods are trusted

Q) How do we tell the difference between these scenarios?
 A) *Stack inspection!*

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Stack Inspection

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- An invocation of a trusted method, when calling another method, may either:
 - *permit* R on the stack above it
 - *forbid* R on the stack above it
 - *pass* permission from below (be transparent)
- An instantiation of an untrusted method must *forbid* R above it



Stack Inspection

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- When about to execute R, look down through the stack until we see either
 - a system method permitting R -- do it
 - a system method forbidding R -- don't do it
 - an untrusted method -- don't do it
- If we get all the way to the bottom, do it (IE, Sun JDK) or don't do it (Netscape)

Case A: R is not executed

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Conclusion

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Java and the Java Virtual Machine:
Full of interesting ideas

Many systems have been built by
taking an open source JVM and
then somehow "doing surgery" on it.
You can too!