

# Smart Grids and Cloud Computing

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

Makoto Bentz

CS6027

Feb. 27, 2011


# Power Grids

- Power Grids are formed mainly from generators, networks and loads
- Utilities will often control the power grid, and sub-stations will also be built to step voltages and ensure transmission



# Smart Grids

- Term dates back to at least 2005
  - "Toward A Smart Grid", by S. Massoud Amin and Bruce F. Wollenberg
- Many definitions, but all focus on idea of data flow and information management central to the power grid




# What is the Smart Grid?

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1. Optimize asset utilization and operating efficiency.
2. Accommodate all generation and storage options.
3. Provide power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy.
4. Anticipate and respond to system disturbances in a self-healing manner.
5. Operate resiliently against physical and cyber attacks and natural disasters.
6. Enable active participation by consumers.
7. Enable new products, services, and markets.

## Smart Grid

Smart grid puts information and communication technology into electricity generation, delivery, and consumption, making systems cleaner, safer, and more reliable and efficient.



# Why the Smart Grid?

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1,638 billion kWh of energy is lost in the US grid annually

655 billion kWh lost in the distribution system alone

Reduce by 10%

Saves

\$5.7 Billion

Cuts

42 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>


(2006) (ABB)

# Smart Grid Technologies

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<b>Sensor/Actuator</b>	Automated Switches, Smart Metering, Distribution Network Distributed Sensors
<b>Communication</b>	Wireless and Wired Networking, Control centers, Inter ISO communication
<b>Power Flow Control</b>	HVDC, Volt/Var Optimization, Flow Controls
<b>Decision Intelligence</b>	Microgrid control, Wide-area monitoring, system events and alerts, end-user management, Supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA)

# Smart Grid Systems



(Ipakchi) ©2009 IEEE




# Smart Grid: Research Applications

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
- Optimization of Power Flow in a Non-Linear Framework
- Effects of Local Storage and Local Generation
- Effects of Gradual Addition of Smart Grid Technologies
- Optimal Market Pricing Strategies with the Introduction of Real Time Pricing
- Market Clearing Strategies with Renewable Energy
- Security in Control Systems (SCADA)

# Focus: How to Make Data Centers Smart?

- What makes Data Centers expensive?
  - Designed with Resistance to Maximum Possible Transient Peaks
  - Designed with “unlimited power concept”
  - Heating and cooling not considered by software/electrical engineers
- Possible Solution:  
Addition of Smart Monitoring (Tu, et. al) to read the power flow on each server




Berl, et. al



Tu, et. al

# Focus: Smart Grids and Data Centers

- Cloud Computing
  - Computing, software and data services that can be used by end users without knowledge of physical location or configuration of the systems
- Cloud computing uses data centers around the world to provide services
  - **Amazon:** (Ashburn, Virginia; Dallas/Fort Worth; Los Angeles; Miami; Newark, New Jersey; Palo Alto, California; Seattle; St. Louis; Amsterdam; Dublin; Frankfurt; London; Hong Kong; Singapore; Tokyo)



 **Windows Azure**  
Microsoft's Cloud Services Platform

 **amazon**  
web services™


cloud servers™ 

“Where Amazon’s Data Centers Are Located” [www.datacenterknowledge.com/](http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/)  
November 18th, 2008 : Rich Miller

# Focus: Smart Grids and Data Centers

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- Problem: Current Cloud Computing does not take into consideration power constraints
- Solution: Geographical routing of requests to data centers where power is available, cheaper, easier to balance
- Objective: Route requests to data centers to best balance the power distribution network  
(Mohsenian-Rad, A.; Leon-Garcia, A.;



# Focus: Smart Grids and Data Centers

- Model the power supply and data centers as buses
- Each bus may have generators and loads (data centers, background load)
- Buses are connected by limited branches
- Each bus is modeled as (DC-Equivalent Power Flow Equations)


$$P_i = \sum_{j=1, j \neq i} B_{ij} (\theta_i - \theta_j), \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N},$$

- Each branch can be described as

$$P_{ij} = B_{ij} (\theta_i - \theta_j).$$

- Therefore, the system can be described as

$$\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{P}^{\text{Background}} + \mathbf{P}^{\text{DataCenter}}$$



# Focus: Smart Grids and Data Centers

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- Set of Buses that Feed a Data Center
- Set of Buses that Feed a User
- Service Requests at U Routed To S
- Therefore, all requests must be met

$$S \subseteq \bar{\mathcal{N}}$$

$$U \subseteq \mathcal{N}$$

$$\lambda_{us}$$

$$\sum_{s \in S} \lambda_{us} = L_u, \quad \forall u \in U$$

$$\gamma_s \triangleq \left( \sum_{u \in U} \lambda_{su} \right) / (m_s \mu), \quad \forall s \in S.$$


- Average Server Utilization at s
- Then,

$$P_s^{\text{DataCenter}} \triangleq m_s (P_{\text{idle}} + (E_{\text{usage}} - 1) \times P_{\text{peak}}) + m_s (P_{\text{peak}} - P_{\text{idle}}) \times \gamma_s + \epsilon,$$


- For each branch, one wants to keep the ratio with respect to maximum low

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathbf{minimize} & \max_{(i,j)} P_{ij} / P_{ij}^{\max} \\ \mathbf{subject\ to} & \text{Eqs. (1) - (12)}. \end{array}$$

# Focus: Smart Grids and Data Centers




Effect of Grid-Aware Routing on Maximum Transmission



Effect of Grid-Aware Routing on Link Breakage

# Focus: Controllable SCADAs and the Risk of Attack


- Problem: With more intelligent control systems, this opens them up to the risk of attack. What happens when a control system on a generator is attacked?
- Solution: Model the generator, and then model the effect of losing control  
(Rohan Chabukswar, Bruno Sinopoli, Gabor Karsai, Annarita Giani, Himanshu Neema, Andrew Davis.)
- Used the Tennessee Eastman Control Challenge Problem






# Focus: Controllable SCADAs and the Risk of Attack

- Conclusion: The effect of total communications disruption was modelable, but attacks on the feed router and product router were harder to simulate and estimate



(b) Product Flow Rate



(c) Operating Cost




Fig. 9. Network Map

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