Cornell University

IT Security @ Cornell

IT Security Office

Wyman Miles, CISO

Glenn Larratt, Sr. Security Engineer

Overview -- ITSO

- 16 staff – CISO, Deputy, 5 Sr. Security Engineers & 2 Operations Engineers, plus Identity Management: Manager and 5 Sr Security Engineers
- We work closely with Counsel, Audit, law enforcement, etc.
- Responsible for the security of Cornell information, operational stability of the IT ecosystem, IT Policy, certain aspects of Privacy

IT @ Cornell

- Central: 270 employees
- Departments: 670 employees
- On any given day, 65000 devices active on campus
  - 35000 of those are on wireless

Security Incidents

- 500 system compromises per year
  - ¾ are student systems on wireless
  - Almost all are drive-bys, heavily weighted towards Windows
  - Fortunately, very few put regulated data at risk
- Another 1500 password thefts per year
- Assorted web defacements, stolen devices, and other events account for 100+ more incidents/yr

Threat Landscape

- Cybercrime
- Espionage – Industrial and National
- Hacktivisim
- Attacks *against* the university (50K/day, typically)
- Attacks *from* the university (???)
- Internal actors, direct and incidental

Regulatory Landscape

- We are a 30000 person city that runs its own bank, insurance company, medical clinic, refuse collection, power generation, potable water treatment, hotel, animal hospital, law enforcement agency, and hazmat team
- Oh, and the next Nobel Prize lurks somewhere within its 100 buildings and 2800 acres
- You name it, it applies: *FERPA, HIPAA/HITECH, PCI, SOX, GLBA, FISMA, FERC/NERC, …*

Guiding Principles: The Textbook

- Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
- Or, as most people think of it:
  - Secrecy
  - Get Security Out of the Way
  - Huh?
- Administrative, Technical, Physical
- Defense in Depth
- Least Privilege

Guiding Principles: Cornell

- Separation of Duties
- Minimal Access to Log Data, Zero Access to Content
- Data Stewardship
- *We are a cog in the risk management apparatus of the university*
- *IT Security enables the Academic and Research missions of the university*


1988: Morris Worm
1998: Melissa
2003: Sasser
2006: Drive-Bys
2009: USB Bot
2011: Zeus, ZeroAccess
Exploits are an educational experiment
Exploits are an ego experiment
Exploits drive an underground economy
(Revealed) Exploits are a matter of national security
Computers are the target
People are the means
People are the target

The Objective is Data

Defending Cornell: Now

- Rudimentary network filtering across 80% of networks
- Network intrusion detection
  - FireEye
  - SIEM
  - Homegrown
- Log analysis
- Managed Antivirus
- Managed Encryption
- Vulnerability Scanning
- University Policy
  - Data classification and safeguards
  - Network registry
  - Accounts and access control
  - Data Governance

Defending Cornell: Future

- We need to shift to a preventative posture
  - *Risk Assessments, Risk Assessments, Risk Assessments*
  - *Re-align the program with FISMA, FedRAMP, and NIST*
  - *Application vulnerability management*
  - *Penetration testing*
  - *Virtual Desktops*
  - *Multifactor Auth*
  - Firewalls with Unified Threat Management – *coming Jan 2016*
  - Increased encryption – all university owned devices by 2017
  - Data-loss prevention
- Policy re-aligned to meet new threats: espionage and cybercrime

(Hopefully) Interesting Reading

- NIST-800:
  - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html
- FISMA:
  - http://www.dhs.gov/fisma
- FedRAMP:
  - http://www.fedramp.gov

IT Security Ops – Priorities / Customers

- "The Data" is our first priority
  - Networks designed based on data contained therein
  - First question we ask in incident response
  - Data types and data stewards
- Our customer base
  - End users
  - Sysadmins / Netadmins / College Security Liaisons
  - Investigative/administrative units within the University

IT Security Ops – Defense in Depth

- There is no, no, **NO** silver bullet
- Layered defense – one layer catches what another misses
- Firewalls, encryption, and AAA are obvious layers
- Less obvious layers include policy, detection, incident response, and trained analysts

IT Security – Services

- Antiphishing / SafeDNS
- Network Quarantine / PASS
- Endpoint Protection
- Remote Access via VPN
- Full-disk and other encryption
- Edge ACL's – Managed UTM Firewall soon
- Proactive vulnerability scanning


Edge ACL Viewer
Cornell University
Search Cornell
Cornell IT Security Engineering
Service homepage
Tips & Templates
Shared ACL's
Contact us
Edge ACL Viewer
More information can be found by following the links above, or contacting IT Security Engineering at 607-255-6664 or via e-mail to security-services . In case of emergency, please contact us via 607-255-6664.
Current (Mon Aug 26 16:31:24 2013) Edge ACL ruleset for VLAN cit-itso-test-out .
test stuff
permit tcp any any established
permit tcp any any
permit udp any any
permit ah any any
permit esp any any
permit ospf any any
permit icmp any any
permit ip any any
deny ip any any
Shared Edge ACL management
Network Quarantine
Network Quarantine
Valid netid gl89 with valid cit.noc permit.
New Network Quarantine Record
NetID:
MAC address:
* Ipaddr:
* Incident Timestamp:
Time is GMT
Time is Local Ti
* Incident Type:
NQCP100 -- Copyright Infringement - DMCA Notice (DMZ block over
NQCP101 -- Copyright Infringement - DMCA Notice (RedRover)
NQCP102 -- Copyright Infringement - (block record only)
NQCP103 -- Copyright Infringement - 2nd DMCA Notice (Student)
NQCP104 -- Copyright Infringement - Failure to Respond
NQCP105 -- Copyright Infringement - 1st DMCA Notice (Student)
NQCP106 -- Copyright Infringement - 3rd DMCA Notice (Student)
NQCP107 -- Copyright Infringement - Settlement Letter with Prior No
NQCP108 -- Copyright Infringement - Suspension of Network Access
NQHV100 -- Highly Vulnerable System (General)
Custom Message:
Mozilla Firefox
https://pass.sec...bin/incident.cgi
Per-day activity:
Real-time cases
Integrated cases
Regenerated cases
Currently open
2013-08-08
2013-10-04
Detail for host 128.253.159.140
Cornell University
Search Cornell
Cornell IT Security Engineering
Back to start
Back to search results
Contact us
SFSCAN
More information can be found by following the links above, or contacting IT Security Engineering at 607-255-6664 or via e-mail to security-services .
Host Detail for 128.253.159.140 / hogplum.serverfarm.cornell.edu
Summary
Retirement Date
Reports
Wed Jul 24 04:05:07 2013
Active
Tiered / Long
Wed Apr 24 04:05:10 2013
Active
Tiered / Long
Tue Jan 29 04:05:10 2013
Active
Tiered / Long
Return to the search page
Nessus
Nessus
Nessus vulnerability scanner
Username
Password
Sign In To Continue
Looking for the older Flash interface?
tenable network security

IT Security – SIEM

- Security Information/Event Management
- Listens to network traffic at the core
- Receives AAA, IDS, and other logs
- Correlation / Corroboration / Investigation

IT Security – Detection (Network)

- NetFlow – Server Farm and Border routers
  - Spike alerts
  - Traflog
- Tap on the network core, feeding:
  - Flow processor of our SIEM
  - FireEye IDS
  - Bro/Snort IDS

IT Security – Detection (logs)

- AAA logs from most systems on campus
  - Look for obvious patterns of compromise
- IDS logs from our several such systems
  - Postprocess, correlate, check with bad actor info

IT Security - Consulting

- “How do I use this service?”
- “Why doesn’t my network work as expected?”
- “Is this (old) firewall really giving me any value?”
- “Why can’t I run Windows XP?”
- Security Assessments
- Security planning for new IT projects

IT Security – Incident Response

- Again – it's the data
- What data was there?
- What capabilities did the attacker have?
- Analyze a large volume of technical data…

…to reach a simply-stated likelihood of data loss, for a committee of university executives

Incident Response

- Volatile data is important
- Modern malware is encrypted
- Acquire RAM and disk (where possible)
- Contain communications
- Restore user work environment

Threat Landscape

- Older
  - Trojan horses
  - Viruses
  - Worms (network, USB)
  - Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
- Newer
  - Phishing / Identity Theft / Fraud
  - Drive-by downloads
  - Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
  - Web application attacks
  - Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

Phishing

- Trick the user into giving information (social engineering)
- Trick the user into executing malware
- Methods
  - URLs in
    - e-mail, instant messages, social media, SMS
  - Attachments
  - Phone calls


System Administrator - Message (HTML)
File
Message
Ignore
Junk
Delete
Reply
Reply All
Forward
Meeting
More
Delete
Respond
To Manager
Team E-mail
Done
Quick Steps
Move
Rules
OneNote
Actions
Move
Assign Policy
Mark Unread
Categorize
Follow Up
Tags
Translate
Find
Related
Select
Editing
Zoom
Zoom
From: Shawn Rearden <Shawn.Rearden@sumterschools.net>
Sent: Wed 2013-05-15 11:24
To:
Cc:
Subject: System Administrator
You will not be able to send/receive more emails until you visit the below helpdesk link to restore your email access within 48-hours.
Copy/click http://www.strud.com/forms//forms/form1.html
System Administrator
201.286.2331System Administrator
****
This message is intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This communication may contain information that is proprietary, privileged, confidential or otherwise legally exempt from disclosure. If you are not the named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy, or disseminate this message or any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately either by phone (803-469-8536 or 803-469-6900) or reply to this email and delete all copies of this message.


We Have A Package For You On Our Desk - Message (HTML)
File
Message
Ignore
Junk
Delete
Reply
Reply All
Forward
Meeting
More
Delete
Respond
To Manager
Team E-mail
Done
Quick Steps
Move
Rules
OneNote
Actions
Move
Assign Policy
Mark Unread
Categorize
Follow Up
Tags
Translate
Find
Related
Select
Editing
Zoom
Zoom
This message was sent with High importance.
From: FedEx Delivery Post <info@fedex.in>
Sent: Fri 2013-07-19 17:30
To: Recipients
Cc:
Subject: We Have A Package For You On Our Desk
Attachments: FEDEX PARCEL.doc (27 KB)
Open Attached


Notice of Tax Return - Message (HTML)
File
Message
Ignore
Junk
Delete
Reply
Reply All
Forward
Meeting
More
Delete
Respond
To Manager
Team E-mail
Done
Quick Steps
Move
Rules
OneNote
Actions
Move
Assign Policy
Mark Unread
Categorize
Follow Up
Tags
Translate
Find
Related
Select
Editing
Zoom
Zoom
You responded on Monday, 08 April, 2013 13:23.
Click here to download pictures. To help protect your privacy, Outlook prevented automatic download of some pictures in this message.
From: IRS <e-acc@ir.com>
Sent: Mon 2013-04-08 12:52
To:
Cc:
Subject: Notice of Tax Return
Claim Your Tax Refund Online
We identified an error in the calculation of your tax from the last payment, amounting to $ 419.95. In order for us to return the excess payment, you need to create a e-Refund account after which the funds will be credited to your specified bank account.
Please click "Get Started" below to claim your refund:
Get Started
We are here to ensure the correct tax is paid at the right time, whether this relates to payment of taxes received by the department or entitlement to benefits paid.


Registration - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Registration
http://c4forums.com/plugins/.a/?http://www.irs.gov/Refunds/individuals/phpdiu3yyd7773
Google
Internal Revenue Service
United States Department of the Treasury
e-services
On-line Tutorials
Help
Mailbox
Registration
Please enter the following information to register for using e-Refund.
For help, select the Help link and information will be provided in a "help" window.
IMPORTANT: Please print a copy for your records before you submit your entries for processing.
*First Name (Required):
Middle Initial:
*Last Name (Required):
Name Suffix:
*Social Security Number (Required):
*Date of Birth (Required):
(MM/DD/YYYY)
*Phone (Required):
(3 digit area code followed by 7 digit number, i.e. 8005551111)
Email Address:
Please select your preferred Username and Password.
(You must type password twice)
Rules governing the creation of the Username and Password have been created to further enhance the security of e-Refund. The most commonly encountered rules are identified below. Select this link to see the full set of password rules.
*Username (Required):
Username must be at least 8 characters long, may contain letters and numbers only, case insensitive (read as upper-case only).
*Password (Required):
*Re-Enter Password (Required):
Password must be at least 8 characters long, must contain both letters and numbers, case sensitive, cannot be the same as the username.
Please select one question to be answered by you if you forget your username and you attempt to re-register with IRS. The question and answer should be unlikely to be known by other individuals. For example, do not select your street where you currently live or the car you own today.
*Question to Recover Username (Required):
What is your mother's date of birth?
*Answer (Required):
*Street Address (Required):
*City (Required):
*State (Required):
*Zip Code (Required):

Registration - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

Registration

http://c4forums.com/plugins/.a/safe.htm?https://www.irs.gov/pub/rup_login_1?TYPE=3355443

Google

Internal Revenue Service
United States Department of the Treasury

e-services | On-line Tutorials | Help | Mailbox

Registration

Please attach a card to your account by entering the details below. (on this card you will receive your refunds)

NOTE: On this card you will receive your refunds.

***Cardholder Name (Required):**

***Card Number (Required):**

***Card Expiry Date (Required):** /

***Card Security Number (Required):**

3 digit number found on the back of your card

Continue

e-services Privacy Policy


Cornell University Web Login
http://web4.login.cornell.eduo.in/
Google
Heads
diversions
DNSDB et.al.
QR/FireEye
Other Cornell ref
training
weather
Colin & Connor
post-NOC
f-l.net
IncResp
Pentest/warga...
appliance
Cornell University
CUWebLogin
NetID:
Password:
Login
What is this?
I forgot my password!
I don't have a NetID, now what?
To log out, you must Exit or Quit your browser.
Caution: Always check your browser's address bar before you enter your NetID password to make sure the address starts with https://web*.login.cornell.edu/ (where web* is either web1, web2, web3 or web4).
CUWebLogin is a component of Cornell University's central authentication service. If you are unsure of the authenticity of any online University service, please contact the IT Service Desk.
This service and the services to which it provides access are for authorized use only. Any attempt to gain unauthorized access, or exceed authorized access, to online University resources will be pursued, as applicable, under campus codes and state or federal law.
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Drive-by Downloads

- Installs malicious software without user's knowledge or consent
- Vector typically is a compromised web site or malicious advertisement
- Goal: exploit a vulnerable system and execute a "dropper" that downloads malware du jour

How do they work?

- Web-based exploit kits
- Hidden iFrame or redirect to malicious Javascript, usually obfuscated
- JS determines environment
  - OS platform, browser version, plugins installed
- Delivers tailored exploits based on results
- Exploits typically attack
  - Web browser
  - Plugins
    - Java
    - Adobe Flash
    - Adobe Reader

Popular Malware on Campus

- Fake anti-virus
- FBI ransomware
- ZBot
- ZeroAccess
- Flashback

DDoS

- Use voluminous resources around the Internet to conduct attack
- Source can be
  - Botnet
  - Open or insecure services
    - DNS
    - SNMP


DNS Amplification Attack
Root Servers
.com Namespace
Step 1
Sends signal to activate Bots
Attacker
Botnet (Compromised PCs)
Step 2
Question: what is the IP Address of some-webserver.com? Please reply to Victim IP Address
Step 3
Question: where can I find the IP Address of some-webserver.com?
Step 4
Answer: I don't know but .com NameSpace should have the answer
Step 5
Question: What is the IP Address of some-webserver.com?
Step 6
Answer: Primary DNS Server of some-webserver.com knows it.
Step 7
Question: What is the IP Address of some-webserver.com?
Step 8
Answer: Here is the IP Address of some-webserver.com
Step 9
Answer: Here is the IP Address of some-webserver.com.
Each reply can be amplified up to factor of 73
Not authoritative for some-webserver.com
User's Primary DNS Servers (Recursion Allowed)
Primary DNS Server of some-webserver.com
Victim's Server
Vicitim IP Address

Case: SpamHaus

- Largest DDoS reported in history
- Estimated that over 30,000 resolvers were used
- Each 68 byte query resulted in a 3 kilobyte response (50x amplifier)
- Over 90 Gb/s smashed SpamHaus servers
  - More than 300 Gb/s at Tier 1 and 2 providers


Distribution:
Attacker's Botnet Hosts
Reflection:
SNMP Vulnerability
Target:
Hit With
Reflected
Amplification
DDoS Attack
Attacker
Network 1
Attacker's Bot Network Hosts
Network 2
Attacker's Bot Network Hosts
Network 3
Attacker's Bot Network Hosts
Network 4
Attacker's Bot Network Hosts
Network 5
Vulnerable Devices Running SNMP
Network 6
Vulnerable Devices Running SNMP
Network 7
Vulnerable Devices Running SNMP
Network 8
Vulnerable Devices Running SNMP
Attack Target:
- Network
- Hosts
- Websites
- Applications
Results for Target - Attack Can:
- Continue for Hours
- Exceed 100 Gbps
Step 1:
Attacker Sends Command to Botnet "Send Forged SNMP Query to All Bots" at ISPs 1 - 4
Step 2:
Bots Send SNMP Queries to All SNMP Devices at ISPs 5 - 8, Using Forged IP Address of Target
Step 3:
Vulnerable Devices Respond to Forged Queries, Replying En Masse to Target

Cornell University

Email Spoofing and Backscatter

Cornell.edu Recipients



Web Application Attacks

- OWASP
- Common attacks
  - SQLi
  - XSS
  - CSRF
- Common goals
  - database access
  - credential stealing
  - malware hosting
  - spam hosting

Prevention

- It's all about the layers
  - Nextgen firewall
  - Endpoint protection
  - Patch and Vulnerability management
  - Awareness training
- OS protection
  - ASLR
  - DEP
  - EMET (Windows)
- Penetration Testing
- Even *more* critical as we move to the cloud