

Defending Computer Networks

Lecture 2: Vulnerabilities

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Logistics

- Still space in class
- Restriction to CS M.Eng will be lifted shortly
- HW1 probably given out next time
- Website not up yet (my bad).

Main Goals for Today

- Understand system() function vulnerabilities
- Outline understanding of buffer overflow vulnerabilities

Interesting News This Week

JPMorgan and Other Banks Struck by Hackers

A number of United States banks, including JPMorgan Chase and at least four others, were struck by hackers in a series of coordinated attacks this month, according to four people briefed on a continuing investigation into the crimes.

The hackers infiltrated the networks of the banks, siphoning off gigabytes of data, including checking and savings account information, in what security experts described as a sophisticated cyberattack.

The motivation and origin of the attacks are not yet clear, according to investigators. The F.B.I. is involved in the investigation, and in the past few weeks a number of security firms have been brought in to conduct studies of the penetrated computer networks.

Russian hackers attacked the U.S. financial system in mid-August, infiltrating and stealing data from **JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)** and at least one other bank, an incident the FBI is investigating as a possible retaliation for government-sponsored sanctions, according to two people familiar with the probe.

System() Function Vulnerabilities

- Very basic class of C/Unix vulnerability
- “man 3 system”
- Been known for decades
- Still occurs, however.
- Let’s work through an example

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
```

```
// This code is a very short hack to illustrate server vulnerabilities!!
```

```
// Do not write production code like this!!!
```

```
int      sockFd;
int      connFd;
unsigned short  port      = 3333;
struct sockaddr_in  serverAddress;
struct sockaddr_in  clientAddress;
```

```
void setupSocket(void)
{
    unsigned clientLen;
    assert( (sockFd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) >= 0);
    bzero(&serverAddress, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
    serverAddress.sin_family    = AF_INET;
    serverAddress.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
    serverAddress.sin_port     = htons(port);
    assert(bind(sockFd, (struct sockaddr *) &serverAddress, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) >= 0);
    assert(listen(sockFd, 5)>=0);
    clientLen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
    assert( (connFd = accept(sockFd, (struct sockaddr *)&clientAddress, &clientLen)) > 1);
}
```

```
int getLineFromSocket(char* buffer, int len)
{
    int n;
    assert(write(connFd, "Type Symbol>", 12) >= 0);
    n = read(connFd, buffer, len);
    buffer[n-2] = '\0';
    return n;
}
```



```
void extractCountFromFile(char* fileName, char* answer)
{
    char buf[256];
    char* start;

    FILE* file = fopen(fileName, "r");
    assert(file);
    fgets(buf, 256, file);
    for(start = buf; *start; start++)
    {
        if(*start == ' ' || *start == '\t')
            continue;
        else
            break;
    }
    if(*start)
    {
        char* end = index(start, ' ');
        if(end)
        {
            *end = '\n';
            *(++end) = '\0';
            strcpy(answer, start);
        }
    }
}
```


```
void processLine(char* buffer, int len)
{
    // line format is "username\n"
    char answer[256];
    char command[256];
    sprintf(command, "ps aux |grep %s |wc > tmp.txt", buffer);
    fprintf(stdout, "Buf %s\n", buffer);
    fprintf(stdout, "About to execute %s\n", command);
    system(command);
    extractCountFromFile("tmp.txt", answer);
    assert(write(connFd, answer, strlen(answer)) >= 0);
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char buf[256];
    int n;
    if(argc ==2)
    {
        port = atoi(argv[1]);
    }
    setupSocket();
    while(getLineFromSocket(buf, 256))
        processLine(buf, n);
}
```

Live Demonstration of Exploitation

General Point


- When writing a server
 - Task is to mediate access to server's resources
 - Not grant arbitrary access
 - Have to be very careful in channeling
 - Constrained client-server protocol
 - To general-purpose OS/computer
- Attackers are evil/bad/smart/patient
- They are out to get you!



Side Note

- SQL Injection Vulnerabilities are closely related
 - Eg ‘;’ passed through to SQL server is a statement separator there too.
- The general issue is failure to properly sanitize input before passing it to general execution engines.

Interlude



Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities

- Most important early class of vulnerabilities
 - Still important
- Will start today, finish in subsequent lecture(s)
- Today, will introduce a “fictionalized” account
 - How things used to be 10-20 years ago
 - Simpler to understand
 - Will not match what happens if you look at output of a modern compiler
 - Modern OS/compilers have numerous defenses
 - Still vulnerable though, just more complex to exploit
 - We will expand into more realistic detail next time
- Loosely based on Aleph1 *Smashing Stack for Fun and Profit*.
 - http://www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/fa08/papers/stack_smashing.pdf

Example 1


```
void myFunc(int a, int b, int c)
{
    char buffer1[5];
    char buffer2[10];
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    myFunc(1,2,3);
}
```

Assembler

- Function Call:
 - pushl \$3
 - pushl \$2
 - pushl \$1
 - call myFunc
- Function Prologue:
 - pushl %ebp
 - movl %esp,%ebp
 - subl \$20,%esp

Stack in Example 1




Example 2


```
void myFunc(char *str)
{
    char buffer[64];
    strcpy(buffer, str);
}

int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char large_string[256];
    int i;
    for( i = 0; i < 255; i++)
        large_string[i] = 'A';
    myFunc (large_string);
}
```


Stack in Example 2 right before strcpy()



Stack in Example 2 right after strcpy()



More Useful Stack for Attacker



Note similarity to System()

- Both cases it's channel mixing
 - “;” mixed with commands in shell language
 - Instruction pointers mixed with data
- Mixing control and data is frequently useful
 - But usually dangerous

Additional Readings

- Cowan et al: *StackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of Buffer-Overflow Attacks*
 - https://www.usenix.org/legacy/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/full_papers/cowan/cowan.pdf
- Shacham et al *On the Effectiveness of Address-Space Randomization*
 - <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~locasto/projects/candidacy/papers/shacham2004ccs.pdf>
- Hovav Shacham *The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone*
 - <http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/geometry.pdf>