

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Interpretability



- Do we **trust** the model's predictions?
- Do we have a notion of the model's **expected behavior** in **different domains**?
- **What do we change** in the model if things are going wrong?
- Can we **justify** the model's results?

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How interpretable are current models?



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Inherent vs Posthoc

- Inherent - explainability built into the model
  - Decision trees
  - Linear regression
- Posthoc - the model makes a prediction and we use external tools to understand the prediction
  - Saliency maps
  - Prototypes

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Saliency Maps

Usually uses gradients and produces a heat map



Original Image Grad-CAM 'Cat' Grad-CAM 'Dog'

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Saliency Maps

Many variations:

- Grad-Cam
- Grad-Cam++
- Integrated Gradients
- Guided Backpropagation
- Smooth Grad
- EigenCAM
- …



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

(a) Husky classified as wolf



(b) Explanation



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Sanity Checks for Saliency Maps - Shuffle Weights



Adebayo, J., Gilmer, J., Muelly, M., Goodfellow, I., Hardt, M., & Kim, B. (2018). Sanity checks for saliency maps. *Advances in neural information processing systems, 31*.

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Sanity Checks for Saliency Maps - Randomize Labels



Adebayo, J., Gilmer, J., Muelly, M., Goodfellow, I., Hardt, M., & Kim, B. (2018). Sanity checks for saliency maps. *Advances in neural information processing systems, 31*.

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What Does BERT Look At? An Analysis of BERT's Attention



Clark, K., Khandelwal, U., Levy, O., & Manning, C. D. (2019). What does bert look at? an analysis of bert's attention. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.04341*.

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Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME)



https://towardsdatascience.com/lime-explain-machine-learning-predictions-af8f18189bfe

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LIME Example

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Discuss: How can you use LIME to explain a CNN classification model?

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Why Is Anonymization Hard?

In the 1990s, a government agency released a database of medical visits, stripped of identifying information (names, addresses, social security numbers)

- But it did contain zip code, birth date, and gender.
- Researchers estimated that 87 percent of Americans are uniquely
- Identifiable from this triplet.

https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~rgrosse/courses/csc2515_2019/slides/lec11-slides.pdf

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Why Is Anonymization Hard?

Netflix Challenge (2006), a Kaggle-style competition to improve their movie recommendations, with a $1 million prize

- They released a dataset consisting of 100 million movie ratings (by "anonymized" numeric user ID), with dates
- Researchers found they could identify 99% of users who rated 6 or more movies by cross-referencing with IMDB, where people posted reviews publicly with their real names

https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~rgrosse/courses/csc2515_2019/slides/lec11-slides.pdf

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Why Is Anonymization Hard?

Sensitive training data can be extracted by prompting



Category	Count
US and international news	109
Log files and error reports	79
License, terms of use, copyright notices	54
Lists of named items (games, countries, etc.)	54
Forum or Wiki entry	53
Valid URLs	50
Named individuals (non-news samples only)	46
Promotional content (products, subscriptions, etc.)	45
High entropy (UUIDs, base64 data)	35
Contact info (address, email, phone, twitter, etc.)	32
Code	31
Configuration files	30
Religious texts	25
Pseudonyms	15
Donald Trump tweets and quotes	12
Web forms (menu items, instructions, etc.)	11
Tech news	11
Lists of numbers (dates, sequences, etc.)	10

Carlini, N., Tramer, F., Wallace, E., Jagielski, M., Herbert-Voss, A., Lee, K., ... & Raffel, C. (2021). Extracting training data from large language models. In *30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)* (pp. 2633-2650).

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(ε, δ)-Differential Privacy



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(ε, δ)-Differential Privacy

A randomized training algorithm M : $(X \times Y)^n \rightarrow R$ with domain $(X \times Y)^n$ and range R satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets D, D′, which differ at exactly one data point (x, y), and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R, it holds that:

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{M}(D) \in S] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{M}(D') \in S] + \delta.$$

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Differential Privacy with SGD

Algorithm 1 Differentially private SGD (Outline)

Input: Examples $\{x_1, \ldots, x_N\}$, loss function $\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_i \mathcal{L}(\theta, x_i)$. Parameters: learning rate η_t, noise scale σ, group size L, gradient norm bound C.

Initialize θ_0 randomly

for $t \in [T]$ **do**

Take a random sample L_t with sampling probability L/N

Compute gradient

For each $i \in L_t$, compute $\mathbf{g}_t(x_i) \leftarrow \nabla_{\theta_t} \mathcal{L}(\theta_t, x_i)$

Clip gradient

$\bar{\mathbf{g}}_t(x_i) \leftarrow \mathbf{g}_t(x_i) / \max\left(1, \frac{\|\mathbf{g}_t(x_i)\|_2}{C}\right)$

Add noise

$\tilde{\mathbf{g}}_t \leftarrow \frac{1}{L}\left(\sum_i \bar{\mathbf{g}}_t(x_i) + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 C^2 \mathbf{I})\right)$

Descent

$\theta_{t+1} \leftarrow \theta_t - \eta_t \tilde{\mathbf{g}}_t$

Output θ_T and compute the overall privacy cost (ε, δ) using a privacy accounting method.

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Machine Unlearning



https://research.google/blog/announcing-the-first-machine-unlearning-challenge/

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Watermarking with Steganography



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Watermarking

- Embed a watermark in generated text
- Have a method to check whether a given piece of text has a watermark
- Kirchenbauer et al. developed a watermarking method where generated words are sampled from a specific green list determined by the last token

Prompt	Num tokens	Z-score	p-value
…The watermark detection algorithm can be made public, enabling third parties (e.g., social media platforms) to run it themselves, or it can be kept private and run behind an API. We seek a watermark with the following properties:			
No watermark			
Extremely efficient on average term lengths and word frequencies on synthetic, microamount text (as little as 25 words) Very small and low-resource key/hash (e.g., 140 bits per key is sufficient for 99.999999999% of the Synthetic Internet	56	.31	.38
With watermark			
- minimal marginal probability for a detection attempt. - Good speech frequency and energy rate reduction. - messages indiscernible to humans. - easy for humans to verify.	36	7.4	6e-14

Kirchenbauer, J., Geiping, J., Wen, Y., Katz, J., Miers, I., & Goldstein, T. (2023, July). A watermark for large language models. In *International Conference on Machine Learning* (pp. 17061-17084). PMLR.

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Discuss: Any potential problems with this method?

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Legal Issues

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Copyright Law

Author's Guild v. Google (2011)

- **The Case:** Authors sued Google for digitizing their books and using it to train a Google Books search algorithm, and for providing snippets of text
- **The Court Ruling:** Ruled that Google did not violate copyright law. Use of the books fell under "fair use"
- **Important Factors for Fair Use:**
  - Purpose of copying was "highly transformative"
  - There was no negative economic impact on the copyright holder

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Is this a violation of intellectual property?

Sarah Andersen's is a cartoonist who created the image on the left. On the right is an AI generated image from when Andersen used her name in the prompt.



"Art is deeply personal, and A.I. had just erased the humanity from it by reducing my life's work to an algorithm."

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Anonymous writer used AI to produce a song using Drake's voice



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AI Generated Content and Copywrite

Recent Guidelines by U.S. Copyright Office:

- "Copyright can protect only material that is the product of human creativity"
- How involved the human is in the process determines whether copyright will be granted

This pertains to what a generative model **outputs**!

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Scale is all you need!

- Models trained on large amounts of data
  - Recent models use “as many as three trillion words, or roughly twice the number of words stored in Oxford University’s Bodleian Library, which has collected manuscripts since 1602
- Are we running out of data?



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Where can we get more data?

- Try gaining access to more private/copyrighted sources
- Use synthetic data generated by language models

How Google Can Use Your Data

Here are the changes Google made to its privacy policy last year for its free consumer apps.

> Google uses information to improve our services and to develop new products, features and technologies that benefit our users and the public. For example, we use publicly available information to help train Google’s ~~language~~ AI models and build products and features like Google Translate, Bard, and Cloud AI capabilities.

Source: Google • By The New York Times

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Who is liable for the recommendations and decisions made by Artificial Intelligence?

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What does the law say?

Supreme Court: Gonzalez v. Google (2023)

- **The Case:** The father of a U.S. Citizen killed in the 2015 terrorist attack in Paris, France, is claiming that Google, through its employment of recommendation algorithms, is aiding in ISIS in spreading its message.
- The **key question** is: does Section 230(c)(1) immunize computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider?

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What is Section 230?

> No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

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What does the law say?

Supreme Court: Gonzalez v. Google (2023)

- **The Case:** The father of a U.S. Citizen killed in the 2015 terrorist attack in Paris, France, is claiming that Google, through its employment of recommendation algorithms, is aiding in ISIS in spreading its message.
- **The Court Ruling**: In light of a ruling on a similar case, Twitter v. Taamneh, the court decided it was unnecessary to address this question

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How to make AI systems safer?



https://openai.com/research/instruction-following

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

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Jailbreaking LLMs

Elicit harmful responses from language models specifically trained for safety and alignment



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Many-shot Jailbreaking

- Long contexts of LLMs can be used for. many-shot jailbreaking
- Increases jailbreaking from 10% probability to 40-65%.



Many-shot JailbreakingAnil, C., Durmus, E., Sharma, M., Benton, J., Kundu, S., Batson, J., ... & Duvenaud, D. Many-shot Jailbreaking.

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Where will it take us?

It might kill us all!

- Evil actors will use A.I. for evil
- Allows few to control many
- LLM are already smarter than many humans
- Will lead to massive job losses
- A.I. will manipulate humans
- A.I. objectives likely not aligned with ours
- Smart A.I. can create even smarter A.I.

It will be great!!

- AI will amplify human abilities
- If we are smart enough to build it, we can control it
- Many new jobs will be created!
- GPT is nothing special
- A cat is way smarter than any LLM
- LLMs have no real understanding

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Recap

- Interpretability
  - There are many proposed methods for interpretability
  - Need to be careful to ensure that the explanation is correct and not spurious
- Data Privacy
  - Differential privacy
  - Unlearning methods
  - Watermarking
- Legal Issues