


Practical Mostly-Static Information Flow Control


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


Privacy

- Old problem (secrecy, confidentiality) : prevent programs from leaking data
- Untrusted, downloaded code: more important
- Standard security mechanisms not effective (*e.g.*, access control)



Privacy with Mutual Distrust



Static Information Flow

- Denning & Denning '77
- Programs must follow rules
- Annotations added for tractability
- Static analysis = type checking
- Security property composes


$$\boxed{A} + \boxed{B} = \boxed{A|B}$$

Jif Language

- Jif = Java + information flow annotations (Java Information Flow)
- More practical than previous work
 - **Real language**: supports Java features
 - **Convenience**: automatic label inference
 - **Genericity**: label polymorphism
 - **Decentralized declassification** mechanism
 - **Run-time** label checking

Architecture

- Source to source translator (mostly erasure)
- Modification to the **PolyJ** compiler (Java + parametric polymorphism)



Jif Features

- Labeled types
- Convenience: automatic label inference
- Genericity: label polymorphism
- Static, decentralized declassification
- Safe run-time label checking (first-class labels)
- First-class principals
- Object-oriented features
 - Subtyping rules
 - Inheritance
 - Constructors
 - Method constraints
- Exceptions
- Arrays
- Described by formal inference rules

Labeled Types

- Variables, expressions have *labeled type* $T\{L\}$
- Labels express privacy constraints
- L_2 is at least as restrictive as L_1 : $L_1 \sqsubseteq L_2$
- Assignment rule (simplified)

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} v : T\{L_v\} \in A \\ A \vdash E : L_e \\ L_e \sqsubseteq L_v \end{array}}{A \vdash v = E : L_e}$$

Decentralized Label Model

- Label is a set of **policies**
- Each policy is **owner : reader₁, reader₂, ...**
 - owner (principal)
 - set of readers (principals)
{ Bob : Bob, Preparer ; Preparer : Preparer }
- Every owner's policy is obeyed
- Relation \sqsubseteq is pre-order w/lattice properties [ML98]

Implicit Label Polymorphism

- Method signatures contain labeled types

```
float {Bob: Bob} cos (float {Bob: Bob} x) {  
    float {Bob: Bob} y = x - 2*PI*(int)(x/(2*PI));  
    return 1 - y*y/2 + ...;  
}
```

- Omitted argument labels: *implicit label polymorphism*

```
float{x} cos (float x) {  
    float y = x - 2*PI*(int)(x/(2*PI));  
    return 1 - y*y/2 + ...;  
}
```

Explicit Parameterization


```
class Cell[label L] {  
    private Object{L} y;  
    public void store{L} ( Object{L} x ) { y = x; }  
    public Object{L} fetch ( ) { return y; }  
}
```

Cell[Bob: Amy]

- Straightforward analogy with type parameterization
- Allows generic collection classes
- Parameters not represented at run time

Declassification

- A principal can rewrite its part of the label



- Other owners' policies still respected
- Must know authority of running process
- Potentially dangerous: **explicit operation**

$\text{declassify}(E, L)$

Static Authority

- Authority of code is tracked statically

```
class C authority(root) {  
    ...  
}
```

- Authority propagated dynamically:

```
void m(principal p, int {root:} x) where caller(p) {  
    actsFor(p, root) {  
        int{} y = declassify(x, {}) // checked statically  
    } else {  
        // can't declassify x here  
    }  
}
```

Implicit Flows and Exceptions

- Implicit flow: information transferred through control structure
- Static program counter label (pc) that expression label always includes
- Fine-grained exception handling: pc transfers via exceptions, break, continue

$\{b\} \sqsubseteq \{x\}$


```
x = b;
```

```
x = false;  
if (b) {  
    x = true;  
}
```

```
x = false;  
try {  
    if (b) throw new Foo ();  
} catch (Foo f) {  
    x = true;  
}
```

Methods and Implicit Flows

```
class Cell[label L] {  
    private Object{L} y;  
    public void store{L} ( Object{L} x ) { y = x; }  
    public Object{L} fetch ( ) { return y; }  
}
```



- Begin-label constrains calling $\underline{pc} : \underline{pc} \sqsubseteq \{L\}$
- Prevents implicit flow into method
- Omitted begin-label: implicit parameter, prevents mutation

Run-time Labels

- Labels may be first-class values, label other values:

```
final label a = ...;  
int{*a} b;
```

- Run-time label treated statically like label parameter: unknown fixed label
- Exists at run time (Jif.lang.Label)
- `int{*a}` is dependent type

Run-time Label Discrimination

- switch label statement tests a run-time label dynamically:

```
final label a = ... ;  
int{*a} b;  
int { C: D } x;  
switch label(b) {  
  case ( int { C: D } b2 ) x = b2;  
  else throw new BadLabelCast();  
}
```

tests $a \sqsubseteq \{ C : D \}$ at run time

Run-time Labels and Implicit Flows

```
final label{b} a = b ? new label {L1} : new label {L2};
int{*a} dummy;
switch label(dummy) {
  case ({L1}) : x = true;
  case ({L2}) : x = false;
}
```

=

```
x = b;
```

- Proper check is $\{b\} \sqsubseteq \{x\}$
- In case clause, \underline{pc} augmented with label *of* label a (which is $\{b\}$)
- Therefore: $x = \text{true}$ results in proper check

Implementation

- Translates to efficient Java, mostly by erasure
 - Labeled types become unlabeled types
 - Label parameters erased
- First-class label, principal values remain
- switch label, actsFor translated simply

Is it Practical yet?

- Addresses limitations of earlier approaches to checking information flow statically
 - allows run-time checking
 - infers annotations
 - limited declassification mechanism
 - genericity: implicit & explicit polymorphism
- Greater expressiveness and convenience
- Only small programs so far
- Can reuse existing Java code
- Only sequential programs, no timing channels

Related Work

Denning, Denning. CACM 1977

Palsberg, Ørbæk. ISSA 1995

Volpano, Smith, Irvine. JCS 1996

Myers, Liskov. SOSP 1997, IEEE S&P 1998

Heintze, Riecke. POPL 1998

Smith, Volpano. POPL 1998

Abadi, Banerjee, Heintze, Riecke. POPL 1999

Conclusions

- Most practical language yet for static enforcement of privacy
- Promising; more experience needed to understand limitations
- Why not 20 years ago?

Inheritance/Subtyping

- Subclass signature (1) constrained by superclass signature (2)
- Argument, begin-label $a : \{ a_2 \} \sqsubseteq \{ a_1 \}$
- Return value, exception $r : \{ r_1 \} \sqsubseteq \{ r_2 \}$
- Class authority (set of principals) can only increase with inheritance : $A_1 \supseteq A_2$

C_2
↑
 C_1