

# PPay: Micropayments for Peer-to-Peer Systems

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## ABSTRACT

Emerging economic P2P applications share the common need for an efficient, secure payment mechanism. In this paper, we present PPay, a micropayment system that exploits unique characteristics of P2P systems to maximize efficiency while maintaining security properties. We show how the basic PPay protocol far outperforms existing micropayment schemes, while guaranteeing that all coin fraud is detectable, traceable and unprofitable. We also present and analyze several extensions to PPay that further improve efficiency.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems—*Distributed Applications*

## Keywords

Economics, Security, Design, Performance

## General Terms

peer-to-peer, micropayments

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, peer-to-peer (P2P) applications have emerged as a popular way to share huge amounts of data, compute cycles, knowledge/expertise, and other resources. For example, as of April 30 2003, the KaZaA [9] multimedia file sharing application reported over 4.5 million users sharing a total of 7 petabytes of data. The reason P2P systems can achieve such scale is their ability to pool together and harness large amounts of resources at the “edge” of the network (i.e., at the peers), rather than relying on expensive centralized resources.

Recently, the “killer” application of free multimedia file sharing has come under legal fire from the recording industry. As a result, new P2P applications are emerging, such as pay-per-transfer file sharing systems, Grid-style computing

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systems, web service catalogs/service discovery, data storage/archival systems, etc. The goal of these new applications are for the rightful owners of goods or services to be compensated; therefore they all share a common need: an efficient and secure *micropayment* mechanism, by which peers can purchase services from one another.

The problem with most existing micropayment schemes is the heavy load on the trusted, centralized broker. A broker is required to handle accounts, distribute and cash coins, provide security (such as double-spending detection), etc. Although payments need not be online, eventually the broker must take some action for every transaction; as a result, broker load is always  $O(n)$  in the number of transactions. Brokers therefore present a scalability and performance bottleneck for any system using these micropayment schemes.

However, P2P applications have two main characteristics that we can exploit to address the above problem:

- First, peers serve as both *vendors*, who sell goods, and *buyers*, who purchase them. As a result, a *transferable* coin can be used in many transactions before the broker must be involved in cashing it.
- Second, and more importantly, are the massive resources available at the peers themselves. Like other P2P applications, if we can tap into this pool of resources and shed the broker’s load onto the peers, we can build a micropayment scheme with much better scalability and performance properties than existing ones.

The main challenge in exploiting the above two points is to ensure that the *security properties* of the scheme are not compromised. For example, transferable coins delay the detection of coin fraud, and we now want operations normally done by the trusted broker to be performed by untrusted peers.

In this paper, we present PPay<sup>1</sup>, a micropayment scheme that addresses the dual problem of improving performance while maintaining security. PPay only requires broker involvement when peers open or close accounts, for arbitration, and in limited cases, to perform services on behalf of offline peers. We show that under realistic application scenarios, PPay significantly outperforms existing schemes in terms of broker load. At the same time, however, PPay guarantees that all fraud is detectable and traceable. Our contributions are as follows:

- We present (Section 3) the basic PPay protocol for floating, self-managed coins.
- We show (Section 4) how the necessary security properties hold.

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<sup>1</sup>“PPay” is short for *PeerPay*

- We describe (Section 5) several extensions to the basic protocol that greatly improve system performance.
- We present a detailed performance analysis (Section 6), using simulations to (1) show PPay outperforms existing micropayment schemes in our target application scenario (Section 7.1), (2) determine the special cases in which PPay is *not* better, and (3) show how to tune the performance of PPay by setting the appropriate parameter values for our extensions (Section 7.2).

We believe that our performance analysis is unique in this field, where most schemes are proposed and only qualitatively analyzed.

**Preliminaries.** One very important point to keep in mind is that micropayments are payments of a *small amount*. Therefore, (1) utmost security is not required, and (2) the payment mechanism must be lightweight, otherwise the cost of the scheme will outweigh the value of the payment. A real-world analogy to vending machines is illustrative. Because the goods are low-cost, it is not profitable to hire an employee to attend the machine. As a consequence, candy bars may be stolen, or clients may receive low-quality, stale candy. Likewise, most micropayment schemes (all schemes known to the authors) do not guarantee fair exchange of goods and payment. An escrow service (e.g., [8]) would make transactions more expensive than the value of the goods. Therefore, the main disincentive for cheating is that a bad user will be shunned, and will not be able to carry on business in the future.

Furthermore, because payments are offline, coin fraud (e.g., using a counterfeit coin in a vending machine) may not be discovered until after the fact. However, offline payments are preferred from a practical standpoint because they have lower latency, communication costs and computational costs. Naturally, large-scale fraud needs to be detected and punished (discussed in Section 4). On the whole, however, effective micropayment systems simply need “good enough” security where fraud is detectable, traceable and unprofitable, while maintaining high efficiency.

**Notation.** The public key of a node  $N$  is denoted  $PK_N$ , and the secret key  $SK_N$ . A message  $M$  signed by some key  $K$  is denoted as  $\{M\}_K$  (e.g.,  $\{M\}_{SK_N}$ ).

## 2. RELATED WORK

Many micropayment schemes have been proposed in the past, including NetBill [13], DigiCash [4], Millicent [5], and the scheme proposed by Rivest et. al. [14, 11]. Each of the above schemes require  $O(n)$  broker load, where  $n$  is the total number of payments made. In fact, in DigiCash and NetBill, every transaction requires an online broker involvement, which as we noted earlier, has worse performance but better security.

Payword hash chains [14] and electronic lottery tickets [11] greatly reduce the “hidden constant” of this  $O(n)$  cost in the work of Rivest et. al., but we note that both these techniques may also be applied directly to our scheme to reduce peer and broker load (see Sections 5.4 and 7.2.3).

The Millicent scheme also has a very low “hidden constant,” because the broker does not need to perform any signature generations or verifications. As a result of this low security, however, there is no way of proving fraud. Instead, the broker will eject any vendor for which it receives many complaints. The money spent by the broker to pre-purchase that vendor’s scrip will be lost. Furthermore, given the pos-

sibility of malicious peers “framing” a particular user, we prefer a system with stronger security properties.

At first glance, *transferable coins* [1, 3] seem to exploit the first characteristic of P2P systems we mentioned in the previous section. The basic idea behind transferable coins is similar to *layered coins* discussed in Section 5.2. When a user uses a coin for payment, he adds some information to the coin, such as his (possibly disguised/hidden) identity. Most transferable coin schemes have been developed in a macropayment context, and are very heavyweight in order to provide additional security properties such as anonymity and untraceability. In general, anonymity and untraceability are not used for micropayments because the cost outweighs the benefits. However, even a lightweight scheme employing the basic idea of transferable coins has the following properties: (1) the coin grows in size as it is transferred, and (2) double-spending detection is significantly delayed. For the above reasons, in practice, transferable coins must be cashed after they have been used a certain number of times. Even with transferable coins, then, broker load will still be  $O(n)$  in the number of transactions. Furthermore, even if coins could be transferred indefinitely, eventually when the coins are cashed, the broker will receive  $O(n)$  amount of data, because each coin’s size is  $O(n')$  in the number of times it was transferred.

Elements of the PPay protocol are *optimistic*, in that transactions between peers do not involve the broker unless an exception occurs (e.g., a peer dies). Optimistic protocols for fair exchange have been studied in the past (e.g., [2]). Unlike fair exchange, however, a micropayment protocol will always require some broker involvement in non-exception cases (e.g., when the final payment is made); hence, the focus of this work is to minimize broker involvement in non-exception cases.

Finally, MojoNation [12] developed a micropayment system for P2P applications; however, the company has gone out of business, and left no documentation of their scheme. From informal interactions with others knowledgeable about MojoNation, it appears that their system also had broker load that was  $O(n)$  in the number of transactions.

In Section 7.1, we provide a performance comparison between our scheme and the micropayment scheme of [11, 14] in conjunction with transferable coins. For a survey over these and other schemes, please refer to [10].

## 3. PPAY PROTOCOL

In PPay, we present the concept of *floating, self-managed currency* to greatly reduce broker involvement. Floating currency allows digital currency to “float” from one node to another without the involvement of a centralized broker, which is only useful when peers act as both buyers and vendors. However, unlike traditional transferable cash, coins in PPay do not grow in size as they are transferred. We say the currency is “self-managed” because all security related to a coin, except for when the coin is first created or cashed, is managed by the users who “own” the coins. In this way, we harness the resources available at individual peers.

**Basic Implementation.** Self-managed, floating currency is implemented as follows. A user  $U$  purchases digital coins from the broker  $B$ . A *raw coin* from the broker has the following form:

$$C = \{U, sn\}_{SK_B} \quad (1)$$

where  $sn$  is the *serial number* of a coin that uniquely identifies it. User  $U$  is now the *owner* of coin  $C$ .

Now, when  $U$  wishes to buy a service from another user  $V$ , it will send  $V$  the *assigned coin*:

$$A_{UV} = \{V, seq_1, C\}_{SK_U} \quad (2)$$

where  $seq_1$  represents the *sequence number* of the assignment. Each assignment of a coin must have a sequence number that is greater than the sequence number of the previous assignment, if a previous assignment exists (that is, if this assignment is not the first of this coin).  $V$  is now the *holder* of the coin. At any time, a holder may “cash” its assigned coins (or any unused raw coins) at the broker for a flat fee (the fee is meant to deter users from constantly cashing coins, which reduces the benefits of floating currency).

Instead of cashing the assigned coin,  $V$  may instead pay another node  $X$  using the same coin. In the basic case,  $V$  sends the following *reassignment* request to owner  $U$ :

$$R_{UVX} = \{X, A_{UV}\}_{SK_V} \quad (3)$$

When  $U$  receives  $R_{UVX}$ , it keeps a record of the reassignment request in order to later prove that  $V$  “relinquished” the that particular assignment of the coin, in the case of a dispute.

After receiving and processing the reassignment request,  $U$  then sends to  $V$  and  $X$  the new assignment:

$$A_{UX} = \{X, seq_2, C\}_{SK_U} \quad (4)$$

Nodes  $V$  and  $X$  are responsible for verifying that  $seq_2 > seq_1$ . After the new assignment has been issued, the old assignment,  $A_{UV}$ , is no longer valid. In Section 5.2 we discuss the option of *layered* coins, where  $V$  reassigns a coin to  $X$  without going through owner  $U$ . Note that both  $V$  and  $X$  receive the new assignment. That way, if for some reason  $X$  claims to have not received the coin,  $V$  can send its copy to  $X$ . If neither  $V$  nor  $X$  receive the coin, then the scenario is identical to the one in which  $U$  is simply down.

**Downtime Protocol.** Peers must be online to manage their coins. Say a node  $V$  receives a coin owned by  $U$ , and then attempts to spend it at node  $X$ . If  $U$  is unavailable (e.g., due to network partitions or natural downtime of a computer), or if  $U$  is attempting an attack, then it will not reassign the coin.

If the owner of a coin is not online (which the holder should determine via a ping *before* sending the reassignment request), the holder should attempt to make the payment via a coin owned by a different user who is online. In the case where this option is not available, or where the holder already sent the reassignment request but received no response, the holder may have the coin reassigned by the broker. Continuing our example from above, broker  $B$  will generate the newly assigned coin:

$$A_{UX} = \{X, seq_2, C\}_{SK_B} \quad (5)$$

which is identical in content to an assignment issued by owner  $U$ . The broker will then store the reassignment request from  $V$  and send it to owner  $U$  when it comes back online.  $U$  will be responsible for detecting any misconduct while it was down.

In the off chance where both the broker and the owner reassign the coin (e.g., because the holder timed out on waiting for a response from the owner), no damage is done. Both assignments will have the same sequence number and be assigned to the same user; hence they are essentially the same assignment. If the holder tries to reassign the coin to two different users, the owner can detect this misbehavior through the two reassignment requests. Please refer to Section 4 for a detailed security analysis of our protocol.

Broker  $B$  will charge both  $V$  and  $U$  a percentage of the reassigned amount for this service. Both parties must be charged in order to prevent attacks where  $U$  always pretends to be down, or  $V$  pretends  $U$  is down. Note that this extension provides incentives for nodes to remain online, and to minimize the involvement of the broker. It also makes any attack by the owner unprofitable, since the owner will not only be charged a fee, but it will also be unable to reuse the coin for itself.

An alternative to this downtime protocol is for peers to simply print a new coin whenever it does not hold another coin whose owner is alive. What a peer decides to do will depend on how much it is willing to manage another coin, and on what the respective fees are (which the broker controls). Later in Section 7.1 we present a performance analysis of this alternative method of dealing with offline owners. Even if this alternative method is used, however, we still need the downtime protocol to handle the case when the owner does not respond after the reassignment request has already been sent.

**Observations.** First, the broker’s involvement is now limited to  $O(m)$ , where  $m$  is the number of coins issued. Since each coin can be involved in thousands of payments before being cashed,  $m$  may be orders of magnitude lower than  $n$ , the number of payments made. Furthermore, in the “ideal” case where all nodes own the same number of coins, and coins are randomly selected to make payments, the cost per node of handling coin reassignments remains constant, regardless of the number of nodes in the system – i.e., it scales perfectly.

Next, we observe that reassigning a coin is relatively expensive (2 signature generations, 4 signature verifications, and 3 extra network messages). However, here we can directly use existing micropayment techniques originally intended to reduce broker involvement. For example, we can use *electronic lottery tickets* [11] to reduce the number of coin reassignments by a factor of  $s$ , where in practice  $s$  can safely be set to roughly 100. We refer readers to the citation for details.

Third, PPay is offline with respect to the broker, meaning that broker load is conserved. However, because payments must (usually) be online with respect to the coin owner, overall communication cost and latency is higher than with true offline payments. In Section 7.1 we compare the load of peers in PPay with other offline schemes.

Finally, we note that downtimes increase the involvement for the broker, but to a limited degree. As downtimes increase, PPay essentially degenerates into a regular brokered scheme where broker involvement is  $O(n)$  in the number of transactions. In Section 7.1 we show how our scheme maintains good performance, even in the face of many offline peers.

## 4. SECURITY

As with any offline payment system, *coin fraud* is an important issue that must be carefully addressed. Like other micropayment schemes, PPay does not prevent coin fraud at the outset, but instead makes fraud unprofitable. To achieve this goal, we need to ensure that (1) any fraud can be detected and traced back to the misbehaving peer (Section 4.1), and (2) proper punishments are in place (Section 4.2). Note that although a payment scheme can be designed to make fraud impossible (e.g., by making all payments online through the broker), such a scheme would

be very inefficient. Recall that the goal of micropayment schemes is to provide an *efficient* payment mechanism with “good enough” security – i.e., where fraud is unprofitable.

Throughout this discussion, we assume that the broker is trustworthy. For a discussion on why this is a reasonable assumption, please refer to [17].

## 4.1 Detection

To assure that coin owners and holders cannot commit fraud without leaving behind proof of misconduct, the following invariants must hold:

1. If  $H$  is the valid holder of coin  $C$  owned by  $U$ , then  $U$  does *not* have proof that  $H$  has relinquished its valid assignment. Proof of relinquishment is in the form of a signed reassignment request from  $H$  for coin  $C$ , for the specific assignment in question (i.e., with the matching sequence number).
2. The sequence number of each assigned coin is greater than the sequence number of the preceding assignment of the coin.
3. If  $H$  is *not* the valid holder of coin  $C$ , then  $U$  can refute any assignment that  $H$  claims with proof of relinquishment (as defined earlier).

Note that as a consequence of invariant 3, the owner of a coin must keep a full “audit trail” of the coin.

To show that our system can detect and trace various attacks, we must prove the following theorem:

**THEOREM 1.** *The above three invariants hold at all times, for all coins  $C$ .*

For a full proof of the above theorem, we refer readers to our extended report [17]. The proof covers both the *default protocol*, where owners reassign their own coins, and the *downtime protocol*, where owners are offline and the broker must reassign their coins.

**Attack Analysis.** Given that Theorem 1 holds, it is now a simple matter for malicious peers to be detected and identified. Here we enumerate the most common attacks on a micropayment scheme, and show how all instances of the attack can be detected and traced back to the misbehaving peer.

First, the holder of a coin may commit fraud by **replicating** an assigned coin and spending it twice. For example, say owner  $U$  assigns a coin to  $V$ . User  $V$  then reassigns the coin to  $X$ , and then tries to reassign it again to  $Y$ . Given invariant 3, however, owner  $U$  will always be able to refute the second reassignment of coin  $C$ . Note that if owner  $U$  was offline when  $V$  replicated its assignment, then the second, invalid assignment will be retroactively refuted when  $U$  comes back online (details in [17]).

The owner of a coin may commit fraud by wrongfully denying validity of an assignment, or by double-spending a coin (generating two coins with the same serial number). As an example of **wrongful denial**, a peer  $V$  may hold a valid assignment of coin  $C$  owned by peer  $U$ . If  $V$  tries to reassign  $C$ , and  $U$  claims that  $V$ 's assignment is invalid, then  $V$  will lose the value of that coin. By our protocol, wrongful denial is prevented by default, because the burden falls upon the owner to prove that a given assignment is invalid. If an assignment is valid, by invariant 1, no such proof exists.

As an example of **double-spending**, an owner  $U$  may assign a raw coin  $C$  to  $V$ , and then assign the coin to  $X$  as well. The broker evades the double-spending attack by

recording the serial number and owner of each coin that has been cashed, and the holder of the coin who cashed it. If multiple coins with the same owner and serial number are cashed, the broker will ask the owner of the coin to prove the invalidity of one or both of the assignments. If the owner is able to refute an assignment, then the holder of the coin will be punished. If the owner is *not* able to refute either assignment, then the owner will be punished. By invariants 1 and 3, the owner will only be punished if it double-spent the coin.

## 4.2 Punishment and Risk Management

In real life, if a business can be proven to be corrupt, then legal action can be taken. Likewise, because fraud can be exposed with proof, then the broker will be involved in the arbitration. In general, the broker  $B$  will require the misbehaving party to pay for any “fake” coins, as well as a penalty fee for misbehavior. If a node continues to misbehave, the broker may boot the node out of the system (e.g., never allow the node to cash in its coins, and/or inform other users to avoid the node).

Unfortunately, in any offline payment scheme, it is possible that when credit fraud is detected, the cheater is not able or available to make payments. In our system users must provide a valid credit card to the broker when they first join the system, and the broker can charge the penalty fees via this payment channel. However, if a user cheats, immediately closes down his credit card account, and disappears from the system, the broker can no longer charge the penalty fees. In the worst situation, the business owning the broker must settle with the user out-of-system, using the personal information provided when the user first joined the system (e.g., name, address, phone). Fortunately, we believe this type of “cheat and run” attack can be avoided in most or all cases given the following proper disincentives.

First, bear in mind that individual micropayments are worth very little. Hence, if the user cheats with a small number of coins, then the loss to the broker is negligible. To guard against medium to large cheat amounts, the broker may charge a deposit when the user first joins the system. When a user permanently leaves the system, he notifies the broker, who then recalls all coins belonging to that user. After the coins have been recalled and the broker has determined no cases of cheating, the user receives his deposit back, and may cash any coins it is currently holding. If the user cheats and disappears, without going through the formal process of leaving the system, he forfeits his deposit.

It is also possible that a user cheats with an enormous number of coins that a reasonable deposit can not cover. However, such a scenario means that the user must purchase an enormous number of low-value goods (e.g., 100000 web pages), which is not likely or realistic behavior. This observation is in contrast to credit card fraud, where the cheater can select from a huge range of goods that are potentially very expensive. Furthermore, to select and download all these goods will take quite some time. Because the user cheated with an enormous number of coins, there is a greatly increased chance that the user will be caught before he finishes downloading the goods. Finally, the user will always be caught, eventually. Hence, even if the user is able to cheat and disappear before he is caught, he will eventually face a collection agency and bad credit as a consequence. Given these disincentives, then, we believe that large-scale cheating will be very rare or nonexistent.

In terms of a peer's risk, the broker will guarantee refunds

to cheated peers in all cases except large-scale fraud. With large-scale fraud, the broker will provide refunds as far as can be covered by the bad peer’s deposit. The remainder of the fraud amount will be covered if the broker can extract payment from the bad peer through out-of-system means. Individual peers must therefore manage their risk; e.g., by not accepting too many coins from the same user, or by periodically cashing their coins.

## 5. ISSUES AND EXTENSIONS

Here we consider a few issues in the scheme described, and provide extensions that solve or mitigate the problems. For each extension proposed, we also discuss the associated security considerations and risks.

### 5.1 Limit Certificates

Printing raw coins can be expensive for the broker, given that the broker’s load is otherwise very low. Observe that the purpose of a raw coin is to notify other users that the owner  $U$  has purchased this coin; hence, the coin can later be redeemed at the broker. To achieve this same functionality, we can instead have users print their own coins, given proof that the broker has authorized them to do so. When a user  $U$  first joins the network, it obtains a *limit certificate* from the broker that specifies how many coins  $U$  is authorized to print. The certificate has the following format:

$$L = \{U, \text{lim}_l, \text{lim}_u\}_{SK_B} \quad (6)$$

Field  $\text{lim}_l$  denotes the lower bound on the serial number of the coins that  $U$  may print, while  $\text{lim}_u$  denotes the upper bound. User  $U$  will typically need to prepay the value of  $\text{lim}_u - \text{lim}_l + 1$  coins.  $U$  may now print his own “raw coin” with the following format:

$$C' = \{sn, L\}_{SK_U} \quad (7)$$

where it must be the case that  $\text{lim}_l \leq sn \leq \text{lim}_u$ . Any raw coin with a serial number outside of the limits set by the certificate is not valid.

**Security Considerations.** Note that while user  $U$  may print a coin with the same serial number twice, such an action is no different from  $U$  copying and double-spending a raw coin issued by the broker. The security properties of self-printed coins with limit certificates is therefore no different from the security properties of broker-printed raw coins.

### 5.2 Layered Coins

Rather than requiring a node  $V$  to go through owner  $U$  to reassign coin  $C$  to node  $X$ ,  $V$  can instead reassign  $C$  itself by directly sending  $X$  the following message:

$$P_{UVX} = \{X, V, \text{seq}_n, A_{UV}\}_{SK_V} \quad (8)$$

where  $\text{seq}_n$  is greater than the sequence number of  $A_{UV}$ . Similarly,  $X$  can then reassign the coin to some node  $Y$  by adding another “layer” to  $P_{UVX}$ . Each layer of the coin is effectively a reassignment request, and serves as proof of relinquishment. When a node finally does go to  $U$  to have the coin reassigned,  $U$  can obtain all necessary proofs by “peeling” off the layers.

Layered coins are a lightweight implementation of traditional transferable cash, with no anonymity or untraceability properties. Like transferable cash, layered coins grow in size as they are transferred. Unlike transferable cash, however, layered coins in our scheme will eventually be peeled

at a peer, rather than the broker; therefore broker load is significantly lower.

**Security Considerations.** In our extended report [17], we show how Theorem 1 continues to hold in the presence of layers. However, layers may still delay the discovery of fraud. For example, say user  $V$  replicates coin  $C$  belonging to owner  $U$ . If layers are not allowed,  $V$  will be caught as soon as it tries to spend  $C$  the second time. With layers, however,  $V$  can reassign coin  $C$  to two users without  $U$ ’s knowledge. Only after both coins are peeled, can  $U$  pinpoint  $V$  as the misbehaving party. In Section 7.2.1 we study the tradeoff of layered coins between security and efficiency.

### 5.3 Coin renewal

To limit the amount of state each peer must keep (e.g., audit trails, payment history), we can require coins to be *renewed* during a certain time window (e.g., a 30-day window starting at time  $t$ ). After the renewal window closes, the owner of the coin may purge the audit trail of the coin and start the audit trail anew. Further, any payment history involving an expired coin may also be purged. Any coin that has a renewal date in the past is considered invalid. If nodes do not renew their coins, then they forfeit the coins after the renewal window closes. Hence, the renewal window must be large enough such that nodes have a fair chance to renew the coins in their possession.

Just as with reassignment, if  $V$  tries to renew a coin at  $U$  but  $U$  is not alive, then  $V$  may have the coin renewed at broker  $B$ , at a fee for both  $V$  and  $U$ . Alternatively,  $V$  may simply cash the coin if it is about to expire, thereby taking it out of circulation. The decision  $V$  makes will depend on the respective fees charged for renewal and cashing.

Assigned coins now have the following form:

$$A_{UV} = \{V, ts, r_b, r_e, C\}_{SK_U} \quad (9)$$

where  $r_b$  and  $r_e$  designate the begin time and end time of the renewal period, respectively, and  $ts$  is the current timestamp. When  $V$  wants to renew a coin, it sends the following renewal request to  $U$ :

$$N = \{A_{UV}\}_{SK_V} \quad (10)$$

$U$  will then return the assigned coin to  $V$  with a new renewal period specified:

$$A_{UV} = \{V, ts, r'_b, r'_e, C\}_{SK_U} \quad (11)$$

**Security Considerations.** In our extended report [17], we discuss what happens if owner  $U$  tampers with the renewal window (e.g., sets the window to a time in the past) and how a holder  $V$  can easily guard against that attack. We also prove that Theorem 1 continues to hold in the presence of renewals. Here, we briefly discuss how the size of the renewal period affects the worst-case time to detect fraud.

As we mentioned in Section 4.2, we expect large-scale fraud to be rare, and likely to be detected within a short amount of time. However, in the worst case, fraud will not be detected until conflicting coins (i.e., with the same serial number) are cashed, reassigned or renewed at the broker. There are no guarantees as to when a given coin will be cashed or reassigned; however, the coin must be renewed within the renewal period. Hence, the worst-case time to detect any kind of fraud is equal to the renewal period. In practice, we must balance the tradeoff between renewal load and worst-case fraud detection. In Section 7.2.2, we discuss further this tradeoff between security and performance.

## 5.4 Soft Credit Windows

In some systems, payments are not only made for large items, such as downloads, but also for small items, such as forwarding messages or answering queries. Such systems use economic incentives to ensure the proper operation of the P2P infrastructure. Because these “picopayments” may need to be very fast and will occur very frequently, we cannot require a signature generation and verification per payment. Furthermore, because the value of picopayments are very low (fraction of a micropayment), security surrounding them can also be low.

To make payments fast, we observe that in P2P systems, the economic relationship between nodes is often symmetric. For example,  $U$  may provide several services to  $V$ , but later,  $V$  will then provide services to  $U$ .<sup>2</sup> Due to this symmetry, payments between nodes can “cancel” each other out before the exchange of a signed lottery ticket or coin is required.

We take advantage of the above observation by utilizing *soft credit windows*.<sup>3</sup> For each node  $V$  that  $U$  interacts with,  $U$  must keep track of the balance  $M_{UV}$  of “picopayments” it owes that node. The balance begins at 0. Each time  $V$  performs a service for  $U$ ,  $M_{UV}$  is increased. When  $U$  performs a service for  $V$ ,  $M_{UV}$  is decreased. At the same time,  $V$  is maintaining  $M_{VU}$ . Under correct behavior,  $M_{UV} = -M_{VU}$  at all times. Naturally, peers can easily behave incorrectly; we will discuss this problem shortly. When  $M_{UV}$  falls out of the range  $(-x, x)$ , then  $U$  must pay  $V$ , or vice versa. The balances are then reset to 0.

We make several observations about the performance of soft credit windows. First, if  $x$  is large enough to handle the variance in balance, theoretically, two nodes may never need to exchange coins, even if they provide enormous amounts of service for each other. Second, soft credit windows require you keep state per node you interact with, but this per-peer state is very small. Even if each node interacted with a million other peers in the system, total state would be on the order of 6MB of memory (i.e., one integer and one short per node), which is not at all significant on today’s computers. Finally, soft credit windows are very efficient, not only because of the symmetric relationship between nodes, but also because no signature generation/verification is needed. Even if the relationship is totally asymmetric, we can still utilize soft credit windows to decrease the number of signature operations required.

**Security Considerations.** Because soft credit windows do not provide proof that one party is indebted to another, choosing window size  $x$  presents a tradeoff between efficiency and risk. As we observed earlier, large  $x$  may result in super-linear reduction in the number of coin reassignments. However, the larger  $x$  is, the more a peer stands to lose if it is cheated, for example, if the other peer refuses to make a payment when the balance reaches  $x$ . Note that it is possible for  $U$  to believe the balance has exceeded the window, but  $V$  disagrees. If this situation occurs frequently, then  $U$  should learn to avoid  $V$ . However, if the situation occurs

<sup>2</sup>Symmetric behavior may not be seen for large items, e.g., in download patterns. However, if payments are made for small items such as forwarding messages or processing queries, then relationships become much more symmetric.

<sup>3</sup>The authors have been informed that MojoNation [12] used a similar idea, which they called *bilateral accounting*. However, no documentation is available to confirm or cite. Beyond the introduction of this idea, we also discuss risk management for this technique, as well as a performance analysis in Section 7.2.3

infrequently (e.g., due to honest mistakes, lost messages), then the loss of a few picopayments is a very small deal. In Section 7.2.3 we will explore this tradeoff between efficiency and risk as  $x$  varies, and as the number of misbehaving peers in the system varies.

Because potential loss sustained by a peer can be high, we need to investigate ways of bounding this loss. We now present the *NetLossCap* method of managing the risk of credit loss.

Let  $c_{ij}(t)$  denote the credit (in picopayments) peer  $p_j$  owes peer  $p_i$  at time  $t$  ( $c_{ij}(t) = -c_{ji}(t)$ ). Potential *credit loss*  $l_i(t)$  of peer  $p_i$  is defined as  $l_i(t) = \sum_{p_j \in \text{network}} c_{ij}(t)$ . The maximum value of  $c_{ij}(t)$  is  $x$  (the size of the window), hence maximum possible loss  $l_i(t)$  is  $x \cdot \|\text{network}\|$ . Loss is implicitly potential until a peer permanently leaves the system.

In the *NetLossCap* method, peers set a *cap value*  $v$  that limits credit loss  $l_i$  at any point in time. If  $l_i(t) = v$  and a peer  $p_j$  wishes to extend its credit at  $p_i$ ,  $p_i$  will refuse. Instead, in order to receive service,  $p_j$  will need to pay  $p_i$  a coin. In paying this coin,  $p_j$  is essentially extending  $p_i$   $x$  picopayment credits (since a coin is worth one window’s worth of picopayments). Loss  $l_i(t)$  is thus decreased by  $x$ , and  $p_j$  can now receive service at  $p_i$ .

Note that when  $p_j$  pays  $p_i$  the coin, other requirements should not be broken. In particular, if  $l_j(t) > v - x$  prior to the coin payment, then  $p_j$  cannot pay  $p_i$  – otherwise  $l_j(t)$  will go over the cap value. In addition,  $p_j$  cannot pay  $p_i$  if  $c_{ij}(t) > 0$  prior to the coin payment, otherwise  $c_{ij}(t) + x$  will fall out of the credit window. No exchange of credit and service will occur unless  $p_j$  can afford to make the payment without unnecessarily affecting its own risk. In Section 7.2.3, we investigate the impact of *NetLossCap* on system performance and risk.

**Hash Chains.** An existing, popular way to make fast, small payments are Payword hash chains [14]. For readers not familiar with hash chains, a longer discussion of the statements made in this section can be found in [17].

Unlike soft credit windows, hash chains present no credit loss risk to peers, assuming broker functionality is extended to honor partial hash chains. However, maintaining hash chains has high state overhead. In a system with a million peers and hash chains of length 100, over 4GB of state per peer must be maintained. Furthermore, because hash chains can only express an *increasing* amount of credit (as opposed to both increasing and decreasing, like soft credit windows), they can not take advantage of the symmetric relationship between peers. If users  $A$  and  $B$  exchange an infinite but balanced number of picopayments, they will need to exchange an infinite number of coins, rather than zero coins. In Section 7.2.3 we compare the performance of hash chains and soft credit windows.

## 6. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

In the previous three sections we have provided a formal description of the PPay micropayment scheme. Now, we wish to use simulations to answer the following important questions: (1) Is PPay feasible in terms of broker load, peer load, and the amount of state needed to implement our security features? (2) How does PPay perform relative to other schemes? What usage scenarios produce best or worst case behavior? (3) How should we tune parameter values (such as credit window size) for best performance?

We evaluate PPay in the context of a file-sharing system using the GUESS protocol [7] to discover files. GUESS

Name	Default	Description
Network Size	1000	Number of peers in the network
Cache Size	100	Size of each peer’s pong cache
Query Rate	9.26 .10 <sup>-3</sup>	The expected number of queries per user per second
Lifespan Multiplier	1	Multiplier used to extend the period of time peers remain online
Downtime Multiplier	1	Multiplier used to extend the period of time peers remain offline
Credit Window Size	10	Size of a soft credit window or hash chain
Credit Window Type	Payword	The type of credit window used (Payword, soft credit windows)
Max Layers	2	Maximum number of layers allowed on a coin before it must be peeled
Renewal Wait	30 days	Elapsed time between audit trail purges for a given coin
Scheme	PPay	The micropayment scheme used (PPay, PPay*, or RM)
Net Loss Cap	∞	Maximum allowed net loss per peer due to soft credit windows

**Table 1: System and Micropayment parameters**

is a new protocol from the Gnutella Development Forum (GDF) aimed at addressing performance and security issues in Gnutella [6] – the largest open P2P system in operation today. In brief, under the GUESS protocol each peer keeps a “pong cache”, which is a list of IP addresses of other peers in the system. When a peer has a query, it “probes” the peers in its pong cache with the query message, one by one, until a match is found. There are many policies by which peers can order their probes; for simplicity, we assume that the order is random.

One problem with the current GUESS protocol is that it does not provide the proper incentives for peers to cooperate – peers can easily cheat the system by sending out its probes all at once. This behavior incurs a much higher load on other peers, while drastically improving the response time of the search for the querying peer. If all peers act according to their best interests, the system might fail as if under a denial of service (DoS) attack. In order for GUESS to work, there must be a way to give peers an incentive to adhere to the protocol. One straightforward proposal is to have peers pay for each probe. Peers will then be motivated to probe as few peers as possible to answer their queries. In our evaluation, we use the PPay micropayment system to implement this incentive mechanism. In particular, peers will make one picopayment per probe. Coin payments are then made as credit windows are filled.

## 6.1 Metrics

Performance of a micropayment scheme is measured primarily by *load*. Load is defined as the amount of work an entity must do per unit time. Load is measured along three resource types: *incoming bandwidth*, *outgoing bandwidth*, and *processing cost*. Bandwidth is measured in bits per second (bps). Processing cost is conceptually measured in cycles per second (Hz), although we actually measure costs in coarse units before converting them to approximate cycles (described further below). We look at load from two perspectives: the broker, and the peers. Recall that our goal is not overall efficiency, but broker efficiency. At the same time, however, we want to ensure that peer loads are reasonable.

In addition to load, we also look at *state*, and *credit loss*. State is simply the number of “proofs” (i.e., reassignments

or renewals) that an entity must store. Because the amount of state varies over time, we will be measuring the average state over time.

## 6.2 Parameters

We will be comparing the performance of different *configurations* of PPay, where a configuration is defined by a set of system and micropayment parameters, listed in Table 1. Most system parameters will remain unchanged in our experiments, as they do not qualitatively affect the results. We will describe these and other parameters in further detail as they appear later in the section. In our experiments, unless otherwise specified, the default parameter values are used.

Note that **Network Size** = 1000 is a modest number of peers, compared to the scale of an actual P2P application. We had to limit network size because of the length of our simulations. However, most results shown in Section 7 should be a good qualitative representation of any network size, because PPay is scalable. For peer loads, although application-level purchases grows with the number of peers in the system, so does the number of peers that manage coins. In fact, peer load *decreases* as network size increases because more payments are absorbed by the greater total amount of picopayment credit (recall that maximum possible credit is equal to the network size times the size of the credit window). Broker load scales sublinearly with network size for the same reason. The only potentially unscalable result the *NetLossCap* method for bounding credit loss, and we discuss this issue in Section 7.2.3. Please refer to [17] for figures showing the above scalability results.

## 6.3 Simulation Framework

In a given simulation run, we simulate **Network Size** peers participating in the GUESS protocol. At the beginning of the simulation, peers begin with a limit certificate but no printed coins (e.g., as if the peers just joined the network). Over time peers print new coins as they are needed. We assume the limit certificate is large enough to handle each peer’s needs for the duration of the simulation, which is 40 simulated days. Throughout the simulation, peers may go offline and come back online. The duration of these online and offline periods follow the distribution of lifespans and downtimes measured by [15] over the Gnutella network. We may tune online or offline times via the **Lifespan Multiplier** and **Downtime Multiplier** parameters, respectively. If **Lifespan Multiplier** =  $x$ , then all values in the measured distribution of lifetimes are multiplied by  $x$ . At the end of the simulation, we assume that all peers leave the system and cash in their coins. Doing so is a worst-case scenario for our scheme since in practice, the existing coins can continue to “float” before they are cashed.

The “arrival” of queries at each peer follows a Poisson process with rate **Query Rate**. When a peer has a query, it will sequentially probe the peers in its pong cache, which is of size **Pong Cache Size**. Peers in the cache may be offline, and the querier need only pay peers that are online. To determine whether a peer returns a result for a query, we use the query model developed in [16]. Though this query model was developed for hybrid file-sharing systems, it is still applicable to the file-sharing systems we are studying. The probability of a peer returning a result depends partially on the number of files owned by that peer; number of files owned by peers are assigned according to the distribution of files measured by [15] over Gnutella. If a peer returns a result to the querier, then the query is stopped. Otherwise,

the queryer will probe every live node in its cache before stopping the query.

When a peer makes a payment, it will first try to pay with a coin for which the owner is online. If the peer has no such coin, it will attempt to pay with a coin via layers. If all its coins already contain the maximum number of layers, the peer may reassign a coin through the broker, or print its own coin if it has a valid limit certificate (in Section 7.1 we compare these two alternatives). Within each class of coin (e.g., the class of coins whose owners are alive), the peer may often choose among several coins in its possession. The order in which coins are selected may have security and performance implications; for example, a peer  $V$  may choose a coin owned by another peer  $U$ , if  $V$  already holds many coins belonging to  $U$ . This policy decreases  $V$ 's risk if  $U$  commits large-scale fraud. While the ordering of coins is an interesting question, in our simulations coins within a class are accessed through a queue.

**Action Costs.** Our simulations tell us how many “macro actions” each entity must execute, such as signature generations, message transfers, etc. In order to calculate load, we now need to calculate the cost of these actions, measured in bytes for bandwidth, and cycles for processing. Due to space limitations, details on how these costs are determined can be found in our extended report [17].

## 7. RESULTS

In this section we present and discuss the results of our simulations. We divide the results into two sections, corresponding to the two main questions that we wish to investigate: (1) The performance of the PPay micropayment scheme relative to other schemes, and (2) the tradeoffs involved in setting micropayment parameter values.<sup>4</sup>

### 7.1 Comparison with Existing Schemes

We compare PPay against the micropayment scheme proposed by Rivest et. al. in [11, 14] (the *RM* scheme). We choose the RM scheme among many possible existing schemes because it is the most recent research in the area known to the authors. In this scheme, users print tokens (like coins) to give to vendors as payment. Vendors then give these coins to the broker to redeem. In fact, the RM scheme is a special case of our scheme in which peers immediately<sup>5</sup> cash every coin they receive. On top of RM, Payword hash chains are used to delay the payment of a coin, as discussed in Section 5.4. We also allow the use of layered, transferable coins. The maximum number of layers allowed before a coin must be cashed is set by **Max Layers**.

We compare the RM scheme to two variants of PPay. By default, we assume peers prefer printing a new coin over using the downtime protocol. If a peer must make a payment, and it does not possess any coins whose owners are alive or that can be layered, the peer will print a new coin. In the second variant, which we call “PPay\*”, peers prefer using the downtime protocol over printing a new coin. Likewise for renewals, in the first variant peers prefer to cash a coin

<sup>4</sup>Due to space limitations, we report all load results in terms of processing cost. Bandwidth results can be omitted because in all our experiments, either behavior is comparable to processing cost results, and/or the absolute bandwidth costs are very low, making them insignificant relative to processing costs.

<sup>5</sup>By immediate, we mean that the coin is not reassigned to a different user before it is cashed.

that is about to expire, rather than have it renewed through the broker; in PPay\*, the preference is switched. While the first variant conserves broker load in terms of renewals and reassignments, it also causes more coins to be printed, which must eventually be cashed. In our performance studies, we want to see whether this tradeoff is worthwhile.

Figure 1 shows us the broker’s load (work per unit time) in the three micropayment schemes in terms of processing cost, as **Downtime Multiplier** is varied. Bars are labeled below according to **Downtime Multiplier** value, and shade indicates the micropayment scheme. For now, let us focus on **Downtime Multiplier** = 1, the default case.

We see from Figure 1 that PPay and PPay\* perform significantly better than RM. While the broker must cash  $O(n)$  coins in RM, where  $n$  is the number of transactions, it must only cash  $O(m)$  coins in PPay and PPay\*, where  $m$  is the number of coins. Therefore, in this simulation RM broker load ( $40.6 \cdot 10^5$  Hz) is over 12 times heavier than in PPay\* ( $3.46 \cdot 10^5$  Hz), and over 20 times heavier than in PPay ( $1.98 \cdot 10^5$  Hz).

At the same time, PPay outperforms PPay\* because the broker no longer needs to reassign or renew any coins. Instead, for each reassignment/renewal the broker used to do in PPay\* (which constituted about 43% of broker load), it now has to cash at most one new coin. Since cashing (1 verification) is substantially less expensive than reassignment or renewal (1 verification + 1 generation), broker load is likewise less expensive. The price of PPay falls onto the peer (discussed later), rather than the broker, which is a desirable tradeoff from our perspective. From Figure 1, then, we can conclude that floating, self-managed coins are crucial to minimizing broker performance in a P2P application.


Recall that the distributions of online and offline periods are measured directly from the Gnutella network. Therefore, these distributions reflect the instability of peers, and their tendency to come online for short periods of time.<sup>6</sup> Despite peer instability, PPay and PPay\* continue to perform well. One interesting question is how far can we “push” the instability of peers before the broker in PPay becomes overloaded.

Let us look again at Figure 1. In general, overall application-level activity decreases in absolute value as offline periods increase in duration (i.e., **Downtime Multiplier** increases), because there are fewer peers online performing queries. At **Downtime Multiplier** = 20, only 3% of all peers are online at any given time, on average. We believe this scenario is very extreme, yet PPay continues to far outperform RM. At **Downtime Multiplier** = 20, broker load in RM ( $2.94 \cdot 10^5$  Hz) is over 7 times heavier than load in PPay ( $.41 \cdot 10^5$  Hz). However, broker load in PPay\* actually *increases* as application-level activity decreases, because the number of reassignments and renewals that must go through the broker increases. At **Downtime Multiplier** = 20, 89% of broker load in PPay\* ( $3.59 \cdot 10^5$  MHz) consists of reassignment load. As a result, PPay\* has the highest load of all.


While we have achieved our goal of significantly reducing broker load, we still need to make sure that peer load does not suffer. Figure 2 is just like Figure 1, except that it shows

<sup>6</sup>These distributions do *not* reflect the case where some peers may log on, log off, and then never come back to the network again. In our simulations, we assume that even though peers are online for short periods of time, they will always come back at some (possibly distant) time in the future. This assumption is reasonable in a system where peers have an incentive to come back (i.e., to make money).






**Figure 1: Comparison of broker processing loads in PPay vs. RM as Downtime Multiplier varies**



**Figure 2: Comparison of peer processing loads in PPay vs. RM as Downtime Multiplier varies**



**Figure 3: Broker load is barely affected by Max Layers**

average peer load, rather than broker load. In this figure, we see that peers in PPay do have higher load than peers in PPay\*, but only slightly. As we mentioned earlier, peers in PPay will need to manage more coins than in PPay\*. The cost of managing these coins comes from reassignments and renewals. However, note that since the number of reassignments is not affected by the number of coins in circulation, having more coins does not necessarily mean that reassignment load will be higher. Furthermore, renewals only constitute about 6% of total peer load in PPay, which is higher than it is in PPay\*, but still not a significant cost. As a result, PPay has peer load that is comparable to PPay\*.

Also in Figure 2, we see that peers in PPay and PPay\* have processing load that is roughly 50% higher than peer loads in RM. Peer bandwidth load (not shown) is 25-35% heavier than in RM. While the increase in peer load is non-trivial, we believe it is a desirable tradeoff with broker load for two reasons. First, the absolute value of peer loads are small; users probably would not notice the extra load. Second, although the absolute values of broker load shown in these experiments are not much higher than peer loads, recall from Section 6.2 that peer load *decreases* slightly as the number of peers grows, while broker load *increases* (sublinearly). When network size grows, for example, to 1 million, broker load will be much higher than peer load. Therefore, from a scalability viewpoint, it is most important for broker load to be minimized.

Because PPay outperforms PPay\* in all the scenarios we studied, in terms of broker load, we will only present results for PPay from this point on. PPay has also outperformed RM in the experiments we have looked at thus far, but there are specific scenarios in which RM outperforms PPay. In particular, the worst-case scenario for PPay is the extreme case in which each coin is used exactly once before being cashed. Even in this scenario, however, broker load is comparable in both micropayment schemes: bandwidth load is 35% higher in PPay, and processing load just 6.6% higher. Further details are given in our extended report [17].

## 7.2 Setting Micropayment Parameters

### 7.2.1 Layers

Figure 3 shows us broker processing load as the maximum number of allowed layers on a coin (**Max Layers**) is varied. In this figure, **Downtime Multiplier** = 20, because the more peers that are offline, the more impact layers will have on


performance. As we can see, broker performance varies very little as **Max Layers** increases. We initially found this result quite surprising. Because coin owners are often down when a payment must be made (with almost 97% probability, on average), we would have expected layers to be very useful in avoiding the need to print new coins. However, recall that new coins are printed in two payment scenarios: (1) when the peer has no coins, and (2) when a peer has coins but the owners are offline, and layers cannot be used (e.g., because the maximum number of layers has been reached). It turns out that printing more coins in scenario 2 results in printing fewer coins in scenario 1, such that the total number of coins printed is not largely affected by layers. Because layers have so little impact on broker performance (nor peer performance), and since layers do delay the detection of fraud, we recommend that very low values for **Max Layers** (e.g., 0 or 1).

### 7.2.2 Coin Renewal


The **Renewal Wait** parameter specifies the system-wide renewal period for a coin. Renewals present a tradeoff between performance and security, and state management as well. As discussed in Section 5.3, the renewal period determines the worst-case time to fraud detection. Therefore, the closer together renewals are, the tighter the bound. State also decreases, because audit trails are purged after each renewal period. However, load increases, since each renewal is fairly expensive.

In our implementation, we assume that that coins are renewed every **Renewal Wait** =  $w$  days, and that the renewal window is also  $w$  days long. That is, if the renewal begin-time of an assignment is  $r_b$ , then after a renewal, the new renewal begin-time is  $r_b + w$ , and the renewal end-time is  $r_b + 2 \cdot w$ .


Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the tradeoff between peer load and state as **Renewal Wait** is varied. Figure 4 shows peer processing load divided into four main tasks: GUESS-related work (e.g., processing queries), reassignments, renewals, and miscellaneous (e.g., cashing coins). As we can see, renewals take up a non-trivial fraction of peer load, ranging from 20% at **Renewal Wait** = 10 days to 6% at **Renewal Wait** = 30 days. However, Figure 5 shows us that although **Renewal Wait** does have an impact on the amount of state a peer must store, this impact is limited. Therefore, the more important tradeoff is between performance and security. In terms of broker load, **Renewal Wait** has very little effect, since the



**Figure 4: Peer load decreases as renewal period increases**



**Figure 5: Peer storage (average number of proofs stored over time) increases as renewal period increases**



**Figure 6: Soft credit windows have better broker load by accounting for symmetric peer relationships**

number of coins printed due to payment is far higher than the number of coins printed due to expired coins. Therefore, since broker load is unaffected and peer load is scalable, we recommend a relatively low **Renewal Wait**, such as 10 days in our application scenario. Note that the renewal period should not be too low (e.g., 1 day), otherwise peers may not have a chance to renew their coins due to downtimes.

We note that in Figure 4, for peer loads, the overhead of PPay relative to the load of the application (GUESS) is very high - about 18 times higher. However, this comparison is skewed, as GUESS is not processing-intensive. In terms of bandwidth, the overhead of PPay is just 4% of the GUESS load. Furthermore, if we set **Credit Window Size** to 100 (default is 10), then even the processing overhead of PPay is just 13%, and the bandwidth overhead just .03%. In both processing and bandwidth cost, absolute overhead is always very low; therefore we do not believe the overhead of PPay for peers to be a significant issue.

### 7.2.3 Credit Windows

Figure 6 shows the processing load of the broker as **Credit Window Size** is varied, for both Payword hash chains (Payword) and soft credit windows (SWC). We immediately observe that credit window size greatly affects broker load - large credit window is crucial for good broker performance.

As we discussed in Section 5.4, Payword cannot take advantage of the “back and forth” symmetry of peer relationships. Soft credit windows, on the other hand, are designed to take this symmetry into account. In Figure 6, we see that soft credit windows consistently outperform Payword for this reason: broker load with Payword ranges from being over 40% heavier at **Credit Window Size**=10, to almost 3 times heavier at **Credit Window Size** = 100. Furthermore, peer load shows an even greater performance benefit with soft credit windows. Figure 7 shows peer load as a function of window size, in terms of processing cost. Here, we see how Payword loads range from 17 times heavier (at a window size of 10) to over 38 times heavier (at a window size of 100)! Clearly, then, exploiting the symmetry of peer relationships is very beneficial to performance of both the broker and peers.

**NetLossCap.** Figures 6 and 7 show us the benefits of soft credit windows when no credit loss cap is applied. However, as we discussed in Section 5.4, in practice we need to bound the risk taken by peers using the *NetLossCap* method. Be-

fore discussing *NetLossCap*, let us define how a misbehaving peer might take advantage of soft credit windows.


We assume that the goal of a misbehaving peer is to receive the best quality service possible while spending no money. In other words, rather than being *malicious*, the peer is *lazy*. A lazy peer  $p_j$  will never pay a coin for service. Instead, it will only probe a peer  $p_i$  if  $c_{ij} < x$ , where  $x$  is the size of the credit window. Because a lazy peer  $p_j$  still wants to receive service, it will not lie about its view of  $c_{ij}$ , since that will cause peer  $p_i$  to shun it. Furthermore, the lazy peer is willing to provide service to other nodes, since it can potentially make money by doing so, and because it will at least receive credits to redeem for service in the future. For this same reason, then, the lazy node will not lie about its cap value (e.g., will not refuse service to another peer by claiming that  $l_j = v$ ).

Now, let us see how effective *NetLossCap* is as **Credit Window Size** and **Percent Lazy Node** (the percentage of peers in the network that are lazy) vary. Recall that we assume all peers permanently leave the system at the end of the simulation. Credit loss for a peer  $p_i$  in the following figures therefore reflect  $l_i(40 \text{ days})$ .


First, Figure 8 shows us the mean and maximum credit losses of non-lazy peers in our simulation, when *NetLossCap* is not used. Along the x-axis we vary credit window size, while the different curves show different values of **Percent Lazy Node**. For example, when **Credit Window Size** = 100 when there are no lazy peers, the largest value of  $l_i(40 \text{ days})$  observed for some peer  $p_i$  is roughly 12000 picopayments. This worst-case observed value is rare, however; 90% of all  $l_i(40 \text{ days})$  values are under 4000, while the average value of  $l_i(40 \text{ days})$  is 0.

We make several observations. First, the percentage of lazy peers in the system does not seem to greatly affect the risk of non-lazy peers. The reasons for this are that (1) credit risk is already very high, with no lazy peers, and (2) lazy peers are not cheating, per se - they are simply acting conservatively. Cheating peers will eventually be cut off from the rest of the system; hence, lazy/cheating peers do not pose a significant additional risk to the existing credit risk of an honest peer. Second, soft credit window size greatly affects potential credit loss. The need for a way to bound credit loss is clear, if we are going to reap the benefits of large credit windows.


When we apply the *NetLossCap* method with a cap value



**Figure 7:** Soft credit windows have better broker load by accounting for symmetric peer relationships



**Figure 8:** Maximum credit loss increases as credit window size increases



**Figure 9:** Broker load as the credit loss cap value varies

of  $v$ , the maximum observed credit loss is always  $v$ , regardless of credit window size. As an example, when window size is 100 and  $v = 500$ , maximum credit loss is 500, as opposed to 12000 when there is no cap. However, we need to be sure that using *NetLossCap* does not significantly affect performance – otherwise, hash chains may be a better alternative than soft credit windows.

Figure 9 shows us broker processing load as cap value and credit window size are varied. Window size is varied along the x-axis, and different curves represent different cap values. Although the lines may be difficult to distinguish, the basic shape of the curves tells us what we need to know. First, the choice of **Credit Window Size** is still very important in tuning performance, for all cap values shown. Second, assuming the cap value is not too small, cap values do not significantly degrade performance. Although this result may be surprising at first, the cause goes back to the law of large numbers. Even though credit between pairs of peers may be imbalanced (e.g.,  $c_{ij} = 100$  and  $c_{ik} = -100$ ), the sum of these individual credits,  $l_i$ , will fall closer to the expected value, which is 0. Finally, we found (not shown here) that the quality of service received by each peer is not affected by *NetLossCap*, for the cap values studied. Hence, *in the given simulation scenario*, the *NetLossCap* method is very effective in limiting risk while maintaining good performance.

However, we note that the *NetLossCap* method is not necessarily scalable. As the number of peers in the system increase, if we assume that all users interact with all other peers, then the cap value must also increase proportionally. However, if the number of peers with which a given peer interacts does *not* grow with the size of the network, which may be reasonable in many situations (e.g., peers only interact with neighbors), then *NetLossCap* *does* scale. In either case, important future work lies in designing a quick payment mechanism that can take into account symmetric peer relationships, but can also provide proof of the credit balance to the broker.

## 8. CONCLUSION

Business-oriented P2P applications hold great potential for the future. Before such applications can take off, however, there must be an efficient way for peers to pay each other for services. In this paper, we present PPay, an efficient micropayment scheme designed for P2P applications.

By identifying and exploiting characteristics unique to P2P applications, PPay can significantly outperform existing schemes in terms of broker load, while maintaining a reasonable peer load. We present a detailed performance analysis over a sample P2P application to support our claims, and to illustrate how PPay can be tuned for best performance.

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