

CS514: Intermediate Course in Operating Systems


Professor Ken Birman Vivek Vishnumurthy: TA


Peer-to-Peer (p2p) Systems


- The term refers to a kind of distributed computing system in which the "main" service is provided by having the client systems talk directly to one-another
- In contrast, traditional systems are structured with servers at the core and clients around the edges







































What problems are "fundamental"?


- If we assume clients serve up the same stuff people download, the number of sources for a <u>less popular item</u> will be very small
- Under assumption that churn is a constant, these less popular items will generally not be accessible.
- But experiments show that clients fall into two categories:
 - Well-connected clients that hang around
 - Poorly-connected clients that also churn
 - ... this confuses the question


What problems are fundamental?


- One can have, some claim, as many electronic personas as one has the time and energy to create. *Judith S. Donath.*
- So-called "Sybil attack...."
 - Attacker buys a high performance computer cluster
- It registers *many times* with Napster using a variety of IP addresses (maybe 10's of thousands of times)
 Thinking these are real, Napster lists them in download
 - pages. Real clients get poor service or even get snared
 Studies show that no p2p system can easily defend against Sybil attacks!


Early Napster just listed anything. Later: Enhanced directory servers to probe clients, track their health. Uses an automated reporting of download problems to trim "bad sources" from list Ranks data sources to preferentially list clients who... Have been up for a long time, and Seem to have fast connections, and Appear to be "close" to the client doing the download (uses notion of "Internet distance") Implement parallel downloads and even an experimental method for doing "striped" downloads (first block from source A, second from Source B, third from C, etc) Leverages asymmetric download/uplink speeds





















- Universities were first to view p2p as an interesting research area
 - CAN: "Content addressable network" proposed by Berkeley
 - Chord: MIT "distributed hash table"
- Both systems separate the "indexing" problem from actual storage











DHTs: Area quickly took off

- Can, Chord: DHTs, already mentioned
- Pastry: From Rice and MSR, uses "Plaxton trees" (a kind of lookup tree)
- Tapestry: Berkeley (similar to Pastry)
- Kelips, Beehive: Cornell (use replication to get much faster responses)

... and too many more to list!



Are there legitimate uses of p2p file systems? • One thought: corporations might want to index "everything in their file store" or to archive stuff • Digital libraries might use p2p to avoid keeping extra copies of special or extremely big objects • Risk of "bit rot" is a big concern • Suppose some huge set of PCs collaborates to preserve important documents • Might also encrypt them – various options exist... • How many replicas needed to avoid risk that "rare events" will destroy all copies simultaneously? • A topic of study in Oceanstore and at UCSD


Are there legitimate uses of p2p file systems?


- p2p could be a great way to legally share information within a team of collaborators at work, or some other "interest group"
 - Think of these as little groups superimposed on a massive p2p network using the same technology
 - Idea would be: "We help each other out"
 Some argue that p2p systems could be value
- Some argue that p2p systems could be valuable in resisting repressive political regimes
- Like "coffee house" meetings in pre-revolutionary Russia
 Can repressive regimes survive if they can't control the flow of information?


Spyware: The real thing Imagine a *popular* p2p system that Encrypts content: need key to make sense of it Achieves a high degree of anonymity Pretty much everyone helps to serve each request, but nobody actually has a copy of the whole file on their drive – e.g. I have a few bits, you have a few bits Real sources and nodes accessing content concealed from intruders Robust against disruptive attack Needs to be popular: Spies hide in crowds




P2p outside of file sharing Key idea was that p2p systems could "gossip" about replicated data Now and then, each node picks some "peer" (at random, more or less) Sends it a snapshot of its own data Called "push gossip" Or asks for a snapshot of the peer's data "Pull" gossip Or both: a push-pull interaction









Uses of gossip epidemics

- To robustly multicast data
 - Slow, but very sure of getting through
- To repair inconsistency in replicas
- To support "all to all" monitoring and distributed management
- For distributed data mining and discovery

A contemporary perspective p2p computing has many pros and many cons, and for most purposes the cons outweigh the pros A "hard to control" technology Firewalls cause many annoyances Rather slow to propagate updates But at the same time

Incredibly robust against disruption

Contemporary response? So... use p2p techniques, but mostly In data centers or LANs where there are no firewalls In uses where slow update times aren't an issue Often means that we need to marry p2p mechanism to a more "urgent" protocol like our multicast protocols

